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          FROM OTTOMAN IMPERIAL WORLDVIEW TO TURKISH NATIONAL              
                   OUTLOOK: THE LATE OTTOMAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE 
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                                Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Cemil Koçak 
 
             19
th
 Century Ottoman Empire, Diplomatic History, Bureaucracy,  
                                      Nationalism, Elite Formation  
 
 
This study investigates the cultural, intellectual, and ideological formations of the Ottoman 
diplomatic service in the late Ottoman Empire with an emphasis on the Hamidian era. The study 
attempts to describe the basic contours and premises of the culture of the late Ottoman 
bureaucracy as well as the social origins of the late Ottoman state elite by examining the 
diplomatic service as a microcosm of the late Ottoman bureaucratic elite. Examining the 
dispatches sent from the Ottoman legations abroad as well as the memoirs and books written by 
diplomats, the study attempts to overview the concerns and dispositions of the diplomats. The 
study also aims to highlight the prominent role the late Ottoman bureaucratic establishment 
played in the development of the modern Turkish national identity and Turkish nationalism, as 
well as the ideological premises of the republic.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
 
 
 
                                                       ÖZET 
 
   OSMANLI EMPERYAL DÜNYAGÖRÜŞÜNDEN TÜRK ÇEHRESİNE :  
                                                                  GEÇ DÖNEM OSMANLI HARİCİYESİ 
 
 
 
                                                       Doğan Gürpınar 
 
                                                       Tarih doktorası 
 
                                             Danışman: Prof. Dr. Cemil Koçak 
 
                      19. yy. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Diplomatik Tarih, Bürokrasi,                                    
                                              Milliyetçilik, Elit Oluşumları 
                  
Bu çalışma Abdülhamid dönemine yoğunlaşarak, geç dönem Osmanlı hariciyesinin kültürel, 
entelektüel ve ideolojik donanımlarını incelemektedir. Çalışma, Osmanlı hariciyesini Osmanlı 
bürokratik elitinin küçük bir örneklemi olarak ele alarak, geç Osmanlı bürokratik kültürünün 
niteliklerini ve bu elitinin sosyal kökenlerini tanımlamaya çalışmaktadır. Çalışma yurtdışı 
Osmanlı temsilciliklerinden yapılan yazışmalara ve diplomatlarca yazılmış hatırat ve kitaplara 
dayanarak diplomatların temel kaygı ve duyarlılıklarını ortaya koymaya çalışmaktadır. Çalışma, 
aynı zamanda Osmanlı bürokratik elitinin Türk ulusal kimliğinin, milliyetçiliğinin ve 
cumhuriyetin ideolojik dayanaklarının oluşumundaki kayda değer rolünü ortaya sermeyi 
amaçlamaktadır.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
      This study is a modest attempt to examine the mental structures of the late Ottoman 
bureaucracy. It examines the intellectual/cultural/ideological formations of the Hamidian 
diplomatic service. The diplomatic service is selected as representative of the late Ottoman 
bureaucracy since it reflected the distinctive habitus and culture of the late Ottoman 
bureaucracy at its best with its elitist and exclusivist character. Although one of the 
motivations of the dissertation is to show the significance and extent of the ideological and 
cultural formations of the diplomatic service (and the entire Ottoman political 
establishment beginning with Abdülhamid himself) in the formulation of foreign policy 
orientations, the primary aim of this study is to investigate the emergence of a bureaucratic 
nationalism wielded around the Empire and to expose the imperial origins of Turkish 
Republican nationalism. Arguing that the Hamidian (as well as the Tanzimat) bureaucratic 
establishment was constitutive in the making of Turkish nationalism, I attempt to 
demonstrate that the Turkish nation was imagined and formulated by a certain state elite 
which defined the Turkish nation in its relation to the state, which claimed to represent the 
nation in itself.  This Turkish nation was defined in a subservient relation to the eternal and 
transcendental state and the idea of the Empire. However, the same state was 
simultaneously intimitized by the state elite, given that the state was imagined and 
constructed with reference to a certain habitus, identity, and culture espoused by this elite. 
The study especially emphasizes that the state was not perceived as transcendent, but on 
the contrary familiarized by the Turkish state elite. The particular concerns of this state 
elite were projected to the imagined ―Turkish nation‖. I also elaborate on the continuities 
of the perceptions of the institutional culture of the Ottoman Foreign Office and its legacy 
in the Republican Foreign Office. Evidently, most of its peculiarities and its distinct social 
culturalization were retained and reproduced in the transition to the republic and persisted 
throughout the republic. Therefore, a cultural and ideological continuity may be observed 
from the late Ottoman bureaucratic establishment to the Republican bureaucracy. 
     This study will not develop a discursive analysis. It will be an inquiry into a certain 
mindset which was constitutive of Turkish modernity, the modern and secular Turkish 
state, and the Turkish national imagination. This study will not discuss the intellectual 
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formations of the late Ottoman elite in a vacuum but contextualize and situate its mental 
structure within a particular milieu in which the Empire was in retreat, and the challenge 
created by modernity, the imperialist powers, and non-Muslim groups could not be met.  In 
a sense, this study will try to trace the progress of some of the prominent ―unit ideas‖ and 
―unit concepts‖ as historians of Begriffsgeschichte applied to the fundamental concepts of 
European modernity.
1
 Although, this study lacks the meticulousness and depth of 
Begriffsgeschichte, it aims to be a modest preliminary to a full study of the development of 
concepts constitutive of the modern Turkish political and national discourse.  It attempts to 
show the intertwined character of the notions of the nation, modernity, and the state, 
especially in the imaginary of the Ottoman/Turkish elite. Furthermore, it will point out how 
the concept of the Turkish nation was constructed in the imagination of a particular elite 
deriving from an imperial vantage point. It tries to demonstrate that the particular concerns 
of the political (and therefore national) elite stimulated the constitution of a national 
imagination so that particular self-attributes (or ―cultural intimacy‖ to use the term of 
Michael Herzfeld
2) of this particular elite were ―nationalized‖ and consecrated as ―national 
characteristics‖. In this dissertation, it will be argued that, many of the Turkish ―lieux de 
mémoire‖ were already formulated and espoused by the imperial ancien régime before 
                                                 
1
 For the literature available in English for conceptual history, see Koselleck, Reinhart, The 
Practice of Conceptual History, Stanford: Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002; 
Critique and Crisis: Pathogenesis of Modern Society, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988; 
Richter, Melvin, The History of Political and Social Concepts, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995; Tribe, Keith, ―The GG Project: from History of Ideas to Conceptual History‖, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 31 (January 1989); Melvin Richter, 
―Begriffsgeschichte and the History of Ideas‖, Journal of the History of Ideas 48 (April 
1987).  
 
2
 ―Cultural intimacy‖ is defined by Michael Herzfeld as ―the recognition of those aspects 
of a cultural identity that are considered a source of external embarrassment but that 
nevertheless provide insiders with their assurance of common sociality, the familiarity with 
the bases of power that may at one moment assure the disenfranchised a degree of creative 
irreverence and at the next moment reinforce the effectiveness of intimidation.‖ Herzfeld, 
Michael, Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State, London; New York: 
Routledge, 1997, p. 3.  
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their perfection in the early Republic, albeit some in a modified version.
3
 It will also 
emphasize the institutional and cultural continuities of the bureaucratic and political elites 
without underestimating the breaks, modifications, adaptations, and ruptures. This 
continuity from the pre-Tanzimat elite to the republican elite can be seen both in terms of 
its perceptions and genealogy. In short, this study attempts to expose some facets of an 
intellectual collective biography of the late Ottoman diplomatic service with a particular 
emphasis on the Hamidian diplomatic service embedded in a distinctive culture and 
habitus. 
     In many aspects, this study leans on the revisionist historiography of the late Ottoman 
Empire that challenged conventional assumptions and modernist paradigms. A long 
summary of the revisionist historiography of the late Ottoman Empire will not be presented 
here. The modernist paradigm that reigned in the late Ottoman scholarship was challenged 
and discredited by a new generation of Ottomanists who were in close contact with the 
paradigms and methodologies of the European historiography by the 1980s and 
approaching the late Ottoman Empire in a comparative perspective. The new generation of 
historians who challenged the paradigms and visions of the pioneers of the late Ottoman 
scholarship came from a different intellectual formation. They learned to be more critical 
of the alleged achievements of modernity and were skeptical of the extent of the 
transformative impact of 19
th
 century modernity. Following the European historians who 
demonstrated the impact of the early modern age on the 19
th
 century transformation and 
exposed the ―early modern origins of modernity‖, Ottoman scholars demonstrated the pre-
Tanzimat origins of the Tanzimat. One of the latest interests in Ottoman historiography is 
the ―roads to modernity‖ of the post-classical Ottoman Empire. This period is no more 
regarded as decline and degeneration.
4
 Instead, the 17th and the 18th centuries are studied 
                                                 
3
 For the concept of  ―lieux de mémoire‖, see Nora, Pierre (ed.), Rethinking France: Lieux 
de Mémoire, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001 (v. I)  
4
 Kafadar, Cemal, ―The Question of Ottoman Decline‖, Harvard Middle Eastern and 
Islamic Review, no: 4 (1997-98), pp. 30-76; Grant, Jonathan, ―Rethinking the Ottoman 
"Decline": Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire, Fifteenth to Eighteenth 
Centuries‖, Journal of World History, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring, 1999), pp. 179-201. 
4 
 
as the foundational periods of the modern bureaucratized Ottoman/Turkish state.
5
 The new 
paradigm that reinterprets modernity not as a complete rupture exported from abroad, but 
as a continuous process fuelled by indigenous dynamics further questions the agency of the 
state (and especially the Tanzimat state) in the reception and production of modernity. 
Beginning from the avant garde study of Abou-Al-Haj, Ottomanists such as Linda Darling, 
Ariel Salzmann, Butrus Abu Manneh, and Beshara Doumani demonstrated the long history 
and multiple sources of an indigenous modernity in the Ottoman lands and the Middle 
East. These historians were also uninterested in grand theories and Gordion-knot concepts. 
The Arab historian Beshara Doumani wrote:  
―(w)hen it comes to the modern period, this discourse has been dominated by a single 
overarching narrative: the piecemeal incorporation or integration of the Ottoman 
Empire into the European economical and political orbits. This narrative is a central 
one because it deals directly with the problems of capitalism, imperialism, and 
colonialism...in discussions of these key issues the Ottoman Empire was, until fairly 
recently, usually portrayed as a stagnant, peripheral, and passive spectator in the 
process of integration. The decline thesis, as it has come to be called, has been 
persuasively challenged since the early 1970s, but the very thrust of the integration 
narrative, regardless of the theoretical approach used, tends to relegate the interior 
regions of the Ottoman Empire...to the status of a periphery‘s periphery.6‖   
The new generation of scholars was also critical of the self-righteousness of modernity and 
the modern state. Influenced by the post-World War II critical scholarship on modernity, 
they did not cherish the emergence of modernity in the Middle East. On the contrary, they 
were prone to expose the mechanisms of violence and surveillance new modern states 
imposed under the cover of progress and development. 
    Other historians rejected dualities, such as secularism versus Islam, Republic versus 
Empire, and reaction versus progress, and portrayed the late Ottoman Empire in its 
complexity and multidimensionality. Studies such as Selim Deringil‘s ―The Well-Protected 
Domains‖ and Ussame Makdisi‘s work on Ottoman Orientalism exposed the rich mental 
                                                 
5
 For the earliest effort to interpret these two centuries as the emergence of the modern 
state, see Abou-Al-Haj, Rifat, Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire 
Sixteenth to Eighteenth Century, New York: SUNY Press, 1991. Also see Salzmann, Ariel, 
Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State, Leiden; Boston; 
Köln: Brill, 2004 
6
 Doumani, Beshara, Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus 
1700-1900, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995, p. 3 
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worlds of the late Ottoman identity, representations, and possibilities.
7
 Şükrü Hanioğlu‘s 
evaluation of the Young Turks in exile exposed the ambivalent and syncretic nature of 
their mental formations and portrayed them in their complexity and in their contradictions.
8
 
Many other works scrutinized the ideological and intellectual formations of the late 
Ottoman men of prominence. Dispositions such as Turkism, Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, 
modernism, and traditionalism were no longer taken as mutually exclusive categories and 
diametrical opposites. The new generation of late Ottoman scholarship demonstrated how 
different dispositions coexisted and complemented each other and overlapped. In that 
regard, they also established the institutional, structural, ideological, and cultural 
continuities from the Empire to the Republic, partially influenced by the genre of 
―persistence of the old regime‖ in the scholarship of modern European history. It was also 
established that Turkish nationalism did not emerge after the 1908 Revolution as a break 
from the ancien régime, but that its seeds, various manifestations in various disguises, were 
already observable much earlier. 
     Apparently, these new approaches were inspired and even exported from the changing 
paradigms of Western historiography and the social sciences. New intellectual history, 
Foucauldianism, cultural turn, poststructuralism, and postmodernism were all sources of 
inspiration.    
     In every decade, academia subscribes to some magical formulas and terms as 
revelations. The ―magical term‖ of the 1950s and 1960s in the heyday of optimism and 
self-confidence in the modern West, was ―modernization‖. Besides books such as Berkes‘ 
The Development of Secularism in Turkey, Weiker‘s study of Turkish modernization9 and 
the book on the beginnings of modernization in the Middle East edited by Polk and 
                                                 
7
 Deringil, Selim, The Well-Protected Domains, London: I.B. Tauris, 1998; Makdisi, 
Ussama, The Culture of Sectarianism, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. 
8
 Hanioğlu, Şükrü, The Young Turks in Opposition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995; Hanioğlu, Şükrü, Preparing for a Revolution, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001; Hanioğlu, Şükrü, Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Abdullah Cevdet, İstanbul: Üçdal 
Neşriyat, 1981. 
9
 Weiker, Walter F, The Modernization of Turkey, New York: Holmes & Meier 
Publications, 1981 
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Chambers
10
, which all examined the modernization process in its totality, other classical 
studies scrutinized particular aspects of modernization within the modernization paradigm, 
such as the studies of Kazamias
11
, Robertson
12
, Frey
13
, Magnaraella
14
, Szyliowicz
15
, and 
Ross
16
. With the failure of developmentalism and the developmental state, this paradigm 
had been abandoned. Governmentality replaced modernization.
17
 The postmodern 
                                                 
10
 Polk, William R. & Chambers, Richard (ed.), Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle 
East, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968. 
11
 Kazamias, Andreas, Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1966 
12
 Robinson, Robert D, The First Turkish Republic, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1965. 
13
 Frey, Frederick W, The Turkish Political Elite, Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge, Mass: 
M.I.T. Press, 1965 
14
 Magnaraella, Paul J, Tradition and Change in a Turkish Town, Cambridge, Mass: 
Schenkman Publishers,1974. 
15
 Szyliowicz, Joseph S, Political Change in Rural Turkey: Erdemli, The Hague: Mouton, 
1966. 
16
 Roos, Leslie L Jr. & Roos, Noralou P, Managers of Modernization: Organizations and 
Elites in Turkey, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971. 
17
 For the Foucauldian notion of governmentality, see, Graham Burchell & Colin Gordon 
& Peter Miller (ed.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1991. The Foucauldian narrative of the emergence of the modern art of 
government in his lecture on governmentality that follows is quoted in Rabinow, Paul 
(ed.), Michel Foucault, New York: The New Press, 1997, vol. III: ―(I)n the late sixteenth 
century and early seventeenth century, the art of government finds its first form of 
crystallization, organized around the theme of reason of state, understood not in the 
negative and pejorative sense....but in a full and positive sense: the state is governed 
according to rational principles that are intrinsic to it and cannot be derived solely from 
natural or divine laws or the principles of wisdom and prudence....The state, like nature, 
has its own proper form of rationality, albeit of a different sort. Conversely, the art of 
government, instead of seeking to found itself in transcendental rules, a cosmological 
model, or a philosophical-moral ideal, must find the principles of rationality in that which 
constitutes the specific reality of the state. ‖ (p.212-13) He discusses the redefinition of the 
meaning and reason of the state with the modern age and the emergence of 
governmentality as follows: ―(P)opulation comes to appear above all else as the ultimate 
end of government. In contrast to sovereignty, government has as its purpose not the act of 
government itself, but the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the 
increase of its wealth, longevity, health and so on; and the means the government will act 
either directly, through large-scale campaigns, or indirectly...the population now represents 
7 
 
condition had contrived the word ―discourse‖ to replace the mystical powers of the now 
abandoned term ―modernization‖. Now, ―the long 19th century‖ Ottoman history was 
constructed along a ―discourse‖. The policies and reforms of the 19th century Ottoman 
state were no longer seen as efforts of modernization and Westernization, but as strategies 
of governmentality. The population censuses, the temettuat registers, the introduction of 
quarantine, the regulating of public health, the organization of modern education, and 
cartography were manifestations of the concern of the Ottoman state to measure and 
regiment its subjects and the land.
18
  
     Accordingly, this process was the emanation and fulfillment of an overarching 
discourse. The term ―discourse‖, as refashioned and formulated by Foucault, had tacit, evil 
connotations. For Foucault, discourse was there to dominate, control, and subdue the 
masses. Thus, the 19th century was no longer the ―good century‖ of the modernization 
school. Instead, it was now the mother of all evils, namely nationalism, excessive 
rationalism, modernism, intolerance, et cetera. The benevolent state of the 1960s turned 
out to be intrinsically malicious. Ehud Toledano concluded his book on the demise of 
slavery in the late 19th century as follows: ―In recent years the trend has been to portray 
states and empires in the long nineteenth century as the ever-centralizing, oppressing tool 
of the elites. Contrary to that, the case of Ottoman enslavement provides here sufficient 
evidence to argue that the state‘s growing interference in the slaver-enslaved relationship 
in fact benefited and protected the weaker partner in the relationship. The Tanzimat-state, I 
have tried to show, increasingly abandons its traditional support of the slavers‘ ownership 
rights and gradually began to favor manumission claims put forth by the enslaved.‖19 Of 
course, a fervent Foucauldian would argue that the state‘s benevolence towards the 
subaltern was a new strategy to include the previously non-included larger populace within 
the political and social community to be able to control, govern, and discipline them. This 
                                                                                                                                                             
more the end of government than the power of the sovereign; the population is the subject 
of the needs, of aspirations, but it is also the object in the hands of government....ignorant 
of what is being done to it.‖ (p. 216-17) 
18
 For the early modern state‘s appetite for measuring and knowing its land and its subjects, 
see Headrick, Daniel R. When Information Came of Age, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000. 
19
 Ehud Toledano, As If Silent and Absent: Bonds of Enslavement in the Islamic Middle 
East, New Haven: New Yale University Press, 2007, p. 260.  
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is what Patrick Joyce called the ―rule of liberalism.‖20 For Joyce and many others, the 
abolition of slavery and all other unnatural statuses are contrary to the logic of market and 
liberalism, the very ideological tool of the 19th century surveillance menace, and therefore 
have to be eradicated for market and liberalism to rule.
21
 Thus, according to them, the 
leniency on behalf of the state is yet another manifestation of Foucauldian pastoral 
power.
22
  
     Also influenced by the rise of the new statism developed by historians such as Skocpol 
and Tilly, many new studies had taken the ―Foucauldian turn‖. These new works and 
dissertations tried to discover and ―unveil‖ the draconian encroachment of the state over 
society, over the public and the private. Various articulations and manifestations of the 
making of the centralized Ottoman/Turkish state were examined, such as the establishment 
of the modern police
23
, army, social institutions, and the social state.
24
 In Foucauldian 
jargon, modernity was identified with the insatiable assault and the subsequent victory of 
                                                 
20
 Joyce, Patrick, The Rule of Freedom: Liberalism and the Modern City, London; New 
York: Verso, 2003. 
21
 For a Foucauldian treatment of liberalism, see Joyce, Patrick, The Rule of Freedom: 
Liberalism and the Modern City, London; New York: Verso, 2003; Barry, Andrew & 
Rose, Nikolas & Osborne, Thomas (ed.), Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-
Liberalism and Rationalities of Government, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.  
22
 For Foucault, ―pastoral power‖ which the early modern state derived from the Catholic 
Church is ―concerned with the salvation of everyone in ‗the flock‘ on an individual level, 
requiring, ideally, a thorough knowledge of the subject‘s ‗soul‘ and officials who could 
monitor and account for each and every individual. It (is) an individualizing power in that 
is sought, through supervision, to structure the life of the individual, both through 
confessional technologies and techniques of self mastery.‖ Introduction: Moss, Jeremy, 
―The Later Foucault‖, in Moss, Jeremy (ed.), The Late Foucault Reader, London; 
Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998, pp.2-3.  
23
 Ergut, Ferdan, Modern Devlet ve Polis: Osmanlı‟dan Cumhuriyete Toplumsal Denetimin 
Diyalektiği, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004. 
24
 Ozbek, Nadir, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Sosyal Devlet: İktidar, Siyaset, Meşruiyet 
1876-1914, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002, also Ener, Mine, Managing Egypt‟s Poor 
and the Politics of Benevolence, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. 
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the beast called ―the state‖, which was not a free agent but itself a prisoner and executer of 
the pervasive discourse of encroaching modernity.
25
  
       This study is in agreement with the general premises of the Foucauldian movement. It 
holds that the Foucauldian movement catches the fundamental psyche of modernity very 
accurately. However, I believe that the Foucauldian movement is too simplistic and derives 
from a reactive moralism and resentment against the ―winners of modernity‖. 
       It is a question how reasonable and accurate it is to explain the complexity of the rise 
of the 19th century modern state with only one single overarching concept. Similarly, the 
papers gathered in ―Osmanlı‟da Asayiş, Suç ve Ceza‖ (Order, Crime and Punishment in the 
Ottoman Empire) also advances a critical approach to the ―Foucauldian effect‖ on Ottoman 
studies.
26
 These papers pointed out the simplistic and reductionist tendencies of adapting 
Foucault to the 19
th
 century Ottoman trajectory. The modernization and centralization 
processes were not intended conspiracies perpetrated by the elites but were complex 
processes not to be explicable within one single overarching narrative. Likewise, as the 
papers in this collection demonstrate, it is inadequate to interpret the making of the 
Ottoman police and reform of the prisons as simply a cunning fabrication of the modern 
state.
27
 Many different dynamics and concerns played an equal role in the reorganization 
and reconceptualization of the state, society, and the self in the 19
th
 century.  
     This study sees the thrust of the 19
th
 century transformation in the shifting structures of 
mentalities of the Ottoman elite. Nationalism and modernism derived from the concerns, 
                                                 
25
 For the rise and domination of this new discourse, see Foucault, Michel, The Order of 
Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York: Vintage Books, 1973. 
26
 Levy, Noemi & Toumarkine, Alexandre  (ed.), Osmanlı‟da Asayiş, Suç ve Ceza, 
İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2008. For a critique of Foucault and the limitations of 
the Foucauldian approach in criminal history, see Özgür Sevgi Göral‘s chapter ―19. Yüzyıl 
İstanbul‘unda Suç, Toplumsal Kontrol ve Hapishaneler Üzerine Çalışmak‖ in this volume. 
27
 Along the same lines, Bruce F. Adams in his study on Russian prison reform criticizes 
the Marxist and other schools of historical interpretation (and especially the historiography 
of 19th century Russia) that explain the course of history based on interest seeking and 
based on materialist assumptions. He underlines the reformist zeal in the Russian 
governing and elite circles regarding prisons. He concludes ―(a)ltruism and the desire of 
people to make the world conform to their ideals have been powerful forces in history.‖ 
Probably, Toledano would agree with this statement. Adams, Bruce F, The Politics of 
Punishment: Prison Reform in Russia 1863-1917, De Kalb: Northern Illinois University 
Press, 1996, p. 197.  
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perceptions, and politics of the elite. This does not mean that these concerns and 
perceptions were merely fantasies and belonged to the realm of ideas. On the contrary, 
these concerns and dispositions were embedded within a certain material conjuncture and 
products of a certain social and political context as Quentin Skinner, J.G.A. Pocock, 
Koselleck, and others have demonstrated for the transformations of the European mental 
structures and perceptions. 
     The elite as a concept had not been examined as a specific and prominent formative 
component of Turkish modernity beyond the pioneering studies of Frey
28
 and works of 
scholars such as Roderick Davison, Şerif Mardin, and Metin Heper. The concept of the 
elite and its structural qualities were not analyzed within a structural framework. The 
reductionist paradigm of the duality of center and periphery was preserved; this paradigm 
treats this duality as specific to the Ottoman/Turkish pattern and sees it as an ―aberration‖. 
This duality fails to answer several questions regarding the emergence and development of 
Turkish modernity. For example, why did the republican secular elite whom we may call 
―Kemalists‖ assume the national leadership position and how did they retain this position 
long after the transition to multi-party democracy ?  From where did it derive its legitimacy 
? What were the structural reasons that enabled a ―superwesternized‖ elite to assume the 
position of ―national leadership‖ in most of the late modernizing, ―non-western‖ nations in 
formation and to be able to speak ―in the name of the nation‖? Kemalists in Turkey, the 
Congress Party in India, Muslim League in the future Pakistan, and Ba‘athists in the Arab 
world are manifestations of the same structural pattern
29
. Why is it that the national 
leadership was always taken over by a modernizing/westernized and supersecular elite? 
What are the structural bases of this recurring pattern ? These questions need answers that 
go beyond the paradigm of the dichotomy of center-periphery which treats this dichotomy 
as a ―mistake‖ rather than a particular sociological and political pattern.  
      The question of why the 19th century non-western elites replicated the western model 
seems to be very obvious and straightforward at first glance, but in fact it is a very complex 
                                                 
28
 Frey, Frederick, The Turkish Political Elite, Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1965. 
29
 For the emergence of the modernist/nationalist elite in India, see Seal, Anil, The 
Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nineteenth 
Century, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 1968. 
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question. If we acknowledge that ―westernization‖ and ―modernization‖ are the sine qua 
non of the non-western 19th century elites, it means that westernization is not an 
autonomous process but a dependent variable of the politics and economies of elites and 
states. Then, westernization/modernization constitutes no historical/social category by 
itself. We have to assume that westernization is not a cultural category but a social/political 
one. Westernization and modernization are functions of the relationships of class and social 
structures. They are explicable within a socio-economical structure.  
       The nuances and modifications of the manifestations of westernization are to be varied 
in different geographies, but not westernization itself. Westernization emerges and 
develops as an imperative rather than a choice or an option. It is important to emphasize 
this dimension because Turkish sociology and political science literature takes it for 
granted that there is a dichotomy between the westernized elite and the traditional folk 
whether it be called center and periphery or otherwise
30
 and treats it as a conspicuous 
phenomenon. We may even speak of the ―westernization of west‖ with reference to the 
path breaking works of Norbert Elias, Eugen Weber, and Marc Raeff
31
 where it has been 
demonstrated that the traditional ―folkways‖ were classified as barbarism and uncivilized 
and were effectively obliterated or transformed beginning in early modern Europe.  This 
discourse is endorsed with equal vigor at the same time by both the Kemalist left and the 
Turkish right as the alleged dichotomy serves to enhance the self-images and righteousness 
of both parties, the first representing the courageous enlightened few against the ignorant 
                                                 
30
 Mardin, Şerif, ―Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics ?‖, Daedalus, 
102-1 (1973) pp. 169-190. İdris Küçükömer‘s classic book, which preceded Mardin‘s 
article by two years, should also be considered as a complement to this article with its 
sweeping impact on Turkish intellectual thought and academia although it sometimes has 
the negative effect of simplifying the course of Turkish history and Turkish social 
dynamics. Küçükömer, İdris, Düzenin Yabancılaşması, İstanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1969. 
Whereas Mardin‘s periphery is the populace untouched by the reformism of the center, 
Mardin‘s center is state, and therefore the center-periphery clash is not between two 
compatible foes. Mardin‘s tension is between the state and its unruly subjects, and 
therefore it is wrong to develop this scheme along a cultural rift. Also see, Heper, Metin, 
The State Tradition in Turkey, Beverley, North Humberside: Eothen Press, 1985.   
31
 Elias, Norbert, The Civilizing Process, Oxford; Cambridge, Mass. :Blackwell, 1984; 
Weber, Eugen, Peasants into Frenchmen, Stanford: Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1976, Raeff, Marc, The Well-Ordered Police State, New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1982. 
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masses, the later representing the vox populi against the illegitimate usurpers. If we assume 
westernization as a non-category, then we have to redefine the course of late 
Ottoman/Turkish history within a social/economical framework after redefining the 
―cultural‖ dynamics as historical and structural categories embedded within their social 
context.
32
  
      States are not only class-based entities, but they are also inventors of values as well as 
bearers of values. The modern state, by its nature of being ―modern‖ is a generator and 
promoter of certain values compatible with its vision of governance.
33
 For example, one of 
the most indispensable and prominent values the modern state generates is its secularity. A 
modern state should be secular not only for reasons of state but also to fulfill its obligations 
towards its subjects, which it professes to uphold. Therefore, the state renounces any 
alternative source of power that may hinder its ability to espouse its legitimacy over its 
subjects. In that regard, secularism derives from such a structural concern and is an 
imperative. It is less a cultural category than a structural necessity. Secularism is not an 
option but a corollary of the modern state and nation-state.  The legal understandings of 
religion and modern nation-states are wide apart. Whereas the religions prioritized the 
regulation of relations between the community as a whole and the individuals within this 
community, the modern nation-states acknowledge only relations established between the 
state and the individuals and deny the legitimacy of any intermediaries. Only individuals 
exist and not communities. We may argue that, modernity is the renunciation of 
communalism in favor of a nation-state universalism in which the state is able to 
monopolize the regulation of relations between individual citizens and the relations 
between the individual citizens and itself. Apparently, the modern states generated and 
disseminated values ex nihilo, values which were evidently not derived from social sources 
and do not need to be. What is called westernization is in fact the practice of the emerging 
modern/rational states.  The supposedly-westernized elites became the executer of this 
                                                 
32
 For the outlines and premises of the new cultural history, see Geertz, Clifford, The 
Interpretations of Culture, New York: Basic Books, 1973. 
33
 The classical work that underlines the value-generating nature of the early modern state 
is Raeff, Marc, The Well-Ordered Police State, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982. 
For the 19th century modern state, see also Weber, Eugen, Peasants into Frenchmen, 
Stanford: Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976. 
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practice not only in the 19
th
 century Ottoman Empire but also in other states including 
Eastern European ones. This elite‘s foremost quality is to acquire the necessary skills to 
manage and lead this process thanks to the process which is rightfully dubbed as 
―westernization‖ (and modernization). 
       This interpretation makes the paradox of nationalism more elucidative. After all, a 
nation is created in the image of the elites (and the rising new intellectuals). By nation, a 
nationalist does not understand ―the ethnic community which he feels to belong to‖ but 
something more subtle. Nation is an idol which he adores and adheres to. It is not a 
coincidence that many of the nationalist intelligentsias developed anti-populist discourses, 
especially in the Third World, and despised the commoners unlike nationalist 
intelligentsias such as the Russian Panslavists who were ―going to the people‖ in late 19th 
century czarist Russia and glorifying the people.
34
 Indeed, it is the sacred mission of the 
nationalist intelligentsia to educate, civilize, and rear the people so that the ―nation‖ will be 
saved from obscurantism, ignorance, and the threat of national demise. Thus, the scorning 
of the people may be seen as an indispensable trait of the nationalist intelligentsia. It is an 
intrinsic attribute of its missionary zeal. This attitude is visible throughout the history of 
Turkish nationalism from the first generation of nationalists (and most explicitly in Ömer 
Seyfeddin
35
) to the early 21st century neo-nationalists. It may be argued that this is because 
in the minds of the nationalist intelligentsia the nation they sympathize with is not the 
present-day nation but the ―future-nation‖ designed and appropriated by the modernist 
visions of the intelligentsia. It is the prospective ―ideal nation‖ that will be created after the 
overcoming of backwardness they feel attached to. Because such an ideal ―really existing 
nation‖ does not exist, it is only the image (or mirage) of the nation they adore and praise. 
In fact, in the image of the nation, the nationalist intelligentsia sees its own values and 
reference system. The fiction of the nation is thus appropriated from the prism of the self-
attributes of the elite and serves to disseminate the traits of the culture and habitus of a 
certain cultural community in the disguise of ―national traits‖.  
                                                 
34
 See Kohn, Hans, Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology, New York: Vintage, 1960. 
35
 For example, the short stories of Ömer Seyfeddin, such as ―Tuhaf Bir Zulüm‖, humiliate 
Turks for their backwardness, ignorance, and stupidity. See Ömer Seyfeddin, Yüksek 
Ökçeler, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1973. 
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      The nation is an idea before it becomes a reality. Even when it becomes a reality as a 
result of communication, education, and the practices of everyday, it still remains an idea. 
However, this ―idea‖ continues to shape and reshape the material world.  
       Moreover, the emergence and development of a ―national idea‖ cannot be dissociated 
from the encroachment of modernity. We may observe that nation-making and modernism 
go hand in hand. Furthermore, they are not only complementary processes but may be seen 
as consequences/manifestations of the same phenomenon. Actually, they are not hand in 
hand, but are actually different sides of the same coin. One obliges the other.  
       Here, the question of which one of these manifestations precedes the other may be 
raised. Here, I would argue for the precedence of modernism over nationalism. According 
to this suggestion, nationalism becomes a corollary of modernism. This does not mean that, 
a la Marx, nationalism and other developments should be regarded as epiphenomena and 
consequences of modernity. On the contrary, the establishment of nations and their 
espousal is an indispensable and preeminent element of the formation of modern states and 
modernity. Following the transformation of the state and subsequently the populace from 
which the state derives its legitimacy, a certain imagination is to be generated compatible 
with the transforming perceptions of the world, society, and the self. Subsequently, this 
new imagination acquired its own reality. Disentangling the ―concept of nationalism‖ from 
a label referring to ethnicity and reconceptualizing it as an expression of a collective self-
identity constituted within a process of social and economic transformation and as a 
response to the challenges posed by these developments will let us frame it within the 
process of the formation of modernity (and early modernity). 
36
  
    The new intellectual historians criticized conventional intellectual history for being 
interested only in what the authors wrote and not paying attention to the social/political 
                                                 
36
 For a discussion of nationalism as an expression of a collective identity, see Eisenstadt, 
Shmuel N. & Schluchter, Wolfgang,  ―Introduction: Paths to Early Modernities- A 
Comparative View‖, in Eisenstadt Shmuel N. & Schluchter, Wolfgang, Wittrock, Björn 
(ed),  Public Spheres & Collective Identities, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 
2001, pp. 13-14. For a discussion of nationalism and early modernity, see Wittrock, Björn, 
―Early Modernities: Varieties and Transitions‖, ibid, pp. 19-40. 
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milieus in which ideas developed and concepts emerged, matured, and died out.
37
 
Moreover, they questioned the reliability of taking only some eminent authors (some 
became famous only after their death) to portray the structure of the mentalities of the time. 
Likewise, the new cultural historians rejected the conventional understanding of ―culture‖. 
They arrived at a ―thick description‖ of culture in which culture was perceived as being 
constituted within a particular social, economic, and political background and milieu, and 
also as a reflection of the social, material, and political background in which they flourish.  
    This study was inspired by the impressive studies of new intellectual historians, new 
cultural historians,
38
 and historical anthropologists who probed into early modern and 
modern European history, as well as political anthropologists such as Michael Herzfeld.
39
 
It attempts to emphasize the prominence of ideas and concepts which acquire an objective 
existence for themselves once they are constructed in the mind. Rejecting a duality of 
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―objective existence‖ and ―subjective existence‖, this study treats the 
intellectual/cultural/ideological formations as shaped by the social and political 
background they inherit and the social, economic, and political structures in which they 
were born. It also argues that structures of mentalities have the power and capacity to 
shape the supposedly ―objective‖ political, social, and economic dynamics. This relation is 
evidently double-track. They complement and mutually constitute each other 
simultaneously. Thus, the emergence of a ―nationhood‖ and a secularized outlook were at 
the center of the making of the ―Turkish modern‖ and were consequences of reflexes given 
in the context of a retreating and threatened empire. In short, this study is more of an essay 
of historical anthropology rather than a work of history proper focusing on the making of a 
certain structure of mentality that establishes the ―Turkish nationhood‖ and ―Turkish 
modern‖.    
     The first chapter of the study is an overview of the 19
th
 century transformations of the 
Ottoman structures of mentalities and the configuration of the state elite. This chapter also 
aims to construct a theoretical framework for the emergence and development of a 
―nationalized‖ imperial elite. The second chapter is an overview of the mental and 
ideological formations of the 19
th
 century Ottoman bureaucracy. The third chapter attempts 
to discuss how modernity and ―modern knowledge‖ triggered a new configuration within 
the state elite and how the bureaucracy, enjoying the monopoly over access and 
employment of the ―modern knowledge‖, took over the state and controlled it before its 
power was restrained in the Hamidian era. This chapter also attempts to show how the 
dynamics of international politics and foreign policy had an impact on political 
developments.  
      After the first three chapters which deal with the Tanzimat and Hamidian bureaucracy 
as a whole, given that different governmental offices are hardly distinguishable from each 
other, the next chapters particularly focus on the late Ottoman diplomatic service with a 
specific emphasis on the Hamidian diplomatic service. The fourth chapter attempts to draw 
the main social characteristics of the Ottoman diplomatic service. As can be observed, the 
social backgrounds of the diplomats are conspicuously similar. They were predominantly 
born in Istanbul as the sons of (some low-ranking and some others high-ranking) officials 
and thus share a certain habitus welded around the state. Although, the 19
th
 century 
17 
 
Ottoman bureaucracy shares a common culture, the Ottoman diplomatic service is the one 
with the most elitist background (not unlike the European diplomatic services). This is not 
to say that all the diplomats came from illustrious families with aristocratic backgrounds. 
On the contrary, the chapter shows that the diplomatic service recruited from various layers 
of the Ottoman bureaucratic cast and thus constitutes a microcosm of the late Ottoman 
bureaucracy, albeit considerably more aristocratic one.  
    The fifth chapter focuses on the routine of the diplomatic service. This chapter examines 
how a certain structure of mentality may be molded from the routine of the Ottoman 
diplomatic service. The concerns of the diplomatic correspondence draw the outlines of a 
structure of mentality. The sixth chapter investigates the ―great transformation‖ of the 
ideological/mental/cultural formations of the Ottoman diplomatic service. This chapter 
argues that the third generation of the Tanzimat exhibits certain traits significantly different 
from the first and second generations of the Tanzimat. With the third generation, a 
conservative modernization was abandoned in favor of a radical modernization. The third 
generation was radical in many regards. This generation was radical with regard to its 
perception of modernity, its identity, and its perception of the ―others‖. However, this 
transformation is not just a matter of a ―clash of fathers and sons‖. It is argued that, on the 
contrary, this transformation is pervasive and not limited to the new generation. Thus, 
many Hamidian grandees adapted to the transformation and endorsed the ―new outlook‖ 
enthusiastically although many others were disillusioned with this process. The seventh 
chapter is a general survey of the cultures of the European diplomatic services. The chapter 
attempts to show that the Ottoman Foreign Ministry replicated the 19
th
 century pattern and 
shares its common culture. World War I brought not only the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire along with the Romanovs, Hohenzollerns and Habsburgs, but also a European-
wide aristocratic style of governance and culture.  
     At its end, the study will also try to highlight the continuities from the Empire and its 
structures of mentalities to the Republic. The epilogue is a preliminary attempt to 
demonstrate the continuities (as well as modifications and breaks) from the Empire to the 
Republic as can be observed in the social and cultural formations of the Republican 
diplomatic service and the patterns of Republican diplomacy. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
NATIONALISM, MODERNITY AND ELITE POLITICS 
 
1.1. Nationalisms 
 
       This chapter aims to situate ambivalent concepts such as modernity, elites, nationalism 
and proto-nationalism with regard to their contributions in the making of modern Turkey 
before focusing on the ideological/intellectual/cultural formations of late Ottoman 
bureaucracy and diplomatic establishment. 
       The very early theories of nationalism had approached nationalism in terms of an 
―idea‖. After all, this was the time when social sciences were conceived as an outer reach 
of humanitas, an activity related to the reflection on the world and the self. The most well-
known classical study of nationalism within this paradigm was penned by Elie Kedourie. 
For Kedourie, nationalism was an innovation of early 19th century German romantics
40
. 
Given that Kedourie was in the tradition of the pre-World War English conservativism, he 
was distressed with the endorsement, popularization and spread of this continrntal fiction, a 
consequence which for Kedourie was an avoidable misfortune.
41
 
                                                 
40
 Kedourie states his assesment rather bluntly. He begins his book with the following 
statement: ―Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century.‖ Kedourie, Elie, Nationalism, Hutchinson & Co, 1966, p. 9. Kedourie‘s 
introduction to his book is an example to the genre of ―history of ideas‖ at its best.  
41
 ―The attempts to refashion so much of the world on national lines has [sic]not led to 
greater peace and stability. On the contrary, it has created new conflicts, exacerbated 
tensions, and brought catastrophe to numberlss people innocent of all politics. The history 
of Europe since 1919, in particular, has shown the disastrous possiblities inherent in 
nationalism. In the mixed area of Central and Eastern Europe, and the Balkans, empires 
disappeared, their ruling groups were humbled and made to pay, for a time, the penalty of 
previous arrogance....What can be said with certainity is that the nation-states who 
inherited the position of the empires were not an improvement. They did not minister to 
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       However, his particularistic explanation remained a minority view. ―The twin 
founding fathers‖ of the academic study of nationalism, Carleton B. Hayes and Hans 
Kohn,
42
 who wrote after World War I during the age of the emergence of numerous new 
nation-states in Central and Eastern Europe
43
, argued that nationalism is by definition a 
modern concept. Within the modernist paradigm of the time, they tacitly assumed that this 
process (like any development in history) was inevitable. For them, nationalism was 
inherent in the making of the modern world and modern imagination. Hayes was a scholar 
who was one of the first to observe the bleak nature of the 19th century underneath the 
disguise of the glamour of progress
44
 but nevertheless he viewed this undercurrent as a 
deviation from the inevitable triumphal march of modernity.  In other words, his critical/ 
relatively pessimistic approach to modernity did not lead him to question the triumphalism 
and the myth of modernity.  
      Later scholars of nationalism distanced themselves from Kedourie, denied any room 
for contingency in history and advanced the path of Hayes and Kohn. The modernization 
                                                                                                                                                             
political freedom, they did not increase prosperity, and their existence was not conducive 
to peace....‖ Kedourie, ibid, pp. 138-39. 
42
 See Carlton Hayes‘ The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism in 1931 and Hans 
Kohn‘s The İdea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background in 1944. Hayes 
sees nationalism as a pathology unexplicable with ―merely economic considerations‖. 
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school, which was an upshoot of structural functionalism,
45
 treated the course of modern 
history and emergence of a modern society/social organization as an institutionalization of 
a mechanistic body in which there is no place for agency and ―meaning‖. Thus, they 
renounced anything peculiar and uncanny in nationalism. For them, nationalism was an 
inevitable and indispensable outcome of modernity. Nationalism was viewed as intrinsic in 
modernity and an indispensable element of modern social organization. It is functional in 
the establishment of a capitalistic and modern society. In the words of Benedict Anderson: 
―(within) the formal universality of nationality as a socio-cultural concept- in the modern 
world everyone can, should, will ‗have‘ a nationality, as he or she ―has‖ a gender-vs the 
irremediable particularity of its concrete manifestations‖46 in the modern age. However, 
these early historians of nationalism disagreed on why nationalism became unavoidable 
and inevitable.  
      A classical explanation was proposed by Ernest Gellner. For Gellner, ―nationalism is 
not the awakening of an old, latent, dormant force, though that is how it does indeed 
present itself. It is in reality the consequence of a new form of social organization, based 
on deeply internalized, education-dependent high cultures, generally transforming them in 
the process, but it cannot possibly use them all.‖47 Gellner explains nationalism as a 
necessary instrument in the transition of humanity from agraria to industria within his 
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periodization of human history.
48
 Gellner‘s impressive interpretation of nationalism 
renders nationalism not an independent ideology per se but a mechanism to create a nation 
and society. National formation is a process which is a requirement for the emergence and 
consolidation of modern industry-based states and social organizations of industria. In 
short, for Gellner, nationalism is the sin qua non of capitalism, modernity and 
industrialization. Nationalism is thus not an irrational outburst, but a masterfully planned 
plot to serve for goals totally irrelevant to the ―official‖ goals of nationalism. 
       Gellner‘s modeling of nationalism appears to be impressive and instructive. However, 
what is unpersuasive in Gellner‘s account is its all-encompassing explanatory nature. The 
model is so perfect, so convincing and comprehensive, that it generates the suspicion that 
somewhere something is missing; it does not leave much room for contingency and 
variation. Although Gellner‘s general modeling is impressive, his presentation of 
nationalism as a rational and coldly calculated ideology that was hijacked for ends other 
than its declared claims remains too deterministic, concealing nuances and distinctions.
49
  
                                                 
48
 For Gellner‘s suggested modelling of human history, see Gellner, Ernest, Plough, Sword 
and Book: The Structure of Human History, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. 
49
 Gregory Jusdanis rejects the Gellnerian market-state-centered logic explanation of the 
emergence of nationalism in favor of a ―culturalist‖ alternative explanation. ―I argue that 
nationalism developed in the latter eighteenth century for two reasons. First, the far 
reaching transformations accompanying modernity brought about a profound interaction 
among populations. Although cultural and economic exchanges had always been part of 
human history, in the modern age this intercourse began to threaten the ethnic identities of 
regional groups more than had been the case with the polyethnic empires of the Antiquity 
and the Middle Ages. Capitalism, colonialism, and new means of communication and 
transportation pulled distant places closer together and mixed their populations, 
endangering thereby their cultural existence. The intensity and scope of contact among the 
world‘s peoples engendered a deep interest in the collective self and the separation of this 
self from others. The more people confronted groups beyond their frontiers and borrowed 
from them, the more the differences between those inside and outside were emphasized.‖ 
Jusdanis, Gregory, The Necessary Nation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. 
5-6. For the birth of Turkish nationalism, a reconciliation of these two approaches may be 
established. First of all, material considerations, to save the state which represented and 
affirmed the pride and exaltation of its kinship, played a prominent role. This urge did arise 
both from ―culturalistic‖ reasons (self-respect, pride, identity-formation, expression of the 
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and uphold the group‘s privileged status). The emergence of Turkish nationalism is a 
problematique for a Gellnerian approach because the Ottoman context lacks a market-
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       More recent historians in particular and social scientists in general had contemplated 
on the meaning of believing in belonging to a nation and the experience of discovering a 
nation. With the ―cultural turn‖ new generation of scholars of nationalism and comparative 
nationalism rehabilitated basic premises of Kedourie and refashioned them within the 
perspectives of ―new intellectual history‖ and ―new cultural history‖. Since Gadamer‘s 
―Truth and Method‖50, ―meaning‖ gained a prominence as the ultimate explanatory 
concept to comprehend the complexity of modern society and the making of modernity. In 
a sense, this shift can be seen as a return to Kedourie. However, the recent anthropological 
approach, rejecting the conventional ―history of ideas‖ perspective situating ―nationalism‖ 
belonging to the realm of ideas, focuses more on the context in which people are enforced 
and constrained to contemplate on their identity, their self and their relation to the outer 
world. In recent studies, the principal subject of inquiry focused on individuals and their 
appropriation of the outer world rather than anonymous masses.
51
 As historical 
anthropology developed, the cosmologies of individuals such as the miller Menocchio 
became objects of inquiry and interest.
52
  
     Recent social scientists and historians sought to answer how a socio-political vision 
(named nationalism) may be engendered as an end to this ―existential‖ quest. Accordingly, 
the idea of nation may be viewed as inseparable from individuals‘ and group‘s encounter 
with modernity. The birth and development of nationalism cannot be dissociated from the 
unprecedented transformations individuals faced. It may be argued that, nationalism was 
received by these individuals and groups as a revelation to explain the perplexing and 
petrifying developments observed which individuals and groups failed to comprehend. 
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Thus, we can further argue that, in an age of uncertainity, nationalism provided relief, 
certitude and confidence. It may be seen as a comprehensive answer given to all 
unknowns, thus resolving all ambiguities and obscurities, an action at once comparable to 
the cutting of the Gordion knot by Alexander the Great.  
       Recent studies also approached nationalism as a constitutive element of modernity 
rather than an outcome of modernity.
53
 Accordingly, nationalism was neither a bastard of 
modernity nor its side effect. It was not the collateral damage of modernity. According to 
this view, something rather quintessential was present in the nature of nationalism.  
      With ―modernity,‖ a mechanistic transformation is not implied. Rather, by modernity, 
we understand a redefinition of the perception of the relation of man to nature, the relation 
of man to other men, and of man to society. Among other outcomes, modernity is the 
emergence of a new meaning of personal and social existence. Thus, it is an 
anthropological experience as much as a social and political development. The ideas of 
nation and of belonging to a nation are also upshots of the drastic alteration of social 
meaning and existence. This is not to claim that nationalism is a natural and automatic 
process that comes with the new configuration of meaning of man. On the contrary, the 
new structures of meaning were created, maintained or at least buttressed by the emerging 
modern states. According to this approach, a new interpretation of nationalism is necessary 
without reducing nationalism to a dependent function of the modern nation-state, industrial 
capitalism, or mass education. The simple question we have to answer is that why do 
people tend to feel to belong to a nationhood or why they tend to accept/affirm the 
ideological infiltration of the state-sponsored or intelligentsia-sponsored idea of nationhood 
and nationalism ? 
       For our purposes, we also have to ask the question as to why the 19th century 
European intellectuals were disposed to imagine and discover a nation for themselves. 
After questioning the reality of nationhood, then we have to address the question why the 
construct of nationhood was so foundational in the development of 19
th
 century social, 
cultural and political developments. 
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       Very simply put, we may speak of two different types of nations in the 19th century 
Europe: those nations with their state in power and those nations without their states.
54
 
With regard to the first type, a scholar may study how the idea of nationhood was forged 
around an already existing state. Many studies investigated the emergence of a national 
idea in countries such as England and France where preexisting states became associated 
with a national essence and identity.
55
 In other countries, national ideas and sense of 
nationhood developed before the organization and consolidation of modern states. A sense 
of nation was pursued and developed in countries such as Greece and Russia relatively late 
and parallel to the organization and consolidation of a modern state where state 
consciously enforced an ideological project.
56
  
       A study investigating the emergence of nationalism in countries such as England and 
France would involve a survey of the state and the bureaucracy because in these examples 
the fiction of nationhood was forged with the active involvement and vanguard role of the 
state while the background of this endeavor was already prepared within an ideological 
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setting. With regard to the second category where the emergence of a ―sense of nation‖ 
preceded the emergence of a state, nationalism was more or less an intellectual activity and 
a ―curiosity‖ turned into ―political‖. It was a ―fantasy‖ that was subsequently politically 
came into being. The Greek, Bulgarian, Romanian, Czech discourses of nations can be 
given as examples to this category. In the first category, the states forged an idea; whereas 
in the second, ideas appear to have forged states. For example it was the sense of being a 
Czech (and Slovak) that to an important extent enabled the foundation of Czechoslovakia.  
        In comparison to the abovementioned models, the Turkish/Ottoman trajectory follows 
rather an idiosyncratic path. In the Ottoman case, an idea took over an already existing 
state. Moreover, the conspicuous situation in the Ottoman Empire is that the state 
bureaucracy and the intellectual elite are mostly indistinguishable. Therefore, in the 
Ottoman/Turkish case, the ―nation‖ may be both an intellectual fantasy and a political 
imposition at the same time.   
       Why does ―an intellectual‖ need to belong to a nation and furthermore dedicate his life 
for a fictitious nation ? Certainly ―nation‖ is an idea which has emerged within a certain 
social context, and since ideas can be meaningful only within the framework of social 
contexts, intellectual quests may be contextualized in their social/historical settings.   
       Here, primordialist theories of nationalism provide some assistance to us. As is well-
known, Anthony Smith and others claimed that nations existed prior to the modern age. 
John Armstrong, in his survey book discussing the ethnics within the gigantic scene of 
history throughout centuries, claimed that nations do exist before nationalism.
57
 Anthony 
Smith wrote: 
 
―…ethnie and nations are not fixed and immutable entities ―out there‖ (not even the 
nationalist thought so); but nor are they completely malleable and fluid processes and 
attitudes, at the mercy of every outside force. To interpret them as masks and channels 
of ―real‖ social forces or the cultural surface of anatomical structures beneath, is to 
miss the independent role and originating power of ethnic identities and ethnic 
cleveages.....(h)ence the need to take the ethnic roots of modern nationalism seriously, 
and give due weight to those myths, memories and symbols that can ignite 
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populations and mobilize them for assault on the precarious balance of forces that 
hold the regional systems of state together.‖58 
 
In other words, for Smith, the ethnic symbols, myths and the very ethnicities themselves 
constituted a reservoir of material to be utilized for other goals. However, this does not 
mean that ethnie is a blank sheet to be filled freely. The ethnie has its own genuinity and 
autonomy. The genuinity of the ethnie as a value limits the extents of manipulation as well. 
Ethnies are not simply words of Humpty-Dumpty meaning whatever the nationalist meant 
to be.  
       In the light of the Smithian perspective, what did ―nationhood‖ mean for the ruling 
(and intellectual) elite in the context of the Ottoman Empire ? The Ottoman case 
exemplifies neither the first (nations with states) nor the later version (nations without 
states) of the two ―types of emerging nationhoods‖. The Ottoman ruling elite had its state 
but this state was to be reclaimed and reshaped. It had to be charged with new attributes 
and meanings. As Smith pointed out, there is no one objective and single notion of 
ethnicity and nation, thus lacking one definite meaning. It may signify different meanings 
in each historical context, continuously shaped and reshaped in interaction with various 
dynamics that are also in constant change. The dynamics that shape the makings of 
nationhoods are not necessarily domestic. International factors may be as influential as are 
domestic factors as apparent in the development of Turkish nationalism. In the end, some 
of the competing meanings of ―nation‖s arise amongst others, due to suitable intellectual 
and realpolitik conditions. 
 
 
1.2. Imperial Nationalism vs. Ethnic Nationalism 
 
       The ―creation of the Turkish identity/nationhood‖ will tell us not about a certain 
(social and political) reality but about a mental set derived from a certain preexisting 
structure of mentality. All nationhoods began their careers as an idea before they became a 
reality.  
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       Abigail Green begins her book Fatherlands with a quote from Heinrich von Kleist‘s 
German Catechism (1809). ―In his ‗German Cateschism‘, Kleist envisages a confrontation 
between a Saxon father and his German son. ‗I am a German‘, the son declares. ‗A 
German‘ his father cries. ‗You must be joking. You were born in Meissen, and Meissen is 
in Saxony !‘ ‗I was born in Meissen‘ the son replies ‗and Meissen is indeed in Saxony; but 
my fatherland, the country to which Saxony belongs, is Germany-and your son, my father, 
is a German.‘ But the father remains unconvinced. ‗Where is this Germany ?‘ he asks. He 
cannot find it on the map
59.‖ This anectode is probably one of the earliest examples of the 
clash of generations; the radical son revolting against his conservative father; a popular 
theme of the 19th century European literature and imagination. The anecdote also 
resembles the late Ottoman overlapping of identities. One can easily replace the ―Saxon‖ 
with the ―Ottoman‖ and ―German‖ with the ―Turk‖ to adapt it to the Ottoman context (later 
to meet the Teuton and Turanian dyad as well). However, Green criticizes the conventional 
historiography of 19
th
 century Germany and those who assume the anecdote of Kleist as 
sheer reality. She asserts that, rather than a break, German nationalism displays continuity. 
―The book (Green‘s book-DG) attempts to establish how national Germany was before 
unification and how federal it remained thereafter.‖60 
       Same criticism may be leveled against the conventional historiography of 19
th
 century 
Ottoman historiography and Turkish nationalism. The conventional historiography dates 
the emergence of Turkish nationalism to the era of the Young Turks
61
. According to this 
narrative, the idea of Turkishness emerged in the minds of Young Turks in the first decade 
of 20
th
 century when they were in opposition in the Hamidian era. The idea came to power 
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with the 1908 Revolution. One dissenting interpretation, however, had been proposed as 
early as 1977 by David Kushner. In his book, he demonstrated the prevalence of Turkism 
as early as the era of Abdülhamid II62. Interestingly, the Turkists of Kushner were not 
revolutionaries or upstarts unlike the Turkist Young Turks. On the contrary, Kushner‘s 
Turkists were established figures writing in the harmless dailies of Istanbul and publishing 
articles approved by the censor of Abdülhamid II‘s censor. In short, in their intellectual 
orientations, they were men of different stock than were the Young Turks and in their class 
background. Although Kushner‘s study did not capture attention in his day, later studies of 
Turkish nationalism did begin to date the emergence of Turkish nationalism at an earlier 
date.
63
 This observation also requires questioning the alleged sharp dichotomy between the 
Hamidian generation/establishment and the Young Turk generation in their intellectual 
orientations. Dating the emergence of a ―certain idea of Turkishness‖ to an earlier date is 
not only a matter of chronological precision. It also requires us to question the main 
premises and features of Turkish nationalism. The redefinition of Turkish nationalism 
acknowledges the intertwining of various coexisting and sometimes contradicting 
dispositions, ideologies and leanings in its very emergence.  
       The presumed characteristics of the two variants of nationalism/national awareness 
(Hamidian versus Young Turk) differ in many ways. The Young Turks were busy 
―inventing‖ a nation ex nihilo in their image. Conversely, the earlier imperial generation 
was mending the society (Muslim society in process of being imagined as a Nation) into 
the already existing imperial identity and into an imagination of social order. The nation 
was to serve a certain purpose. That is to say; the nationalism of the earlier generation was 
a ―matter of state‖ although it is not claimed that that was intentionally and consciously 
done. In the perception of the Hamidian dignitaries, the Nation is submissive, hiearchically 
organized community. Nevertheless, within this framework; ―the Ottoman Empire hedged 
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towards a ‗nationally imagined community‘ as Ottoman identity assumed an increasingly 
Turkish character, even if this identity was packaged in universalist Islamic terms.‖64 
       However, whatever the differences between the two strands of nationalism may have 
been, there was no simple process of replacement of the one with the other. On the 
contrary, the social imagination and premises of the Hamidian generation was prominent in 
the formation of the nationalism of the Young Turks. In this study, it has been argued that, 
the Young Turks took over many propositions of the earlier generation as indispensable 
tenets of their imagination of the Turkish nation and Turkish nationalism which they were 
professing to invent. Turkish nationalism was constituted as a state project although not 
necessarily planned so intentionally. It is also interesting to observe that dating the 
emergence of a full-fledged nationalist discourse to the Young Turks was first developed 
by the Young Turks themselves (presenting themselves as the generators of a national 
awareness in contrast to the corrupt Hamidian ancient regime) and the assumptions of 
historiography derived from this ideological maneuver (which was further consolidated by 
the Kemalist/republican historiography).   
       The very early historiography on the emergence of Turkish nationalism developed 
after the World War II within the modernization paradigm insisted on establishing a 
dichotomy between Turkish ethnic nationalism and imperial Ottomanism.
65
 In fact, these 
accounts were heavily influenced by Young Turks‘ discrediting Ottomanism and 
presenting it as a naïve and almost effeminate paradigm. Here, ―imperial Ottomanism‖ is 
not taken as the official Ottomanism propagating the equality of subjects of the Empire 
regardless of religion. Apparently, the Ottoman center was not a neutral site but biased 
disproportionately towards an Islamic and Turkish identity.
66
 By ―imperial Ottomanism‖, 
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we refer to the ideological/political orientation prioritizing the imperial interests and 
having imperial reflexes in contrast to the Turkist reflexes of the later generation which 
would prioritize the explicit interests of the Turkish nation. This dichotomy assumes as the 
imperial Ottomanism had became defunct and succumbed without leaving any trace. This 
simplification derives from the very categorization Young Turks themselves formulated. 
The caricature of Ottomanism by Young Turks (and the non-Muslim and non-Turkish 
intellectuals) obliterated the significance and possibilities of Ottomanism. The gradual 
secularization, radicalization and ethnicization of the Turkish nationalism between early 
years of 1900s and early 1910s obscured the transitions, linkages and interwining between 
imperial nationalism and ethnic Turkish nationalism.
67
 In a sense, Yusuf Akçura‘s 
breakthrough article ―Three Modes of Politics‖ [Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset] published in the Young 
Turk journal ―Türk‖ in Egypt in 1904 determined the course of Ottoman studies, 
persuading the practitioners of it to assume that (secular and radical) Turkism was the only 
feasible ideology, the only one capable to adapt to the modern times in a somewhat 
Darwinian logic.  
       Interestingly, Akçura in his ―Three Modes of Politics‖ himself does not speak of three 
mutually exclusive ―modes‖ of politics (i.e. ideologies) but seems to blend them. 
Furthermore he is ambivalent in opting for one among the three options.
68
 He is a 
pragmatic Turkish patriot urging for strategies to save the Empire rather than urging for 
ideologies. Ideologies are a secondary concern for Akçura.69  
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       For Akçura, Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism were all ―ideal types‖ because he had 
written his text in a relatively early date when Turkism was not yet seen as a predatory 
ideology destined to monopolize the ideological scene by eliminating its rivals as an iron 
law of history. 1904 was too early to realize that ethnic nationalism would turn into the 
inevitable ideology of the future whereas the others were destined to collapse. But it turned 
out to be so. Turkish nationalism (in its particular form) succeeded to present itself as the 
only viable and popularly feasible ideology. In this study, the extent of this success, the 
contradictions between Turkish nationalism‘s self-presentation, and its actuality will be 
investigated. It will be claimed in this study, following several other studies of the past two 
decades, that Turkish nationalism has its peculiarities and distinctivenesses deriving from 
what it had inherited from its Ottoman/imperial heritage. Turkish nationalism neither 
resembles state-centred ―Western nationalisms‖ nor is idea-centred ―Eastern 
nationalisms‖.70 Rather, Turkish nationalism is an imperial nationalism with its distinct 
features and background. Apparently, such ―peculiarities‖ are not unique to Turkish 
nationalism. The riddle of nationalism is that nationalism is a general label/code word used 
to define various distinct evolutions of certain imaginations that do not necessarily 
resemble each other. As Anne McClintock aptly states, ―nationalisms are invented, 
performed and consumed in ways that do not follow a blueprint.‖71 Likewise, as expressed 
by Partha Chatterjee, they don‘t ―follow ‗script already written‘ but they are projects of 
individual national imaginations.‖72 Therefore, with regard to Turkish nationalism, our 
work is to expose what social/cultural/class-related attributes Turkish nationalism evokes 
under the rubric of nationalism and the national imagination. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Bilmem siyasi işlerde, fırsatları değerlendirmekten (oportuniste‟)likten daha doğru, daha 
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1.3. Development of an “Official Nationalism” at the Otttoman Center 
 
       Nationalism was an ―import‖ into Ottoman lands. The use of the word ―import‖ may 
sound rather odd as if it were a commodity. However, nationalism was in fact an ―import‖ 
in the sense that the arrival of the word ―nationalism‖ preceded the arrival of nationalism 
as a social-political reality. The concept of ―nationalism‖ had been learned as a textbook 
concept before it had been encountered in its mature form manifested resembling its 
European versions disregarding the proto-nationalist popular movements preceding the 
European-style nationalisms observable within the Ottoman geography beginning from the 
early 19
th
 century. The South Eastern European intellectuals marveled with the ideas and 
worlds of the Enlightenment which had developed their national identities and transformed 
Balkan peasant rebellions into national revolts and awakenings.
73
     
       The approach of the Ottoman ruling elite towards the Balkan nationalities was very 
―technical‖ not unlike their approach to the concept of ―nationalism‖ itself. Ahmed Cevdet 
Pasha (1823-1895), the conservative reformist statesman and one of the emblematic figures 
of the culture of the 19
th
 century Ottoman imperial elite, wrote that these Balkan 
nationalities had taken the motive of nationhood from the West as if it was an imported 
commodity. He also noted that ―nationalism is an outcome of French Revolution‖ as he 
copied down the French historians‘ accounts covering the French Revolution without 
contemplating on the dynamics and origins of this novel phenomenon called nationalism. 
Ahmed Cevdet Pasha held a rather negative opinion of nationalism. He wrote that there is 
no equivalent of the word ―nation‖ in the Ottoman vocabulary. According to him ―vatan‖ 
(patrie) implies just the village square and has no capability to motivate the soldiers, 
whereas ―Islam‖ provides a far better motivation for waging war.74 However, Ahmed 
Cevdet Pasha‘s usage of ―Islam‖ was also ―national‖. For him, Islam was a political cause 
                                                 
73
 Kitromilides, Paschalis M, ―The Enlightenment East and West: A Comparative 
Perspective on the Ideological Origins of the Balkan Political Traditions‖, in Canadian 
Review of Studies in Nationalism 10, no: 1, 1983, p. 64. 
74
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to be pursued not limited, to the ―other world,‖ but also related to this world. Islam was 
what is just, good, and simply the pillar of the ideal political order for Ahmed Cevdet 
Pasha. This mental background was the reason for his disparagement for Balkan 
nationalisms. For Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, Balkan insurgencies were no more than brutal and 
barbaric banditry, failing to surrender to the perfect and just political order of the abode of 
Islam as practiced by the Ottoman polity.
75
  
       In the perception of the Ottoman elite, Bulgarians, Greeks or Serbians were not equal 
to the imperial Ottomans. The emerging nationalisms of these Balkan nations were only 
expressions of rapaciousness and arrogant and uncivilized sentiments of these nations. 
Contrary to the obnoxious nature of the Balkan nations, Ottoman Empire symbolized the 
ultimate goodness and righteousness. Thus, its use of force was legitimate and served for a 
higher ideal. These were the premises of the imperial discourse elaborated against the 
unruly Balkan nationalisms. Given that, Balkan nationalisms to a certain degree emanated 
from rural banditry and were reactions of the Christian villagers to their subordinate status 
vis-à-vis their Muslim landlords before it had been given nationalist twists in Bulgaria, in 
Serbia, in Bosnia, the perception of the imperial discourse was not too wrong. 
      The Ottoman imperial vision took for granted that the Ottoman polity was inherently 
superior to the ―unhistorical nations‖ of the Balkans. The Ottoman imperial vision did not 
acknowledge any agency to the Balkan nations.
76
 As Ebru Boyar rightfully pointed out in 
her book, the perception of Ottomans ―represented the Balkans very much within the 
centre-periphery paradigm, assigning no concept of ‗sentient being‘ to the areas of the 
periphery whose very existence depended not on their own aspirations and actions but on a 
centre, be it Istanbul or elsewhere....although nationalism came to be used more and more 
in the interpretations of the later Ottoman historians and, especially, of those of the early 
Republic, essentially the late nineteenth-century understanding....of the uprisings remained 
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framed within the centre-periphery paradigm.‖77 The traditional Turkish/Kemalist 
historiography attributed this perception to the mental backwardness of the nineteenth-
century Ottomans, their inability to comprehend contemporary ideological developments. 
However, more recent studies pointed out to other motivations for Ottomans‘ 
denouncement of Balkan nationalisms. It did not derive out of being not in touch with the 
latest developments but out of its imperial discourse and worldview.  
     In fact, a striking discursive continuity exists from the narrative of Ahmed Cevdet 
regarding the depiction of the Balkan nationalist uprisings in the official Kemalist 
discourse in terms of denying them any agency in their exploits.
78
 The Kemalist 
historiography reiterates the imperial assumptions and assumes that these Balkan rebels 
might be only manipulated by the Russians (or other foreign powers)
79
. The Ottoman 
ruling elite did not recognize any legitimacy for the banditry in the Balkans to claim 
political authority for themselves.
80
 This perception is in contradistinction to the self-
victimizing perception of the Unionist and Kemalist nationalisms which portrayed Turks as 
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oppressed and in retreat and Balkan nationalists as arrogant and aggressive. However, the 
republican perception may be interpreted as a consequence of the change of the 
conjunctures and not as a modification in ideological outlook. Yet, if we agree to establish 
a link from Ahmed Cevdet Pasha to the Turkish nationalism of the coming decades, we 
also need to acknowledge a continuity from the post-classical Ottoman historians to 
Ahmed Cevdet Pasha. Ahmed Cevdet Paşa in his Tarih, in his Tezakir and in his other 
works reiterates the premises and contours of the age-old Ottoman discourse, which relies 
on the Islamic law and Islamic notion of polities
81
, claiming the absolute legitimacy to rule 
over the territories already seized and ruling over its subjects without necessarily paying 
attention to their considerations. The mercilessness of premodernity and the naturalization 
of violence (as long as it is just) is also prevalent in Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, reminiscent of 
his predecessors. Once the subject races revolted, the Islamic âmân (―mercy‖) was to be 
abandoned and being in a ―situation of war‖ the life of any rebellious subject was no more 
to be maintained.
82
 Therefore, a dehumanizing discourse was maintained based on classical 
Islamic and pre-modern premises prevailed in the modernizing 19
th
 century. 
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       The transformation of the Ottoman perception with regard to its taking care of its 
subject and the endorsement of the discourse of the modern benevolent state was visible as 
early as the reign of II Mahmud.
83
 Although to claim to serve its subjects and maintain 
their prosperity and security was present in the premodern political rhetoric and was a 
pivotal part of the Islamic (and therefore Ottoman) conception of law and governance
84
, 
the modern understanding that acknowledges its subjects as individual citizens and 
perceives the duties of the state not as graceful benevolence but a social responsibility was 
novel. Moreover, the enhancement of state capacities ensured the interference of the state 
to lives of individuals directly and indirectly. The changing perception of the Ottoman 
polity was manifested in various occasions such as in the tour of the Grand Vizier Kıbrıslı 
Mehmet Emin Pasha in Bulgaria (who also planned to visit Macedonia but cancelled the 
trip due to the emergency situation in Lebanon) in 1861 to listen the complaints of its 
Christian subjects
85
 although ―visits‖ to distant areas as far as Varna began with Mahmud 
II and Mehmet Emin Pasha‘s visit was only the most comprehensive and most publicized 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Islamic political culture, the non-Muslim subjects were not regarded as fully human 
beings deserving a dignity but captives whose right to life were recognized conditionally. 
In many ways, this language may be seen as dehumanizing the non-Muslims. However, 
such a judgment would not be correct because dehumanization refers to a normality in 
which humans are not seen as individuals with complete control over their bodies. 
Apparently, in premodernity there was no such perception. The persistence of this 
dehumanizing discourse in Tanzimat can not be regarded as the ―persistence of old regime‖ 
but should be perceived as an integral part of the Ottoman modernization experience. This 
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one.
86
 Nevertheless, this new sensibility and ―rhetoric of inclusion‖ did not terminate the 
prevailing ―rhetoric of exclusion‖. Instead, we observe the coexistence of these two 
contradictory discourses. The Islamic dehumanization of non-Muslims did not die out. 
Rather, it adapted itself and went along with an inclusive rhetoric towards the non-Muslims 
as long as they kept their loyalty. This conditional ―rhetoric of inclusion‖ would be pursued 
as long as the aspirations of non-Muslims would not challenge the notions and premises of 
Islamic hierarchy, morality, justice and order.  
       Ahmed Cevdet Pasha‘s perception of the French Revolution may be read along the 
same imperial rhetoric. His negative attitude towards the French Revolution
87
 did not arise 
from the fact that he was, as an "old Turk‖, imperceptive to the latest European currents 
and developments but due to his class/status origins.
88
 Apparently, he was alarmed with the 
revolution not only for the Ottoman polity but for the European order in general. He was an 
aristocrat in the sense that he was a member of the semi-closed and privileged community 
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of the Muslim state elite. He happened to be also an ethnic Turk. These two identities of 
his were intertwined:  being an ethnic Turk was associated with membership in the state 
nobility.
89
 Many ethnic Turks might be denied this privilege and despised as vulgar masses 
but still being an ethnic Turks (and being a Muslim from different origins to a lesser 
extent) was relatively advantageous for incorporation to the state elite. It could be claimed 
that a peculiar Turkish national identity was born from this overlapping. This identity 
implied a certain notion of superiority (millet-i hakime), not only vis-a-vis the non-Turks 
but vis-a-vis the ethnic Turkish masses as well
90
. The separation was established between 
those who were almost divinely ordained to rule and those who were supposed to be 
submissive (Muslim masses and non-Muslims) to those who were morally superior (the 
Muslim/Turkified imperial elite). The imperial identity was forged not based on ethnic 
lines but with implications for its ethnicity. Similarly, imperial identity was not strictly 
exclusive but open to those comfortable with the imperial premises including the non-
Muslims.   
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       The concept of millet-i hakime appeared in the first half of the 19
th
 century as a 
reaction to the rise of non-Muslim nationalities, probably inspired by the Habsburg 
Herrenvolk
91
 idea and the Germans‘ self-perception in the Habsburg Empire.92 This 
concept denotes the development of what Benedict Anderson calls ―official nationalism93‖ 
imbued with a nationalized imperial identity. The racist doctrines of late 19th century 
Europe were far away from the mindset of the Ottoman imperial elite although such a 
linkage might be tangible to the Young Turk thought. Whereas the racist doctrine is 
egalitarian, equalizing any member of the racial community/ethnicity, the Ottoman 
imperial identity and the idea of nationhood was flamboyantly elitist and inegalitarian.    
        It had been suggested that the future racist nationalism of Germany had emanated 
from the European-wide colonial thought which divides society into two, i.e. those who are 
destined to be subjugated and those destined to rule. It has been argued by scholars such as 
Deringil and Makdisi that European colonialist discourse influenced the 19th century 
Ottoman political governance and ideology.
94
 Apparently, we observe several 
manifestations of the impact of the European political visions and terminology on Ottoman 
political culture such as the term and notion of millet-i hakime (which was refashioned 
with a new content by the Young Turks as boldly articulated by Hüseyin Cahid in his 
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notorious article ―Millet-i Hakime‖ in Tanin in 1908 and transmitted to the Young Turk 
generation and the secular and ethnicized Turkish nationalism and subsequently to the 
practices and premises of the republic vis-à-vis the non-Muslim minorities95).  
    Given that the new generation of historians established that the early modern European 
state formation was pivotal in the making of the modern state and paradigms of 
governance
96
, the reception of these structures of governance and the ideological settings 
by the Ottoman Empire had to be relocated to an earlier date. Thus, we can argue that the 
Turkish nationalist discourse was simultaneously influenced from the hierarchical premises 
of both modern and premodern imaginations and visions of political order. On the one 
hand, the 19
th
 century colonialist visions that presupposed the superiority of the 
―enlightened ones‖ impacted nascent Turkish nationalism. On the other hand, hierarchy 
and order were two of the principal ethical premises of classical Ottoman polity 
appropriated by the later generations also receptive to early modern and modern influences 
-both deriving from domestic origins and imported from the European patterns-. Thus, the 
hierarchy in its established form based not necessarily on acquired but inherited merits was 
one of the founding stones of the 19th century Ottoman ideology; furthermore, this specific 
ideological formation was derived from different and sometimes contradicting sources.     
 
 
1.4. Discovery of a Nation for a State and for an Intelligentsia 
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       Within this hierarchical order paradigm, it is argued that, the Ottoman ruling elite 
―discovered‖ Turks and ―Muslims‖ as a community with which it can identify itself in 
response to two different challenges. The first was the challenge of a series of non-Muslim 
unrests shattering the Ottoman imperal authority severely. The second was the 
encroachment of the European great powers on the Empire. The unchallengeable military 
and diplomatic supremacy of Europe exerted a severe pressure on the Ottomans forcing 
them to encounter the European powers. It may be argued that, a self-identity was 
developed in response to these emerging perceived threats. These perceived threats 
enforced the imperial center not only to develop new mechanisms of legitimacy but also to 
engender new self-identities. The discovery of a religio-ethnic community in its road to the 
discovery of Turkishness could be located within the historical context of these grim 
realities and pressures.  
       We speculated that, in the beginning, the idea of a certain proto-nationhood was an 
imperial project ―discovered‖ by the ruling elite, not necessarily overlapping with an 
ethnical understanding of nationhood. This argument is not surprising at all given that the 
process was more or less similar in some other cases, especially in the Eastern European 
examples (in the hands of ―intellectuals‖ in the lack of a ―ruling class‖).97 However, we 
have to bear in mind that the Ottoman Empire retained its religious/imperial identity while 
discovering and developing a certain proto-nationhood for itself. Moreover, it is important 
to reiterate that at least before the 1860s, there is no possibility about speaking of an 
intellectual elite independent from the state. The Turkish/Muslim intelligentsia was hardly 
distinguishable from the state elite. No Habermasian intellectual ―public sphere‖ 
independent from the political realm and political authority emerged in the 
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Ottoman/Turkish centre (especially until 1908).
98
 Furthermore, the emergence of a public 
sphere outside the state did not bring an ―emancipation‖ of the intellectual elite from the 
political authority as occured in Russia with the emergence of a totally new class known as 
―raznochintsy‖. The latter one distinguished itself and its interests from the state and the 
classes whose interests were strictly dependent on the state. The raznochintsy, a class 
composed of graduates of colleges who were devoid of the prospect of quick advancement 
in the civil service and therefore alienated from the state-centered prospects of life and 
worldview, did develop its own knowledge, its own values and value system independent 
of the state. Therefore the raznochinsty nurtured its own public sphere and spaces of free 
public discussion such as literary journals and publishing networks.
99
 Contrary to the 
process of the emergence and development of the intelligentsia in Russia, Ottoman 
intelligentsia did not break away from imperial paternalism. On the contrary, it associated 
its interests and prospects with the interests and prospects of the state. The Ottoman 
intelligentsia, in terms of its members‘ occupations, wealth and lineages (blood lines as 
well as genealogies not based on blood lines) continued to be wedded around the state. The 
question of the destiny of the Ottoman state continued to be the central preoccupation of 
the elite as their assets relied on the well-being of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, it was 
their concern regarding the fate of the political authority in which they had faith that 
motivated them to endeavor for a community/nation.
100
 Thus, the Ottoman/Turkish 
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intellectual sphere was more or less a function of the state and the knowledge they 
produced could not be disassociated from the state including the knowledge they produced 
with regard to nation and ethnicity. Therefore, although the impact of Balkan nationalism 
was considerable, the Turkish intellectuals‘ discovery of the proto-nationhood and ethnie 
was a rather different experience from their East European counterparts. Their discovery 
was molded to a major extent within an imperial discourse.  
       At the same time, it is possible to talk about the actuality and historicity of a ―Turkish 
ethnie‖ a la Anthony Smith. By Turkish ethnie, we mean those Sunni Muslim populations 
who either spoke Turkish or who identified in their minds Sunni Islam with Turkishness. 
Furthermore, it could be claimed that there existed an implicit self-consciousness (based on 
linguistic and cultural distinctions) among the Turkish-speaking population who felt to a 
certain degree that they belonged to a certain community which distinguished them from 
the Albanians in Macedonia and from the Kurds, Arabs and others in Eastern Anatolia and 
in the Levante. It could be anticipated that with the improvement of communications, 
transportation and enhancement of the awareness of the existence of a world beyond their 
localities, a feeling of belonging that surpassed people‘s localities would emerge. 
However, this was not a natural and an inevitable process but rather a constructed one 
which was foremost political (rather than social or cultural).  
       Furthermore, it is more accurate to speak of various Turkish ethnies (or proto-nations) 
that shared a similar language and accumulated a shared memory transmitted in the courses 
of generations throughout centuries. However, the existence of common traits does not rule 
out the potentiality of separate nations-in making. It was the marginalization and 
trivialization of differences and nuances which together with the exposure and emphasizing 
of commonalities and resemblances that engendered the imagination of a single Turkish 
nation. Among these potential Turkish nations-in-making, the Roumelian community was 
arguably raised to betray the main attributes of the emerging Turkish nation in the eyes of 
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its spiritual founders; what we have called the Young Turk generation.
101
 The rise of 
Roumelians was arguably fundamental due to two factors; Balkans‘ relative openness to 
the impact of the West and its position as a war zone in a combat in which Turks were on 
defensive. Thus, we may suggest that, the modern imagination and construction of the 
Turkish nationhood (Turkish nationhood ―as we know it today‖) was very much shaped by 
the individual/communal experiences of 19th century Roumelian Turks.  
       Therefore, it may be argued that, a significant factor in the forging of the imagination 
of a ―certain‖ Turkish nationhood was the Roumelian origin of the Young Turk generation. 
These Young Turks rose up from the opportunity of a good education and were able to 
subsequently join the Ottoman bureaucracy based on their distinguishing merits (besides 
all others belonging to the same generational cluster and coming from all the parts of 
Ottoman Empire benefiting the educational opportunities provided by the imperial 
schooling system).  
        This is not to say that they ―invented‖ the Turkish nation in their image. On the 
contrary, the origins of Turkish nationalism went further back before Roumelian recruits 
modified it. Here, I would prefer to use the word ―nationalism‖ rather than ―Turkish 
nationalism‖ because the sentiment of nationalism is not simply a matter of discriminating 
and privileging ethnies. Beyond referring to ethnies, nationalism is fundamentally a feeling 
of belonging expressed within the discourse of ethnicities establishing the inner and outer 
groups upon ethnic differences. However, nationalism can not be reduced simply to a 
matter of ethnicities. Indeed, nationalisms address loyalties beyond ethnicities. It is not 
easy to distinguish between coexisting loyalties and isolate one of them. The very 
fundamental reference of nationalism is the concept of ―we‖.102 In this framework of 
conceptualization, the antagonist is ―they‖.  
       In the Ottoman/Turkish context, it may be explicable to use the word ―they‖ rather 
than ―other‖. Before the 19th century, the ―Turks‖ (and ―Muslims‖) did know the ―others‖ 
without necessarily ―otherizing‖ them as ―they‖. This was because they did not previously 
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perceive a ―threat‖ from them. ―Other‖ was safely distant and unthreatening to ―us‖ never 
posing the danger of mingling with ―us‖. In the old order, everybody knew their place, as 
did non-Muslims. The passing of the old order severely shattered the non-Muslim 
communities as well. Once the old hierarchical order was shattered, the non-Muslim 
entities became legitimate rivals with equal or higher chances to outdo Muslims in a free 
(and Darwinian) competition
103
. The process of realizing the competitive advantages of the 
outsiders of yesterday became the cement of the emergence of an awareness of belonging 
to a community for Muslims (of Turkish and non-Turkish origin). It may be argued that, as 
the Muslim populace lost its natural/naturalized and inherited superiority, the psychology 
of entrenchment put the seeds of a sense of nationalism in search of an identity.  
       This development was visible in the localities. However, such 
conceptualizations/categorizations were to remain local phenomena unless an external 
force was to be exerted. It was a ―central project‖ to ―politicize‖ these local senses of 
belongings and unite unrelated developments and incorporate them into one single grand 
narrative.
104
 Apparently, ―nation‖ is a political concept by definition. However, it is built 
on non-political themes. It may be ―artificial‖ in its political construction, though this 
political construction builds on genuine non-political concerns and social-economical 
realities. If we define modernity as the politicization of what had been non-political, 
publicization of what had been private; then nationalism was arguably the main protagonist 
of this transformation. 
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       The existence of local rivalries does not necessarily bring out the politicization of the 
concepts of nation and belonging
105
 as well as the form of its politicization
106
 although it is 
a fact that with the advent of the modern age, ―knowledge of human behaviour.... became 
nationalized and universalized. Events that occur in isolated villages and hamlets or on the 
city streets have become subject to placement in categories and contexts previously 
unknown to or incidental to the lives of those who experience them.‖107 We may observe 
that, the ethnic tensions and atrocities in the Balkans before reaching its climax during the 
Balkan Wars established the founding memories of Turkish nationalism. The sufferings 
and the subsequent exiling of the Turkish/Muslim civilians in the Balkan Wars was 
arguably the apex of this process. 
108
        
      Here, a very critical dimension had to be reintroduced. As claimed above, it is not 
possible to speak of the existence of a certain single ―Turkishness‖ within the Ottoman 
geography. ―A certain idea of Turkishness‖ can be constructed along with a certain 
conception of territoriality and the existence of an undisputable center. A well-know 
response of Fuad Pasha to the British ambassador to Constantinople, Stratford Canning as 
quoted in Cevdet Pasha‘s ―Tezakir‖ illustrates this perception:  ―The integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire is founded on four premises. As long as these four premises are retained, 
it progresses. In the absence of any of these premises, it can not be held. These premises 
are as follows: the nation of Islam, the Turkish state, the dynasty of the Ottomans and 
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Istanbul as its capital.‖ (Devlet-i Aliyye dört esas üzere müesses olup bunlar ile her nasıl 
istenilir ise idaresi ve ilerlemesi kabil olur ve bunlardan kangısı nakıs olur ise idare kabil 
olmaz. Dört esas budur. Millet-i islamiyye devlet-i türkiyye salatin-i osmaniyye payitaht-ı 
Istanbul.
109
)  
       To be able to incorporate rivers Vardar and Arax within the same imagination, a deux 
ex machina is necessary. It may be argued that, it was the ―myth of Istanbul‖ around which 
the idea of Ottoman/Turkish imagery/ideal was constructed. It was a pivotal element that 
enabled the flourishment and consolidation of an encompassing Turkishness within a wide 
geographical setting. Apparently, Istanbul symbolized the grandeur of the Ottoman 
imperium. Here, the symbolism of Istanbul can be taken as the ―primacy of politics‖ (i.e. 
external interference of the center) which facilitated the unification of the various strands 
and embodiments of Turkishness. This was yet another instance of the critical role of the 
imperium in the making of the political Turkish ethnie.  
      Thus, the making of the Turkish nation and a single Turkish ethnie eliminating local 
differences was an amalgamation of different processes in progress. It is impossible to 
dissociate any of these constitutive elements of Turkish nation and nationalism. The center 
needed the peripheral forces; however, the peripheral forces were to remain politically 
negligible unless stimulated and manipulated by the center. Regarding the making and 
development of Turkish national awareness and Turkish nationalism, there was no one 
single storyline in progress but different plots developing independently within the 
storyline to be intersected at a later point in time in the storyline. The imperial center was 
the reference point both for the peripheral developers of Turkish nationalism and the 
intellectuals situated in Istanbul and served as the unifier of these different storylines.  
 
 
1.5. Ruling Elite of the Tanzimat 
 
       At this point, it is necessary to undertake an analysis of the Tanzimat ruling elite. In 
order to make such an analysis, a meticulous and extensive work is to be undertaken; here 
two different clusters referring to two different generations, socializations and upbringings, 
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will be proposed. The two clusters proposed are that of the Tanzimat generation and the 
Young Turk generation
110
. These clusters will constitute models similar to the Weberian 
ideal types. In reality, they resemble and overlap with each other as much as they diverge. 
The transformation of the former to the later and transitional figues defying such a 
reductionism and duality are also observable, especially in the outlook of the bureaucrats 
of the late Hamidian era
111
. The complete detachment of these two clusters (generations) 
would only conceal the Tanzimat origins of the Young Turk era. Furthermore, this study 
aims to emphasize the evolution of a structure of mind rather than to assess the 
generational change in terms of ―the revolt of sons against their fathers‖. This study 
focuses on what we will call the ―Tanzimat generation‖ and discusses the ―Young Turk‖ 
generation when necessary. In the next chapters, it will be attempted to be demonstrated 
that, the diplomats of the Hamidian Foreign Ministry were very much representative of 
their Tanzimat generation in their upbringing, socialization and mental structures.  
     We may also divide the Tanzimat generation into two distinctive sub-groups. In our 
scheme, ―the early Tanzimat elite‖ was comprised of the higher echelons of the imperium 
from 1840s onwards who received limited and informal education, lacking professionalism 
and pursuing precarious careers. The Hamidian generation (the other sub-group of the 
Tanzimat generation) displayed the gradual maturation of the Tanzimat elite comprised of 
bureaucrats with more or less formalized educational backgrounds benefiting from the 
educational opportunities provided by the late Tanzimat reforms and holding clearly 
defined public offices and smooth careers. With the Hamidian era, it may be said that, the 
reforms of Tanzimat had widened to encompass the entirely of the state structure. 
Therefore, a modern bureaucracy, structured to a certain degree in terms of merit and 
formal education,   became visible (albeit with limitations) as a gradual development of the 
Tanzimat. However, the nature of the Hamidian bureaucracy has to be qualified. The 19
th
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century bureaucratic culture hardly resembled the 20
th
 century formal and impersonal 
bureaucratic culture. Instead, it relied predominantly on personal connections, thrusts and 
skills acquired less based on formal education but more on cultural socializations. It may 
be observed that the preexisting agrarian-coercive ruling elite reinvented itself as the 
bureaucratic elite and assumed bureaucratic offices.
112
  
       Here, we are using the term, ―ruling elite‖, a rather ambiguous term. This term has to 
be precisely defined. By the term ruling elite, I mean a group of people who had reached 
the higher echelons of the Ottoman polity by merit, blood or mere chance and felt secure to 
transfer their wealth and prestige to their descendents. Şerif Mardin, in his classic book 
convincingly argued that by the time of Tanzimat or by the late reign of Mahmud II, there 
was an emerging self-consciousness and recognition of the idea of being a closed ruling 
elite with proper education and skills that was motivated and felt responsible for the 
maintenance and upholding of the Ottoman polity, taking the ultimate responsibility for the 
destiny of the Ottoman polity from the sultan.
113
  
       This elite was not a hermetically closed community. It allowed and even encouraged 
new recruits. However, that does not mean that it was a completely ―open‖ system 
welcoming any new member emphatically. A very important condition for admission into 
the ruling elite was the capacity and willingness to endorse the necessary mores, code of 
conduct, values and motivations of the governing elite and the state. In short, the new 
recruit had to attain the same ethos. Generally, this requirement did not generate such a 
drastic obstacle because the required education and training did infuse the relevant mores, 
and the new graduates learned not to pose serious challenges to the ideological pillars of 
the state structure. They willingly and enthusiastically assimilated themselves.  
      It is important to observe that many subjects of the sultan were unfavorable candidates 
to be admitted into the state elite due to their inappropriate ethnic, confessional or social 
backgrounds. Though, many from the unfavorable ethnic and communal groups were 
incorporated into the ruling elite, the extent of incorporation among these ―unfavorable 
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groups‖ remained limited. It is possible to imagine that this discrimination tacitly and 
implicitly contributed to the realization of a belonging to a certain (national) identity which 
generates a sympathy with the population with whom they supposedly share the same ethos 
and same (notorious) fate in the context of the collapse of the empire which, incidentally, 
also threatened their material and non-material interests and dignity. The proposition could 
be made that an imagination of a cross-class community sharing commonalities was forged 
in this process.         
       The new recruits faced few practical problems in their conversion and assimilation to 
the state and the state elite. Of course, they were to encounter severe grievances and 
injustices as they were the new recruits to be sidelined and abused by the more privileged 
in the highly corrupted statecraft of the late Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman establishment 
was a conservative/patriarchal polity in which newcomers were not welcomed 
enthusiastically. That is, they were to be admitted to the governing elite although they were 
not acknowledged as equal as others. However, such mistreatments and discriminations 
derived partially from personal rivalries as a consequence of the gerontocratic and 
patriarchal understanding of statecraft which esteemed age and seniority and therefore 
would be outdone with the gradual promotion within the state bureaucracy.  
     On the other hand, the governing elite in the late Ottoman Empire was always ―in the 
making‖ and continued to be ―in making‖ throughout the early republic as the number of 
bureaucrats and the students studying in the imperial colleges of the Empire continued to 
rise exponentially in every generation. Every new generation of officials redefined the 
nature and build up of the Ottoman bureaucracy and polity although never radically 
altering its characteristics. Thus, continuity within changes is visible. The problem of 
failing to inject the ethos to the new recruits arose in the late Hamidian era when the 
education began to fail to mold the recruits with an appropriate upbringing. The new 
generation became disenchanted with the acclaimed ethos of the empire. The new 
generation demanded the modification of Ottoman ideological build up and rejected the 
ethos introduced to them in their training. Though, the main premises of the new 
generation were not destructive to the thrust of the imperial discourse. 
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1.6. The Elite-Formation and Identity-Formation Processes of the Tanzimat 
 
       It is important to emphasize that it is possible to speak of such a self-conscious state 
elite for the first time in the two decades just preceding the Rescript of Tanzimat (Reform) 
which ensued the proclamation of the Rescript. With the Tanzimat, dignitaries were 
assured that they would not be arbitrarily beheaded and their wealth and property not be 
confiscated as a consequence of their dismissal from office.
114
 The recognition of the 
maintenance of personal wealth after dismissal from office with the Rescript of Tanzimat 
also brought a new self-understanding of this elite. Previously, wealth, property and honor 
were seen as an imperial grant and therefore bound to the imperial grace. The state made 
the man and thus the beneficence endowed by the state may be revoked once the grace is 
withdrawn. With the termination of confiscations, the grandees‘ pomposity began to 
belong solely to the individuals themselves. Such a guarantee and acknowledgement of the 
right to retain their property and wealth turned this ―grouping‖ for the first time into a 
class-for-itself (in a non-Marxian sense). This does not mean that with the state‘s (or 
sultan‘s) recognition of the irrevocability of the wealth, this elite became relatively 
detached from the state. On the contrary, we may argue that, with the assurance of their 
possessions, they became associated/identified with the state even more closely since the 
legal recognition of their possessions meant that their wealth, prestige and reputation 
became bound to the survival and well-being of the Ottoman state. Thus, now, they had a 
major stake in the future of the Ottoman state for the first time.
115
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       In the late Ottoman Empire, as a residue of the pre-modern political-economical order 
and pattern, wealth continued to be distributed and redistributed not according to the 
ownership of capital and holding of means of production but according to the control of the 
political power. The distribution of the capital was not determined as a function of relations 
of capital but as a function of relations of political power.  
       Marx is criticized for disregarding the importance of the mechanisms of distribution 
and redistribution and the prominent role the owners of the means of distribution and 
redistribution assumed in the economic sphere although it was Marx himself who vividly 
demonstrated the unprecedented transformative power of forces of capital with the onset of 
capitalism (i.e. modernity). Contrary to Marx, we may argue that, before the advent of 
modern age, regardless of who made the actual production, the power laid with the 
political authority. It was the coercive mechanisms of the political authorities that could be 
able to extract the surplus from the producers and the owners of the tools of production 
based on their legitimate rights drawn on the divine grace and customs.
116
 So, we may 
argue that, whoever generated a certain surplus within the Ottoman lands, the ultimate 
profiteer and ultimate accumulator of surplus was the political authority. The social group 
who benefited from the accumulation of wealth in the treasury was the state elite, the 
persons who held the key positions in the state‘s extraction of wealth.  
      Moreover, before the Industrial Revolution, productivity and efficiency was minimal 
and production created only very little surplus.
117
 That means, the best option to 
accumulate wealth was not intensive production (unless there was a gigantic market 
demand like in the Roman Empire) but plunder and tribute. Therefore, military activity was 
the quintessential occupation to accumulate wealth. Simply put, warfare was not only an 
economic activity in pre-modernity but it was also the most profitable business. 
Apparently, the military entrepreneurs and contractors like Wallenstein were amassing 
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enormous amount of wealth and were the successful businessmen of their time.
118
 This 
analysis establishes that the possessors of the right to use violence and coercion and not the 
producers of material goods were more likely to be ―elites‖ even in economical terms. The 
state itself was also an economic activity and a mechanism to extract and transfer wealth. 
Moreover, the state was a privilege of those who claimed it for themselves and therefore 
benefited from its material advantages.  
       While discussing the transitional period of the Ottoman statecraft from a medieval 
self-interested and self-oriented organization to a ―patron state‖ claiming to represent and 
uphold the benefit of all its subjects (and land), Ehud Toledano defines the classical and 
transitional Ottoman state as follows:  
―If ‗state‘ is taken to reflect a well-integrated modern entity....then this is not what the 
Ottoman Empire was during the period reviewed in this book (19th century-DG). 
Rather, it was a ―compound‖ polity, made up of a coalition of interest groups that 
formed its imperial elite. That elite was mostly male and Muslim, multiethnic, 
kul/harem and freeborn, military-administrative-legal-learned, urban and rural, 
officeholding and propertied, Ottoman-imperial and Otoman-local....It is in that sense 
of a composite polity that we use here the term Ottoman ‗state‘ which also jibes with 
the notion of a ‗classical tributary empire‘....(It) consisted of ―segmented, loosely 
integrated, and partly overlapping forms of power and authority.‖119  
The description of Ehud Toledano fits well with our Marxian framework which 
presupposes not a well-knit and perfectly organized exploitative elite but a conglomerate of 
various clusters with different inclinations and orientations sharing a common interest and 
assembled as a compromise in this joint venture. Toledano makes the point that in contrast 
to the rhetoric of Tanzimat, this organization did not change considerably throughout the 
19th century although it was on its way to transform itself into a ―patron state‖, especially 
by the Hamidian era. It is also important to note that, this transition was arguably managed 
without disturbing the interests of the ―ruling elite(s)‖. 
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       Of course, here it will not be intended to make a comprehensive and all-encompassing 
Marxian analysis of the Ottoman state elite.
120
 However, it is important to construct an 
operational framework to comprehend the dynamics of the (trans)formation of the19th 
century Ottoman state elite. Here it is argued that, given that the structure and patterns of 
Ottoman political organization were favoring Muslims (and even more so Turks
121
) in 
admitting them into the elite and including them, this Marxian scheme can be seen as 
illustrating the foundations of the making of the Turkish nation forged around the pivot of 
Ottoman polity. Here, it is argued that, the effort and urge to safeguard the economical 
system maintained throughout the several Ottoman centuries contributed to the generation 
of a Turkish/Ottoman national awareness and subsequently nationalism to flourish 
throughout 19
th
 century and onwards.
122
 In other words, the very Turkish nationalism was 
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―Recruitment for the ‗Victorious Soliders of Muhammad‘ in the Arab Provinces, 1826-
1828‖,Gershoni, Israel & Erdem, Y. Hakan, Woköck, Ursula (ed.), Histories of the Middle 
East, Boulder; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, pp. 189-206.  
122
 Although obviously nations did not exist as fixed entities throughout history, this does 
not mean that nations were created in the beginning of the modern age ex nihilo. In this 
sense, nations are genuine not because they did exist before the modern age but because 
they were constituted not as a manipulations of sinister puppet masters but constituted 
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formation resembles the class-formation. Michael Mann explains fascisms as a formulation 
of class war, for example in countries such as Poland, Austria (and Germany to a less 
extent) Jew constituted a very high percentage of the practitioners of liberal professions 
and economical enterprises. In this context, anti-semitism emerged as an expression of 
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haves. (see Mann, Micheal, Fascists, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 
2004). Mann interprets the genocides again as the ultimate expression of class envies. 
―Ethnic hostility rises where ethnicity trumps class as the main form of social stratification, 
in the process capturing and channeling classlike sentiments towards ethnonationalism‖ 
(Mann, Michael, The Dark Side of Democracy, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University 
Press, 2005, p.5) Mann criticizes theorists of nationalism such as Brubaker, Hutchinson 
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partially an effort of the beneficiaries of the political/economical structure to hold on to 
their medieval state privileges at a time when revolutionary transformations of economic 
and political environments took place.  
       The expropriation of the domestic produce was no more possible in the age of 
imperialism, foreign intrusion and the internationalization of Ottoman economy. Although 
with the introduction of machinery, the surplus obtained in production had boomed 
exponentially, the Ottoman state lost its privileged share in the distribution of the surplus 
obtained. Market forces and foreign merchants began to get increasing shares from the 
aggregate surplus and thus weakened the significance and pivotal status of the Ottoman 
polity and its shareholders. The role of the state in economical relations declined and 
destroyed the economic privileges of the beneficiaries of the Ottoman polity.
123
 This 
process was expected in the age of the emergence and predatory expansion of the market. 
Although countries such as Britain had increased their power with benefiting from the 
expansion of the market, Ottoman polity perceived market as its binary opposite. With the 
marketization process, economic relations could no more be determined along 
ethno/religious identities and communities in the age of market in which everything solid 
melted into the air. Market in Europe demolished all socially constructed structures and 
communities such as guilds and aristocracy.
124
 The Ottoman center elite, holding onto the 
classical perceptions, tried its best to perpetuate the economical relations as they used to be 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Smith for completely neglecting the class relations in the making of nationalisms. He 
also criticizes those who see class as something materialistic and nations something 
emotional such as Connor and Horowitz. (p.5) Although here Mann points outs the 
dynamics of class in the making of nationalisms, the class dimension is significant in the 
very making of the nations as well. In the Balkan nationalisms and the Turkish one, this 
interrelation was even more significant. 
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and depended on politically, socially and culturally constructed categories and distinctions. 
The fact that Muslims (and primarily Turks) were the beneficiaries of the pre-modern 
economic organization and it was the non-Muslims who benefited from the marketization 
of economy ensued the ethnicization of the economic transformation and thus the 
economic cleavages (such as in the case of Balkan peasant rebellions in which Christian 
peasants rebelled against the Muslim landowners throughout 19
th
 century) caused the 
formations of ethnic symbolisms and identities.    
       In the Ottoman Empire, the askeri class/reaya distinction had already collapsed in the 
17
th
 century if it had ever existed in its perfect form.
125
  The devşirme system also had 
collapsed by the late 17 century. By 19
th
 century, all the constructed and imagined social 
structures and distinctions were in retreat and on the verge of collapse. In the pre-Tanzimat 
period, ―there was nothing like one Ottoman elite, there were a number of them, and some 
of the elite groups would have had no place in the sixteenth-century concept of askeri; it is 
sufficient to mention as examples the tax-farming provincial notable, the non-Muslim 
kocabaşı (local or regional community leader) the Phanariot hospodar or the Armenian 
money-lender of substance who belonged to the group of people called amira.”126 In this 
period, we also observe the emergence of an ulema aristocracy.
127
 ―Aristocracy‖ here is 
meant a closed community enjoying the advantages of entitlements and stubbornly keeping 
the community intact. This privilege was maintained due to the ulema‟s divine/exceptional 
status. The ulema had managed to avoid outside interferences and meddling, be it sultanic 
or otherwise. The ulema aristocratic families managed to hold onto a common interest, a 
certain sense of class-for-itself. In short, we can speak of a fragmented and subcontracted 
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ruling elite, not consistent with a legal framework, that survived throughout the 19
th
 
century, basically dependent on the Ottoman state. 
       However, whatever the reconfiguration and reality of the Ottoman governing elite may 
be, the social imagination that society was split between those who are ruled (subjects) and 
those who rule (masters) persisted well until the early 19
th
 century and state continued to 
be imagined as a ―privilege‖. This division may be formulated in quasi-Marxian terms as 
between owners of the means of distribution and redistribution and those who do not own 
means of distribution and redistribution.
128
 In theory, this division was determined by 
people‘s status/relation vis-a-vis the state. The askeri group was defined by its members‘ 
submission to a certain authority. It may be that all the members were seeking their own 
self-interest but pursuit of self-interests of all the individual members does not 
automatically entail the existence of a group interest. The existence of strong and shabby 
factions attested by Abou-El-Hajj and others does not indicate the existence of the presence 
of a bureaucratic aristocracy primarily because they did not set the rules themselves. 
However, these factions and rivalries had planted the seeds of the prospective emergence 
of a bureaucratic aristocracy and a state elite.
129
 With the transformation of the Ottoman 
state, this group evolved into an elite for itself although the use of physical violence in 
intra-elite rivalries avoided the emergence of a unified and solid elite. The violent struggles 
between factions severely cost the governing elite as a whole and its development as a 
class.
130
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       The bloody end of the Pertev Pasha-Akif Pasha conflict terminated the use of violence 
and physical elimination of political rivals as an effective method to advance in the 
hierarchy.
131
 The Tanzimat brought out the mutual recognition of the inviolability of the 
basic rights of life and property of the members of the governing elite as well as the 
recognition of these essential rights of the individuals belonging to the governing elite by 
the sultan. Hence, the Tanzimat paved the way for the emergence of a solid governing elite 
with a number of families, each member occupying various chief posts of the state.  
      Dror Ze‘evi speaks of ―the cunning hand of history...(that) plays tricks on the 
protagonists.‖ Ze‘evi points out to the self-destruction of the traditional kul (slave/servant –
of the sultan- DG) class by voluntarily dissolving the pre-national and pre-modern (agro-
literate) collective identity through the official nationalism of the Ottoman Empire. ―In the 
course of their attempts to create a new political and social structure, the kul unwittingly 
destroyed the foundations of the old one-their own.‖132 However, regardless of the shift to 
a new institutional model, I would suggest a genealogical continuity of the Tanzimat elite 
with that of the pre-Tanzimat elite. Itzkowitz after studying the eighteenth century Ottoman 
civil officialdom concludes: ―It is significant that the bureaucrats were in the forefront of 
those who supported the reforms of Selim III and Sultan Mahmud II in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries. The wearers of the fez and the long, black frock coat, the 
uniform of the bureaucracy under Mahmud II, were the sons of the scribes of the 
eighteenth century, many of them in turn, descendants of the scribes of the seventeenth 
century.‖133   
                                                                                                                                                             
Here, it is claimed that with the diffusion of power from the political high-ranking posts to 
the bureaucracy at large, civil servants prominence increased. Hence, dissemination of 
power created a new grouping and identity.  
131
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       The dignitaries of the early decades of the Tanzimat formed the first generation of 
these families who were predominantly scions and descendants of minor (or major) clerks 
and military officers of the preceding generation. Others were scions of 
provincial/peripheral elites moving to Istanbul. In the next decades, we observe the second 
and third generation of these governing elite families retaining the prominent roles of their 
families. A genealogical revolution will take place only with the coming of the graduates 
of the imperial schools in the late nineteenth century although even after the 
―democratization‖ of the education, a remarkable continuity is visible.  
       A proposographic study would show us the genealogies, lineages and connections of 
the late Ottoman elite.
134
 In this study, in the forthcoming chapters, this pattern will 
                                                                                                                                                             
Roderick Davison failed to recognize this continuity of the nineteenth century Ottoman 
bureaucracy implying that Davison treats as if the Tanzimat bureaucracy had came from 
outer space. Also see Itzkowitz‘s remarks in Itzkowitz, Norman & Shinder, Joel, ―The 
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Levy also underlines the persistence of the old elite. ―From a social point of view, the new 
military leadership was fully integrated with the older ruling class. It was this integration 
that had assured the acceptance of Mahmud's reforms in the first place, for they had not 
been accompanied by any social upheavals. This was an achievement of mixed 
significance. The absorption of the old ruling elite into the new system was a source of 
weakness in Mahmud's own time, for the transformation of a traditional leadership into a 
modern one is a slower process than the creation of a new elite. In the long run, however, 
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Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud II's New Ottoman Army, 1826-39‖, International Journal 
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attempted to be revealed in the case of the Ottoman diplomats and a genealogical 
continuity from the first generation of Tanzimat to the early republic will be attempted to 
be established. What is more interesting than the genealogies extending from early 
Tanzimat (and pre-Tanzimat) to the republic are the marriage connections. The marriage-
ties functioned as the glue of a somewhat closed community which delineated its borders 
and strengthened its cohesiveness. The significant role of the marriages will be revealed 
again in the case of the diplomats in the next chapters of this study. The lineages and 
connections observable among the Ottoman diplomats will also expose how this closed 
elite was integrated and how well the closed elite perceives itself as a community with 
clearly drawn borders and habits. Furthermore, marriages enabled this community‘s 
perpetuation and adjustment in terms of welcoming newcomers from the newly ascending 
segments of the society, which was in the process of capitalizing the economic structure 
and the centralization of the state.         
       The emergence of a kind of cohesive bureaucratic aristocracy and a state elite created a 
certain sense of belonging. For the first time, the governing elite constituted a certain 
community (imagined or real).
135
 The development of the notion of belonging to a certain 
                                                                                                                                                             
Tanzimat elite were fathered by prominent servants of state like Mustafa Reşid Pasha 
(Sicill-i Osmani, p. 1384), Mehmed Emin Pasha (İbnülemin…ibid, p. 83), Mahmud Nedim 
Pasha (Pakalın, Mehmet Zeki, Mahmud Nedim Paşa, İstanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası, 1940, 
p. 1).  
135
 The old paradigm equaled the advent of modern age with the decline of aristocracy. 
According to this paradigm, in the new modern world, aristocracy had no chance to live. 
Its age-old privileges were abolished and therefore it was forced to be ousted from the 
political scene. The monetarization and capitalization of the economy destroyed the 
economic base of the aristocracy. However, this paradigm had been questioned as the 
mechanisms the aristocracy developed to adapt itself to the modern economy have been 
studied. The new studies acknowledge a significant role to the aristocracy in the 19
th
 
century not only in Britain but also in France (and apparently Germany). See Higgs, David, 
Nobles in Nineteenth Century France, John Hopkins University Press, 1987. Hence, 
although in the Ottoman Empire we can‘t speak of an official aristocracy in the European 
sense based on bloodlines, we may speak of an aristocracy based on belonging to a 
respectable family with venerable service to the state. In this regard, we may reanalysis the 
―birth of modern Turkey‖ not centered around the Young Turks but around the previous 
generation. The Hamidian ―imperial classrooms‖ in which the prospective Young Turks 
studied and learned to revere the Ottoman polity were established out of the imaginary of 
the Tanzimat generation.  
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community was the first step for the creation of the idea of a national identity.
136
 It could 
be envisioned that nations are imageries of families written large. If this allegory is correct, 
nations then symbolize what a family (or a small community consisted of people who 
know each other well like a neighborhood) symbolizes; intimacy, feeling of security and 
affection. In the case of the Ottoman governing elite, the image of Turkishness (which is 
itself to a certain extent a derivation of the Muslimness) may be interpreted as a projection 
of its own sense of belonging and identity in the face of a variety of threats close and 
distant.  
       The Tanzimat and post-Tanzimat generations of bureaucrats developed different 
political outlooks due to the experience of different social environments in their formative 
periods. The Young Turk generation, experiencing daily ethnic discriminations and 
cleavages, was more prone to conceptualize the social and economic matters in ethnic 
terms given that they felt themselves threatened and regarded themselves inferior to the 
non-Muslims in terms of economic and local political dynamics. For the Tanzimat 
generation, it was rather the opposite. ―They‖ were superior metaphysically and practically 
to the ones whom they regarded as their rebellious subjects or their ra‟yah.137 They were 
superior to the non-Muslims both in reality and in perception. This perception, as pointed 
out above, originated from an actuality but persisted although the reality changed 
dramatically throughout the 19
th
 century when Muslims could not compete with the 
advancement of the non-Muslims. The idea that non-Muslims had to be submissive as the 
Islamic law and divine grace required endured even in the republican perception of the 
non-Muslims as a remnant of the imperial consciousness. In short, these two outlooks, 
sometimes contrasting and sometimes coinciding self-perceptions, were transplanted onto 
the modern self-image of Turkishness. Here, some simplistic categorizations do not apply. 
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On the contrary, these continuities within breaks show the complex nature of the nature of 
Turkish nationalism. 
       This observation is congruent with the argument made above. If we agree that 
nationalism is not a phenomenon out-there to be grasped with the onset of modernity but 
instead created (in the minds), then every social-political-economical context will produce 
its own actuality which we call for the sake of simplification ―nationalism‖ as if all the 
nationalisms are equivalent or similar.
138
 If we define nationalism not as a consequence of 
other dynamics but a ―style‖ or a ―rhetoric‖ and contextualize nationalism in relation with 
the socio-economical and political context in which it developed, then we may answer 
larger existential, distressing and profound questions to which nationalism emanated as a 
modest response. In this regard, nationalism may be seen as a strategy of interest-seeking. 
Nationalism supplies a considerable legitimacy for propagandizing for other means, 
generally particularistic interests of a class, a status group or a generation.  
       Signs of these continuities could be traced to a symbolic level. The language and 
vocabulary of the classical Ottoman polity was a reservoir from which the basic tenets of 
Turkish nationalism were reproduced. Alleged symbols of the grandeur of classical 
Ottoman imperium such as ―Mehter Marşı‖ were invented by the Young Turks as 
―tradition‖ as were the various ―inventions‖ of Abdülhamid II regarding the origins of the 
Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman Empire in its classical age as shown by Selim 
Deringil.
139
 After 1908, the anniversary of the birth of the Empire began to be celebrated as 
a national holiday.
140
 This practice is what Anthony Smith calls the utilization of myths 
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and symbols. Smith argues that the ethno-symbolism was prevalent throughout centuries 
and nationalists had built on these ethno-symbols and myths.
141
 Here, developing on 
Smith‘s argument, we may recall how constitutive the Ottoman symbols and myths were in 
the making of Turkish nationalism. However, these continuities include not only myths and 
symbols but the basic discourses and perceptions as well. This does not mean that Turkish 
nationalism was a continuation, revival or modification of Ottoman imperialism (as the 
Balkan nationalist historiographies like to interpret). It demonstrated how certain 
perceptions and modes of conduct were predetermined by the inheritance which was 
voluntarily or involuntarily, consciously or unconsciously adopted. In short, although 
Turkish nationalism may be a novelty and a recent phenomenon, it rose over a legacy it 
had adopted and appropriated. First and foremost, it took a particular perception which had 
been produced within a certain socio-politico-economical context and background but once 
constructed, it created its own reality and independent existence for its own.   
      Regarding the emergence of a Turkish national identity, it had been pointed out that 
two alternative suggestions may be stipulated. First is to maintain that national identity was 
brought forth by the group of people whom we called  ―Young Turk generation‖, mostly 
originating from Roumelia coming from provincial lower middle classes
142
 (and some from 
Anatolia and Istanbul as well). The alternative interpretation is to argue that a certain 
national identity was already conceptualized in the center (in the abode of imperium). Of 
course these two alternative suggestions are ―ideal types‖ and discussed here for presenting 
a palpable yet simplistic modeling. Here, it is suggested that the conceptualization of the 
Turkish nationhood was not a smooth and straightforward process. On the contrary, it was 
the outcome of an interactive and complex process made, remade and negotiated every 
day. 
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     To summarize, here it is argued that Turkish nationalism‘s perceptions, premises and 
assumptions can‘t be disassociated from the Ottoman central elite‘s perceptions, premises, 
concerns, reflexes and responses to changing circumstances. The perceptions of ―retreat‖ 
and ―advances of the others‖ were all retained, maintained and reinvented. Though, many 
novel concerns particular to the ramifications of modernity and the encounter with 
modernity appeared such as the proposed strategies for ―regeneration‖, a step function 
trajectory from the 17
th
-18
th
 century to the discourse and nature of Ottoman/Turkish 
modernity can be traceable.  
 
 
1.7. The Pre-Tanzimat Istanbul Elite 
 
       Ariel Salzmann, based on her research on the tax-farmers of 18th century, showed how 
the Istanbul ‗aristocracy of service‘, took advantage of a distinctly old-regime type of 
insider trading or what the economist Joseph Stiglitz calls in a modern context, 
―asymmetric information.‖143 Rifa‘at Abou-El-Haj showed how a bureaucratic and military 
aristocracy, without carrying hereditary titles and designations, reproduced itself in the late 
17th century.
144
 Itzkowitz pointed out that sons maintained the career patterns of their 
fathers.
145
 Whereas Dina Rizk Khoury demonstrated that the emergence of a local elite was 
not necessarily adverse to a centralized Ottoman polity within an Ottoman framework, 
Salzmann and Abou-El-Hajj established that the emerging self-interested households of the 
―center‖ did not pose s threat to the effectiveness and authoritativeness of the state as well. 
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The aforementioned Ottomanists reveal that, these household maneuvers and politics, on 
the contrary, contributed to the development of an effective central power.
146
   
       We can not consider all these crucial developments independent from the emergence 
of the modern state. This is especially what Abou-El-Hajj fundamentally demonstrated in 
his studies. In his dissertation, he denoted the Treaty of Karlowitz as a milestone in the 
gradual transformation of the character of the Ottoman statecraft from a military-based 
structure to a modern-bureaucratic structure. Abou-El-Hajj wrote that before the Karlowitz, 
the Ottoman state lacked any formal understanding for the role of diplomacy. The ―militant 
Islamic ideology‖ prioritized victory in the battleground. Diplomacy was not a habitual and 
institutional part of the statecraft but only a method used as a last resort applicable only 
when arms do not produce the anticipated results. After several defeats in the Ottoman-
Austrian war, the Ottoman sultan did not ―turn to compromise until every chance of 
regaining the lost Ottoman territories, by military arms, had been exhausted. Finally, with 
the defeat at Senta in 1697, it became quite clear to the Court at Istanbul that the only 
alternative to compromise and a negotiated peace would most definitely have been an even 
more punitive dictation of terms.‖ Realizing the utmost threat, the Ottomans agreed for a 
settlement. Abou-El-Hajj proposes that ―for Ottoman history, the sultan‘s consent to 
negotiate peace has farreaching consequences.‖ For the  
 
―patently militarist ideology, it is perhaps a truism to assert that to this State war rather 
than compromise had been the chosen and preferred instrument of international 
intercourses with Europe. However, this attitude could be sustained only as long as an 
Ottoman military superiority was upheld.....In the process of dictating its peace terms, 
during moments of victory, the Ottoman State had developed neither the formal 
apparatus for diplomatic communication nor the corps of trained personnel necessary 
for the negotiation of peace. In the past, when knowledge of the immediate military 
situation was considered sufficient qualification for leading an Ottoman diplomatic 
delegation, the personnel of Ottoman mission was drawn almost exclusively from the 
military establishment. In some instances, the grand vizier himself, as commander-in-
chief, would lead a delegation composed primarily of his military entourage.....With 
the appointment of the Reisülküttab Rami Mehmed Efendi as chief of the Ottoman 
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delegation to the Congress of Karlowitz, the transfer of responsibility for leadership of 
Ottoman diplomatic missions from the military establishment is completed.‖147 
 
Although, the argument of Abou-El-Hajj remains reductionist, not giving its due to the 
developments in the scribal service in the preceding crucial decades, especially in the light 
of recent scholarship exposing the earliest stages of modern state-formation and 
bureaucracy-formation and he reiterates the Eurocentric assumption that the classical 
Ottoman (and Islamic) worldview was static, militarist and determined by religious 
affiliations and zeal
148
, the basic premise of his argument that there is a gradual change of 
the self-perception of the nature of state within the Ottoman polity, is valid.
149
 
       In the 18th century, the civil bureaucracy gradually enhanced its position vis-a-vis the 
military and the religious establishments.
150
 Agreeing with Abou-El-Hajj, Virginia Aksan 
wrote that  ―(t)he eighteenth century, then, can be seen as a battleground not just of the 
Ottomans and the Russians but also of the opposing visions of Ottoman elites, who 
gradually began to realize the inadequacy of the old ideology.‖151 She further commented 
that ―(t)he military was probably the most disenfranchised and alienated professional group 
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of the eighteenth century(.)‖152 Aksan sees her protogonist, Ahmed Resmi Efendi, as a 
transitional figure but notes that ―those ideals (of the classical Ottoman discourse) 
disappear for the most part in the political advise literature of the later eighteenth century, 
although appeals for the preservation of religion and state (din-ü-devlet) remain 
constant.‖153 Likewise, although peace with infidels was accepted, ―jurists were 
interpreting the concept of holy war to permit a legal state of peace, basing it on the 
rationale of the good of the Muslim community –maslaha- a term much evoked in later 
treaties.‖ The justification was legitimized by a story of the prophet Muhammad, which 
became a cliché in the Ottoman writings on war and peace. In the Treaty of Hudaybiya in 
628 AD between Muhammad and the Meccans, the prophet was forced to concede a truce 
of ten years, in order to enable the new Muslim community to perform the pilgrimage in 
the city of Mecca. In the event, Muhammad and his community made a triumphal entry 
into Mecca the following year. In other words, such concessions were only a temporary 
stop on the way to the ultimate Muslim victory.‖154  In short, we, like Aksan, observe the 
process of a dramatic upheaval going along with the persistence of the discourse of the 
classical age.
155
 What we observe is not a total repudiation of the former ideology but its 
adjustment, refabrication or even restoration, rendering it compatible in the changing 
environments and communicable/relevant in the novel political vocabulary of the modern 
age.    
       The civil bureaucracy had more vested interest in the survival, well-being, and 
advancement of the state as they were more likely to acquire wealth and property to inherit 
to their scions. Therefore, a civil bureaucratic elite is more prone to stability and thus more 
conservative in its orientation in comparison to the military caste. With the increase of the 
number of clerks within the nascent bureaucracy and their advancing role within the 
administrative body, a new elite with a strong sense of commitment to their stakes was 
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consolidated. Here, it is suggested that, to understand the Tanzimat and the Ottoman 
modernity, we have to reconstruct the nature of this newly emerging elite preceding the 
upcoming radical transformation of the Ottoman polity and contextualize Ottoman 
―transformation‖ within this socio-political background. Although the early modern age of 
the Ottoman polity became an area of interest for study, the integration of the field of early 
modern Ottoman Empire into the field of European early modernity is yet to be achieved, 
especially due to the lack of interest of the historians of early modern Europe towards the 
Ottoman Empire. Framing early Ottoman modernity within the European early modernity 
is yet to be undertaken.
156
 
      The few decades prior to the Rescript of Tanzimat are conspicuous in the sense that in 
them, themes of premodern history and themes of modern history are intertwined and 
blended. Therefore a study of this time span requires a knowledgeable background and 
needs a sophisticated and subtle interpretation. Recent Ottomanists meticulously tried to 
portray this crucial transitional phase in its complexity.
157
 They questioned the alleged 
revolutionary features of the Tanzimat and conceded a long period of ―preparation‖. 
However, we are yet to comprehend the peculiarities of the reforms of Mahmud II, Selim 
III and their backgrounds in their complexity. Furthermore, although the term 
―Westernization‖ is getting less and less explanatory and abandoned for its value-loaded 
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content while conceptualizations such as ―centralization‖ are proposed158, we still lack a 
systematic treatment and an alternative assessment of the sweeping transformation 
undertaken by the pre-Tanzimat Ottoman state.         
       A subtle assessment of the era may be established with entering into the mental world 
of the ruling elite. Such an endeavor may allow us to figure out some aspects of the 
―social‖ origins of the so-called Westernization. As suggested above, Westernization may 
be seen as a dependent function of elite politics and state affairs. When we are speaking of 
the state and formation of the modern state, we cannot comprehend this process without 
contextualizing it within a social framework. Into what kind of socio-political background, 
was all the upcoming tremendous upheaval to be born?  
       Joel Shinder discusses the career and worlds of Mustafa Efendi, a civil servant, a 
nobody for history, and one of those losers ―staffing the bureaus …[who] turned out 
enormous mountains of paperwork‖. He tries to reconstruct the world of Mustafa Efendi 
according to his inventory on his death registered item no. 2448 in Kamil Kepeci 
classification. After documenting his library, full of Islamic books, poetry, political tracts 
and chronicles reflecting the intellectual world of premodernity before the advent of 
rationality and natural sciences, Shinder ended his article writing: ―During the succeeding 
generation a radical change in style and pace of Ottoman life would commence. This 
change was Westernization.... (t)he defeats of 1768-1774 and the changes they called for 
were part of another world. However many watches and chime clocks and European locks 
he might have owned, Mustafa Efendi would not have understood, not at all.‖159 Although 
it is true that any generation faces grave problems in adapting to a changing world, these 
encounters can not be reduced to a simplistic Westernized vs. Eastern dichotomy. The 
recent studies studies on the 18
th
 century Ottoman Empire, while demolishing reductionist 
myths such as ―Age of Tulips‖160, demonstrated the interactions which can not be reduced 
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to two mutually exclusive categories
161
. It is important to notice that although the phrase 
―taking from the West‖ was employed, this process was not a wholesale Westernization, 
and an import. As it had been demonstrated, what had been dubbed as ―Westernization‖ 
had indigenous inspirations and dynamics. 
     Westernization was not a goal in itself but a method to survive/revive in the changing 
times. It was an effort of adaptation and cooptation. Mustafa Efendi, a member of the 
ruling elite and in the view of Shinder was ―probably a scribe in the imperial council when, 
to France‘s delight and Austria‘s dismay, the Ottomans managed to win as much at the 
conference table in 1789‖; illustrates the mental repercussions experienced at the dawn of 
an unprecedented transformation and disproves the supposed dichotomy between the old-
type clerk and the Westernized bureaucrat.
162
 As it had been suggested by Itzkowitz, Aksan 
and many others, there is not only a traceable ideological/mental continuity and affinity 
between the 19
th
 century and the 18
th
 century but a genealogical continuity as well. This 
does not mean that there existed a closed elite. Apparently, inclusion in the Ottoman state 
elite was considerably easier vis-à-vis its European counterparts. It may be even argued 
that incorporations into the state elite was perceived as reinforcing the state and thus 
encouraged. However, the extent of inclusion and the assimilative/selective nature and 
form of this incorporation situated the motor of change within the established elite of the 
Empire. Therefore, assuming a sharp break between Tanzimat and its preceding era would 
be misleading and conceals affinities and continuities. The drastic Otttoman undertaking of 
reorganizing and modernizing the state had been born in such a social milieu. 
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1.8. Modernity as Reorganization of the State, Reorganization of the Society 
 
       At this point, a few words have to be said about Ottoman modernity in order to link 
and relate it to its immediate prehistory. As it should already have been noticed, we have 
not yet presented an operative and authoritative definition of the ―modern‖. Understanding 
―what is modern‖ and what it takes to be ―modern‖ are crucial in our framework for the 
study of the making of the modern Ottoman/Turkish state.
163
  
       First and foremost, it should be observed that formation of modernity was not a 
―democratic‖ process in the sense that it was not equally and simultaneously disseminated 
to all the strata of society simultaneously and in equal proportions. Moreover, the intensity 
of its diffusion is not equal among various social classes, segments and spheres. This 
pattern is not unique to the Ottoman or non-Western contexts. As shown best in the 
landmark study of Eugene Weber, it was only by the late 19th century or the early 20th 
century that modern state and modernity had infiltrated into the French countryside. It was 
the state that had developed and instigated ―modernity‖ by intentionally radiating (or 
imposing) it via the means of education, conscriptions, railways et cetera. The states found 
it necessary to ―socially disciplinize164‖ and ―modernize their subjects‖ by means of 
educating and civilizing them. Thus, the states had stake in the ―modern‖. It was in their 
best interests to reconstruct the individuals and the community which they ruled over 
(dubbed and redefined as nations) as ―modern‖ and ―saving‖ them from being unruly 
savages. By reformatting them, the states rendered their subjects more efficient, productive 
and, thus, controllable.
165
 Their governmentality policies necessitated a modernization 
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program.
166
 Regardless of the reasons and motivations of these actions; the official 
initiatives had shaped the emergence of the modern society.
167
 In short, to an important 
extent, modernity was imposed from above by political decree. We have to consider the 
artificial nature of the genesis of modernity to understand the dynamics of the emergence 
of the Ottoman modernity.  
     As argued above, first, it was the state that was ―modern‖. It was the early modern 
states that reorganized themselves according to objective, rational, sound and effective 
norms. The states did not self-consciously ―opt‖ for ―modernizing themselves‖ but the 
opportunities, such as the development of transportation, communications and 
accumulation of knowledge, as well as constraints such as expansion of the military, 
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growth of the bureaucracy, financing the rising expenses, had compelled them to undergo a 
radical reorganization. This reorganization was accompanied by a restructuring and 
adaptation of the mental sets to maintain, uphold and co-opt with the newly emerging 
necessities of the governmentalities. Simply, ―modernity‖ emerged as an ―official‖ project. 
The states decided to ―civilize‖ and ―modernize‖ their subjects when it became clear that 
only transforming and reorganizing the state was insufficient. Their population had to be 
rendered ―efficient‖ for the state to counter the sweeping challenges168 -hence the Turkish 
nationalism of the late Ottoman Empire and la mission civilisatrice of the Republic-. The 
state and the power of the state were no more understood as an administrative-military 
structures superimposed on the subjects and its territories. The power and wealth of the 
states were now measured and defined with the level of the well-being of the subjects
169
 
(from now on ―citizens‖) and the quality and prosperity of the land it reigned over.170 Such 
a transformation of perception was clear in the eyes of the men of the Tanzimat as 
observable in the text of the Rescript of Tanzimat which refers to the quality and fertility of 
the Ottoman lands and the hardworking nature of its subjects.
171
 For this reason, the state 
was supposed to involve itself with the society and the land. We observe that from early 
19
th
 century onwards, society became a pivotal concern in state affairs in the Ottoman 
context. Issues such as public hygiene, education and poverty became concerns of the 
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state.
172
 For the first time, the state began to attempt to regulate and design society beyond 
aiming to rehabilitate the sphere of government and administration. 
     This Foucaldian governmentality project was legitimized by nationalism, especially in 
latecomer countries. It may be argued that, the radical nature of Third-World nationalisms 
in general and the Turkish nationalism in particular developed due to the immediacy of this 
governmental project as these states were pushed into the corner during the age of 
imperialism and thus destitute to undertake such a radical governmentality project. In this 
regard, nationalism emerged as a function of the encounter with modernity and 
modernization. The secularism of the Turkish Republic was also arguably derived from 
this Foucaldian concern which was perceived as an indispensible component of Turkish 
nationalism as if national identity could not be imagined without impeccable secular 
credentials.  
       A full-fledged ―modern/rational methodology‖ was the founding stone of Ottoman 
modernity. The emergence and development of modern ethics and premises of a ―modern 
society‖ are a different matter. Although a ―modern stance‖ is an ambiguous term and there 
is no ―authoritative‖ definition of the ―modern‖, I would argue that Kantian moral 
individualism and individualized ethics constitute the basis of this modern stance.
173
 
Kantian moral individualism is a corollary of the demystification of the concept of society, 
metaphysics and divinity. Kantianism is the moral foundation of modernity with its 
demanding categorical imperatives enforcing the individual who have become 
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―emancipated‖ from divine imperatives. Yet, modernity is not merely a philosophical 
assumption but also a transformation of the social imagination of man acquired not only 
voluntarily but also superimposed upon him involuntarily by political and economical 
dynamics beyond his control. Kantian ethics is to some extent an outcome of modernity 
and a proposed resolution in response to the perils and ambivalences of the post-
metaphysical world.
174
 However, Ottoman modernity was a political endorsement of the 
modern as a methodology of reform. The philosophical corollaries and premises of 
modernity, however, did not accompany its structural and political framework. It would 
wait until Kemalism for a partial internalization of modernity along Kantian lines although 
the significance of imported Kantianism remained limited during the Republican decades. 
In short, modernity lacks to a certain extent its epistemological as well as ethical bases in 
the Ottoman/Turkish context. Modernity in its actuality/experience and modernity as a 
discourse are two different phenomena. Although the later is a consequence of the former, 
it does not necessarily accompany it. In the Ottoman/Turkish context, not dissimilar to 
other ―belated and borrowed modernities‖, the later followed the former belatedly and only 
partially, establishing the basic premises of the Turkish ―modern‖ as legitimate as any 
other path to modernity. 
       The problem of speaking about the ―modern‖ in history is to conceptualize the 
―modern‖ without historicizing it. The ―modern‖ in philosophy may refer to a different 
notion, but ―modern‖ in historiography is a social concept referring to a certain mode of 
attitude and perception independent from the intentions of the actors. In other words, 
―modern‖ does not describe a certain act but a state of being that is generalizable within a 
spatial and temporal context. That is to say, we are not interested in men and women 
themselves but in the socially and historically constructed mental climate and environment 
in which they are embedded. These remarks are important to reassess the origins and 
dynamics of ―Ottoman modernity‖. 
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       Ottomans didn‘t fail to endorse the modern ―military science‖ rationality since the late 
18
th
 century.
175
 This did not imply a genuine Ottoman transformation and reorganization 
but a reception of the 18
th
 century European military practices and drills.
176
 The problem 
with the general conception of a ―genuine transformation‖ (versus imitating a model) 
obscures the nature of the process. The general Hegelian idea that history is a progression 
of ideas discards the extent of the role and significance of technical necessities that had 
obliged drastic and ideational transformations. Given the intertwined nature of the 
―technical‖ and ―philosophical‖, it is impossible to disassociate them from each other.   
       In the eyes of the reformers, the manual for the conduction of reforms was evident. It 
appears to be that at this early stage, there was no reasonable alternative to be suggested 
other than the complete reception of the Western model. There is yet no perception of the 
possibility of a partial reception of the West.
177
 There is also no conceptualization of the 
two realms of the Western prototype, one technical, the other spiritual, as the reformists did 
not yet face the challenge of modernity and that the problem was not simply a matter of 
technical failure did not become apparent. Of course, the reception was not a choice but 
considered a necessity. The very motivation for ―modernization‖ derived from the fear that 
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unless all the required adaptations were successfully fully implemented as perfect replicas; 
a collapse was inevitable and unavoidable.
178
 A rereading of the not-much-known reign of 
Selim III complicates the picture that we have taken for granted.
179
  
      Contrary to Shaw‘s depiction of two warring parties, the layihas (reports) presented to 
Selim III drawing the proposed outlines of ―reform‖ displays very complex sets of 
minds.
180
 In the layihas, the sole intention was the survival of the state and the recipes were 
purely technical, not considering any repercussions of these technical reforms. ―(T)he key 
processes of late Ottoman history can be explained above all, not by the logic of ideas, but 
by the structural constraints imposed on the leadership of the Empire by geography, 
demography, institutions, and the examples set by European countries. This does not mean 
that one should approach late Ottoman history in a simple-mindedly historicist manner, 
seeing that the path of Ottoman history as predetermined. Rather, it means that one must 
begin with the recognition that the set of realistic choices that lay before the Ottoman 
leaders was not unlimited. One need not be a passionate Social Darwinist to recognize that 
the modification of the old order became inescapable in the late eighteenth century, if the 
Empire was to survive; or that the most logical source of inspiration for any new order was 
Europe.‖181 
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       Beginning with the military reorganization, Ottoman statecraft restructured its 
organization under dire pressures. This restructuring was seen as an obligation to adapt to 
the changing circumstances and environment. This does not necessarily mean a sharp 
renunciation of the ―old‖ as assumed in the conventional historiography. It is, in this 
perception, a ―modification‖. The instruments employed do not necessarily reveal the 
attributes and motivations of the individuals and groups who employed the instrument. Of 
course, the instruments have the power to transform the hand that used the instrument but 
limits of this transformative power should not be exaggerated. We do not observe a 
transformation of the structures of mentalities. On the contrary, with the new equipment in 
hand, the habitual mindset may invigorate and consolidate itself. Modernity is a method 
although a method with unintended and infinite consequences and implications.
182
 
Modernity develops a certain state of mind, but this particular state of mind derives not 
from intellectual encounters but from methods implemented and habitualized. That means, 
although it is completely novel, radical and disquieting, modernity is not necessarily a total 
revocation of the mental sets of premodernity. Beyond the vast opportunities and 
equipments provided by modern technologies (in the Foucaldian sense) , the ruthlessness 
and cold rationality of the modernity may exacerbate the ordinary and banal violence of the 
premodernity and therefore does not necessarily generates a transformation of the 
structures of mentalities. 
       Evidently, we do not distinguish between different manifestations of modernity. The 
seemingly different paradigms of the Tanzimat and the Republic derive from the same 
considerations and embedded within the same historical structure. The Republic 
legitimized itself by discrediting the modernizing experience of the Tanzimat era and 
criticizing it as a half-hearted modernization which failed to comprehend the mentality 
behind the European modernity, as it was most lucidly expressed by Ziya Gökalp, the chief 
ideologue of the Young Turk regime.
183
 As mentioned above, ―mentalities‖ do not develop 
within a vacuum. It is not an ideological category but a historical one determined by its 
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temporal and spatial context and structure.
184
 Such a criticism had been leveled by the 
Republican ideology (beginning earlier with Gökalp), claiming that the Republic did 
internalize the mentality of modernism in contrast to the non-committedness of the 
Tanzimat.
185
 Apparently, for the Tanzimat elite, modernizing was a technical matter to be 
resolved in practical terms. What was different in the radical modernization of the 
Republic was that ―society‖ and ―social culture‖ began to be taken as technicalities that 
had to be transformed. What really changed was not the paradigm but the scope of the 
technical transformation. Looking at a modernist Ottoman governor of the early 19th 
century, Lisa Pollard describes the perception and vision of modernity of Mohammad Ali 
Pasha as follows: ―(He) ranked the world‘s ―nations‖ scientifically and placed Egypt vis-a-
vis other nations in a hierarchy of development, at the apex of which sat ‗modernity‘. 
Knowledge that was useful to the state created a cartography of modernity in which the 
intimate details of domestic activities stood out as prominent features and were used as 
units of measurement.‖186 Modernity and adaptation of the Western methods (which was 
what was understood from ―modernity) was a matter of implementation. ―The Egyptians 
who left Alexandria for Europe were sent out in search of practical knowledge....Egyptians 
in Europe set sail in search of Egypt‘s future-a future that they themselves would later 
construct.‖187 
     As illustrated throughout this work, practical knowledge was not limited to mechanics. 
A grasp of international relations, economics, the underlining philosophical and mental 
foundations of the ―modern West‖ were all seen as practical knowledges to be acquired as 
well. Modernity may be seen as the endorsement of the imperatives of the changing times. 
The very crucial and urgent problem for the Ottomans and other ―trailing states‖ was to 
manage a more effective military and a more efficient state organization. For a 
management of this colossal machine, they were enforced to collect more taxes for 
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provisioning the army and to construct an effective bureaucracy to maintain the 
technicalities of the military.  
       The supposed distinction between possible different kinds of modernity such as the 
supposed conservative modernism of the Empire and radical modernism of the Republic is 
simplistic/reductionist and needs reassessment. From a structuralist view, all the modernist 
transformations including the Ottoman/Turkish one can be analyzed in terms of a technical 
adaptations and adjustments. What was new, striking and daring in the Republican 
reformism was its endeavor to reshape the society, if necessary by force. This was a radical 
break from the earlier mode of modernization which was basically concerned with the 
reorganization of the state. The motivation of the Republic to undertake such a sweeping 
social and cultural modernization project derived from the recognition of the failure to 
transform and uphold the state by limiting its efforts to reorganize it. The changing 
conceptualization of the state which began to be conceived in relation with the society and 
the nation supposed to represent and serve fostered the motivation to reorganize the society 
and the individuals besides the organization of the state. The individuals, the minds of the 
individuals and the society as a whole had to be transformed for the state to encounter the 
challenges of the modernity, the progress of the non-Muslims and the encroachment of the 
Western powers. The nation replaced the state as the pivotal and critical object to be saved, 
protected and maintained. The radicalism of the project derived from its endeavor to 
prioritize the nation/society instead of the state in its transformative project. Therefore, the 
difference between the mode of modernizations of the Republic and the Empire can be 
interpreted as limited to its means rather than its objectives.  
      
 
1.9. Reconstituting Religion Beyond Faith in the Modern Age 
 
       One of the fundamental subjects of inquiry of the modern social sciences, religion was 
long seen as the arch enemy and diametrical opposite of the European Enlightenment, 
science, reason, modernity and all the things assumed to be ―modern‖. The assumption was 
that the year 1789 was the decisive year (year zero) in which religion began to retreat 
against the forces of modernity although the retreat was already observable throughout the 
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eighteenth century, the century of the Enlightenment. Religion did its best to fight back the 
forces of modernity but it was too late for a recovery and there was no chance to avoid 
what was inevitable. Religion was to remain on the defense and its inevitable doom was 
only a matter of time. 
       This paradigm was more a self-propaganda of the nineteenth century ―enlightened‖ 
thought rather than a disinterested observation. Moreover, it reflected the triumphalism of 
the 19th century positivism. This argumentation is now known as ―secularization thesis‖ 
and has been severely criticized after the World War II.
188
 
       Contrary to the positivists who celebrated the end of the stage of metaphysics to be 
followed by the stage of positivism, it is now recognized that, on the contrary, 19th century 
was the apex of religion in many aspects. It was the century in which Europeans cultivated 
a particular piety and showed their respect to God in masses. The Victorian value system 
developed urban middle-class and upper-class forms of piety that were unprecedented in 
many ways.
189
 The rural areas were also reconquered from the darkness of superstition. 
The old superstitions were wiped out by the Church, thanks to the village priests it had sent 
to the remote villages and working-class neighborhoods. The superstitions were replaced 
by the organized and regularized ―correct teachings‖ of the Church. It was the first half of 
20th century or even the two decades succeeding the World War II that religion retreated 
dramatically.
190
  
                                                 
188
 For Comte and his contemporaries see Wright, T.R, The Religion of Humanity, 
Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 1986. For the two founding books of the 
critique of secularization thesis, Luckmann, Thomas, Das Problem der Religion in der 
Modernen Gesellschaft, Freiburg, 1967; Berger, Peter, The Sacred Canopy, Garden City: 
Anchor, 1990 (originally 1967).  Also see Luckmann, Thomas & Berger, Peter, The Social 
Construction of Reality, Garden City: Anchor, 1967. This landmark book summarizes the 
philosophical conceptualization the critique of secularization thesis builds on. This book 
reveals what the exponents of secularization thesis fails to conceive.   
189
 For Victorian religiosity, see Wilson, A.N, The Victorians, New York: W.W.Norton, 
2004; Himmelfarb,Gertrude, Marriage and Morals among the Victorians,Chicago:  
I.R.Dee, 2001. 
190
 For a description of the sudden collapse of religion in the post-war Europe see Judt, 
Tony, Postwar, Penguin Press, 2005; also see Brown, Callum G, ―The Secularization 
Decade: The Haemorrhage of the British Churches in the 1960s‖, paper presented at the 
conference “The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750-2000”, Paris, 1977; 
quoted in McLeod, Hugh,. Secularization in Western Europe, 1848-1914, London: 
82 
 
       The early criticism of the ―secularization thesis‖ derived from the German 
hermeneutic tradition. While contemplating on the much neglected area of ―sociology of 
knowledge‖, they claimed that religion derived from the human quest to give a meaning to 
the outer world around the self. Therefore, religion cannot be reduced to mere ignorance 
and superstition. It is not simply deception but an outcome of the quest to know what is 
unknowable. Hence, religion is not to be dissolved as easily as it had been presumed. 
Hermeneutics also enabled the social scientists to approach religion not as an enemy but as 
a social and intellectual phenomenon needing to be explained. 
       Of course religion is not one single ―entity‖. In line with 19th century Positivism, we 
observe the disappearance of rural religion and the waning of its culture of superstition in 
which local saints were helping the peasants who visited to ―sacred‖ sites nearby the 
villages to seek for healing of their sufferings.
191
 The peasants arriving at the cities did 
leave their countryside habits and beliefs. But in this process of urbanization, we also 
observe the development of an organized religion at an unprecedented scale sponsored by 
the states to manipulate it for their agenda. Taking the hermeneutic analysis of religion to 
the ―realm of state‖; we observe the evolution of a new, more politicized and an 
encompassing version of Christianity in the world of nation-states and modern Empires 
crafted by the states to serve for the self-legitimization of these polities and infuse them 
with self-righteousness and glamour. Institutionalized religion provided the meaning these 
politics needed to legitimize themselves.  
       Religion is a historical category which has many manifestations differing in different 
ages and geographies. The religion of the nineteenth century had risen parallel to the rise of 
the modern states and therefore understandable within this socio-political context. First of 
all, the church institution may be seen as the first modern organization to be replicated by 
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states as argued by Max Weber a century ago.
192
 The church had transformed itself from 
being a holy see regulating the spiritual affairs of Christians to the first bureaucratic, 
political and colossal machine beginning from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.
193
 
The Counter-Reformation was the climax of this transformation. The Counter-Reformation 
was not an invention of the early modern ages constituted as a reaction to the rise of 
Protestantism but denoted the culmination of the earlier dispositions of the Church.
194
 It is 
also a very important point to clarify that the Inquisition is itself a product of late Middle 
Ages, institutionalized so as to respond to the proliferating heresies and therefore an 
outcome of the Early Modern age as a manifestation of the expansion of the Church 
institution.
195
 The vigorous resurgence of the Church also transformed the social meaning 
of the religion. Religion became an institutionalized culture. Catholicism was always 
defined with reference to the existence of a hierarchical institution with a divine grace to 
which the faithful had to submit; however, with the onset of the early modern era, the scale 
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and the scope of the institutionalized religion had become more imposing.
196
 Souls were 
not only to be guided but also to be commanded.  
       Of course the transformation of Christianity (in its Catholic and Protestant 
manifestations) was a multifaceted phenomenon. It was also related with the massive 
diffusion of literacy.
197
 With the acquiring of the skill of reading, the flock demanded a 
new and more interactive style of adherence to the Christian community. They were no 
more to be treated as the passive sheep waiting for the commands and teachings of their 
shepherd. This requirement demanded the sophistication and activation of the Church 
institution. The Church also had to persuade its previously obedient flock in which the lack 
of continuous doctrinization might be won over by heresy. The Church should be 
proactive, aggressive and diligent.
198
 Whereas earlier, the Church discouraged her flock 
from being literate and lay Bible reading in its struggle with the Protestant conventicals, in 
the eighteenth century, the Church began to promote literacy and perceived literacy as the 
best way to wipe out heresies and advance true faith.
199
 There was one drive originating 
from the Church to refashion religion. Another drive derived from the secular authorities. 
As ascendant secular authorities enhanced their political authorities in centuries and 
monopolized sovereignty, they also felt the necessity to tame and domesticate religion. 
Given that Church and religion constituted the greatest sphere independent from the 
secular political authorities, the rise of the secular authorities throughout early modernity 
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gave them the opportunity to contract the autonomous sphere of religion.
200
 For this, 
concordatas with the religious authorities was essential. With concordatas and ―mutual 
understanding‖s, the social religion of early modernity and more so the religion of 19th 
century was domesticated.   
       Another reason why Christianity had been transformed was related with the continent-
wide political developments pertaining to the issue of legitimacy. As the absolutist states 
had felt the necessity to include the subjects in their body politic, they had to speak a 
language which is at the same time universal and sectarian. This was what a religion was. 
As absolutist states began to be more complex than ever, this process brought the religious 
institution which they had associated themselves with to be more complex and more 
institutionalized. As states had risen from being mere polities interfering only with matters 
of politics to administrative monsters regulating the everyday matters of their subjects, the 
religion followed it. Religious devotion also became a full-time occupation or this was 
what the clergy began to preach.  
       In short, there was a deal between the Church and the rising absolutist states. 
Certainly, the political authority needed the religious authority to be on his side to assist in 
realizing its ambitions
201
. Religious legitimacy is the best method to reach and capture the 
subjects and the minds of the subjects. As it had been expressed above, for reasons 
mentioned and for many other reasons not mentioned, the consent and support of the 
subjects began to matter with the eighteenth century onwards. Not only the subjects 
themselves but the souls and the minds of the subjects began to matter in the eyes of the 
political authorities, they also had to be controlled and regulated. Of course, in the 
nineteenth century, in the age of nation-states, subjects and the considerations of the 
subjects will be important more than ever. After all, it is the subjects‘ will upon which the 
nation-states claimed to build themselves. 
       Therefore, religion became politicized beginning in early modernity and further 
politicized in the 19
th
 century. This is not to say that religion was not political before. 
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Given that religion is a social phenomena (different from individual faith), it is by its very 
definition a political concept. What is new, however, was that with the rise of the absolutist 
states, religion had became a pillar of the absolutist states. For example, by the sixteenth 
century, the subjects had to be a believer of the denomination in which the political 
authority professed to.
202
 If a subject was allowed to profess to another denomination, he 
will not be accepted as a member of the community. The act of non-adherence to the 
denomination of the political authority meant the rejection of the earthly power of the 
political authority as well. Associating confession with political loyalty was a novel 
phenomenon that became possible in the age of mass communications and literacy. This 
process became even more apparent in the age of nation. Religion, not being the antidote of 
nationalism, served as the cement of nationalism and national identity, especially in the 
states where nationalisms developed with the sponsorship of states.
203
 British identity was 
forged as early as in the 17
th
 century as being the ―New Jerusalem‖ fighting against the 
continental Catholics in the service of Satanical forces.
204
 Similarly, the Dutch identity was 
forged with the Dutch struggle against the yoke of Catholicism.
205
 Lutheranism of Prussia 
served the same function
206
. Catholicism was an indispensable element of the French 
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national identity even in its Republican forms.
207
 Religion became the distinctive mark of 
the nations as well as their proof to be (morally) superior to other contenting nations. In 
other words, religions baptized and consecrated the nations. 
 
 
1.10.Politicization of Religion in the Ottoman Empire 
     
       As argued above, religion can not be limited to faith. Religion is not only the 
relationship between God and the believer but a relationship between the members of a 
particular community as well as the relationship between the members of the community 
and the community as a whole. The politicization of religion may not be taken as a sign of 
the rise of conservative modernization over liberal modernization but a corollary of the 
early modern developments before religion and modernization were dissociated. This does 
not mean politicization of religion is simply a consequence of modernity. Given that 
religion is a social phenomenon, it is inevitably political. The transformation of the 
meaning of religion and its politicization is rather the outcome of the interaction of many 
processes taking place simultaneously and independently from each other in Early Modern 
and Modern Europe. 
       In the earlier historiography of the late Ottoman Empire, Ottoman reforms used to be 
interpreted simply as a process of secularization as if these two concepts were 
synonymous.   The Turkish translation of the title of Niyazi Berkes‘ classical Kemalist 
study on Ottoman modernization in the fiftieth anniversary of the Republic, where 
―secularization‖ was translated as çağdaşlaşma, i.e. ―modernization‖, is an overt 
illustration of this assumption and ambiguity.
208
 Furthermore, Berkes‘ book‘s original 
name, seeing secularization as the pivotal aspect of the 19th century Ottoman 
transformation, also establishes such equivalence. In this perception, it was a matter of 
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simple arithmetic. More modernization should have led automatically to less religiousness 
of the state and the individual.      
       However, recent studies critical of the Kemalist assumption highlighted the more 
complex nature of the 19th century Ottoman transformation. It had been demonstrated that 
the reforms of Mahmud II were legitimized upon a religious discourse presenting these 
reforms as ―religious efforts.‖209 The abolition of the Janissary corps was presented and 
legitimized as a religious duty and as a jihad against the infields (Janissaries) who had 
infiltrated among the Ottoman military. The janissaries were presented as enemies of state 
and religion in the service of Christian states.
210
 The event itself was conspicuously hailed 
as ―Auspicious Incident‖ (Vaka-i Hayriye). According to this official propaganda, 
Mahmud II was the religious reformer (müceddid) of the era as heralded in the Islamic and 
Quaranic sources. He successfully eradicated all the heretics and all the remnants of the 
heresy.
211
 Mahmud II literally butchered all the Bektaşi graves and reestablished orthodox 
Islam and Bektaşicism was eradicated throughout the Empire and declared as a heretical 
sect.
212
 The Bektaşi influence over the Janissary corps was countered with the endorsement 
of an orthodox Islam and the required study of the works of orthodox Islam by the newly 
organized military corps such as Birgivi Risalesi for the purpose of ―rectifying the practice 
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of religion and faith‖ (usul-ı diniyye ve aka‟idlerini tashih zımmında).213 Furthermore, the 
unprecedented jihadist tone in the declaration of war against Russia in 1826 just after the 
destruction of the janissary corps, whether it be a public relations effort or not, was a 
novelty in the Ottoman official discourse. This radicalizing and orthodoxization of the 
official rhetoric was not a repetition of the traditional Ottoman discourse. It was an 
innovation and an expression of an emerging discourse embedded in the Ottoman 
modernization and in the emerging rhetoric of the Ottoman/Turkish proto-nationalism and 
nationalism.
214
 This process also involved the etatization of Islam. Islam was rendered 
subordinate to the state and state interests. Although the case was not very different in the 
classical centuries of the Ottoman Empire, the extent of this subordination was 
unprecedented. These were early symptoms of the nationalization process interwoven in 
the modernization, not unlike the development of an evangelical language in 17
th
 century 
England in its road to nationalization in the early modernity.
215
  
       The emergence of discourses of identity, demonization and ―othering‖ were 
preeminent manifestations and components of the formation of a modern state. Different 
from pre-modern polities, modern states developed their public faces and discourses to 
legitimize their existences. Along with cannons and rifles, the Ottomans reproduced such 
strategies of governmentality. These modern states differ from the medieval ones in their 
claim to serve for a particular mission. The medieval states knew what they were. Any 
Western barbaric kingdom from Merovengians to the Norman England was founded by a 
certain military/militarized elite longing for more glory and booty. In the words of Charles 
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Tilly, state making was an ―organized crime‖.216 The case was not different in the Muslim 
Middle East. Although they claimed to serve for a higher goal, (religion and God) the 
mechanisms of these polities were not organized on their claims to serve for higher ideals. 
These polities were organized basically to maximize plunder and booty.   
      The modern states did not have such a luxury. They, on the other hand, (re)organized 
themselves to substantiate their claims to serve for respectable ideals. Accordingly, 
although Ottomans always claimed to uphold the banner of Islam; it was with the late 
eighteenth century they endorsed this claim more energetically and self-consciously.
217
 
       To display the sacramentalization of the Ottoman Empire, Akşin Somel aptly named 
his book on the modernization of 19th century Ottoman education as “The Modernization 
of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908 : Islamization, Autocracy, and 
Discipline”.218 Somel‘s book‘s name also implies an analogy to the 19th century Russian 
autocracy‘s zeal in its claim of protection and promotion of order and religion.219 The 
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resemblance of the Ottoman imperium and the Russian autocracy
220
 (and the Meiji 
Japan
221
) is also one of the points Selim Deringil had pointed out in his classic work on the 
self-representations of the reign of Abdülhamid II.222 All these polities had throughout 19th 
century endeavored to establish a cult based on the splendor of their autocracy, the 
religiosity/divine grace of their regimes and their benevolence towards their subjects.
223
 
Thus, the politicization of Islam was an inevitable and pivotal component of the 19th 
century Ottoman Empire replicating the pattern of a modernizing autocracy reminiscent of 
Russia, Japan and Prussia. 
 
 
1.11. Military Revolution and Westernization 
 
    The Turkish modernization/Westernization had been interpreted primarily as an identity 
problem rather than a strictly political and structural one by the earlier historiography. The 
political necessity or even political immediacy had been recognized as a push factor that 
forced Ottomans to pursue an aggressive and uncompromising enterprise of 
Westernization. For scholars like Berkes and Lewis, the Otttoman 
transformation/modernization/Westernization process was primarily a structural and 
political one implemented in dire conditions as an utter necessity but they also assumed 
that identity problem had to be encountered and resolved for Ottomans to embark on a 
determined Westernization venture. In these scholars, the Ottoman transformation was 
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perceived as a matter of identity more than a matter of adaptation to modernity.
224
 This 
paradigm is arguably a relic of the Orientalist origins of Ottoman historiography.  
     With the incorporation of Ottoman studies into the mainstream historiography, from the 
1970s onwards the late Ottoman history began to be investigated through the application of 
universal concepts of social sciences and paradigms of history and historical sociology. 
Here, in line with these studies, it will be suggested that it is misleading to attribute a 
primary role to the politics of identity and presume that politics of identity was prevalent 
since the beginnings of Ottoman Westernization. However, it is necessary to contextualize 
and historicize identity politics rather than treat it as a natural phenomenon as if West and 
East exist in pure forms. Here, it will be argued that, the problem of identity arose in the 
later phases of the so-called Westernization process which itself was a product of 
―Westernization‖.225 This point will be explored in the coming chapters in the case of 
Ottoman diplomats. In fact, identity politics is a consequence of encountering with 
modernity as argued by Sorin Mitu.  
―In fact, identity and self-perception crises are merely an effect of modernization, all 
the sharper as the latter quickens its pace. As a consequence, there is no escape from 
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an inter-conditioning between critical reflection on modernity and an identity-centered 
problematic, as a fundamental and inextricable datum of one‘s existence. Modernity, 
as mental space and general human condition, shelters the seed of a somewhat 
paradoxical attitude: the post-modern tendency to deny and ceaselessly reformulate 
not only tradition and the ‗oldness‘ against which it defines itself, but also its own 
bases and motivations-reasons, individualism and ‗progress‘, individual and collective 
identity, which is a tendency that runs the risk of being (completely erroneously) taken 
for traditionalism and anti-modernity.‖226  
The structural reasons for the precipitation of the Ottoman modernization and 
transformation is attested by the new generation of Ottomanists. Şükrü Hanioğlu writes; 
―by and large, when Ottoman policy makers and intellectuals turned toward Europe, they 
did so not out of a clear, articulate ideological preference, as is often suggested by later 
Ottoman scholars. Rather, they looked to Europe for answers because a return to the old 
order was thoroughly unattractive for answers because there was nowhere else to turn. 
Extreme reactionaries existed in late Ottoman society as elsewhere. But the sharp debate 
between them and the radical Westernizers distorts the historical reality of a consensus on 
the need for a European-inspired change that was shared by a solid majority of the 
Ottoman elite from the nineteenth century onward.‖227 First and foremost, the labeling of 
the process had to be questioned. The label ―Westernization‖ is a label that had been 
established in reading history backwards and misrepresents the actual process in many 
ways. The label ―modernization‖ also creates similar shortcomings. The problem with 
these two idioms is that they evoke an organized, pre-planned and full-fledged project of 
social, political and institutional transformation. These labels assume implicitly that there 
was a certain decision made at a certain time which initiated the inevitable and irreversible 
process of ―Westernization‖ and ―modernization‖. In reality, the objects of the process 
were much more modest and spontaneous. It was in the beginning fundamentally a project 
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of reforming the current state apparatus and rendering the state organization more resilient 
and more efficient. It was a state project targeting state institutions. It involved no social 
and transformative dimensions. 
       It was a Westernizing project in the sense that the Ottomans wanted to replicate the 
impressive and effective state institutions of the Western powers which had been the 
supporting base for strong armies. The Ottomans did not show any timidity in their 
aspirations. They wanted to learn how Western powers had organized themselves that 
made them so vigorous and fierce. This was not a matter related to the ―realm of religion‖ 
but relevant to the ―realm of state affairs‖ and ―military science‖228 (fenn-i harb229). 
       ―State affairs‖ in the late 18th and the early 19th century meant predominantly military 
affairs. The budget was principally spent on military expenditures until the early 19
th
 
century.
230
 Furthermore, it was the military defeats rather than certain other economical 
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losses and failures that enforced a drastic reform. In the perception of the dignitaries of the 
time, the state meant to a larger extent the military machine. This assumption was not 
wrong. The well-being of the state was directly related to military success and efficiency. 
State‘s might, glory and pompousness were measured according to its military efficiency. 
All other state affairs were auxiliary to the military advancement of the imperium. In a 
sense, the pre-modern state was, in Charles Tilly‘s terms, an organized crime founded for 
the very interests of the members of the gang.
231
 The recognition of the fact that military 
might became much more dependent to the non-military factors necessitated the 
reformation of the state apparatus. The demilitarization of the state also triggered the effort 
of the ruling elite to differentiate themselves from those whom they decreed as criminal 
and illegitimate.  
       In this regard, there was nothing surprising that so-called Westernization had been 
―initiated‖ firstly in military affairs. Of course a valid and legitimate question to be posed 
here is that how can we interpret this process as a Westernization move? The phenomenon 
of bringing foreign experts for the military was not a novelty in the eighteenth century. 
Ottomans had always invited foreign experts for assistance.
232
 This was not a unique 
Ottoman method either. In early modern Europe, European countries had always sought 
and brought experts regardless of the nationality and ethnicity of the experts. This was one 
of the causes and the outcomes of the European military revolution
233
. The transfer of 
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technological developments within the European scene was prevalent which ensued the 
dissemination of new military methods. The transfer of military technology had exploded 
due to the rapidly developing military technology. After a point, it became a dire necessity 
to adapt these novelties and no European power could dare to disregard it. Basically, the 
eighteenth century European experts had introduced the novelties of the military revolution 
to Ottomans. This was to counter Russians and Austrians who were holding the upper hand 
against the Ottomans thanks to their superior military technology and tactics.
234
 The 
principal ally of Ottomans against these powers was France, so it was France to whom the 
Ottomans turned to take military know-how. The military advisers who  throughout the 
eighteenth century happened to be French (with the exception of De Tott who had a 
Hungarian origin but had been Frenchified) were individual entrepreneurs trying to make 
their living and career in the Ottoman military although it was with the French backing 
they had acquired their contracts in the Ottoman army.  
       In short, the presence of military advisers in the Ottoman army involved international 
dimensions as well. France was allied with Ottomans and content with the well-being of 
Ottomans as long as it could keep the privileges it obtained in 1740 and retain its 
hegemony in the Levantine trade and economy.
235
 Thus, ―the French connection‖ was a 
crucial factor in Ottoman politics and it continued to be so throughout Tanzimat. 
       The reign of Selim III had begun with continuous defeats in wars with Russia and 
Austria. The warfare ended with the disappointing treaty of Sistova. From then onwards, 
Selim III decided to reform the military.
236
 The military reform was followed by a 
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comprehensive reform of the statecraft as it became evident that military power depends on 
a modern organization of the state. For Ottoman reformers, once the machines were 
activated, the inevitable positive feedback mechanism was also to begin to operate.  
 
 
1.12.The Ancien régime Problem in Europe 
 
       ―(The concept) ancien régime was created by the French revolution. It was what the 
revolutionaries thought they were destroying in and after 1789.‖237 Thus, the concept 
ancien régime emerged as an ideological artifact for the purpose of discrediting and 
denigrating an invented diametrically opposite adversary by the revolutionaries. Thus, 
ancien régime was denied any agency and any constitutive role for its posterity. However, 
later scholarly works acknowledged the existence of a certain form of politics, society and 
culture which may be justly named as ―ancien régime‖ not definable in relation with what 
it preceded (―the new regime‖) but as an encompassing vision of political and social order 
with its distinctive attributes.
238
  
      The culture of aristocracy was at the very center of the ancien régime. ―Nobility‖ and 
―aristocracy‖ are concepts, which may have different meanings in terms of time and social 
context. Marc Raeff, a historian of Russian aristocracy writes in his introduction to his 
book that ―we must turn to the always tricky problem of terminology, for Russian reality 
and concepts have no obvious equivalents in the West. Our study concerns the dvorianstvo 
of eighteenth century.‖ He defines dvorianstvo as ―all titled persons, serf owners, officers, 
officials, professional people, whether they owned land or not‖239, and technically ―the 
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service nobles of the Grand Duke and Tsar.‖240 The aristocracy of Russia was from the 
beginning constituted very much in relation to the state and shaped by the initiatives of the 
state beginning from Ivan the Terrible‘s suppression of the boyars.241 Every polity had 
developed different notions of privilege, distinction and political ordering. An aristocracy 
does not necessarily fit in the Western European classical model in which nobility 
preceded the formation and expansion of the states. The making of nobilities and state 
nobilities had different modalities in different national contexts.
242
  
       Moreover, no aristocratic cluster remains the same in the course of time. The 
characteristics and social roles of aristocracies do change, transform and evolve. One 
interesting case is the trajectory of the Prussian aristocracy throughout Prussia‘s evolution 
from a lesser princely polity to an authoritarian monarchy. The Prussian aristocracy 
achieved to sustain its power vis-a-vis the non-aristocratic interests in a world in which 
land and landed interest were no more the dominant means of production and means of 
power. The state and the aristocracy established a partnership in which aristocracy 
redefined itself with regard to its relation to the state.
243
 
       One of the main debates among English historians is the problem of the 
break/continuity of the ―ancien régime‖ in Britain. The question is whether the political 
establishment of British 19th century can be seen as the continuation of the 18th century 
political regime and establishment or not. The (old) Whig families constituted the political 
elite of the 18
th
 century Britain. It was a century of oligarchy and a period of consensus 
within the commanding heights of the British ruling class. With the extension of political 
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rights in 1832, a reshuffling took place, terminating the Whig ascendancy. Whigs had to 
share political power with the Tories as the commonality of interest among the politically 
ruling elite had ebbed. Furthermore, Tories reigned for the most of the 19
th
 century and 
new alignments within the politically ruling elite and outside the politically ruling elite 
took place. Thus, liberals and radicals made their way into the parliament within the Whig 
establishment and the old whigs had to lose their dominance within the Liberal Party.  
       The traditional Whig historiography associated the ascendancy of Britain with the rise 
of a new entrepreneur class capitalizing on the benefits of Industrial Revolution. However, 
the revisionist historians of 1980s claimed that ―the strength of Britain....lay less in its 
novel entrepreneurial activities than in the elements of stability and continuity, which 
derived from its status as a rural ancien régime society, the monarchy, the church and the 
aristocracy.‖244 The eighteenth century Britain (not unlike with the new interest to the 
eighteenth century Ottoman Empire) was rehabilitated from being a neglected field of 
study to a field of increasing attention. John Brewer, Paul Langford, Linda Colley
245
 and 
others produced remarkable studies that investigated and reassessed the eighteenth century 
Britain and the British aristocracy in power not as a world doomed to collapse and vanish 
but as the harbinger of the dynamic nineteenth century Britain. The revisionist historians 
asserted that aristocracy played a constitutive role in the making of the British nineteenth 
century.  
      David Cannadine showed that the collapse of the British aristocracy can be dated only 
to the late 19th century and 20th century.
246
 In another book, he also reinterpreted English 
imperialism, in a polemic with Edward Said, as a venture motivated mainly by aristocratic 
aspirations
247
 which also challenged the assumptions of historians of imperialism. The new 
imperial historians also shed light on the significant contributions of the British aristocracy 
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to the development of British imperialism. For the impressive historians of British 
colonization, Hopkins and Cain, British imperialism was advanced by the southern 
aristocracy of Britain who failed to compete against the northern industrialists and northern 
capitalism.
248
 In an influential book, Martin Wiener claimed that the disappointing 
economical performance of 20th century Britain was the result of the dominance of the 
southern land-based aristocrats in the political and cultural spheres impeding the rise of the 
ethos of bourgeoisie of the northern industrialists. For Wiener, land-based aristocrats 
disdained the culture of the innovative and industrious business elite and promoted an anti-
industrialist ethos. For Wiener, the industrialists, who were mocked in Charles Dickens‘ 
Hard Times, never seized the political and ideological control
249
 and the ―old regime‖ with 
its value system had prevailed. 
       The French historians also rehabilitated the neglected role of the aristocracy in the 
making of the 19th century France. Coming from an aristocratic family victimized in the 
terror of the French Revolution, De Tocqueville had already in the mid 19
th
 century 
claimed that French Revolution did in fact pursue the legacy of the ancien régime but did 
not suggest that the old powerhouses of the Ancién Regime had survived and retained their 
power after the French Revolution. Nevertheless, Tocqueville‘s view remained a minority 
before he was rehabilitated by the revisionist historians of the French Revolution. The 
―arch-revisionist‖ Alfred Cobban refuted the Marxist interpretation of French Revolution 
in 1964 which argues that it was essentially a bourgeoisie revolution.
250
 Influenced by him, 
in late 1960s and 1970s, a new generation of historians of French Revolution further 
demolished ―the myth of bourgeois revolution‖.251 Revisionist historians of the French 
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Revolution differed in their views and in their interpretation of the revolution. 
Nevertheless, the collapse of the argument that 1789 was a bourgeois revolution brought 
back the aristocracy to the stage. The aristocracy was no longer seen as a class that had 
ceased to exist after 1789. Revisionist historians documented how the ancien régime 
aristocratic families managed to adapt themselves to the new circumstances of the 
nineteenth century and reproduced their wealth.
252
 The French case was different from the 
British one in the sense that the French aristocrats as a class lost their political power. 
Nevertheless, in economics, politics and bureaucracy, the aristocracy retained its strong 
presence throughout the nineteenth century.
253
 The aristocratic families found ways to 
retain their wealth and prestige before they began to vanish by the end of the nineteenth 
century.  
       Furthermore, there was no self-standing and arrogant bourgeoisie committed to 
eradicate the aristocracy and the passé aristocratic values as Marx had postulated with 
enthusiasm in the 19
th
 century. Sarah Maza shows that the myth of bourgeoisie was 
invented to refer to a fictive enemy rather than to represent social reality.
254
 Contrary to the 
vision of Marx, the bourgeoisie of the 19th century France was timid and never intended to 
challenge or oppose aristocracy. On the contrary, the bourgeoisie imitated the aristocracy 
and as it found its impressive literary account in Marcel Proust. We may speak of the final 
triumph of the bourgeoisie, if there ever was a bourgeoisie and if it was ever victorious, 
only in the 1890s with the consolidation of the institutions established by the Third 
Republic.
255
 However, the bourgeoisie of the 1890s was not the bourgeoisie of the previous 
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decades. It was the bourgeoisie that made its peace with the order and abandoned its 
―progressive‖ and oppositionist rhetoric after witnessing the horrors of the Commune. In 
other words, the triumph of the bourgeois and the Third Republic was in many ways more 
the victory of the ancien régime. 
      The czarist Russian historiography also reassessed Russian ancien régime. The 
conventional historiography of the czarist Russia‘s interpretation of czardom had been 
revised by the revisionist historians beginning from 1970s. The revisionist historiography 
developed a comparably ―favorable‖ view of the czardom refuting to label czardom as 
mere despotism;
256
 
―In recent years, Nicholas‘ bureaucracy has been the subject of considerable study in 
the West. For H. J. Torke the major characteristics of the Russian civil service were its 
lack of professional autonomy, expertise or ethos. Unlike its Prussian counterpart it 
had neither the corporate rights guaranteed by the Allgemeine Landrecht, nor yet a 
clear sense of service to the communal welfare enshrined in an abstract ideal of the 
state. Without challenging Torke‘s view that the Russian civil service as a whole was 
corrupt, inefficient, arbitrary and concerned with its own welfare rather than the 
communal interest, some American scholars recently casted a somewhat redeeming 
light on certain aspects of Nicholas‘ bureaucracy. What emerges clearly from the work 
of these scholars is that by the 1850s Russia possessed an elite officialdom fully 
committed to the service of a state whose only legitimate function in their eyes was 
the welfare of the community. These men were expert career officials, firmly rooted in 
the ministerial apparatus, and possessed an ethos distinct in most cases from that of 
the landed aristocracy and the gentry. They expected the state to play the leading role 
in bringing reform and modernization to Russian society and, if permitted by the 
monarch and his entourage, were willing and able to take the burden of leadership on 
their own shoulders.‖257  
The Great Reform era initiated after the catastrophic Crimean War, which had been 
perceived as a dismal failure, was reexamined and rehabilitated: ―More recently, Western 
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scholars have looked much more depth at the question of how the Great Reforms were 
implemented, tested and developed and considered their broader social, political, and 
cultural implications in an impressive series of studies(.)‖258 Apparently, recent studies do 
not celebrate the autocratic reformism of Alexander II but present a balanced evaluation of 
the Great Reform era.
259
 Hence, the myth of ―monarchic absolutism‖ for Russian czardom 
had been demolished. In short, for the revisionist historians, the czarist Russia was not a 
medieval obscurantism but a dynamic polity that would had viability in the world of the 
twentieth century if the Revolution had not taken place as an unexpected consequence of 
the World War I.     
      The post-WW II assumption that Germany followed a distinct trajectory in contrast to 
the British and French trajectories is also criticized heavily by the recent historians. ―The 
peculiarity of Germany‖ argument was very problematic first and foremost because it 
implied that France and Britain followed a ―normal/straight path‖. Furthermore, the 
revisionist historians have questioned the validity of the conventional narrative seeing 
Britain and France necessarily destined to evolve into liberal democracies and Germany 
doomed to its path to the Nazi totalitarian state. Apparently, this was a presentist reading of 
history.
260
  
       The Sonderweg (special path) debates constitute the very essence of the German 
historiography.
261
 The Sonderweg argument simply states that Germany did not follow the 
―normal path‖ to evolve to a liberal democracy but followed a distinctive path. Different 
explanations and variants of the Sonderweg paradigm blamed various reasons such as late 
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modernization, the failure of the 1848 Revolution
262
 or the authoritarian Prussian 
tradition.
263
 The late modernization thesis establishes that the urge to catch up the early 
modernizers compelled the state to engineer the growth of economy.
264
 The state assumed 
an immense power in the economy and did not allow the emergence of a self-regulating 
market. On the contrary, the state had promoted certain industries and entrepreneurs to 
enable them to expand to gigantic proportions. The lack of a competitive market meant that 
the capitalist entrepreneurs were rendered dependent on the state and therefore subordinate 
to the ancien régime elite. In short, according to the Sonderweg approach, ―Germany 
industrialized without destroying the social and political hegemony of aristocracy, of 
modernizing economically while remaining entrapped in a pre-industrial nexus of 
authoritarian social structures, values and political attitudes.‖265  
      This study is not the place to enter into the historiography of the Sonderweg. The word 
was originally coined in the imperial period by the German conservative historians and 
publicists to eulogize Germany for escaping both from the corrupt autocracy of Russia and 
the decadent democracies of Britain and England.
266
 Later, especially with the impact of 
the World War II, the word was employed by English historians such as Sir Vansittard, 
Namier, French historian Poliakov and most popularly by the American journalist William 
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Shirer to establish that Hitler was an inevitable outcome of the course of German history. 
This assumption was taken and transformed into an academic argument by the postwar 
German historians such as Fritz Fischer and Hans-Ulrich Wehler who were critical to the 
nationalist historiography prevalent in Germany before the 1960s. Hans-Ulrich Wehler and 
his ―Bielefeld School‖ associates depicted imperial Germany as a paternalistic and 
hierarchical society carefully engineered by the ancien régime aristocrats:267 
―Criticizing an older German historiography which denied the long-term roots of 
Nazism in German history....(Wehler) insisted..(that) in 1848....the German 
bourgeoisie failed in its attempt to wrest power from aristocracy in the way its 
counterparts in other countries had done, in England in 1640 for example, or France in 
1789. As a result, the Prussian aristocracy was able to preserve its sociopolitical 
hegemony. It cemented it through the conservative ‗revolution from above‘ which 
united Germany under Prussian domination from 1866-1871. Continuing 
industrialization and social change increasingly threatened its position, but it was the 
army, the civil service and the Reich leadership. To bolster this, it engaged in a 
successful ‗feudalization of the bourgeoisie‘ into aristocratic modes of behavior and 
value-orientations (such as dueling, deference to inherited status, the hunt for 
decorations and titles, the scramble for the position of reserve officer, the adoption of 
an authoritarian and paternalistic attitude towards employees in industry, and, 
crucially, the rejection of democracy and parliamentarism), a process made easier.....as 
a result of the ―great depression‖ of 1873-96, which left the big industrialists heavily 
dependent on the interventionism of the undemocratic state.‖268 
Wehler‘s imperial Germany was static and closed to any change unless destroyed by 
external shocks and extraordinary developments such as had happened in 1918.
269
  
       The nature of the German bourgeoisie was at the center of the debate of the German 
Sonderweg. The German bourgeoisie was accused for being accomodationist and 
submissive. It had been suggested that, because the German bourgeoisie did not opt to 
openly challenge the established order, especially in the critical year of 1848, it had been 
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forced to accept a marginal and subordinate role within the elite. However, this assumption 
tacitly assumes that the bourgeoisie fought aggressively elsewhere and, furthermore, 
bourgeoisie as a class has an intrinsic motivation to confront (and destroy) established 
orders. 
       Arno Mayer‘s ―The Persistence of the Old Regime‖ is the classical account of the new 
reassessment of the nineteenth century.
270
 Arno Mayer showed that, contrary to the 
established opinion, in the nineteenth century, it was the nobility of different sorts that had 
controlled political power.
271
 For Mayer, the Marxian assumption that the economical and 
political powers are indistinguishable and who controls the economy controls the political 
power is wrong. For him, throughout the 19
th
 century, the political power continued to be 
exerted by traditional elites which did not overlap and intersect with the economical elites 
and centers of economic production.
272
 
       Two leading historians of Germany, David Blackbourn, and Geoff Eley analyze   the 
problem of the German bourgeoisie in their path breaking book, ―The Peculiarities of 
German History.‖ They question the relevancy of the historiography of German history 
and conclude that, it is misleading to assume that German history is particularly ―peculiar‖. 
They criticized the approach comparing the German model to the supposedly ―normal‖ 
model. For Blackbourn and Eley, the course of German history might display certain 
peculiarities but ―all national histories are peculiar.‖273 
       Blackbourn and Eley opposes the ―bourgeois-centered‖ historiography. The 
conventional historiography assumed that it was the dynamic bourgeoisie that had shaped 
and transformed the modern world. According to this approach, the problem with Germany 
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(and Russia and many others) was that the state played the constitutive role in the ―making 
of modern Germany‖. However, with the hindsight of many historical case studies and 
theoretical works, we now know that the state played an immense role in the making of the 
modern world in general.
274
 First of all, capitalism was generated, fostered and maintained 
thanks to the institutionalization of the states. It was the states that were the gears of 
capitalism, not the markets.
275
  
       To conclude and go back to our inquiry, it had been suggested that the immense and 
decisive role the state played in the emergence and development of modernity was not 
peculiar to the Ottoman/Turkish case. The states defined the mode of the modernity of their 
respective ―nations‖. Moreover, it was the states that had formulated Turkishness as well as 
Englishness, Germannes, Frenchness, even Britishness and Ottomannness. However, 
unlike the 18
th
 century Britain where in the journals ―John Bull‖s were drawn, defined and 
redefined
276
, in the absence of public expression, the degree of the role the state played in 
the Ottoman/Turkish case was incomparably immense.  
       In many ways, Hans-Ulrich Wehler‘s representation of Willhelmine Germany 
resembled Hamidian Ottoman Empire although some seminal aspects which Wehler 
attributed to the Willhelmine Germany are missing in the Hamidian Empire such as the 
―manipulation of political anti-semitism‖277 and ―industrial capitalism‖. Definitely, the 
―industrialists‖ are missing in the power configuration in the Hamidian context. 
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Nevertheless, the Hamidian Empire may be interpreted as an authoritarian polity with 
―superimposition of class differences on those between the traditional late-feudal estates‖ 
and ―myth of the bureaucracy‖ as Wehler had defined Wilhelmine Germany. Interestingly, 
such an interpretation of Hamidian Empire would coincide with the traditional perceptions 
of Hamidian polity which see the Hamidian regime as closed to any modernization and a 
bastion of obscurantism in reaction to the reformism of the Tanzimat. Recent studies, 
however, acknowledged the enormous contributions of the Hamidian era to the 
establishment and development of ―modern‖ institutions and reforms in Turkey. Therefore, 
while the frameworks of historians such as Wehler and Mommsen were criticized by 
names such as Blackbourn, Eley, Evans and Berghahn for taking the Willhelmine era as 
static and ―reactionary‖ within a structural Marxian paradigm, historians such as Deringil 
and Akarlı criticized the depiction of Hamidian regime as a monolithic power structure 
with a reactionary ideological foundation by the earlier generation of scholars. Apparently 
both the Willhelmine Empire and the Hamidian Empire were not monolithic power blocs 
and new generation of late Ottomanists and scholars of Willhelmine Germany are exposing 
the more complicated nature and various aspects of these two polities.  
      It was no coincidence that the foundation and the consolidation of the Hamidian 
autocracy coincided with the consolidation of fellow authoritarianisms of Willhelm II in 
Germany, Alexander III (who inverted the policies of the assassinated liberal czar 
Alexander II) in Russia and the Meiji in Japan. In this regard, Hamidian autocracy, like the 
Tanzimat preceding it, can be seen as influenced and shaped by the 
political/social/economic developments and trends of late 19
th
 century.
278
 It was a 
manifestation of the European turn to conservative modernization and authoritarianism. In 
Europe, the late 19th century was an age of restoration of political stability and restoration 
of ancien régimes within the structures of modern states. This process was a reaction to the 
rise of republicanism, liberalism, and other destabilizing forces and political movements 
throughout the 19
th
 century. Political stability was maintained with the iron fists of the 
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states in the age of dreadnoughts and machine guns.
279
 For sure, the Ottoman Empire did 
also achieve a temporary stability in the Hamidian era. The principal motivations for the 
emergence of Hamidian autocracy were dissatisfaction with the Tanzimat reformism and 
liberalism and the rise of ethnic politics and separatisms. Apparently, in the Hamidian 
context, the forces of instability were ethnic unrests rather than social and political 
agitations of Europe. 
       The assumption Wehler and his contemporary associates developed was that because 
Germany did not eliminate the aristocratic/royal elite as the French did, imperial Germany 
was doomed to be reactionary. Although it is a truism that the aristocratic ruling elite did 
construct a different political system than France or Britain developed, this political system 
was equally ―modern‖. Indeed, in many ways, it was arguably ―more modern‖ than its 
West European counterparts in terms of its economic dynamism, the structure of its 
economy and its military organization, technology and mobilization.  
       Willhelmine Germany created its own ―national cult‖, a state-nationalism unique to 
itself as like any other manifestation of nationalism. Contrary to the pre-1848 
anarchic/Republican nationalisms
280
, the Willhelmine national cult presupposed a staunch 
loyalty to the monarchy and the emperor. It was the emperor and his aura that represented 
the nation in his persona. In the figure of the emperor, the nation found its embodiment. 
The German nation was embedded within the emperor and the state. This national cult was 
to be challenged not only by socialists but race-centered nationalists from 1890s 
onwards
281
, again not unlike the Young Turk challenge to the Hamidian official proto-
national imperial representations and the official cult. Apparently, German/Prussian 
construction of official national cult was not unique to Germany. For example Russian 
autocracy developed its own cult along same lines. Along the same lines, the Russian 
autocracy established its ―national cult‖ around an imperial idea. In the genesis and 
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development of Russian ―official nationalism‖ and in the Russian perception of the 
―nation‖ , nation was defined strictly not in terms of ethnicity but in terms of obedience to 
the imperium and identification with the imperium.282 In the words of Richard Wortman, 
―After 1825, nationality was identified with absolutism, ‗autocracy‘ in the official lexicon. 
Russian nationality was presented as a nationality of consensual subordination, in contrast 
to egalitarian Western concepts. The monarchical narrative of the nation described the 
Russian people as voluntarily surrendering power to their Westernized rulers.‖283  
     As mentioned above, in the post-1870 Europe, the nation-states had consolidated 
themselves and repressed liberal and Republican opposition. The liberal and Republican 
contours of nationalism were eliminated and subordinated. The nation had been redefined 
in terms of states. The states began to be embodiments of the nations and replaced 
ethnicities. The Hamidian structures of loyalty to the Empire and the sultan himself can be 
interpreted in line with these developments. The Hamidian Turkish national cult defined 
nationhood not in terms of Turkish ethnicity but Turkishness embodied within the 
imperium, Islamic identity and the sultan himself. It is here suggested that, such a 
construction of nationhood around the imperial center was a founding moment in the 
forging of the Turkish nationalism.  
       To sum up our remarks on the problem of ancien régime, we portrayed a certain vista 
of ancien régime, not an ancien régime about to be thrown into the dustbin of history but 
an ancien régime that had reestablished/reinvented itself, an ancien régime which is not 
static and doomed to collapse soon or later, but an ancien régime vivid and innovative in 
its own ways. In other words, this is an ancien régime constitutive of the modern world as 
much as the modern nation-state. Establishing the preeminent roles of the ancien régimes, 
we may argue that the Ottoman ancien régime was constitutive of the Turkish modern 
nation-state, Turkish nationalism and ―Turkish modernity‖ in general. It had reinvented 
and adapted itself not as a relic of the past but as an entirely novel phenomenon.  
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       The Turkish ancien régime was very pivotal in the constitution of Turkish modernity  
not only with the  legacy it had left but also by crafting the very founding contours and 
axioms of Turkish modern experience and discourse. It is also argued that Turkish ancien 
régime should be understood fundamentally as a state-elite phenomenon. No economical 
and social forces played a significant role in this process. The principal stimulator was the 
state and the state-elite. As the 1789 and Industrial Revolution were no ―year zero‖s for 
France and Britain, respectively, and as elites of the ancien régimes persisted in new 
clothes, the Tanzimat and Hamidian elites derived from earlier generations of elites. In this 
genealogical continuum, an ideological continuum may also be observable connecting the 
traditional Ottoman imperial discourse to Turkish nationalism. It is argued that, clinging 
under the banner of the Ottoman imperial identity, the agents and actors of the ancien 
régime had designed a modern Turkish national identity defined in its subordinate relation 
to the political authority. The next chapter will deal with the Hamidian bureaucracy and its 
visions of nation and Empire. It will be argued that these premises will be reproduced by 
the later generations. Then the study will particularly focus on the Ottoman diplomatic 
service. The Ottoman Foreign Ministry, one of the best showcases of the Turkish ancien 
régime, is a good place to probe the worlds and times of the Turkish ancien régime. 
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         CHAPTER II 
 
THE STRUCTURES OF MENTALITIES OF THE LATE OTTOMAN 
BUREAUCRACY 
 
2.1. A Note on Bureaucracy         
 
       The bureaucratic theory in its Weberian ―ideal type‖ assumes impersonality as the very 
definition of bureaucracy. This theory takes bureaucracy as impersonal. The officials do 
not exist as themselves, but as anonymities.
284
 This anonymity renders bureaucracy a very 
efficient mechanism.
285
 Thus, within this perspective, bureaucracy is invented for its very 
functionalism by an external superior prerogative. Apparently, bureaucracy lacked any 
―agency‖ itself but was in the service of a superior authority. 
      Weber and Michels
286
 can be seen as the two founders of the classical theory of 
bureaucracy although criticisms of bureaucracy, e.g., idioms like ―bureaumania‖, were 
prevalent themes throughout the 19th century and although Martin Albrow spoke of the 
―English theory‖287 of bureaucracy before Weber and Michels ―theorized‖ bureaucracy. 
Although the Weberian conceptualization of bureaucracy continued to be taken as the 
classical account of the social sciences regarding bureaucracy before the 1970s, the social 
functionalists, who brought Weber to North America, had already exposed the limitations 
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and inadequacies of the Weberian theorization. Selznick and Merton pointed out the 
unexpected consequences of the bureaucratic undertakings and demonstrated the 
inefficiencies of the bureaucracy while Anglo-Saxoning the Weberian theory.
288
 However, 
these criticisms of Weber did not question the founding assumptions of the Weberian ideal 
type. Indeed, they focused on frictions of the theory and qualified, improved, and deepened 
the theory. Their critiques of Weber were limited to pointing out the ―externalities‖ of the 
bureaucratic theory such as the unpredicted complications of organizations rather than 
questioning the theory itself.
289
 It was the later students of bureaucracy who demonstrated 
that bureaucracy is not free of personalized relations, biases, or cultures. For these critics, 
bureaucracy cannot be reduced to the objective and mechanistic implementation of the task 
given.
290
  
        For Weber, ―(b)ureaucratic administration means fundamentally the exercise of 
control on the basis of knowledge. This is the feature which makes it specifically rational.‖ 
Furthermore, in Weber‘s view it was axiomatic that in order to generate control, 
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knowledge itself had to be controlled. Quoting Weber, David Vincent leveled the question 
of ―whose rationality‖ is served in keeping the information secret. Vincent pointed out that 
the secrecy of the bureaucracy is self-serving rather than in the public interest.
291
 Vincent‘s 
book along with many other ―post-Weberian‖ books emphasized the self-interestedness of 
bureaucracy. Of course, one of the most subtle analyses of the bureaucracy had been made 
by Michal Herzfeld, who interpreted bureaucracy not as a master builder but as a 
mechanism of minimalization of damage or as a mechanism of damage control.
292
 
Furthermore, quoting Gerald Britan
293
, Herzfeld notes that ineffectiveness of bureaucracy 
is not a failure but an intrinsic aspect of bureaucracy given that the very basic goal of the 
bureaucrat is not rational efficiency but his and his group‘s survival unless he is motivated 
by some other pragmatic goals.
294
 The bureaucracy is evidently not an altruistic but a self-
interested group contrary to what Hegel had presumed.
295
  
       The birth of modern Turkey and the modern Turkish nation can be seen as an 
elaboration of the bureaucratic or semi-bureaucratized privileged imperial class in 
interaction with other dynamics. The culture and habitus the Turkish bureaucracy had 
developed and maintained was a prominent component of the Turkish modern and Turkish 
national imagination. The fact that the survival and well-being of the Turkish nation was 
central to the self-interest of the Ottoman bureaucracy does not mean that Ottoman 
bureaucracy was a self-interested actor, but it means that the self-interests of the 
bureaucracy defined to a certain extent the character of the ―original‖ Turkish nation 
constructed in the image of the bureaucracy. 
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2.2. Prussian Ruling Elite and Bureaucracy and the Tanzimat Bureaucracy in 
Comparative Perspective  
 
       The illiberal character of the Prussian path to modernity is a well-established notion in 
academia since the World War II.
296
 This illiberalism derived from the existence of an all-
powerful bureaucratic organization regarded as totally autonomous from external forces 
and political/royal prerogatives. It is no coincidence that the ―myth of the bureaucracy‖ 
emerged in Prussia. The Prussian Hegel observed that the bureaucratic class  ―is at the apex 
of the social pyramid not only because of its universal intentionality, but also because it is 
the only class of society whose objective is knowledge itself, not nature, artifacts or 
abstraction, as it is the case with all other classes
297
.....The universal class has for its task 
the universal interests of the community.‖298 Furthermore, it is not a coincidence that 
another German, Max Weber, conceptualized bureaucracy as "the dominance of spirit of 
formalistic impersonality: ‗Sine ira et studio,‘ without hatred or passion, and hence without 
affection or enthusiasm.‖299   It is ironic that Weber‘s perception of the Prussian 
bureaucracy was taken as the representation of the universal bureaucratic model until his 
interpretation was questioned several decades later.  
    The British and French bureaucracies expanded enormously in the nineteenth century 
(and the British bureaucracy‘s expansion preceded the others) and subsequently these 
bureaucracies acquired immense power but no such ―myth of the bureaucracy‖ emerged in 
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these countries.
300
 This was arguably because these bureaucracies remained subservient to 
the political authorities above them and therefore could not ―own‖ the state and were not 
charged with national and universal missions in these countries.
301
  
        If the Prussian model and its independence from any external authority (in its 
Hegelian-Weberian interpretation) is one extreme manifestation of bureaucracy, the 
Russian case can be taken as the embodiment of the other extreme. The Russian 
bureaucracy may be characterized as less autonomous from the prerogative of the czar vis-
à-vis its Prussian, French and British counterparts. Although, the conventional 
historiography depicted 19
th
 century Russian bureaucracy as completely dependent to the 
prerogative of the czar, this reductionist view of the Russian bureaucracy has been 
challenged by a new generation of historians who established that the Russian bureaucracy 
also developed considerable autonomy as well as sophistication and effectiveness in the 
19
th
 century czarist Russia.
302
  
      The Ottoman bureaucracy not only gained an autonomy but also exerted an immense 
power with the Tanzimat. Indeed, it had been shown in this study that, the era of Tanzimat 
may be characterized as the Ottoman bureaucracy‘s assumption of power beginning from 
1839 before the loss of this power beginning from 1871 first with the death of Âli Paşa and 
appointment of Mahmud Nedim Paşa to the grand vizirate and then with the reign of 
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Abdülhamid II.  In the Hamidian era, the Ottoman bureaucracy lost its autonomy 
considerably and lacked effective mechanisms to protect itself from the royal and political 
prerogative, but it could develop as an effective and imposing structure. Nevertheless, what 
Abdülhamid II did was the reestablishment of the political prerogorative. In a way, the 
history of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century can be partially read as the clash 
of the administrative elite versus the royal/political authorities.          
       Hans Rosenberg, the pioneering historian of early Prussia, presents a survey analysis 
of the transition of the Prussian polity from ―dynastic absolutism‖ to ―bureaucratic 
absolutism‖.303 Rosenberg‘s contribution was his assessment that the bureaucracy was an 
autonomous territory independent from the interests of the crown and the aristocracy. 
Although the bureaucracy was a creation of the crown and although its members were 
recruited from the aristocracy (Junkers), through time it acquired a separate identity. 
Rosenberg did not see the bureaucracy as a technical instrument of professional public 
administration. For Rosenberg, the Prussian bureaucracy was a political and social interest 
group. For Rosenberg, by the early nineteenth century, the bureaucracy achieved a 
―revolution from above‖ and assumed control of the Prussian polity.  
       A few other historians studied the Prussian bureaucracy in its different phases, and all 
were influenced by the framework and main thesis of Rosenberg. Reinhard Koselleck took 
over where Hans Rosenberg left off by studying the decline of bureaucratic absolutism 
after the reign of Friedrich the Great and before the Revolution of 1848.
304
 Runge picked 
up the story in 1918, focusing on the role of the civil service in the German Revolution and 
the status of the civil service under the Weimar Republic.
305
 Eckart Kerr, the precocious 
Marxist of Weimar, also penned a fragmentary but insightful assessment of the 19th 
century Prussian bureaucracy.
306
  
                                                 
303
 Rosenberg, Hans, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience 
1660-1815, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1958. 
304
 Koselleck, Reinhard, Preußen zwischen Reform und Revolution. Allg. Landrecht, 
Verwaltung und Soziale Bewegung von 1791 – 1848, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1987. 
305
 Runge, Wolfgang, Politik und Beamtentum in Parteistaat, Stuttgart: Klett, 1965. 
306
 See his chapter ―Das Soziale System der Reaktsion in Preussen unter dem Ministerium 
Puttkamer‖, in Primat der Innenpolitik, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1970. 
118 
 
       According to Rosenberg and other historians of the Prussian bureaucracy, the Prussian 
bureaucracy reached its zenith in terms of the power it held and the prestige it acquired 
between 1815 and the 1840s.
307
 This was the period when Fichte called for a national 
reinvigoration after the embarrassing defeat by Napoleon. In the aftermath of the 
Napoleonic wars, a national plan to reinvigorate Prussia was enacted by Karl von Stein.
308
 
From Stein onwards, the bureaucratic reform was hailed and cherished as ―liberal‖ and 
―progressive‖.309 In the eyes of the ―progressives‖ of the time, bureaucracy was seen as the 
prime mover of emancipation from the obscurantist medievalism of the Junkers. The 
establishment of law, order, and administration was seen almost by definition as 
―progressive‖. It was the social and economic unrest (in the years of the ―hungry 
forties‖310) in the 1840s that harmed the prestige of the bureaucracy. By the 1840s, the 
bureaucratic establishment had lost its magnificent isolation from the social world 
surrounding it. The end of its isolation also meant the end of its grace, aura of privilege, 
respectability, and infallibility. The bureaucracy as a corps came down to earth from its 
divine loftiness and lost the mysticism attributed to it. The mission and the meaning 
attributed to the bureaucracy had vanished. It turned into a mere practical institution. 
Furthermore, Prussian intellectuals began to criticize the bureaucracy for no more serving 
the public interest, but only seeking to protect its own interests as a corps as elaborated in 
Theodor Von Schön‘s influential pamphlet Woher und Wohin ?311 The critics argued that 
bureaucracy became an end in itself. In the following decades, many progressives 
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denounced the Prussian regime to advocate liberal and socialist agendas adverse to the 
Prussian state and its raison d‟etat. Ottoman officialdom did not encounter similar 
ideological and categorical criticism from liberal and socialist standpoints. Socialist/radical 
critique was almost non-existent and was limited to small circles. The timid Ottoman 
liberalism never questioned the legitimacy of state governance but criticized it only from a 
technical point of view: namely the cumbersomeness, ineffectiveness, and incompetence of 
the state which was not necessarily a liberal critique.
312
  
       With the 1840s, the flow of landed aristocrats into the higher civil service was 
accompanied by the influx of the entrepreneurial middle class into the lower echelons of 
the civil service.
313
 The prestige of Prussian bureaucracy was so much that, ―the 
Frenchmen wants the Order of the Legion of Honor; the Englishmen wants MP beside his 
name; the German wants to become a Kommerzienrat or Geheimrat.”314 Throughout the 
19th century, the state became the ultimate address of the expression and manifestation of 
the spiritual cosmos of the privileged. It was no longer the imagined community of the 
nobility but the state that exposed the sheer strength and magnificence of the world of the 
powerful and privileged. The state assumed the central position in the symbolism of the 
imagined community of the nobility. This transition implied a partial surrender of the 
aristocrats‘ lofty distinction and excellence but also implied the emergence of a new 
configuration of relations of power.  
       Another question to be resolved was the extent of the overlapping of the interests of 
the bureaucracy and the Junkers. The Prussian bureaucracy was definitely an institution of 
the establishment. It was a part of the conglomeration of the ancien régime. It may even be 
said that it was the guardian of the establishment although not in a Marxian sense. What 
made the bureaucracy a peculiar status group was that its interests were partially dependent 
on external circumstances and the social forces exterior to it. Willis establishes the 
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connection between the old house of Junkerdom and the modern Prussian bureaucracy:  ―In 
speaking of the modernization of the bureaucracy, one must be careful to note that the 
process did not necessarily involve the cessation of all traditional habits and attitudes. On 
the contrary, one of the most striking characteristics of modernization in Prussia was the 
way in which apparently contradictory elements were combined, and many reformed 
institutions were dependent on traditional symbols and personnel for their authority. 
Nowhere was this more apparent than in the bureaucracy, a group that broke with the past 
in a rapid and dislocating manner, yet preserved many of the habits and attitudes associated 
with the earlier period.‖315  
      Nevertheless, the bureaucracy gained prominence after the Napoleonic wars and 
became a powerhouse by itself. This is why Hegel rightfully called bureaucracy the 
―universal class‖. For Hegel, bureaucracy could not have particularistic interests. Its 
interests overlap with the interests of the ―whole‖. Bureaucracy‘s interest is in the universal 
advancement of the nation and the subjects of the state. Thus, the ―part‖ becomes the 
―whole‖. This was the original version of Marx‘s attribution of the status of ―universal 
class‖ to the proletariat. Marx attributed to the proletariat what Hegel had previously 
attributed to the bureaucracy. For Marx, the proletariat could not have its own interests. 
The proletariat would fulfill itself only by advancing the interests of the whole. Because of 
its being the universal class, Hegel assumed that bureaucracy was a priori progressive. This 
assumption was not particular to Hegel but shared by the intellectual world of his time.
316
 
As pointed out above, this perception changed after the revelation in the eyes of the 
intellectuals (who also perceived themselves as representing the interests of the ―whole‖ in 
themselves) that bureaucracy was the guardian of the status quo from the second quarter of 
the nineteenth century onwards.  
       Hamerow contrasts the Viennese and Prussian bureaucracies and argues that whereas 
for the Viennese civil service bureaucracy was a matter of pragmatic professionalism, the 
Prussian bureaucracy differed in that, ―behind the outward appearance of a devoted subject 
lurked the bold frondeur. His faith in the monarchy arose out of a sense of pride, and his 
                                                 
315
 Willis, John, ibid, p. xiv 
316
 Iggers, George, The German Conception of History, Middletown, Conn. : Wesleyan 
University Press, 1968, pp. 41-43. 
121 
 
opposition to liberalism was more than a preference for royal over bourgeois rule.‖317 
Hamerow does not distinguish between the aristocracy and the bureaucracy and associates 
Prussian bureaucracy with aristocratic power. For him, the Prussian bureaucracy‘s sole 
purpose was to defend the interests of the conservative establishment. Along the same 
lines, he does not concede any significant and effective role to the Prussian bureaucracy in 
the course of German unification in his classic book, The Social Origins of German 
Unification 1858-1871. Apparently for Hamerow, social and economic developments 
shaped the German polity, and he conceded no active role to the state and the bureaucracy 
in this process. Although he saw the Prussian bureaucracy as an adamant adversary of 
reform, he perceived this opposition as a current against the stream with no transformative 
role in the flow of history.  
       After Hamerow, the overwhelming role of the Prussian state in the course of German 
history has been acknowledged by historians as social scientists, who began to ―bring the 
state back in‖. Willis claimed that the autonomy of the bureaucracy ended from 1840s 
onwards. Partisanship, conflict, and disintegration ―replaced the rational and olympian 
Beamtenstand of the early decades(.)‖318  
―What ultimately came forth from the upheavals of the transitional period was a 
relationship suited to an industrialized and urbanized Prussia, in which the old 
corporative distinctions were no longer tenable. By the time of national unification 
much that had once divided the aristocracy and bureaucracy had disappeared; both 
were now part of one relatively homogeneous upper class which also comprises the 
officer corps and the upper bourgeoisie. Whereas earlier in the century the status 
symbols of birth, rank, wealth and education had been the property of the separate 
Stande, now they were characteristic of the upper class as a whole. The social distance 
between the landed aristocracy, the industrial-commercial bourgeoisie, and the higher 
bureaucracy had narrowed to the point that there existed what Otto Hintze was to call 
a ‗noble-bourgeois aristocracy of office‘.‖319  
Willis presents us with a re-articulation of the Wehler-Mommsen ―ruling elite‖ narrative of 
the critical, left-liberal German historians of the post-World War II Bielefeld School. This 
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―academically popular‖ vision of the ―conglomerate of the ruling elite‖ is both illuminating 
and irrelevant for the nineteenth century Ottoman context. The Wilhelmine and Hamidian 
regimes differ in many aspects. First of all, we can speak of neither a ―bourgeoisie‖ nor 
―aristocracy‖ for the Ottoman context. However, we can definitely speak of a certain ruling 
elite for the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. A very important characteristic of the 
Prussian polity (as well as the other European polities) was the existence of corporate 
bodies.
320
 The nobility and the civil service were two corporations. They had their 
precisely defined rights and privileges. What we see through the Tanzimat is the 
emergence of an informal corporation of the ―ruling elite‖ holding official posts and 
gaining ―respectability‖. In this study, it is argued that the culmination of the fashioning of 
the ―ruling elite‖ was reached in the Hamidian era.   
       The Hamidian elite was not the intimidating and monstrous Willhelmine elite of 
Wehler-Mommsen. It was much more modest in terms of its organization and structure. No 
Hegel had attributed a historical mission to it. No Fichte had consecrated it. However, a 
national mission had been assumed by the late Ottoman bureaucracy. It was the state elite 
that had to counter the assault of the Western powers and more importantly the seditious 
and separatist non-Turkish and non-Muslim communities. It was the bureaucracy which 
had to import the necessary knowledge and skills and apply it for the goodwill of the 
nation. It became the teacher/instructor and role model of the nation. It was the importer, 
producer, and reproducer of the modern and national knowledge. This was not yet the 
divine task the Unionists assumed when they tried to reestablish the state as a tool in their 
radical and uncompromising policies of all sorts. However, the Tanzimat bureaucracy 
perceived itself as the only source for the revival of the Ottoman state and the idea it 
represented. In this regard, the Tanzimat bureaucracy played a much more effective role 
than its Prussian counterpart. It was more ―Hegelian‖ than the Prussian bureaucracy at least 
as far as ―national cause‖ was concerned. Therefore, the particular structures of mentalities 
of the Ottoman bureaucracy were decisive in the formation of Turkish nation and 
modernity.  
                                                 
320
 For the role of corporations in medieval Europe and their significance within the 
imagination of social order in European political thought, see Black, Antony, Guilds and 
Civil Society in European Political Thought from the Twelfth Century to the Present, 
London; New York: Routledge, 1984.   
123 
 
      Following the introductory discussions on bureaucracies in general, this chapter will 
discuss the collective intellectual formations of Ottoman officialdom. One of the problems 
in studying  19th century Ottoman intellectual history as well as studying the ideological 
make-up of the 19th century Ottoman state elite has been to perceive it as a passing or 
transitory phenomenon. It is as if the Kemalist mind and the Republican reformers ran over 
the intellectual legacy of the Tanzimat, resulting in its death with this merciless stroke. For 
example back in 1962, Richard L. Chambers divided, ―Turkey‘s evolution into a modern 
nation state in two stages, the first of which may be said to begin in 1789, and the second 
in 1919.‖ For Chambers, ―the early phases of change were in a manner of speaking 
defensive since they were effected to preserve the authority of the traditional ruling elite; 
the changes after 1919 were effected in a genuinely progressive spirit.‖321 The Tanzimat, 
―brought bureaucrats to the fore as leaders of further defensive reforms(.)‖322 Chambers 
saw Tanzimat as the ―age of bureaucrats‖ before they ―lost the position of leadership they 
had intermittently held for some half a century, first to Abdülhamid and his conservative 
allies, then to the Young Turk army officers and intellectuals, and finally to Atatürk and 
the politicians.‖323 Here, the snapshot summary of Chambers‘ analysis will not be 
criticized because these lines are not quoted to criticize the perspective of Chambers but to 
illustrate the emblematic approach of the time. Chambers himself was a scholar of the 
Tanzimat bureaucracy and the author of a dissertation on Ahmed Cevdet Pasha
324
, and 
moreover his quoted article was probing not the Republican bureaucracy but the Tanzimat 
bureaucracy. Nevertheless, he saw the Tanzimat as a bygone age that failed to respond to 
the assaults leveled firstly by the patrimonialism of Abdülhamid and later by the military 
officers. In short, the Tanzimat had been eradicated without any trace. While the Kemalist 
ideology had been delighted with this alleged eradication, many others had resented the 
collapse of the Tanzimat. Many public intellectuals who are critical of Kemalism perceived 
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the gradualism of the Tanzimat as the failed alternative to the radicalism of the Republic. 
However, here we should probe the Tanzimat intellectual environment not as an 
archaeologist excavating to find some relics of the past but as a contemporary historian, if 
not a political scientist, to reconstruct a formative moment of Turkish modernity. In short, 
here the mindset of the Ottoman bureaucracy will not be investigated as a passé 
phenomenon, but as the foundation of Turkish modernity as well as the foundation of the 
Republic.    
 
 
2.3. The Problem of Secularism 
 
       In the modern Ottoman/Turkish historiography, one of the understudied areas and 
concepts is ―secularism‖.325 The fact that Mustafa Kemal had decreed secular practices by 
law and that defined laicism was introduced as a legal concept made us to fail to 
comprehend and locate what secularity is. Furthermore, the emergence and development of 
a ―secular mind‖ in the turbulent decades of the late nineteenth century in the Ottoman 
world could not be mapped satisfactorily. The acuteness and authoritarian nature of the 
Kemalist practice of Kemalist secularism rendered us unable to grasp the complexity, 
multi-facetedness, and ambivalent nature of secularism. The preference for the French 
concept of laicism instead of Anglo-Saxon secularism also determined our (mis)perception 
of secularity.
326
 Laicism was a legalistic and an ahistorical concept as opposed to the 
dynamic, and socially and historically constituted nature of secularity. Not being a legal 
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notion, there is no Archimedian point at which ―secularism‖ begins.327 There is not even an 
agreed definition of ―secularity‖. Furthermore, it is legitimate to question if secularism in 
its fullness is ever possible. Secularism as an epistemological and ontological notion is 
almost impossible to comprehend,
328
 especially as revealed after the debates of the 
postsecular society and multiple modernities.
329
  
       The ambiguous aspects and nature of secularism is evident for a student of the 
development of secularism in 19th century Europe. Arguably, a similar pattern was 
observable in the Ottoman Empire throughout the course of the 19
th
 century.  What was 
probably different in the context of the Ottoman Empire was its politicization and the 
repercussions in its manifestation within the political realm, arguably especially after the 
Incident of the 31st of March in 1909. The word secularism may imply that there is a clear-
cut dichotomy between ―secular‖ polities, and between secular societies and the non-
secular ones. It is as if it should be one way or the other.
330
 However, in the previous 
chapter, the place and role of religion in European monarchies had been discussed, and it 
had been pointed out that religion was brought forth and used for other (i.e., worldly) 
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means. The presence and function of Islam in the 19th century Ottoman Empire also had to 
be analyzed within this framework and these premises. What was aberrant in the course of 
Ottoman/Turkish history was the sharp denial of any role to Islam by the republic. In fact, 
this was also a manifestation of a European-wide pattern (the sudden and drastic decline of 
recognition of any social or political role for religion in the aftermath of World War I with 
the collapse of the monarchies across the continent) and thus cannot be analyzed in 
isolation from global dynamics. In certain ways, this development can be seen as an 
attempt to accommodate the changing times.
331
 This also shows that even the radical nature 
of Kemalism was not a hundred percent local phenomenon but a variation of the postwar 
republican transformation across the continent. 
       What the republic did was to shift the ―address of allegiance‖ from a complex and 
multidimensional one to a blatantly singular one. The republic had declared ―ethnic 
belonging‖ and the ―state‖ as the immediate ―manifestations/embodiments of the nation‖ 
thereby eliminating all other sources of identities and legitimacy structures, first and 
foremost Islam. In this chapter, we will try to delve into the complex and multidimensional 
mental world of the late Ottoman imperial identity in which different allegiances coexisted 
and complemented each other.  
 
 
2.4. The Structures of Mentalities of the Tanzimat Bureaucrat 
 
       What do we know about the mindset of the ―typical‖ Tanzimat bureaucrat, not as a 
literary character in Tanzimat novels, but as a historical person? A meticolous and critical 
reading of the memoirs will not reveal to us coherent structures of mentalities. On the 
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contrary, the memoirs will reveal structures of mentalities full of contradictions and 
incoherence (though maybe only in the eyes of the historian). These texts are useful in 
opening up a world for us which we do not know, which we cannot reconstruct, and with 
which we cannot be familiar or empathize. Still, we can try our best to reconstruct a world 
which is rather distant and unintelligible to our modern minds. We have a few memoirs of 
Ottoman diplomats, each of them reflecting different worldviews and mindsets.
332
 It is the 
careful researcher‘s task to integrate them and interpret them as a whole. The memoirs of 
state officials in general (mostly governors and officers) can also enable us to enter the 
world of the late Ottoman bureaucratic world in all its complexity.
333
 
       Although it is a regrettable fact that we lack an abundance of memoirs written in the 
19th century (and earlier) in the Ottoman Empire in comparison to the number produced in 
Western Europe, the ones available provide us with perspectives from which to enter the 
cultural formations, and social and political cosmologies of the late Ottoman bureaucratic 
mind. It may be argued that the available memoirs and their contents have yet to be 
meticulously worked out and interpreted satisfactorily. Moreover, new memoirs are 
continuing to appear as descendants of the memoirists are publicizing their ancestors‘ 
notebooks, which were long kept in attics and only taken into daylight in a decade in which 
antiquity became fashionable. From early 1990s, a growing interest (peaking in the late 
2000s) was shown in the memoirs, and since the early 1990s the memoirs of military 
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officers
334
 and the members of Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (Special –Secret- Organization)335, 
accounts of Ottoman travelers to foreign countries
336
, and other conspicuous accounts were 
published. Many contemporaneous memoirs printed in part in newspapers (tefrika) were 
turned into separate books after some more than sixty years since their original printing 
(some transcribed into the Latin alphabet), as well as some memoirs printed in part in the 
popular historical journals of the 1950s and 1960s. Although several deficiencies like the 
―Turkicizing‖ of the memoirs without providing the original texts are reducing their 
substantiality and utility for historical research, these memoirs enable us to learn more 
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regarding the worldviews of the Tanzimat and Hamidian cadres. The old assumption that 
the ―Orient‖ lacks memoirs and personal narratives before the arrival of modernity has 
been already refuted.
337
 New memoirs and diaries have been discovered both from the 
classical age of the Ottoman Empire written in Turkish and Arabic, and from the 19
th
 
century, further proving that this orientalist cliché is baseless.  
       The memoirs pose several problems to be tackled. First of all, not all of these memoirs 
can be taken as sincere accounts. Different from diaries written immediately and 
objectively, all memoirs have a particular motivation and purpose in being written down. 
Some might have more innocent purposes, like looking for a commercial success or hoping 
to be remembered after long years of oblivion. Some are to serve a political agenda. Cemal 
Pasha wrote his memoirs to expose his innocence regarding the Armenian massacres.
338
 
Rıza Nur wrote his flamboyant and eccentric thick volumes to be published after his death 
to challenge and discredit the Kemalists from his tomb.
339
 Several memoirs published in 
the Istanbul dailies in the 1930s were the long-forgotten voices of men of prominence of 
yesteryear such as the Lord Chamberlain of Abdülhamid II, Tahsin Pasha340 or forgotten 
Young Turks like Ahmed Rıza341, Muhittin Birgen342 and Ali Haydar Midhat343. 
Apparently, all these accounts inevitably distorted the past to serve political or personal 
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interests. Some distortions may be intentional and others unintentional. However, 
distortions may also be suggestive for deciphering the worldviews of these authors.  
Memoirs may communicate wonderful observations and interpretations that can be 
perceived only by an intimate observer. Interesting single anecdotes told by the observer 
may enable us to conceive the broader picture. Single incidents may be more explanatory 
and revealing than a whole account. Of course, again we should be careful not to over-
interpret the anecdotes and bear in mind that the anecdotes narrated are selected by the 
author to make his points more persuasive. Literary creativity is a necessary quality of the 
historian, but the historian is first of all a hard scientist. Though we have the ability to 
know what the observer preferred to tell us, we however do not have the chance to know 
completely what the observer preferred not to tell us. However, the possibility of distortion 
renders the memoirs even more valuable in the eyes of the intellectual historian. The 
distortions are also a part of the mind of the memoirist.
344
     
       One way to categorize the memoirs would be in terms of ―typical‖ and ―non-typical‖ 
ones. The non-typical memoirs may not be the best sources to depend on as they would not 
be representative. On the other hand, non-typical memoirs may display the complexity and 
multi-facetedness of the group for which they are classified as ―non-typical‖. They diverge 
from the mainstream in a way that reveals the norms and normalities of the ―mainstream‖. 
For example, we may classify Ebubekir Hazim‘s (Tepeyran) memoirs (written only in the 
1940s) as non-typical with regard to his non-nationalist and liberal approach as a provincial 
administrator and a governor.  
       Besides the memoirs of governors, military officers, high profile politicians, denizens 
of the palace, and men of letters, figures from various governmental offices also penned 
down their memoirs. Some memoirs depicting the interesting careers of the authors were 
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written by medical doctors serving in the imperial hospitals who became the founders of 
modern Turkish medicine
345
, a military engineer who became a pioneering industrialist and 
aviator
346
, a member of the imperial orchestra
347
, a military officer active in the 
establishment of a military veterinary school
348
, one of the earliest female painters
349
, and 
travelers visiting all parts of the world. 
        Another categorization of memoirs might be established based on the memoirs‘ 
profoundness and lucidity. Some accounts do not disclose more than a depiction of the 
daily routine of an author serving in various posts. Many of the memoirs lack a structured 
framework. Others may reveal the cultural, intellectual, and ideological formations of the 
author in its all complexity. For example, Ebubekir Hazim‘s (Tepeyran), Mehmet Tevfik‘s 
(Birgen) and Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha‘s memoirs are examples of lucid and 
knowledgeable memoirs written by men of prominence who held high offices. More 
importantly, they were competent and knowledgeable officials, and thus their memoirs 
convey to us a lot about the worldview of the late Ottoman bureaucrats. From such 
memoirs, we can construct a comprehensive worldview of the late Ottoman bureaucrat. 
       Some labels with which we may categorize/label the authors of the memoirs are 
―nationalist‖, ―conservative‖, ―modernist‖, et cetera. As articulated in the previous chapter, 
all these simplistic, definitive labels fail to represent the minds of the Ottoman bureaucrats 
as the memoirs leave us with perplexing questions rather than providing the keys for 
penetrating into the mind of the memoirist.  
       First of all, it is very hard to find an uncompromising 
―conservative/traditional/reactionary‖. The wicked and bigoted reactionary is a character 
which we encounter both in the Western observers‘ accounts and in the supposedly 
liberal/westernist Ottoman accounts. For example, the theme of the clash between the 
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progressive Mustafa Reşid Pasha and his reactionary archenemies is prevalent in Ahmed 
Cevdet Pasha‘s Tezakir. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha wrote that, when Mustafa Reşid Pasha was 
temporarily dismissed from office, his archenemy the reactionary Said Pasha took control 
of the state and accused Mustafa Reşid of blasphemy. Furthermore, he exiled all the 
champions of progressive ideas from Istanbul and tried to transform the state into what it 
had been one hundred years earlier (İstanbul‟u efkar-ı cedide eshabından tahliye etmek 
velhasıl devleti yüz sene geriye döndürmek gibi hülyalara saptı).350 The western accounts 
also like to depict the irreconcilable clash between the progressive wing and the 
reactionaries within Ottoman officialdom. However, all these accounts fail to substantiate 
the gist of the matter. The ―uncompromising arch-reactionary character‖ seems to be a 
literary character (as well as an ideological asset) given that the Tanzimat bureaucracy as a 
whole was imbued with a certain reformist/transformative agenda although kindred souls 
of this fictitious character could be found among various conservative figures of the 
Tanzimat bureaucratic world. As has already been argued, this shared ethos derived less 
from cultural preferences than from structural imperatives and concerns. A few names such 
as Namık Pasha, who renounced his earlier Westernized culturalization, became a devoted 
Naqshibendi, and publicly displayed his piousness, remained exceptional.
351
  
     The affair that was portrayed as a ―reactionary takeover‖ was Mahmud Nedim Pasha‘s 
rise to power in 1871. After coming to power, Mahmud Nedim Pasha purged many of the 
men of prominence (and members of the ―progressive‖ cabal of Âli Pasha) and practically 
exiled them by appointing them to provincial posts. The appointment of Mahmud Nedim 
Pasha to the Grand Vizirate was depicted in almost all the contemporary Ottoman accounts 
as a kind of counter-revolution
352
 (irtica is the translation of one of the foundational 
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concepts of French Revolution, reaction) with a tone resembling the Young Turk accounts 
narrating the Incident of 31 March as the insurrection of reaction when the politically 
heavily loaded term/label irtica made its debut.
353
 For example, Ebuzziya Tevfik writes 
that the Young Ottomans who previously were outspoken foes of Âli Pasha appreciated 
him after his death.
354
 This was because although they were disturbed by the despotic 
nature of Âli Pasha‘s governance, they shared the ethos of the Tanzimat whereas Mahmud 
Nedim Pasha was depicted as a man of radically different aspirations and worldview. 
Mahmud Nedim Pasha was described in all these accounts as someone who was not only 
reactionary and politically incapable, but also a man with negative personal qualities such 
as ―maliciousness‖ and ―treachery‖.355 For Namık Kemal, Mahmud Nedim‘s rule was a 
despotism aimed at eradicating all the reforms and achievements of the Tanzimat (in 
contrast to the government of Ali Paşa which was guilty of not undertaking any substantial 
reforms and betraying the legacy of Mustafa Reşid Paşa) and collapsed in the face of  
resistance by the whole nation (umum millet).
356
 Butrus Abu Manneh claimed that 
Mahmud Nedim‘s takeover had signified a conscious, drastic transfer of power and the 
capture of power by a certain ideologically motivated mentality which failed after strong 
and effective resistance by the bureaucracy.
357
 Mahmud Nedim‘s goal was to destroy the 
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existing bureaucratic caste and to pack the bureaucracy with an alternative group of 
officials.
358
 Henry Eliot also notes that after the appointment of Mahmud Nedim as the 
Grand Vizier, ―(t)he sultan....appoint(ed) to high posts several of the worst of the old 
school of Pashas.‖359 Although in Elliot‘s narrative, the sultan‘s act remained a personal 
prerogative and an arbitrary act rather than a manifestation of an ideological dynamic, he 
established the political underpinnings of this personal prerogative. Although this prevalent 
narrative reflects a genuine concern and a political feud, it also constitutes a founding 
discourse of the Turkish progressive narrative by creating an enemy and demonizing it 
(preceding the 31 March Incident of 1909).
360
 This is not to suggest that Mahmud Nedim 
lacked such motivations. However, the ―official demonization‖ of Mahmud Nedim reflects 
a certain bias. Furthermore this narrative was semi-officialized after Mahmud Nedim‘s 
retreat against the organized resistance of the leading cadres of the Tanzimat.  
     The basic motivation that influences Mahmud Nedim‘s rise and practices developed, as 
shown by Abu Mannah, out of a broad disappointment with the West and the fear of the 
prospective and inevitable rise of the non-Muslims within the bureaucracy and in the 
Ottoman world in general after the liberal reforms of 1860s. This fear was shared by the 
adamant opponents of Mahmud Nedim as well. Therefore, Mahmud Nedim‘s reaction may 
be regarded as a symptom rather than a cause. The liberal-reformist optimism of the 
Tanzimat had collapsed from the inside, and Mahmud Nedim was only a symptom of the 
evolution of the Tanzimat ideology. Mahmud Nedim was only the most visible and 
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outspoken expression of the change in perceptions. In short, Mahmud Nedim‘s 
conservative backlash emanated from the dynamics of the Tanzimat. Nevertheless, his 
critical attitude to the basic premises to the Tanzimat were denounced and doomed him to 
failure.        
   
 
2.5. Sivilizasyon 
 
       According to Tuncer Baykara, the word ―medeniyet‖ as the translation of the French 
word civilisation possibly appeared for the first time in the Turkish language in 1834 when 
it was used by Mustafa Reşid Pasha, himself being praised later by Şinasi as a ―messenger 
of civilization‖ (medeniyet resulü).361 For Mustafa Reşid Pasha, civilization meant the 
―upbringing of the population and the execution of orders‖ (terbiye-i nas ve icra-i 
nizamat). Sadık Rifat Pasha also mentioned ―the present civilization of Europe, i.e., the 
principles of familiarity and culture‖ (Avrupa‟nın şimdiki sivilizasyonu yani usul-i 
me‟nusiyet ve medeniyeti‖), also equating Europe and ―medeniyet‖. It is also very 
illuminating to check the translation of the French word civilisation into Ottoman Turkish 
in the dictionaries of the time. Artin Hindoglu in his Dictionnaire Français-Turc in 1831 
translated civilisation as ―edeb, erkan öğrenme‖ (cultivation, learning of manners) and 
civilité as ―edeb, erkan, çelebilik‖ (cultivation, refinement). The Vocabulaire Français-
Turc of Bianchi published in Paris in 1831 translated civilisation as ―insaniyet‖ (humanity). 
In short, the word civilisation in Turkish implied good manners and elegance on the eve of 
the Tanzimat. By the 1870s, the word had attained a more political and ideological 
connotation besides its more personalized aspects. Redhouse, in his Lexicon in 1877, 
translated civilization as ―a-) medeniyet; terbiye; terbiye-i medeniye: tehzib-i ahlak ve 
tervic-i ulum ve fünun; içtma‟-ı kemalat-ı edebiye ve ilmiye b-) vahşilik halinden çıkarub 
terbiye ve medeniyet yoluna dahil etmeklik‖ (a-) civilization, politeness, development and 
perfection in learning, politeness and morality b-) giving up barbarism and becoming 
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civilized and developing good manners). In his 1880 dictionary, Redhouse translated 
civilization as ―terbiye‖ (good manners). In short, medeniyet meant at the same time being 
refined and polite determined according to the contemporary code of conduct standards of 
Europe, which did overlap and complement each other.
362
 
       One of the important points to underline is that according to the perception of the time, 
there was one single civilisation. It was understood in some ways as the European 
civilization, and in some ways it was perceived as a laudable notion without any 
geographical and cultural references. The second point to be underlined is that this notion 
had an unambiguously positive connotation. Thirdly, civilization was an ideal to be 
emulated and attained. Furthermore, it was perceived as open to all who were eager to 
endorse it and who had the ability to internalize it.  
       Although we have tried to list the non-political conceptualization of ―civilization‖, this 
does not mean that ―civilization‖ was a non-ideological concept. On the contrary, 
civilization was an ideological concept reflecting and imposing the value system of a class, 
the class that distinguished itself from ordinary folk. 
       In the mindset of Tanzimat officialdom, the ideal of civilization was a very pivotal 
theme. In the culture of the classical Ottoman Empire, influenced by the pre-Islamic 
Persian and Islamic ideals, the state was associated with refinement and cultivation. Thus, 
a member of the privileged member of the askeri class (being part of the state), the 
Ottoman scribe was to be a figure of emulation. He perceived himself as a figure of 
emulation and was supposed to be distinctive from the common men due to his upbringing 
and refinement
363
. This traditional Ottoman/Islamic perception and ideal overlapped with 
the 19th century ideal of civilization. In fact, before the impact of the 19th century Western 
civilization ideal, a certain ideal of cultivation was a very prevalent and pivotal aspect of 
the classical Ottoman officialdom and worldview. In this regard, the endorsement of the 
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19th century civilization ideal was not an entirely new phenomenon but an 
alteration/modification of classical Ottoman vision and ideology.  
       Civilization epitomized the imperial ideal as well. Civility was one of the hallmarks of 
being an empire and state. An empire was to be distinguished and revered by its claim to 
refinement, which set it apart from the sheer military might of usurpers and tyrants. These 
are some reasons why the endorsement of Westernization was so smooth before it began to 
be problematized in the late 19th century. In this regard, the import and endorsement of the 
―ideal of civilization‖ has to be explained in structural terms rather than cultural terms.  
       Ebubekir Hazim, then a lower level official working in the Governorship of Konya and 
a dilettante poet and man of letters, was advised by the governor of Konya, Müşir Mehmed 
Said Pasha, as follows:  
―I am reading your poems in newspapers. I do not get any taste from our poems which 
are mere imitations of the Persian poems....we have to acknowledge that in this 
country genuine talent in fine arts is restricted to only a few. I never heard of any poet, 
artist, or musician who became prosperous. Especially, all the poets live without any 
exception in conditions of misery and curse what they call fortune (felek)....I do not 
want to see you join this miserable community....You can specialize in a certain 
science. Even if you decide to continue your career in the bureaucracy, you have to 
have proficiency in fiscal, judicial, or administrative matters ... To acquire such an 
expertise in any of these fields, you are obliged to learn one of the European 
languages. This is because there are not enough books in any of the fields (in Turkish). 
To read the available books again and again is to be like a horse with his eyes closed 
and to run and run in a small circle. You cannot move one step forward in progress 
and maturity.‖364  
Taking the advice of the governor seriously, Ebubekir Hazim decided to learn French 
although he was desperate to find a printed alphabet in Konya. He mastered the French 
language in the miserable conditions of the provinces in ten years.
365
 The French language 
symbolized the opening of a new world. In the person of Ebubekir Hazim, the learning of 
the French language also allowed him to become familiar with modern French poetry 
instead of only encountering ―monotonous‖ Ottoman poetry. The French language was a 
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passport allowing the bearer entrance into the modern world and civilization, and 
permitting travel from one world to another.
366
   
       Civilization was perceived as an elite ideal rather than a political and ideological 
concept. The endorsement of Westernization by the pre-political inter-elite world of the 
Tanzimat was based on this perception and asssumption. Münif Pasha equated civilization 
with Islam. For him, Islam advocates Bildung and civility in opposition to ignorance 
(cehalet) and barbarism (bedeviyet).
367
 Civilization was yet to be an subject of contestation. 
In fact, during the abolition of the janissaries and the establishment of a modern military 
corps, drastic reforms were presented as the clash between the righteous defenders of Islam 
and the ignorance and (religious) corruption prevalent among janissaries and other 
defenders of the ―old regime‖.368 Apparently, there was a class background to these 
representations since whereas the state and state elite were associated with (genuine as 
opposed to rhetorical) piousness, righteousness, and morality, the mob was associated with 
incivility, barbarism, and heresy. During the Tanzimat-period, rather than being an 
impediment to westernization, Islam was perceived as a supportive force in the course of 
Westernization. In the classical Ottoman Empire as well as throughout Islamic history, 
Islam epitomized civility, refinement, and the distinction of the elite. The contrast was 
drawn between the ignorant barbarism of the nomads and the ordinary folk, and the 
cultivated elite which were distinguished by their careful and strict observance of Islam. 
The ordinary folk were ignorant of Islam and its refinements. Tanzimat advanced on this 
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premise. Therefore, Islam was an integral part of the Tanzimat civility. It did not pose an 
obstacle. On the contrary, the Islamic ideal was complementary to and harmonized with the 
Tanzimat ideal. We do not observe a contradiction between Islam and the zealous 
―imitation‖ of the Western ideal. Of course, such a harmony was possible within the 
traditionalist and elitist interpretation of Islam espoused by the Ottoman elite. An 
alternative and oppositionist Islam was also in the process of development, especially those 
ideas associated with the Khalidiyya-Naqshibandi order.
369
  
     We observe the emergence of a process of parting of the ways during the Hamidian era 
as religion/religiosity began to be perceived, particularly among the younger generations of 
educated intellectuals, to be incompatible with science and the emerging materialistic 
thought.
370
 This 19
th
 century Ottoman blend of Islam, progress, and science was not unlike 
the Victorian ideal which was in contrast to the strictly secular and emancipationist 
republican ideal of republican France. Much as the Victorian consensus was retreating in 
the very late post-Darwinian decades of 19
th
 century, simultaneously the Young Turks 
were revolting against the Islamic ideal (and Islamic-and Western- civility as well). 
Nevertheless, many other Young Turks continued to retain both their commitments. 
Contention over the ideal of civilization will emerge also as an impact on the West after 
the radicalization of German right with its emphasis on the deadly antagonism of the 
Western Zivilisation and the German Kultur among writers such as Oswald Spengler and 
Ernest Jünger.371 Nevertheless, it also has to be pointed out that the first signs of this anti-
civilizationist discourse developed during the Hamidian era. It is ironic that the post-
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Tanzimat anti-westernist discourse of the multiplicity of civilizations and of Western 
civilization as the (toothless) evil incarnate was also an outcome of Westernization. 
     It was the impact of the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century discourse of multiple 
civilizations and the rhetoric of anti-civilizationism especially prevalent in Germany that 
had diluted Tanzimat‘s civilizationism and generated the discourse of 
Ottoman/Turkish/Muslim authenticity and distinctiveness claiming to descend from a 
different and superior civilization. Although the great Islamic past was a theme to be 
articulated, its juxtaposition in opposition to western civilization and its transformation into 
a strategic asset exposing the deficiencies and hypocrisies of western civilization emerged 
from the late 19
th
 century onwards and gained prominence with the radicalism of Young 
Turks.
372
 In fact, anti-civilizationism and the rhetoric of multiple civilizations were 
partially influenced by and imported from the German anti-civilizationism developed 
during the Wilhelmine era and peaked in the thoughts of post-war right-wing intellectuals 
such as Oswald Spengler
373
 and Ernest Jünger374. As these intellectuals juxtaposed Geman 
Kultur against cosmopolitan Western Civilization, the Young Turk generation proclaimed 
the irreconcilability of the Western Christian imperialist ―Civilization‖ with Turks and 
Muslims being the political leaders and representatives of Islam. In this view, imperialism, 
Europe, and Christianity became indistinguishable and virtually meant the same thing. It 
was equally true for the Turks, Islam, and the innate anti-imperialism of this 
cultural/political entity who began to be depicted as the diametrical opposite of the 
―toothless‖ Western civilization.   
 
 
2.6. Reformism, Civilization, Progress, Science and Islam: The Consensus of the 
Tanzimat Bureaucratic World 
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       It is another question whether the Tanzimat scribal class had a comprehensive political 
worldview. It may be argued that they had divided political orientations and dispositions. 
The notion that people are to have encompassing political worldviews and orientations 
appears to be hardly applicable to the 19th century Ottoman context.
375
 Some fundamental 
assumptions of the Tanzimat scribes were clearly non-political or supra-political. 
Furthermore, these assumptions were not contested assumptions but the expression of a 
common understanding regardless of the minor differences among the political/social 
views of the Tanzimat officials. We have to await the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 or 
perhaps the Hamidian era for the differentiation and the flourishing of alternative and 
rivaling political/ideological stances.  
       One feature of the mindset of Tanzimat Ottoman officialdom was commitment to and 
belief in a standardized and fixed scheme of programs of reform. In the numerous ―reports‖ 
of the time, the issues suggested to be undertaken and accomplished were almost identical 
and straightforward: regulation of fiscal matters, improvement of education, alleviation of 
the agricultural infrastructure, improvement of the efficiency of the bureaucracy, et cetera. 
The very basic idea was that once all these reforms were accomplished, the serious, age-
old problems would be overcome. This faith in progress via implementation of the 
necessary technical reforms was limited to the replication of what had been already done in 
the ―West‖. No structural impediments were to be expected once the necessary will and 
skills were put into effect. The agenda for the advancement of the Ottoman state was rather 
straightforward.
376
 
       One of the most overt examples of this optimism was arguably Mustafa Sami Efendi‘s 
―Avrupa Risalesi‖ (Pamphlet on Europe) first published in 1840. Mustafa Sami‘s travel 
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account is a striking example of an utmost confidence in the achievements of Europe. At 
the end of his book, Mustafa Sami concludes that the advanced state of Europe was neither 
due to the climate of Europe nor to the fertility of its soil. For Sami, the reason for the 
advanced state of Europe was due to science and to science only. Mustafa Sami suggested 
that once Ottomans emulated this model, the abode of Islam would be even more advanced 
than Europe given that its land is fertile, its climate is fine, and its people are intelligent by 
birth.
377
 It is striking to notice that almost the same ―developmentalist‖, optimistic 
interpretation was articulated in the Rescript of Tanzimat in which it was claimed that due 
to the fertility of the soil and intelligence of its people, the Ottoman Empire will be an 
advanced nation ―in five to ten years‖ once the necessary measures were taken.378 In fact, 
what Mustafa Sami did was to reiterate and propagate the ideas of the Rescript of 
Tanzimat. Given that Mustafa Sami was appointed as a secretary in the Ottoman embassy 
to Paris (after serving in the Ottoman embassy to Vienna) and that this travelogue was 
written based on his observations while on his way to Paris to begin to serve in his new 
post and furthermore given that he was a confident of Mustafa Reşid Pasha, the political 
agenda of this text is evident. A similar and earlier analysis and prescription was presented 
by Sadık Rifat Pasha in 1837, who at the time of writing his report was the Ottoman 
ambassador to Vienna.
379
 It may be claimed that in his report, Sadık Rifat foreshadowed 
Tanzimat. In his risale, Sadık Rifat noted that the basis of advancement no more lay in 
military improvement but in peaceful means.  
     In fact, both Sadık Rifat Pasha and Mustafa Sami Bey‘s accounts could be understood 
as variations of the Rescript of Tanzimat. In fact, the same reasoning and policy proposals 
will be reiterated in many political pamphlets. Tunuslu Hayreddin Pasha forty years later 
suggested similar policy proposals to Abdülhamid. Although he was critical of some 
aspects of Tanzimat, his reasoning and arguments were strikingly reminiscent of Mustafa 
Sami and Sadık Rıfat. Like his predecessors, for him the Ottoman Empire regressed due to 
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its internal corruption and its diversion from the path of the golden age of the Ottoman 
Empire. The Empire will ascend by employing the Staatswissenschaft of Europe, 
reorganizing the state as a modern state, and avoiding corruption and lethargy.
380
    
      Münif Pasha was another representative of early Tanzimat. His years in Berlin as a 
secretary in the Ottoman embassy in his youth were constitutive of his later intellectual 
formation. Facing Western intellectual superiority, young Münif developed a radically 
Westernist orientation and contributed significantly to the transmission of Western 
knowledge in an encyclopedia format in the 1860s.
381
 The same observation is equally 
valid for İbrahim Edhem, who along with Münif Pasha served as a secretary in the Berlin 
embassy in the same years. As suggested above, Münif‘s and İbrahim Edhem‘s were 
educated at a time when the astronomical gap between the Muslim Ottomans and Europe 
did not produce enmity but admiration of the West. Münif Pasha began his career in the 
Translation Office before his appointment to Berlin. ―In 1859, he returned to the Porte and 
reentered the Translation Bureau. In this year, he provided the Muslim Ottomans with the 
first translation into Turkish of what may be termed the ideas of the Enlightenment.‖382 
After a brief tenure in the Bureau, he rose to other governmental departments including a 
five- year tenure at the embassy to Teheran.‖383 Münif Pasha belonged to the very early 
Tanzimat generation and preceded Namık Kemal and his colleagues, who were frustrated 
by the shortcomings of Tanzimat and the attitudes of the Western powers and were seeking 
an authentic identity for Ottomans, Turks, and Muslims.
384
  
     Nonetheless, the optimistic vision of the undertaking of the necessary technical reforms 
and improvements was not as naive as it may seem. This faith also contained a resilient 
trust in the state as it was the only possible actor to direct and administer this sweeping 
                                                 
380
 See Çetin, Atilla, Tunuslu Hayreddin Paşa, Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1988, 
pp. 254-75. For the texts of his three policy proposals presented to Abdülhamid, see ibid, 
pp. 312-56. 
381
 Budak, Ali, Münif Paşa, İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2004, p. 22. 
382
 Mardin, Şerif, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1962, p. 234. 
383
 Budak, Ali, ibid, pp. 21-24, 31-35. 
384
 See for a comparison between Münif Pasha and Namık Kemal, Mardin, Şerif, ibid, pp. 
233-246. 
144 
 
transformation. Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha‘s impressive account is a perfect example of 
the perception that the establishment of the order by the state was the primary condition for 
the establishment of a modern and well-ordered infrastructure.
385
 Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, an 
officer motivated by professional ethos and confidence in the progressive capacity of 
modern organization and technology, carried out his assignments by suppressing revolts in 
the various peripheries of the Ottoman Empire, moving from Yemen
386
 to Montenegro, 
from Lebanon to Serbia. In his account, he was anxious to suppress these revolts by 
violence if necessary, not because he was a merciless soldier filled with loyalist zeal, but 
because he regarded these rebels as unruly savages needing to be educated and tamed. For 
him, the modern organization of the state and society had to be handled with the iron and 
authoritative hand of the state, which was by definition the only legitimate authority 
capable of undertaking this demanding mission. Apparently, the reform project was welded 
around a benevolent state.  
      For the reformers, the state represented the ultimate good, not unlike the classical 
Ottoman and classical Islamic political imagination. The local resistance to the state 
simultaneously symbolized obscurantism, uncivilized manners, and treachery. That axiom 
definitely led to the assumption that all the opponents and critics of the state, at least those 
who were not favorable to the territorial integrity of the empire, were motivated by evil 
goals. The discourse of orientalism and colonialism of the Ottoman center towards the 
periphery had been scrutinized by Usama Makdisi.  ―By casting the Ottoman Empire as the 
progenitor of the Enlightenment ideal (and therefore its natural inheritor), capable of its 
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own renaissance, Ottoman reformers also articulated the notion of the ‗Ottoman man's 
burden‘ toward its subject populations, who would have to be disciplined and reformed 
before the Ottoman Empire could firmly establish itself as a civilized power
387.‖ 
Apparently, these ―reforms‖, ―disciplining‖ and civilizationist practices also included 
violence. The destruction of the Kurdish principalities
388
, the forced settlement of 
Turcoman tribes
389
, and the introduction of  modern governance in Yemen
390
 were all 
achieved by violence legitimized on progressive and civilizationist grounds. These 
premises were the sanctity and rightfulness of the Ottoman state, and the intellectual and 
ethical superiority of the Ottoman ruling elite. A new expansionism molded with a 
civilizationist discourse emerged in the Tanzimat, especially in the Arab lands.
391
 Here, the 
undertakers of the ―progenitoring of the Enlightenment ideal‖ were ―members of the state 
elite‖, ―Muslims‖ and gradually ―Turks‖ (especially vis-à-vis ―Kurds‖ and ―Arabs‖). 
       Not only the Tanzimat statesmen, but also Ottoman intellectuals displayed the 
amalgamation of these complex and overlapping identities and self-perceptions. Namık 
Kemal epitomizes the intertwined nature of these identities and ideals. In his article, 
―Terakki‖ (Progress), published in the daily Ibret in 1862, we observe his commitment to 
―civilizationism‖ and adoration and admiration of the West. Namık Kemal defined London 
as ―the photograph of the display of the progress of civilization‖.392 After this introduction, 
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Namık Kemal makes an imaginary visit to London with his readers. Namık Kemal 
describes certain buildings and what is done there. He visits Westminster, a building in 
which the hard-working parliamentarians are contributing to the progress of their 
homeland; the Palace of Justice, in which justice is distributed with utmost civility and 
politeness; schools in which children are given manners and erudition; libraries in which 
people are reading books about science, et cetera. After long paragraphs of fascination, 
Namık Kemal concludes by asking why the Ottomans were left behind. He also asks the 
reader if ―we‖ lost all our learning and why ―we‖ are in such a desperate situation.393 
Namık Kemal suggests that London with all its glamour, civility, and elegance is the model 
to imitate. It is the ultimate goal in the quest for progress. In his other articles, Namık 
Kemal entertains colonial visions towards the Arab lands (with the motive of rehabilitating 
Arabs to their distinguished past as the original nation of Islam)
394
, dreams of a pan-Islamic 
enlightenment and revival
395
, claims authenticity and cultural distinctiveness from the 
Europeans
396
, and envisions an Ottoman Empire which has fully appropriated 
―civilization‖ and ―modern technologies‖.397  A recurring concern in his articles was to 
show and prove that Islam was not the cause of the deterioration of the Islamic lands. In 
other words, in Namık Kemal we observe the perplexed mind of the 19th century Ottoman 
intellectual/bureaucrat, where all of these concerns exist intertwined and are meaningful 
only in interrelation with each other. Likewise, the ―we‖ of Namık Kemal remains vague. 
For example, although he has a clear idea of a community of Islam, Islam is inevitably 
politicized, and as soon as Islam was imagined as a politicized identity, the prospects of 
Islam were to be defined in terms of the prospects of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, for 
Namık Kemal, the Ottoman Empire was clearly an empire led by the Turks though they 
were supposed to serve an altruistic goal.  
     Namık Kemal‘s perception of Arabs is intriguing because although he respects the 
Arabs as the original nation of Islam, noting that Arabs had converted Turks to Islam and 
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―educated them‖ (terbiye etmek), at the same time he points out that the Arabs were in a 
miserable condition at the  time (Arap bizim fesad-ı rüzigar ile a‟sabına halel gelmiş 
üstadımızdır). Turks were to save the Arabs from their backwardness and restore them to 
their historical greatness.
398
 Apparently, he sees Turks as the nation destined to educate, 
civilize, and lead the nations of Islam as Turks were the ruling nation (millet-i hakime) of 
the Ottoman Empire. Thus, his ―we‖ is a complex one, amalgamating discrete identities 
although it is rather clear within his worldview and within his historical context that he 
arranges Ottoman imperialism, the Turkish nation, and Islam within a hierarchy. Given that 
there is no space here to enter into the convoluted structures of the mindset of Namık 
Kemal, it will be only noted that Namık Kemal illustrates the multilayered and anomalous 
nature of the late mind of the Ottoman bureaucratic elite at its best.   
      Within this encyclopedic intellectual milieu, ―knowledge‖ was perceived as a semi-
sacred and ―objective‖ notion, not unlike the Islamic notion of ―ilim‖ with its 
divine/religious connotations. In fact, it may be argued that the Islamic ―ilim‖399 (which 
served as further proof of the existence and magnificence of God) was replaced by the 
modern/Western notion of science (ulum-plural of ilim) and thus, that the positivism of late 
Ottoman thought was derived from Islamic premises and outlook. ―Knowledge‖ was hailed 
as emancipating people (from ignorance and unjust oppression) and functioned as the 
beacon of humanity and progress. Thus, the attitude towards ―knowledge‖ derived not only 
from the 19
th
 century European positivist perception, but also from the authentic Islamic 
culturalization that consecrated authority and authoritative knowledge. Thus, 19
th
 century 
―Western knowledge‖ was perceived as authoritative and worthy of being imported. 
However, this did not mean that they should merely imitate Western techniques and 
become ―modernists‖. On the contrary, their adaptation of technical knowledge was not to 
be in conflict with or in contradistinction to their authentic culturalization and 
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distinctiveness. The western technical ―objective‖ knowledge was to be employed to 
strengthen the Ottoman state.  
    In the early Tanzimat, science and knowledge lacked any cultural connotations. There 
was yet no contestation over knowledge and science or an effort to Islamicize and 
indigenize them. Nevertheless, the discourse of the ―Islamic golden age‖ accompanied the 
reception of Western knowledge and science. The Western science and knowledge was 
adapted and digested with the discovery and articulation of ―Turkish-Islamic‖ scientists, 
such as Avicenna and al-Farabi, the glorification of the ―Islamic golden age‖, and an 
emphasis on the crucial Turkish-Islamic contribution to the development of (modern) 
science. A discourse of authenticity and distinctiveness in the late 19
th
 century developed. 
In fact, this discourse of authenticity was partially based on the conjectures of 19
th
 century 
French republican historiography -which constituted the chief and almost only source of 
information regarding the European medieval period for the Ottoman intelligentsia- and 
positivist thought, which depicted the feudal, European medieval age as obscurantist, 
uncivilized, and ―dark‖ and which juxtaposed the alternative civilization of the 
―enlightened Muslim East‖ against obscurantist Christendom.400 Nevertheless, there was 
not yet the ―indigenization of knowledge401‖ and development of a discourse of an 
alternative and rival ―Islamic/local/traditional knowledge and civilization‖ which became 
visible later, especially after the Revolution of 1908.  
       Faith in science, a shared attitude among the late Ottoman bureaucrats, reached an 
extreme level within the context of the Darwinian ideas circulating in the Ottoman Empire 
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in the 1890s. A new generation emerged, endorsing a materialistic worldview in reaction to 
conservative ideas, most famously in the thoughts of Doktor Abdullah Cevdet
402
 and Beşir 
Fuad, but not limited to a small circle of people.
403
 However before the 1890s, the 
perception that science and religion are inevitably contradictory did not exist either in the 
Ottoman Empire or in Europe in general. Until then, science had been welcomed as the 
beacon of humanity. Such an infinite faith in science was also compatible with the 
assumption that the superiority of the European nations was principally due to science. 
Once the Ottomans appropriated science as the Europeans already had, they would reach 
the level of progress of Europe. Therefore, the superiority of Europe was not a matter of 
―culture‖, as would be claimed from the 1890s onwards, but only a matter of delay. The 
ones who were suspicious of the achievements and limitless opportunities of science were 
mocked for failing to comprehend the modern world and were regarded as examples of an 
obsolete and archaic mentality as can be observed in numerous accounts of the time.
404
  
       A break in this optimistic faith in science and the idea that science and religion were 
not compatible but mutually exclusive emerged only in 1890s, a decade which was also 
critical for the transformation of the ―European mind‖ as well.405 In this regard, the 
generational drift observable in the Ottoman context was actually a continent-wide 
phenomenon and has to be assessed as part of a European intellectual phenomenon. The 
fall of the conservative Tanzimat men with their optimistic, conservative, and evolutionist 
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visions was yet another manifestation of the European-wide transformation as has been 
previously pointed out.
406
  
        
  
2.7. The Image and Representation of the Tanzimat-Period in Official Hamidian 
Discourse 
 
      The discourse of the Hamidian regime did not level an open assault against the 
Tanzimat. On the contrary, the establishment and consolidation of the Hamidian regime 
was presented and legitimized by its contribution to the Tanzimat. The official Hamidian 
discourse acclaimed and extolled Tanzimat, which it celebrated as the rebirth and 
regeneration of the Ottoman state.
407
  The year 1839 continued to be year zero and the 
annus mirabilis of the ―new Ottoman Empire‖. For example, Mehmed Memduh Pasha, 
who served as the Minister of Interior between 1895 and 1908, eulogized Mustafa Reşid 
Pasha as follows: ―When we look at history, we see that the greatest achievements are 
performed not by administrators, but by geniuses who possess extraordinary skills from 
birth and who act in ways which no one else thinks of. Mustafa Reşid Pasha is such an 
unequalled person.‖408 The same commentary was also enunciated verbatim by Mahmud 
Celaleddin Pasha, who was one of the grandees of the Hamidian regime
409
. Mehmed 
Memduh shared the antipathy towards Mahmud Nedim Pasha, whom he described as an 
unskilled and malicious, and towards his loyalists whom he defined as hypocritical and 
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careerist.
410
 The tone of Üss-i İnkilap (Foundation of the Revolution), which may be taken 
as the authorized account of the Hamidian regime, written by Ahmed Midhat Pasha to 
eulogize the ―revolutionary‖ takeover of Abdülhamid went along the same lines.411 Ahmed 
Midhat presented Abdülhamid as the revolutionary leader whose mission was to fulfill the 
undertaking of the Tanzimat. The book was not entitled Üss-i İnkilap for nothing. The 
name of the book established a connection and continuity from the elimination of the 
Janissaries
412
 to the Hamidian takeover. The book‘s criticisms were directed not towards 
the founders of the Tanzimat and not towards its founding motivations/orientation, but 
against those who diverged from the glorious path of the Tanzimat. The Hamidian 
discourse presented itself as the corrector of the misdeeds of the corrupters of the 
Tanzimat. 
 
 
2.8. De-whigging Late Ottoman History 
 
       How should we interpret the Hamidian takeover in light of the developments of 1870s 
? As mentioned previously, the old paradigm was to present the Hamidian takeover as the 
return of reaction. However, scholars such as Stanford Shaw and Engin Deniz Akarlı 
challenged and demolished this cliché. Instead of symbolizing a break, the Hamidian 
establishment legitimized itself using the Tanzimat.
413
 We may suggest that with the 
realization that reformism is not sufficient to maintain the empire intact and with the rise of 
authoritarian/conservative states such as Prussia and Russia (after the discrediting of liberal 
France), a mental turn was observed. The Hamidian regime was a process of redefinition of 
                                                 
410
 Mehmed Memduh Paşa, ibid pp. 62-64. 
411
 Ahmed Midhat Efendi. Üss-i İnkılap, İstanbul: Selis, 2004. 
412
 The book‘s name was inspired by Esad Efendi‘s Üss-i Zafer, in which Esad Efendi 
narrates and eulogizes the act of Mahmud II. 
413
 For the textbooks, see Demiryürek, Mehmet, Tanzimat‟tan Cumhuriyet‟e Bir Osmanlı 
Aydını: Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi, İstanbul: Phoenix, 2003, pp. 153-173. 
152 
 
the Tanzimat after disillusionment with the liberal reformism of Tanzimat as it became 
apparent with the ―incident of Mahmud Nedim‖.414 
       The ―whig interpretation of history‖ was first criticized by Herbert Butterfield and 
Lewis Namier. Butterfield defined the ―whig interpretation of history‖ as follows: ―To 
praise revolutions provided they have been successful, to emphasize certain principles of 
progress in the past
415
....(and)...imagine it as working not to accentuate antagonisms or to 
ratify old party-cries but to find the unities that underlie the differences and to see all lives 
as a part of the one web of life.‖416 For Namier, 18th century British political history was 
limited to factional strife among groups consisting of self-interested individuals. Namier 
denied any role to ideology and ideas. For him, politics was an arena for the clash of 
personal ambitions rather than the historic struggles of ideologies and social interest 
groups.
417
  
       In the Ottoman context, it was Rifat Abou-El-Hajj who applied the Butterfield-Namier 
paradigm for the first time. Based on a case study on the origins and meaning of the 1703 
Edirne Incident, he questioned the teleological assumptions attributed to developments in 
the early modern Ottoman Empire. By establishing factional lineages and coalitions 
between factions, he showed that the main tension was not between alleged progressives 
and defensive reactionaries, but between rivaling factions.
418
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       In order to de-whig the 19th century Ottoman Empire, we have to reassess power 
struggles along these lines. That does not mean that we have to ignore/exclude ideology 
and politics, but we have to reassess ideology and politics in interaction with factionalism 
and to a certain extent, as a corollary of factional divisions. We may define the Hamidian 
status quo as a ―transition to a controlled and restrained modernization in reaction to the 
advancing threats supported and administered by the newly established Muslim elites 
aiming to avoid the rise of rival elites be it Muslim or non-Muslim‖. This endeavor 
necessitates the establishment of its value system organized hierarchically and symbolized 
in the persona of Abdülhamid.‖ Elites are not ideologically motivated. They seek to 
maximize their interests. The claim here is not that this elite had created Abdülhamid. 
What may be modestly suggested is that the consolidation of an established state elite after 
the precarious decades of the early Tanzimat provided the appropriate conditions for an 
autocracy to rise which nurtured and monitored an established status quo representing and 
upholding the values and priorities of this elite in the persona of the sultan and in the 
symbolism of the imperium. The state was reified for these self-interested reasons. The 
―officials both contribute to the creation of standardized views of the state and experience 
the constraints on action that result from this constant process of reification.‖419 Engin 
Deniz Akarli also notes that, ―This new elaboration of bureaucratic structure penetrated 
deep into society and enhanced the visibility, control, and to a certain extent also the 
respectability of the government. Equally important, it served as a mechanism to create a 
growing cadre of officials committed to the Ottoman cause.‖420 As it happens, self-interest 
and social/political visions are often negotiated and intertwined. 
 
 
2.9. Hamidian Autocracy as Class Politics and Class Formation 
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       Fatma Müge Göçek analyzes the making of Turkish modernity as a class formation. 
Discussing and criticizing the Marxist and Weberian interpretations of class formation, she 
establishes that, ―(i)n the context of Ottoman Empire, the Marxian and Weberian analyses 
help identify three significant elements of Ottoman social change: households as the unit of 
analysis, the sultan and the state as the significant social actor, and war and commerce with 
the West as the external catalyst.‖421 She constructs a dichotomy between what she calls 
the ―commercial bourgeoisie‖ and the ―bureaucratic bourgeois‖. Without discussing the 
reliability of her label ―bureaucratic bourgeoisie‖ (a term which is an oxymoron), she 
explains the demise of the empire by pointing to the failure of the two social clusters to co-
opt. For Göçek, these two social clusters felt apart because the bureaucratic bourgeoisie 
was predominantly Muslim/Turkish and the commercial bourgeoisie was predominantly 
non-Muslim. For Göçek, the bifurcation and polarization of the two segments became 
apparent in the late Hamidian regime and the polarization ended with the tragic collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire and the formation of the nation-states founded with blood and iron. In 
Göçek‘s account, the culpability for the emergence of this polarization belongs to the 
Young Turks.
422
 It is important to highlight that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie of Göçek had 
already seeded the mentality of the Young Turks. In a way, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie of 
the Hamidian era was already concerned with the question of how to deal with the non-
Muslim commercial bourgeoisie. The motivations of the Hamidian ―bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie‖ were in accord with the coming generation sharing the same concerns with 
their successors. In fact, they were not only non-bourgeois, but also disturbed by the 
emerging commercial bourgeois which was predominantly non-Muslim. For this particular 
reason, the Ottoman state aimed to establish and promote a Muslim entrepreneurial class as 
well as Muslim professionals whom the state perceived as reliable and loyal, and 
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established several agricultural, industrial, and commercial schools as well as schools of 
veterinary medicine and pharmacology.
423
 The state elite of the Hamidian era‘s vision of 
politics was centered on the well-being and security of the state. The macro-understanding 
of state politics which relates the interests of the state to the interests of the society and 
social forces was lacking in the Hamidian elite. Its reflexes derived from its class formation 
welded around a state. For that reason, it envisioned a class of entrepreneurs and 
professionals loyal to the state and not posing a threat to the state as opposed to 
entrepreneurs and professionals alienated from and adverse to the state. The Hamidian state 
elite conceptualized the interests of the state in contradistinction to the interests of the non-
state actors, especially when the non-state actors were at the same time non-Muslim and 
therefore unreliable and even treacherous.  
       One of the crucial dynamics which set the ground for the Hamidian autocracy to 
emerge and to consolidate itself was the fear of the Tanzimat state elite of the rise of the 
non-Muslim bureaucrats. With the Reform Edict of 1856, public service was opened to 
non-Muslims. By the 1860s, the non-Muslims were beginning gradually to be promoted.
424
 
Musurus Pasha was the first non-Muslim to hold the title of pasha. Non-Muslims were 
admitted to the Supreme Council (Meclis-i Vala) and later to the Council of State (Şuray-ı 
Devlet), established in 1868 and organized as the legislative organ of the Empire.
425
 The 
rise of the non-Muslims in the bureaucracy and the inevitability of the increasing presence 
and prominence of the non-Muslims within Ottoman statecraft with the supposedly hidden 
destructive agenda of the non-Muslims created questions in the minds of the state elite.
426
 
The personal autocracy of Abdülhamid enabled the circumvention of the non-Muslims and 
avoided the interference of the rising non-Muslim threat within the government. The 
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number of non-Muslims and their promotions were restrained during the Hamidian rule 
although the number of non-Muslim officials continued to increase exponentially.
427
 The 
imperial prerogative served as the assurance of the preponderance of the Muslim character 
of the polity and the bureaucracy. It was the presence of the sultan and his title as ―caliph‖ 
which were the hallmarks of the Muslim (and tacitly Turkish) character of the polity. In 
short, Abdülhamid‘s personal autocracy resembled a coup in a situation in which elite 
interests could not be protected unless a deus ex machina was asked to intervene. Although 
Abdülhamid‘s autocracy partially eliminated a certain cabal, it was not simply a takeover 
of power from the Tanzimat bureaucracy given that the Tanzimat bureaucracy‘s 
institutional capacity and institutionalization had deepened and been strengthened. The 
Hamidian takeover may be regarded as a half-conscious strategy of the Tanzimat officials 
to counter the new realities. ―Fine tuning was concerned in the first degree with the power 
elite, the men who formulated and applied policy. Even as autocratic a sultan as 
Abdülhamid II, who was in effect the last real sultan of the empire, had to rely on a staff 
who fed him information, advised him, and indeed influenced him. So, the so-called ‗Red 
Sultan‘....who rarely left his palace, and never left his capital, depended on these men(.)‖428 
With the 1870s, as discussed above, a reaction to the Reform Edict and to the new 
conditions triggered by that document was in the air.
 429
 Since the Reform Edict, trust in the 
Tanzimat reformism had eroded drastically. The autocracy of Abdülhamid was the only 
viable and optimum solution to the discomfort felt by the state elite in restructuring the 
Ottoman state to evade mounting European pressure and the troublesome non-Muslim 
clamor. Hamidian modernization was an example of ―controlled modernization‖ as an 
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alternative to the uncontrolled modernization of the liberal Tanzimat.
430
 In short, the 
Hamidian era was a fine tuning which adjusted the Ottoman state machine against the 
newly rising and encroaching threats, whether merely perceived or real.  
 
                        
2.10. Governance versus Politics: On the Social and Political Cosmology of the 
Tanzimat Bureaucratic World 
 
       Another issue that has to be highlighted is the lack of political space in the 19
th
 century 
Ottoman Empire. Politics may be defined as ―judgments and proposals for the conducting 
of matters of governance and society‖, whereas ―governance‖ may be defined as the 
―application of the expert and decided policies.‖ Politics a priori assumes that there are 
equally legitimate alternative ways of addressing and resolving problems. Governance by 
contrast presupposes that the means to deal with the problems is a matter of technicality. It 
may be argued that the Tanzimat denied any legitimate role to politics.
431
 Not distinct from 
the classical Islamic notion that was apprehensive of fitna (sedition), politics was perceived 
as divisive and corrupting. While the Young Turks, like the Young Ottomans preceding 
them, challenged the rule of Abdülhmid, they did not oppose him on political grounds.432 
They accused Abdülhamid of mismanagement of the state and of treachery. For them, 
Abdülhamid was betraying the supreme interests of the Ottoman polity, which was 
assumed to be monolithic, fixed, and identifiable. Abdülhamid departed from serving the 
metaphysical Ottoman polity and cared only about his own interests and throne. Thus, 
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Abdülhamid‘s reign was not legitimate for these reasons. The Young Turks claimed to 
defend the genuine interests of the Ottoman polity, which was facing the grave danger of 
partition and dissolution. Although they did not aim to introduce ―politics‖ and replace it 
with ―governance‖, it was the Young Turks who had unintentionally crashed the notion of 
the legitimacy of governance and introduced politics after the 1908 Revolution.
433
 It was 
the strikingly new conditions of 1908 that had imposed the introduction of ―politics‖. The 
Revolution of 1908 opened new channels for the democratization of the political sphere not 
in terms of procedures, but in terms of the emergence of a new legitimacy based on the 
masses (and political programs and manifestos) instead of on elite bargaining and 
compromises, especially observable in Armenian and other non-Muslim communities.
434
   
       The ideological assumption that politics was fitna and therefore evil and illegitimate 
does not mean that there was no politics. On the contrary, although not recognized as a 
legitimate activity, the deeds of the leading Tanzimat figures and the prerogatives of 
Abdülaziz and Abdülhamid were all acts of politics. The impetus behind these acts was 
clearly political concerns. Some concerns were related to the domestic inter-elite struggles 
and some others were strategies developed as responses to international developments. In 
many cases, international and domestic concerns were indistinguishable and cannot be 
taken into consideration in isolation. However, a conceptualization based on the 
understanding of differentiation of ideas and the equal legitimacy of varying opinions was 
non-existent due to the lack of a legacy similar to the European religious wars, which gave 
birth to an at first reluctant and gradually internalized respect for or at least recognition of 
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alternative beliefs and opinions.
435
 Politics were yet to become legitimate in the late 
Ottoman Empire. 
       The Hamidian regime may be defined as an amalgamation of the institutionalization of 
a modern bureaucratic state under the supervision of a semi-aristocratic and patriarchal 
polity. The Hamidian bureaucracy was a loyalist bureaucracy, not necessarily loyal to the 
persona of the sultan, but loyal to the Ottoman polity, its image, its representations, and its 
ideal. Loyalty to the sultan was one of the indispensable and fundamental components of 
the Ottoman polity as the sultan‘s personality embodied and symbolized the integrity and 
immortality of the empire. In such a complex organization, the role of the sultan was 
pivotal. The office of the sultan was indispensable not because there was consensus over 
the legitimacy and efficiency of the system, but because there was no viable and promising 
alternative to it, not unlike the Habsburg monarchy in the perception of the German-
speaking bureaucracy or in the perception of the Russian bureaucracy. The presence of the 
sultanic authority also excluded politics from the legitimate sphere of governance. 
Moreover, there would be no transcendentalization of the governing elite and the social 
internalization of the inherent superiority of the governing elite in the absence of the sultan 
and his metaphysical aura. Allegiance to the sultan meant allegiance to the class itself. Of 
course, the Turkish and Muslim (and caliphal) identity of the sultan established the ethnic 
and confessional nature of the imperium as well. Therefore, this was a class identity 
embedded in confessional and (to a certain extent) ethnic identities. In Marxian terms, this 
was class consciousness rather than a false consciousness.  
      It is also noteworthy to note that Engin Deniz Akarlı, one of the leading authorities on 
the Hamidian bureaucracy, suggests that the highest echelons of the Hamdian bureaucracy 
were an exception to the impressive professionalization and structuring of the lower and 
middle echelons. Akarlı writes that, ―other contradictions that embittered these young 
bureaucrats were related to the politicized nature of the upper reaches of the Ottoman 
officialdom. Each pasha was at once an administrative expert and a political figure, 
susceptible to the influence of different interest groups. Petitioning, persuasion, shared 
profits, and bribery were among the means available to influence a pasha's decision; the 
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nature of the business at hand as well as the personality and current power of the pasha in 
question determined the means chosen.‖436 For Akarlı, the critical function of Abdülhamid 
was to be the supreme arbiter between the pashas. Nevertheless, Abdülhamid‘s job was not 
easy. ―For one thing, he was openly afraid of the pashas' proven ability to seat and unseat 
sultans; for another, he believed that it was ‗the royal fountain of favor‘ that produced "the 
best harvest on the field of sovereignty.‖437 Of course, the arrogance and pettiness of the 
pashas does not mean that the Ottoman polity was mere the preserve of pashas for their 
corruption and plunder. On the contrary, it was a metaphysical entity in which pashas felt 
at ease and embodied the social and political cosmology of a certain mindset. 
       It was Şerif Mardin who first demonstrated that the thought of Young Ottomans in 
particular and the Tanzimat in general could not be understood without taking the Islamic 
worldview and Islamic visions of political and social order into account. Young Ottoman 
thought was very much molded within this mental/ideological formation. The Young 
Ottomans showed an intense ―concern for the welfare of the Islamic community.‖438 On 
the other hand, Selim Deringil showed that the Hamidian state policy displayed a more 
secular and utilitarian stance employing Islamic concerns for other political ends. In the 
words of Reinkowski, the Tanzimat aimed at ―the institution of a secular foundation for 
state ideology, but through the use of Islamic vocabulary and ideological tools. After 
having sifted a great amount of documents it seems rather that the Ottoman routine 
bureaucratic correspondence during the Tanzimat period shows, if anything, a kind of 
secularized ‗Islamic‘ vocabulary.‖439 He further argued that; 
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―At the heart of the Tanzimat political idiom it is a state ideology of order cum 
prosperity. Central to it is the term asayiş (public order, public tranquility; repose, 
rest). Similar to it, but more narrowly referring to the technical production of security 
is emniyet (safety, freedom from fear, security; confidence, belief; the police, the law). 
Security is granted by the state to its subjects, but the state is entitled in recompense to 
the subjects' complete obedience. The immediate outcome and positive product of as-
vvi,s- is prosperity, expressed by the terms rahat (ease, rest, comfort, tranquility) or 
istirahat and refah (easy circumstances, comfort, luxury, affluence). The term refah is 
based on the general notion of mülkün ma‟murluğu (flourishing condition, prosperity) 
which seems nothing else than the Roman salus publica (public wealth) in an Ottoman 
disguise. Prosperity, hand in hand with security, will be of maximum benefit to the 
state's and society's order
440
….The official announcements of the Tanzimat stressed 
the quest for enlightened state policy and sought a new basis on which to legitimize 
the rule of the central power over the polity. However, the standard terminology of the 
bureaucracy stuck closer to the traditional concepts of order. All the images and terms 
that have been discussed to this point were in use not only in the early Tanzimat 
period but also in the later phases which started with the second reform rescript of 
1856 and were to be enforced even in the empire's most remote provinces. New 
concepts central to the Tanzimat ideology did not supersede old concepts but only 
supplemented them, e.g., the confessionally neutral kb' a which could be applied to all 
subjects of the Ottoman state coexisted with the representation of the Christian people 
as members of the "flock" (re` aya). Tanzimat rhetoric and political terminology 
remained deeply embedded in the traditional Ottoman imagination of a perfect order 
and society.‖441 
 
This does not mean that Tanzimat remained within the premodern and traditional 
cosmology. On the contrary, gradually the Tanzimat figures learnt and adapted the modern 
political and social discourses and visions. These two cosmologies do not exclude each 
other. Based on the aforementioned premises, the Hamidian bureaucracy blended the 
traditional Islamic Ottoman political and social cosmology with the modern cosmology and 
institutionalized it. In this regard, Hamidian institutionalization of the bureaucracy sealed 
the perimeters of Turkish modernity. The Hamidian bureaucracy, considerably 
institutionalized and enlarged by the 1890s as an interest group which could influence 
(although not shape) the forging of the modern Ottoman polity was also compatible with 
their interests as individuals and as an interest group. This was an internalized and intimate 
state meaningful within a certain social and political cosmology. In this perception, the 
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nation was defined in reference to the state which was perceived within a cultural prism. 
The nation was to be submissive to the imperial state which represented the nation in it. 
This state also internalized the habitus of this state elite. Therefore, the ―nation‖ was 
imagined in line with the habitus, cultural formations, and premises of this state elite. The 
state was reified as long as it served as the embodiment of this habitus and become its 
disseminator.
442
 Thus, the Turkish nation was imagined ―secular‖ and ―modern‖ as 
opposed to ―backward‖ and ―pious‖. 
 
 
2.11. The Enigma and Spirit of Tanzimat in the Eyes of Western Beholders  
 
       The Western perceptions of the Tanzimat and the Tanzimat men may be insightful for 
us to identify the patterns in which the ―new men‖ of Tanzimat were depicted and enable 
us to imagine the nature of the state elite of the Tanzimat and Hamidian periods. The 
Westerners‘ accounts perceived and interpreted the course of the 19th century Ottoman 
Empire entirely with regard to the developments in the Ottoman state apparatus. This 
narrative was ―statist‖ in the sense that the state was assumed to be the sole determinative 
actor in the flow of history and historical development.
443
 The Western interest was 
focused upon this supposedly omnipotent actor. They were interested in the reformation of 
the cruel Muslim institution called the Ottoman state. The Tanzimat, which was identified 
simply as ―reform‖ in the western accounts, constituted the central theme of the historical 
narrative. The disagreements among various accounts revolved around two questions: the 
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degree of successfulness of the reforms and the sincerity of the reformers.
444
 With 
―reform‖, they implied the Ottoman state‘s reorganization but also more importantly its 
evolving/emerging new mentality. Thus, the term ―reform‖ was associated more with a 
mental change of the Muslim ruling elite of the Ottoman Empire than a 
technical/organizational change. 
       So, here in these accounts we encounter not a Weberian legal/bureaucratic state, but a 
state governed by ideological concerns and ambitions. Here, the ideology determines the 
nature of the state, not vice versa. That is, these accounts assume an idealist theory of state 
and history. These accounts supposed that by understanding the dominant mentality of the 
ruling Muslim elite, they could grasp the nature of the Ottoman state. The Ottoman state 
was merely an embodiment of the ideological and mental disposition of the Muslim ruling 
elite. 
      It may be also claimed that these accounts did not specifically explore the ideological 
dispositions of the Ottoman elite (Islamism, liberalism, et cetera) but attempted to trace the 
intentions and good will of the Ottoman state as an abstraction. The critical question they 
had endeavored to decipher was if the Ottoman state had (inherently) ―good‖ or ―evil‖ 
intentions.  
       The western accounts had a very idealistic conceptualization of state of affairs. They 
discussed the political situation and developments in terms of ―good‖ or ―bad‖, or within 
the Christian value system, in terms of ―good‖ and ―evil‖. This is obviously not unexpected 
given that most of the accounts were written by the evangelical Protestant missionaries. 
However, the accounts of non-missionaries (diplomats, journalists, et cetera) were not very 
different. This is because the English observers especially revealed an intense Protestant 
devotion and commitment which guided the formation of their worldviews.
445
 There were 
two levels of ―idealizations‖ within this discourse. The first level was with regard to the 
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―essential nature‖ of the reforming Ottoman state, whether it was essentially blameless and 
innocent, determined to get rid of its unspeakable sins of yesteryear, or was it the old 
sinister and deceitful Ottomans posing as if reforming in order to deceive ―civilized 
nations‖. The second level concerned the extent of success of reforms if it was assumed 
that Ottomans were sincere in their endeavors. The accounts rated the level of ―purity‖ of 
the Ottoman state in terms of its success in its reformism. The more it was found 
―reformist‖, the more ―benevolent‖ it was.  It is worth noting that even the word ―reform‖ 
itself was a religious/Protestant concept and refers to a spiritual rebirth purifying the soul 
from degeneration and sinister corruptions, sins, and vices. Here, ―reform‖ did not imply 
the connotation the word gained in later times (gradual and modest transformation as 
opposed to a radical transformation), but on the contrary implied a strong commitment to 
complete transformation. This approach apparently reflected a Christian/Protestant 
worldview.  
       It is also important to bear in mind that the 19th century accounts were speaking of 
―national traits‖ and ―national characters‖. As one ethnicity/nation/race might have round 
cheeks, narrow foreheads, and tough faces, they might be also sly, treacherous, hospitable, 
or quiet. These ―national characteristics‖ in fact reflected the moral judgments objectified 
by attributed national characteristics. These alleged characteristics might not necessarily be 
entirely good or entirely evil but in the amalgam of these attributes, authors revealed their 
sympathies and antipathies towards different ―races‖446. In various traveler accounts of 
Ottoman lands, some sympathized with Greeks and despised Armenians, whereas other 
travelers boosted Bulgarians and scorned Serbians.
447
 It is as if all the authors had their 
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―favorite races‖ among others which they observed as humble, trustworthy, hard-working, 
et cetera in contrast to other ―races‖ sinister, untrustworthy, and pernicious. Similarly, all 
these writers developed their opinions of Turks and their national traits, some high, some 
low, some very low.
448
 Apparently, different from the ―subject races‖, Turks were the 
―master race‖, and therefore appraisal of the Turks could not be done without making 
statements about Ottoman rule. Some differentiated between the Turkish populace at large 
and Ottoman officialdom, and some commented that the differences were only on the 
surface.
449
 These prejudices (although derived from some factual observation) also 
influenced their assessment of the capacity of Turks to ―reform‖. They also judged the 
genuine sincerity of the Turks to reform. If the Turk was to be essentially sinister and 
treacherous, there would be no reason to believe in the word of the Turk.
450
 Of course, it 
                                                                                                                                                             
authoritarian Greek Patriarchy, which was perceived as a corrupted body. For such 
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should be emphasized that these clichés predominantly derived from religious beliefs and 
premises. 
       Another predominant paradigm of these western accounts was ―liberalism‖. 
―Liberalism‖ embedded in these accounts was not an ideology with its 20th century 
implications and overt political connotations. Although French influence had its impact on 
the making of liberalism, the 19th century Anglo-Saxon weltanschauung was the primary 
foundation of 19th century liberalism. This liberalism was not a normative ideology but an 
expression of a time and space specific perception of social order. The liberalism of the 
19th century (beginning with 18th century British political commentators, as well as Adam 
Smith, who succeeded them) was primarily the belief that with the progression of modern 
world, more liberties and freedom will make the world a better place.
451
 This optimism was 
less a coherent ideology than a certain mindset and a set of attitudes and beliefs. Although 
this mindset was necessarily secular and distanced itself from conservatism, it had a 
strongly embedded religious motivation behind it. Liberalism was also an ethical 
perspective interpreting political developments in terms of value judgments, such as 
―good‖ and ―bad‖. In this regard, liberalism in the eyes of ―liberals‖ was defending the 
―good‖, the ―just‖, and the ―right‖ against the ―evil‖ and ―unjust‖. In this perception, the 
forces of conservatism and ―old mentalities‖ represented the evil. The shining brave new 
world was against the dark forces of the medieval mind. Therefore, in its assessments and 
perceptions, 19th century Anglo-Saxon liberalism was the reformed and secularized form 
of Christianity/Protestantism in the 19th century.
452
 It was the new expression of the 
Christian/Protestant faith and ideals.
453
 In other words, liberalism was not a worldly 
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ideology with a political/economic program, but the political expression of Dissenting 
Protestantism. With regard to the Ottoman Empire, liberals tended to support or condemn 
the Ottoman state depending on their theological images and their interpretation of the 
divine essence of the Ottoman Empire.
454
  
       The pivotal and complicated problem in all these discussions was the Muslim 
character of the Ottoman polity. Could a Muslim polity ever be ―good‖? If the answer to 
this question was affirmative, then the entire Tanzimat was to be perceived as a test of this 
bold statement
455
. Although an analysis of the numerous accounts would show that most of 
the accounts tended to answer this question negatively, quiet a number of accounts were 
optimistic, some for political reasons (seeing Turkey as a political ally against the Russian 
menace
456
) or for religious reasons (the Christian idea that people are inherently good and 
act accordingly when the opportunity is given). The Palmerstonian foreign policy of 
safeguarding the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was launched against the expansionist 
ambitions of Russia. This Turcophile stance was criticized by many liberals for supporting 
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and buttressing Muslim oppression of the Christian rea‟ya. For these opponents of the 
policy, the Christian rea‟ya would prefer their co-religionist Russians vis-a-vis the 
Ottomans.
457
 The counter-argument argued that Turks were less oppressive than the 
Russians and furthermore that Turks were reforming with a tremendous zeal.  Therefore, 
Turkey was by now a much better polity, and the old Turkish brutality was about to end for 
good soon
458
. In fact, throughout the 19
th
 century, the British political scene was 
characterized with the struggle between the Turcophil conservatives versus skeptical 
liberals (who represent different confessional and theological constituencies).  
       It is also noteworthy that the same word in English (reform) had two possible 
translations into Turkish with diverging connotations. Both ―Tanzimat‖ and ―Islahat‖ were 
referring to the same concept in the English political/theological vocabulary: Reform. In 
Ottoman political terminology, ıslahat (reform) referred to reforms addressing the rights of 
the Ottoman Christians whereas tanzimat (reorganization) implied the reorganization of the 
Ottoman state within the age-old, intra-Muslim world. Whereas ―tanzimat‖ was espoused 
unanimously by the bureaucracy, ―ıslahat‖ encountered fierce opposition, including 
Mustafa Reşid Pasha.459 For the Tanzimat bureaucracy, ―tanzimat‖ was ―necessary‖ and 
―good‖, and therefore it had to be undertaken immediately and seriously whereas ıslahat 
was secondary, irrelevant, and even treacherous. Such differentiation was irrelevant for the 
Christian/Western observers of Ottoman reform for whom the gist of the matter was the 
amelioration of the sufferings of the Ottoman Christians. Within this perspective, the 
reorganization of the Ottoman state was a means to improve the conditions of the 
Christians. Amelioration of the life conditions of the Christians was perceived as the 
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principal criterion measuring the level of the success of the ―Ottoman reform‖.460 These 
diverging perspectives caused misunderstanding between the two parties. 
       The assumption in these accounts was that the Ottoman state was the only agent of 
Ottoman political development. The will of the omnipotent Ottoman state was to determine 
the prospects of the Ottoman lands and the miserable Ottoman Christians. The litmus test 
of Ottoman goodwill was its commitment to ―reform‖. Reform was associated with all the 
good deeds. All the other issues were derivatives of reform with a capital R. The ―reform‖ 
requires the ―will‖ of the Ottoman leadership and also the technical/administrative 
capability of the Ottoman leadership. Both sympathetic and unsympathetic observers of the 
19th century Ottomans make the observation that whatever the efforts of the leadership 
may be, the execution of the reform encounters severe problems.
461
 There were different 
and varying arguments brought up by the observers who acknowledged the limitations of 
the reform. Some spoke about the lack of modern, technical knowledge. Some pointed out 
the financial inadequacy of the empire. Some others who preferred more ideological 
reasoning for the partial failure of the reform indicated the discrepancy between the visions 
and mentalities of the ruling central elite and the conservative provincial administrators 
and officials. For these observers, although there was an enlightened and determined 
leadership in Constantinople which was anxious to endorse liberal/western governance, the 
local officials were subscribing to the old, despotic oriental mind. This assumption was one 
of the most overt clichés of the paradigm of westernization which contrasts the enlightened 
few of the leadership with the ignorant and barbaric unenlightened oriental flock. In this 
assumption, with the emanation of the new enlightened ideas from the privileged few to the 
lower cadres of government and to the bulk of the Muslim populace, the transformation of 
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the Ottoman Empire will be completed. Given the small possibility of a mental 
transformation on such a scale, the western observers feel obliged to admit that the 
enlightened views of the leadership are not enough as long as the bulk of the officials 
retain oriental despotic worldviews.  
       As stated above, without developing a Weberian state theory of post-Holocaust 20th 
century, the western observers perceived the Ottoman state (as any other ―state‖) as the 
embodiment of a certain mentality and will of the ruling elite. In other words, the state was 
for them a matter of ―mentality‖. It was a mere reflection of the minds of the people 
holding the commanding positions. The western accounts observed that the emanation of 
this ―idea‖ could not be achieved by decree. This was a problem given that the Muslim 
masses and provincial petty officials continued to be ―fanatics‖ regardless of the intentions 
of the Tanzimat bureaucrats. The ―idea‖ had to be disseminated to be effective. Therefore, 
the ―old Turks‖ of all levels have to be eliminated, marginalized, sidelined, or transformed. 
As stated above, this line cannot be explained by reducing it to a modernist paradigm. This 
approach is also ―ethical‖. It perceives a struggle between ―good‖ and ―bad‖. We should 
bear in mind that in the 19th century, western supremacy was associated with Christian 
ideals, especially when encountering the non-Christian world.  
     Another major point that has to be emphasized is the dynamics of international relations 
and politics shaping the development of these clichés, prejudices and assumptions. 
Apparently, the sympathetic discourses developed by British and Franch authors towards 
the Ottomans derived from the fact that the Ottoman Empire was an ally of the British-
French axis against the Russians.
462
 With the dying out of this alliance and the failure of 
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the Ottoman treasury to pay its debts to its English and French creditors in 1875, the 
English and French accounts will also change.
463
 The accounts written after the waning of 
Tanzimat were more critical and mistrustful of the Ottoman reformation. Around that time, 
the image of the unreconstructed barbaric character of the Ottomans made a sudden 
comeback. This is very understandable because as the Ottoman Empire lost its stance in the 
19th century ethical battle to be placed on the side of the ―good‖ against the ―evil‖. By 
departing from the British-French axis, the Ottomans began to represent barbarism, 
bigotry, and the enemies of civilization. Its inadequacies and negative attributes became 
visible and disturbing in the eyes of the Western observers. The optimism of the early 
Tanzimat waned after the failure of the enactment of the reforms, and thus the 
shortcomings of the entire Tanzimat became more apparent in the eyes of the western 
accounts.
464
 
 
 
2.12. “Old Turks” 
 
       ―Old Turks‖ versus ―Young Turks‖ was one of the favorite themes of the western 
observers of the Ottoman Empire, who felt no need to explain what these labels meant and 
assumed that they were self-evident. Mordtmann in his 1877 book Stambul und Das 
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Moderne Türkenthum465 elaborated on the meaning of these categories and criticized the 
erroneous usage of these categories. Mordtmann noted that westerners used the term 
―Young Turks‖ in relation to Young Germany and Young Italy (which were movements 
with overtly liberal overtones) and understood Junkers when referring to the ―Old Turks‖. 
Mordtmann wrote that the genuine Old Turks were gone forever after the breakdown of the 
janissary corps. For Mordtmann, if there were a few of them surviving, they could never 
form a faction. Mordtmann established that there was no Old Turk party defending their 
interests fervently as the Junker party was doing in Germany.
466
 The ―Old Turks‖ were a 
new formation rather than being the unreconstructed remnants of the old guard and 
representing an old class. For Mordtmann, the Old Turks were conservative in the sense 
that they defended the autocracy in its existing form. The principal motivation of ―Old 
Turks‖ was to avoid foreign interference as much as possible. Here, Mordtmann made an 
interesting point, arguing that for this reason the Old Turks were keen to satisfy the non-
Muslims and maintain good relations with the Western powers. Mordtmann opposed the 
commonly held view among European observers that Young Turks were preferable to Old 
Turks.
467
 Mordtmann went further and wrote that, ―Old Turks are with a few exceptions 
honorable men.‖ For Mordtmann, it was the Young Turks who were radical although he 
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regarded all the Turks as chauvinists whatever party they belonged to.
468
 To sum up, what 
distinguished Old and Young Turks for Mordtmann was the methods they employed rather 
than their mentality. Moreover, because the ―Young Turks‖ were on better terms with 
modern equipment, they were more capable of realizing their ambitions and hence were 
more dangerous. 
       Mordtmann‘s assessment was prophetic. He was exceptional in seeing the 
complexities and contradictions of modernization in general and Turkish modernization in 
particular. The fundamental misrepresentation the western accounts held to was to 
construct the clash between the supposed ―Old Turk party‖ and the ―Young Turk party‖ as 
constituted with regard to their approaches to Westernization and modernization. This 
alleged distinction between the Old Turks and Young Turks was illusory and superficial in 
many ways. While it has a grain of truth in it, this distinction did not reflect a sharply 
defined ideological antagonism or even a factional division.
469
 The post-World War II 
Anglo-Saxon historiography was in agreement in calling the men of Tanzimat reformers
470
, 
but although the term ―reform‖ was in common usage at the time, what was meant by the 
word ―reform‖ was not always clear. The reformers did not face any apparent antagonistic 
party of considerable strength before the 1870s. In this regard, ―reform‖ did not imply any 
political or ideological standpoint, but implied only the concern to undertake 
administrative and legal changes to render the Ottoman state more efficient, stronger, and 
better able to respond to the challenges of the modern world (hence, Tanzimat). For 
―reformers‖, reform was a technical matter rather than an ideological imperative in the 
absence of an outspoken opposition organized within the political/bureaucratic sphere. We 
observe the politicization and factionalization of ―reformism‖ with the1870s as alternative 
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voices within the bureaucracy and political sphere were heard and liberalism had to 
accompany the reform process.  
       Western observers were divided in their assessment of the capability of ―old‖ Turks to 
reform. Throughout the 19
th
 century, British authors had a tendency toward ―showing a 
very English respect for the Ottoman governing class‖ and ―constructed indigenous 
peoples (of the Balkans-DG) through the familiar motifs of chaos, savagery, backwardness, 
and obfuscation.‖471 Burnaby, a Turcophile and propagator of support for the Ottoman 
Empire against the Russian aggression just before the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War, saw 
Turks as a race capable of governing, even governing Christians after the ―cadi‘s law‖ was 
abrogated given that this law, as Burnaby emphasized, does not accept the testimony of a 
Christian. Burnaby‘s sympathy for and confidence in the ―Turk‖ increased, especially after 
he encountered the unruly and savage Kurds in East Anatolia.
472
 Although others were 
dubious of the ability of the ―Turk‖ to govern, they still respected the remarkable 
characteristics of the ―Turk‖. Mark Sykes, who travelled throughout Anatolia and Arab 
lands, observed the ―rule of the Turk‖ and wrote, ―A Turk will understand an Englishman‘s 
character much sooner than he will an Arab‘s; the latter is so subtle in his reasoning, so 
quick-witted, so argumentative, and so great a master of language that he leaves the stolid 
Osmanli amazed and dazed, comprehending nothing. The Turk is not, truth to tell, very 
brilliant as a rule, though very apt in assuming Western cultivation.‖473 In Edhem Bey, he 
found a reformist Turk who resolved the Armenian disorders. ―(H)ere the chapter of Zeitun 
closes, for within three weeks Edhem Pasha, a noble example of what a cultivated Turk can 
be, arrived on the scene, and with the assistance of the European Consuls concluded an 
honorable peace with the town(.)‖474 In another passage, he expressed his doubts that 
Turkey could ever be reformed in the grip of financial shortcomings, given the lack of a 
developed infrastructure and educational opportunities, though these structural limitations 
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did not lessen his respect for the ―Turk‖.475 Likewise, the war correspondent of the Daily 
Telegraph in the Balkan Wars wrote, ―We were received on every hand with the greatest 
courtesy and politeness, the Turk being by instinct the first gentleman in Europe.‖476 These 
western (and indeed very much Anglo-Saxon ) stereotypes are presented to exemplify the 
complex reception of the ―transformed Turk‖ in the eyes of the western beholders. The 
personification of the nations was a prevalent theme in 19
th
 century political writings. The 
national stereotypes were not limited to distinguishing ethnicities, but also to distinguish 
between the imagined ―old Turk‖ and the ―young Turk‖. In fact, these supposedly ethnic 
stereotypes were in effect class-based observations. It was a habit of the 19
th
 century 
observers to associate ethnicities with certain class formations. Interestingly, ―the old 
Turk‖ was generally preferred by the Europeans, and especially by the British, who found 
their oriental counterpart in the gentlemanliness of the Tanzimat-Hamidian pasha. ―Ghazi 
Moukhtar....is a splendid specimen of the old type of Turk(.)‖477  
     Obviously, there was no scientifically defined categorization of the ―old Turk‖. Gazi 
Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, who was an impressive military officer with a Western education, a 
distinguished professional record, and considerable erudition, turned out to be an ―old 
Turk‖ in 1913 (the year this account was published) in the reign of the young Turks. Here, 
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the label ―old Turk‖ attains an ideological connotation. The Young Turks, with their 
Prussian and social Darwinian attributes, were disdained by this British correspondent who 
favored men with whom he can trustingly bargain and compromise. The assumption was 
that they could collaborate with a Turkey which was governed by a class resembling the 
British cultural formation (in its social and cultural connotations) and the British governing 
elite.
478
 That is to say, ―old Turk‖ was not simply a cliché to refer to the ―modernization 
index‖, but a cultural/political/ideological concept determined by concerns and interests of 
the states coinciding with the imperatives of international politics. In this study, we are 
trying to portray this vanished elite dubbed by many Westerners as ―old Turks‖, but 
without the cultural implications the Westerner accounts maintain, and situate it within a 
historical framework and historical structure.   
 
   
2.13. The Problem of Generations: A Key to the History of the Late Ottoman Empire 
? 
 
     It can be maintained that the world of the Tanzimat could also be understood by taking 
ideal-type generations into consideration. ―Generation‖ is a concept that seemingly refers 
to our individual daily lives rather than those lofty social concepts such as ―class‖, 
―bureaucracy‖, ―status‖, and ―stratification‖. However, early experiences and particular 
modes of socializations in particular periods are crucial for the formation and development 
of individuals and constitutive of pervasive and shared mindsets. Arguably, a person who 
is a member of a certain generation has more affinity with his coevals than his parents 
regardless of differences of class, status, et cetera. However, it is also important to point 
out that a generation does not automatically include any person that is born within a certain 
time range. Generations are also class-bound. Generation is an ideational and cultural 
concept. Therefore, generations are exclusive rather than inclusive. For example, Robert 
                                                 
478
 For the notion of ―cultural formation‖, see Poovey, Mary, Making a Social Body, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. Also see Corrigan, Philip & Sayer, Derek, 
The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution, Oxford; New York: 
Blackwell, 1985; Lloyd, David, Thomas, Paul, Culture and the State, London; New York: 
Routledge, 1998. 
177 
 
Wohl defines the generation of 1914 as follows: ―In early twentieth century Europe 
generationalists (generation of 1914-DG) were almost always literary intellectuals living in 
large cities. They were members of a small elite who were keenly aware of their 
uniqueness and proud of their intellectual superiority. What concerned these writers or 
would-be-writers was their decline of culture and the waning of vital energies; what drove 
them together was the desire to create new values and to replace those that were fading; 
what incited them to action was the conviction that they represented the future in the 
present(.)‖479  Paradoxically the generation of 1914 subsumed all Europe surpassing 
national borders, but excluded many of the layers and cultural formations of Europe at the 
same time. Likewise, the Tanzimat generations were also exclusive and inclusive at the 
same time. In short, generations do matter
480
, and they are not only simplifications and 
vulgarizations. Generation is a historical category constructed within social and political 
circumstances rather than a cultural conceptualization. In this regard, some generations are 
―more generations‖ than others in the sense that they reveal very particular characteristics 
differentiating them from others. This is particularly so when history accelerates. Certain 
time periods witness drastic changes and transformations brought forth by certain 
generations. It is needles to point out that generation is a modern concept, meaningful only 
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1914 were revolutionaries and displayed very distinctive features that easily distinguished 
them from their preceding and succeeding generations.   
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in the context of the modern age in which time accelerates and the sharp discrepancies 
between fathers and sons are very easily noticeable.
481
 The first Tanzimat generation was 
arguably the first generation in the course of the Turkish/Ottoman history per se that 
experienced an intentional and dramatic break from their fathers‘ experiences and 
intellectual formations. As Wohl points out, ―Historical generations are not born; they are 
made.‖482 The second Tanzimat generation and Hamidian generations were more ―modest 
generations‖ in terms of their self-consciousness of their own generation and of their 
displaying the characteristics of a generation. The Young Turk (subsuming the young 
officials of the late Hamidian era) generation exemplifies a tremendous rejection of the 
values, codes, and mentalities of their fathers. As pointed out above, generational politics 
cannot be isolated from social changes and transformations. The reshaping of the class 
structures and the export of new thoughts gave rise to the emergence of new politics and 
new cosmologies. For example, Peter Wien illustrates a similar contrast in Iraq in the 
interwar period. Wien demarcates between the old school ―Sherifian generation‖ of 
officers in conflict with the coming radical nationalist ―Young Efendiyyah‖ generation 
sympathetic to Germany and inclined to fascism. Wien defines the Sherifian 
generation/class as ―regard(ing) themselves as an elite of Arab nationalism. Many of them 
had received an elevated military education at the Ottoman Staff College in Istanbul and 
had learned Western languages....The Sherifian officers had managed to enter the old urban 
landholding elite through shady moves in legislation, and thus the old and new urban 
landlords had the upper hand
483.‖ For Wien, the Sherifian officers who turned out to be a 
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ruling conservative elite had compromised with the landholding Sunni elite. In contrast, the 
Young Efendiyya were ―educated in the newly established nationalist schooling 
system...they challenged the ruling elite of the 1920s(.) They were disappointed by the 
collaboration of the Sherifians with the Mandate Power and by their abuse of 
power...Instead of the conciliatory and pro-British inclination of the Sherifian elite, the 
Young Efendiyya absorbed ‗Western Ideas‘ and ideologies as they were transported as 
translations in the press and on the book market.‖484 In short, generations are sets that 
intersect class, status, social backgrounds and age-groups, and are therefore a crucial social 
formation themselves.
485
 As argued above, the Hamidian generation represented the apex 
of the imperial elite at a time when the limits of liberal politics became apparent and the 
empire was failing to respond to the demands of its constituents. It is no coincidence that in 
these conditions, the last imperial generation had been crashed by the first generation of the 
nation. Nevertheless, this last imperial elite cluster was also constitutive of the first and 
later generations of the nation.  
     To conclude this chapter, because generations are not solely determined by time, but 
also by class and socializations, it has to be noted that all these clusters of generations are 
actually restricted to small elites. In fact, the Tanzimat period constitutes a process of elite-
formation and elite-expansion. What we will investigate in the following chapters is an 
―intermediate‖ generation that paved the way for the emergence of a new generation that I 
will call the ―Unionist generation‖. Nevertheless, as argued in the beginning of this 
chapter, the Tanzimat generation did not die out without leaving a trace. On the contrary, 
                                                 
484
 Wien, Peter, ibid, p. 16. The case was no different in the Japanese modernization. ―This 
generation was ‗new‘ relative to the ‗old men of Meiji‘ who had engineered the 
revolutionary reforms of the Restoration; specifically, they were ‗the first generation of 
Japanese to attend the new Western-oriented schools of higher learning.‘ Reaching 
maturity in the decade before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, this generation struggled 
with the fundamental problem of national identity and of the proper use to be made of the 
Japanese heritage in the process of modernization.‖ Smith II, Henry Dewitt, Japan‟s First 
Student Radicals, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, ix. Also see Pyle, Kenneth 
B, The New Generation in Meiji Japan: Problems of Cultural Identity, 1885-1995, 
Stanford: Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969. 
485
 For the forging and dissolution of class/status groups in the course of time, see Batatu, 
Hanna, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1978. 
180 
 
its worldviews, premises, and cultural and intellectual formations made a decisive impact 
upon the subsequent generations. 
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CHAPTER III  
 
PRIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, DIPLOMACY, APPROPIATION 
OF THE “NEW KNOWLEDGE” AND THE OTTOMAN TRANSFORMATION 
 
 
    This chapter aims to show how diplomacy emerged as a primary concern of Ottoman 
statecraft and how this development triggered the appropriation of ―new knowledge‖ which 
consequently resulted in a new organizational and ideological restructuring of the Ottoman 
polity. In other words, it suggests the ―primacy of foreign affairs‖ in certain historical 
conjectures.   
 
 
3.1. Discovery of Diplomacy and the Rise of “New Knowledge” 
 
       Since the formation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1836 as a modern 
bureaucratic structure replacing the previous scribal service attached to the Office of the 
Grand Vizierate, the Ministry became a preeminent part of Ottoman statecraft.
486
 Although 
conducting foreign relations had never been an insignificant business, the increasing 
impact of international developments on the Empire, growing vulnerability vis-à-vis 
neighboring major powers such as Russia and Austria, as well as the requisites of the rise 
of the modern state turned the conduction of foreign relations into a prominent 
preoccupation of statecraft. Therefore, the Ministry gained an importance of unprecedented 
levels within the Ottoman establishment. It rose from a secondary position (especially vis-
à-vis the military and the ilmiye) within the state to the forefront of Ottoman statecraft. The 
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foreign policy office. 
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Ottomans had to play according to the rules of the international game to respond to the 
immediacy of the international pressure on the Empire. 
       It may be argued that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the bureaucratic institution 
that played the most significant role in Ottoman transformation, a role different and more 
intense than that played by the military, especially after it became evident in the eyes of the 
state elite that something more fundamental than military prowess was necessary to survive 
the emerging international challenges. This became apparent after the acknowledgement of 
the enormity of Russian military might which became evident throughout the disastrous 
Ottoman-Russian wars in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
487
 The Russian 
army had the capacity to mobilize millions of peasants as Ottoman contemporaries 
observed, and therefore it was literarily unbeatable given Ottoman military capabilities.
488
 
The Ottomans suffered severe defeats by the terrifying Russian army in 1774, 1812, and 
1829, when Ottoman defenses in Bulgaria collapsed and the Russian army crossed the 
Balkan mountains and reached as far as Burgas, Aydos, Varna, and even targeted 
Edirne.
489
   
     Under such circumstances, no domestic policy could be developed and implemented 
independent of its international consequences and imperatives. The Ottomans were well 
aware that they were dependent on and subject to international developments. This was 
also an opportunity for the Ottomans since exploiting diplomacy and the dynamics of the 
international balance of power provided them room for maneuver against the otherwise 
militarily invincible Russians. Especially from 1774 onwards, the Ottomans were 
cognizant of their retreat and reluctance to act in such an environment. They were obsessed 
                                                 
487
 For the Russian-Ottoman wars and their impact on the Ottoman establishment, see 
Aksan, Virginia, Ottoman Wars, New York: Pearson Longman, 2007. For a risaleh of 
primary importance originally named Hülasat ül Kelam fi Redd il Avam, see Uçman, 
Abdullah (ed.), Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi, Kervan Yayıncılık, 1974. Also see Aksan, 
Virginia, ―Ottoman Political Writing, 1768-1808‖, International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Feb., 1993), pp. 61-62. 
488
 For the czarist Russian army, see Keep, John, Soldiers of the Czar, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1985; Duffy, Christopher, Russia‟s Military Way to the West, London; 
New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1994. 
489
 Aksan, Virginia, Ottoman Wars, New York: New York: Longman Pearson, 2007, pp. 
349-356. 
183 
 
with the efforts to reverse their seemingly inevitable collapse. From 1774 onwards, the 
prospect of an eventual collapse of the Empire guided a substantial portion of diplomatic as 
well as domestic policies. The Ottomans knew that they were no more an independent 
actor in the international arena. The international alignments, rivalries, and aggressions 
were of primary importance for the prospects of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman 
establishment acknowledged that its well-being was dependent on a number of overlapping 
factors. Therefore, they had to accommodate themselves to the world around them.  
       To accommodate to the new circumstances, they had to import and appropriate the 
―new knowledge‖. The ―knowledge‖ to govern, maintain and defend the state was no 
longer held by the ilmiye class, the prestigious class that held a monopoly and the halo of 
respectability for possessing the privileged knowledge throughout all the classical age. 
Although kalemiye rose to prominence within the Ottoman state as early as the eighteenth 
century (if not earlier), the ilmiye class was at the forefront of the ideological backbone of 
the state. Certainly, the very critical moment that had brought the sudden decline and 
marginalization of the ilmiye was the abolition of the janissaries given that the janissary-
ilmiye alliance was the fulcrum of the institutional power of ilmiye. With the organization 
of the new army, the ilmiye retreated from its preeminent position within the power bloc.
490
 
Nevertheless, we cannot explain this retreat merely as a consequence of the changing 
alliance structures. If that were the case, it would be even harder to explain the paradoxical 
involvement and support of ulema in the destruction of the janissaries. It is possible to 
conjecture that the ilmiye‟s prestige collapsed suddenly and drastically with the realization 
that they no longer possessed the superior and relevant knowledge. Islamic knowledge and 
science were increasingly discredited in the process of the Ottoman encounter with the 
modern and ―Western‖ sciences (in the process of military revolution) as their 
―knowledge‖ remained irrelevant and impractical.491 The ulema became sidelined and 
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 Levy, Avigdor, ―The Ottoman Ulema and the Military Reforms of Sultan Mahmud II‖, 
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491
 Timothy Michell explored the meaning of modernity and the employment of modernity 
in the non-Western world. In his landmark study, Colonising Egypt, Mitchell argued that 
the inevitable entrance of the ―new knowledge‖ and ―modern mind‖ brought the collapse 
of the ―old ways of making things‖ and forced Egypt to submit to the modern discourse 
and therefore to the penetration of Western imperialism, which holds the monopoly on 
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marginalized within the new circumstances, and the social-cultural environment in which 
their knowledge remained was restricted to the private and non-political spheres.
492
  
      The holders of the ―technical knowledge‖, who had been recruited for conduction of 
daily affairs, were elevated from being secondary class auxiliaries to being captains of 
statecraft. The quality of having the definite skills to lead the ship of state had been taken 
over by a new group of officials from the kalemiye equipped with positive and pragmatic 
knowledge distinct from the ―philosophical knowledge‖ the ilmiye maintained. The ilmiye 
class gave way to a new class which was more compatible and in touch with the new 
developments (after a period in the late 18
th
 and early 19
th
 century in which the prominence 
of the ulema was at its zenith).
493
 The 18
th
 century rise of the kalemiye class, as shown by 
                                                                                                                                                             
modern knowledge. Local ―experts‖ also established their dictatorship based on their 
monopoly of the ―new knowledge‖. They were the only ones who were familiar with 
―making things rationally‖. In ―Rule of Experts‖ Mitchell shows how the modern Egyptian 
bureaucracy had developed a novel mentality which recreates Egypt in their image and 
causes the eradication of the old knowledge. Thus, in the argumentation of Mitchell, the 
local elite of ―experts‖ and the Western imperialists collaborated, and the local experts 
functioned as the ―compradors of western knowledge‖ adapting the Marxist notion of 
―compradorial bourgeoisie‖. Mitchell, Timothy, Colonising Egypt, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1991; Mitchell, Timothy, Rule of Experts : Egypt, Techno-politics, 
Modernity, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. Also for the eradication of the 
effective ―local knowledge‖ by the states and the detrimental effects of states‘ intrusion 
into the traditional society, see Scott, James, Seeing Like a State, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1999. For another inspiring essay on the meaning of modern/Western 
bureaucracy, see Herzfeld, Michael, The Social Production of Indifference: Exploring the 
Symbolic Roots of Western Bureaucracy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. 
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 The whole Tarih-i Cevdet can be read as a polemic against the crumbling ilmiye class. 
Coming himself from the ranks of ilmiye, Cevdet in his Tarih is a staunch modernist 
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Aksan, reached its apex in the early 19
th
 century. Although the rise of kalemiye can be 
witnessed as early as the 17
th
 century, it was only in the early 19
th
 century that kalemiye 
became a self-conscious group assuming immense political prominence and power. The 
new knowledge was now the monopoly of this new class, who had acquired the necessary 
skills to thrive in the new circumstances that were pushing the Empire into a corner. It was 
this group that assumed power with the Edict of Reform in 1839. Paradoxically, the 
authoritarian policies of Mahmud II that eradicated the opponents of the reform (i.e., 
policies of Mahmud II) enabled the newly rising class, who enjoyed the elimination of their 
rivals from offices of prominence, to grab power from the palace and the sultan with the 
coming to the throne of the young and inexperienced Abdülmecid in 1839.494  
      The analysis of Christoph Neumann on the foreign policy decisions of the Ottoman 
Empire in the reign of Selim III in his aptly named article, ―Decision Making without 
Decision Makers‖, demonstrates that the policy making was a fragmented vocation and 
that there was no authorized corporate structure to decide foreign policy. Neumann also 
underlines the prominent role of the ilmiye class in the making of foreign policy. In 
addition, Neumann shows that foreign policy decisions were dependent on personal 
relations and household rivalries. Before its institutionalization, foreign policy was hostage 
to rivalries of ―political factions aimed at achieving personal career enhancement, not 
political programs.‖495 Although members of ilmiye class had a prominent role in foreign 
policy, many other actors were also extensively involved in this process, such as the 
Admiral Gazi Hasan Pasha who had veto power over matters relevant to the North African 
Barbary Coast. From such a chaotic, uninstitutionalized configuration in which personal 
                                                                                                                                                             
propagating the new way of conducting the state.  He does not spare his words when it 
comes to scorning the ilmiye and making fun of their lack of understanding of the new 
world. For Cevdet, the alternative to accepting the new modes of statecraft is the death of 
the Ottoman polity. See a broad analysis of the discourse of Tarih-i Cevdet, Neumann, 
Christoph, Araç Tarih Amaç Tanzimat: Tarih-i Cevdet‟in Siyasi Anlamı, İstanbul: Tarih 
Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000. 
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and interpersonal relations shaped foreign policy, the creation of an institutionalized and 
impersonal organization isolated from daily and personalized petty politics was no less 
than a revolution.  
      This institutional revolution was a victory of ―modern knowledge‖ replacing the reign 
of traditional knowledge
496
. This epistemological revolution compelled an institutional 
reorganization. The institutional reorganization was a corollary of the epistemological 
revolution. Apparently, ―modern knowledge‖ necessitated the erection of an autonomous 
bureaucracy to reproduce itself. Furthermore, it generated the development of notions of 
expertise and specialization. The modern epistemology maintains that what is valuable is 
not ―knowledge as a whole and in a totality‖ but knowledge as specified and particularized. 
Modern officialdom and its bureaucracy were to an important extent founded on these 
premises.
497
   
       In fact, the modern epistemology enforced a radical reorganization in the military.
498
 
The Ottoman transformation began with the military sector.
499
 The reasons were obvious. 
The very visible symptoms of the Ottoman failure were observed in the devastating 
military defeats. Although the immediate aim of all the efforts was to reorganize and 
strengthen the military, in the ―new world‖, military prowess and military victory was less 
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decisive than before. After long efforts to overcome the military deficit, it was recognized 
that changes had to be made elsewhere. A new kind of knowledge other than military 
prowess had to be acquired. These motivations prepared the ground for the emergence and 
rise of the future-diplomats as a group.
500
 The discovery of diplomacy was the new great 
white hope for the Ottomans. 
       To establish a chronological order, we may contextualize the rising prominence of 
conducting foreign affairs beginning from the late eighteenth century. The continuous 
Russian wars, especially from the disastrous 1774 onwards, exposed the reluctance to 
know and exploit international political dynamics.
501
 The helplessness of the Empire 
against the Russian menace compelled the Ottomans to seek long-lasting and 
comprehensive alliances rather than temporary alliances. The Western European states 
were now potential new comrades for the Ottomans against the Russians. These future 
comrades were sharing a common fear, the rise of the Russian bear.
502
  
       The second crucial period in the emergence of modern Ottoman diplomacy was the 
Napoleonic Wars. The term ―Napoleonic Wars‖ encompasses a more than twenty-year 
period not of continuous warfare, but a period in which coalitions and alliances were 
formed, dissolved, and reestablished. It was a period in which modern diplomacy became 
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formed and reached unprecedented levels of sophistication. The Congress of Vienna of 
1815 can be seen as the founding moment of modern (aristocratic) diplomacy with its 
established codes of conduct.
503
 It was a very constitutive moment in the rise of the role 
and significance of foreign affairs in government policies, which was particularly true for 
the Ottomans. The Napoleonic Wars were an unprecedented episode in which war and 
peace were indistinguishable from each other and in which no power in Europe had the 
luxury of isolating itself diplomatically. The Ottomans were entangled in this complex web 
of relations oscillating within the complex web of alliances. With the aim of preventing a 
possible European-wide deal at the expense of the Empire, the Sublime Porte struggled to 
make the best of it within the European-wide politics of alignment, and thus the Ottomans 
became incorporated into the European order, albeit in a passive posture.  
       The European-wide Napoleonic ―Cold War‖ was also an opportunity for the Ottoman 
Empire. Russia and Austria had to give up their campaigns against the Ottomans by 1792 
as a response to the French Revolution.
504
 After the break of the French Revolution and 
once the European powers including Russia and Austria were forced to track the post-
revolutionary developments instead of fighting, the Ottomans not only found breathing 
space but found a chance to be allies with the Russians and others. Playing a diplomatic 
game between France on one side and Britain on the other, the Ottomans endeavored to 
maximize their interests.
505
  
       Recent studies have revised the Orientalist/reductionist image that Ottomans were 
completely ignorant of their time, demonstrating that on the contrary Ottomans were 
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perfectly aware of the conditions they were in and cognizant of the transforming world.
506
 
However, such awareness does not automatically break the impasse. Diplomacy requires a 
massive technical knowledge to be acquired as has been best exemplified by Venetian 
diplomacy.
507
 Diplomacy also needs accumulated experience and practical skills developed 
over a long time span. Diplomacy as a craft and an art developed in Europe in the early 
modern period, first becoming visible in the Italian city states in the fifteenth century and 
gradually becoming established in the sixteenth century throughout Western Europe.
508
 
The Ottomans were not complete foreigners to the world of diplomacy. They pursued a 
rather sophisticated diplomacy in the post-classical centuries.
509
 However, Ottoman 
diplomacy failed to adopt many of the specifics of the intra-Christian codes and cultures of 
diplomacy. Moreover, they failed to modernize the craft and techniques of diplomacy such 
as information-gathering and utilization of gathered information. The Ottomans had to 
acquaint themselves with the new language, new skills, and new code of conduct. They 
lacked the accumulation of knowledge and experience which Europeans amassed in the 
few centuries of early modernity.
510
 Furthermore, the terrain of diplomacy was a foreign 
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land for Ottomans, and they were trying their best not to act not as guests, but as one of the 
hosts. In other words, they were on the fringes, but not quite ―in‖. 
       In short, the Ottomans were not unaware of the world around them as they used to be 
portrayed by the earlier Eurocentric historiography, but they were certainly far from 
grasping the very exact circumstances in which they could thrive. They had a clear vision 
of what to do to survive in this new jungle, but they lacked the necessary equipment to 
implement complex and sophisticated policymaking. The Ottomans were not naïve 
observers failing to understand the world around them and the new developments therein. 
However, the lack of background knowledge and background training rendered them 
incompetent to react effectively although they were not entirely unaware of their 
incompetence and superficiality.
511
 Knowing the existing circumstances around and having 
the skills to master those circumstances are two different phenomena. 
       After the defeat of Napoleonic France and the conclusion of the Congress of Vienna, 
the new ―European concert‖ and the diplomatic world became even tougher for the 
Ottomans. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha in his Tarih-i Cevdet is highly critical of the non-
participation of the Ottomans in the Congress of Vienna, which in his opinion Pasha cost 
the Ottomans greatly in the diplomatic arena.
512
 He went further in exposing the diplomatic 
blunders of the Ottomans which were to a large extent responsible for the Greek 
independence movement, which was unthinkable and undesirable in the eyes of the 
Western powers at the beginning of the rebellion.
513
 The blunders of the Ottomans 
guaranteed the changing attitude of the European powers towards the Greek rebels. This 
fiasco was the last warning for the Ottomans that full participation and involvement within 
the Concert of Europe was necessary to avoid further setbacks. Ottoman reformism was 
born in such an environment. The so-called Ottoman Westernization was not only 
motivated, but also led, by anxiety about surviving in such a predatory environment. The 
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Ottoman reformism cannot be dissociated from these diplomatic entanglements.
514
 It was a 
function of international developments and alignments. The so-called Ottoman 
Westernization was not a process that started at a certain time in history with a clear 
intention and direction. It was only a set of responses to Western (mainly Russian) 
aggression. There existed no conscious ―break/rupture‖ from the ―old‖. The operation was 
limited to the acquisition of new knowledge first in military matters (Nizam-ı Cedid 
soldiers onwards) and then in diplomacy. Instead of being a dependent variable of socio-
economical and political developments, diplomacy became a transformative force itself, 
and it shaped and influenced socio-economical and political developments.  
       The new knowledge was to be rational, measurable, and free of any metaphysical 
assumption, hence ―modern‖. Therefore, ―modern‖ was first and foremost a methodology 
and organization designed by people mindful of the aforementioned principles.
515
 The 
implementation of this methodology was dubbed ―Westernism‖ or ―reformism‖ 
retrospectively with the hindsight of the drastic transformation it triggered. In short, 
although it prompted an inevitable massive scale transformation, it was not an intentional 
project. As argued above, diplomacy and diplomatic considerations were major dynamics 
in this process. 
 
 
3.2. Origins of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry 
 
                                                 
514
 For the emergence and development of the concept of ―Westernization‖ in Turkish 
historiography, see Murphey, Rhoads, ―Westernization in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman 
Empire: How Far, How Fast?‖, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies vol. 23, 1999, pp. 
116-139. 
515
 This is no place to discuss or evaluate the ―nature of modernity‖. However, it may be 
necessary to define what we understand from modernity. It will be denied that modernity is 
an unprecedented transformation of our mode of thinking and, therefore, of our relations 
with the world. Modernity is a passionate challenge to transform/control the natural world 
around us. However, this kind of passionate modernity reflects the mental worlds of 
Enlightenment philosophes, adventurers, overseas tradesmen, and bankers but not 
necessarily the world of everybody facing modernity. The understanding of modernity by 
the Ottoman statesmen will be evaluated throughout the essay. 
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      The Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Umur-u Hariciye Nezareti) was established 
in 1836 by an edict of Mahmud II.
516
 Akif Efendi, the incumbent Chief Secretary of the 
Sublime Porte (Reis-ül-Küttab) since 1832, was named as the first Foreign Minister.517 
Hulusi Pasha replaced Akif Efendi after the latter was dismissed in four months‘ time. 
However, it was with the appointment of Mustafa Reşit Pasha in 1837 that the new 
ministry began to become a modern office. Before the establishment of the Foreign 
Ministry, the institution of Reis-ül-Küttablık was a department within  sa‟drazamlık. The 
official titles of the Reis-ül-Küttabs were lower in comparison to the other holders of 
prominent offices. Whereas the Chief Financial Official (defterdars) and the Drawer of the 
Sultanic Seal (nişancıs) were among the top functionaries of the Sublime Porte (erkan-ı 
Babıali), the reis-ül-küttabs belonged to the rank of ―higher officials‖  (rical-i Babıali). 
Recognizing the rising importance and increasing role of foreign relations, Mahmud II 
allowed the upgrading of the title of the Reis-ül-Küttablık. Mahmud II in the very 
beginning of his edict established that the the title of the Foreign Ministry had to be 
upgraded because they represent the Ottoman Empire vis-avis the European powers and 
they are in a position to serve the Empire in very important issues. (“çünki rütbe-i 
evveliyede bulunanlar Devlet-i Aliyye‟mizin en büyük hizmet ve maslahatlarına me‟mur 
olduklarından ve zat-ı me‟muriyetleri i‟tibarıyle lazım gelen nüfuz ve haysiyyetleriçün fi 
ma ba‟d müşirlik ve vezaret rütbe-i celileleri sıralarında add ve i‟tibar olunmaları hususu 
geçende tıbk-ı irade-i şahanem üzre icra olunmuş idi.”518)  
       By 1836, the new Foreign Ministry became an independent body with the ministers 
enjoying the title of vezir.
519
 A regulation for the new organization had already been 
prepared by 1835. The regulation clearly established that only the ministry had the 
authority to conduct foreign relations. Parallel to Mahmud‘s centralizing policies and 
institutionalizing and restructuring of the state bureaucracy, the new Foreign Ministry was 
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established and organized as the sole authority to conduct foreign policy in 
contradistinction to the fragmented and collective nature of the earlier policy-making 
organization and process. 
       However, the ministry did not become a modern/Weberian institution overnight. On 
the contrary, it took a few decades for the institution to professionalize and create its own 
esprit de corps. Before its professionalization and specification of knowledge in the 
Hamidian era, it was one of the major offices of the Sublime Porte where there was a flow 
of recruits in and out. In the absence of trained bureaucrats, many preeminent statesmen 
served in diplomatic posts for a while. The Foreign Ministry became an office where 
bureaucrats and men of future political prominence were trained and acquired experience.  
      The Tanzimat Foreign Ministry had a very minor influence in the making of foreign 
policy as an institution.
520
 Foreign policy had been determined in the upper echelons by the 
―political initiative‖. In this regard, it would be wrong to speak of a self-serving and 
autonomous bureaucratic polity reminiscent of the Prussian model.
521
 It seems that, the 19
th
 
century Ottoman pattern resembled the Russian example more than the Prussian one.
522
 
The Foreign Ministry‘s mission was confined to carrying out the tasks it was given. This 
can also be seen in the very low number of Foreign Ministers who came from the ranks of 
the ministry itself, especially in the Hamidian era. The post of Foreign Minister was a 
political post and not a bureaucratic post, being merely the supreme functionary of the 
ministry on top of the undersecretary. Nevertheless, given the small size and intertwined 
nature of the political-bureaucratic elite, it was not a place of minor significance. 
       Reviewing the literature on 19
th
 century Ottoman foreign affairs, one sees too much 
written on foreign relations and almost nothing on the actual daily conduct of foreign 
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affairs, particularly in view of the relatively recent declassification of the files of the 
Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That is to say, we know a lot about Ottoman foreign 
policy yet almost nothing about the technicalities and procedures of making the foreign 
policy. In the absence of documents kept in the archives of the Ottoman Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the archival evidence used in all the relevant studies on Ottoman foreign 
relations consists of sources other than the archives of the Ministry. The bulk of the 
material used in these studies are irades and correspondence between the Palace (in the 
reign of Abdülhamid II) and the Babıali, and the correspondence between the Foreign 
Minister and his international counterparts. Given all these, we still know very little about 
the Foreign Ministry. This observation contradicts the superficial impression that 
diplomatic history is one of the most developed areas of 19
th
 century Ottoman 
historiography.
523
 In other words, diplomacy has been interpreted and analyzed as a 
response to international developments rather than a comprehensive profession. Moreover, 
we lack the insights of the new critical diplomatic history. We have not gained sufficient 
information and insights about the Foreign Ministry from all these diplomatic histories. 
The men in charge implemented their policies based on certain information, but how this 
information had been obtained has yet to be researched.
524
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       What we know is that the Foreign Ministry was a very fundamental source of 
knowledge required for the age. Findley speaks of the renunciation of ―military politics‖ in 
favor of diplomatic politics.
525
 A competent Foreign Ministry became more decisive than a 
strong army in the survival of the state. Civilians (efendi-turned-pashas in Itzkowitz‘s 
formulation) began to rise in the state administration as early as the 18
th
 century.
526
 
However, it was the Tanzimat in which the civilian supremacy was made routine, 
institutionalized, and consolidated after the reorganization of the military as subordinate to 
the political authority following the destruction of the janissaries and the pre-modern 
military organization. The reign of Abdülaziz was the high point of the Foreign Ministry 
with many recruits of the Ministry occupying the highest posts. ―(I)t became common for 
the foreign minister to go on to serve as grand vizier. Dominating this combination of 
posts, Mustafa Reşid (1800-58), Keçecizade Fuad (1815-1869) and Mehmed Emin Âli 
Pashas (1815-71) shaped the period.‖527 But with the coming of Abdülhamid, the Foreign 
Ministry lost its glory days. The reason for that relative decline in prominence within the 
state machine may lie in the fact that the Foreign Ministry cadres lost their monopoly on 
speaking French and being acquainted with the European realities. Their technical 
information and relatively superior level of knowledge regarding European realities might 
have continued to be useful, but possessing the technical knowledge no longer 
automatically provided political prominence. By then, Ottoman statecraft was much more 
sophisticated than it had been half a century earlier. Nevertheless, the Ottoman Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs continued to be one of the most prestigious offices.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
neglected- features of diplomacy, particularly in the twentieth century, must include the 
management of those policies encompassing more subtle commercial or ―cultural‖ 
questions, the responsibilities of lesser bureaucratic officials in periods of both turmoil and 
stability, and the actual administrative machinery or organized context of policy 
formulation and execution.‖Lauren, Paul Gordon, Diplomats and Bureaucrats, Stanford: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1976, p. xvii.   
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3.3. Ottoman Foreign Ministry as Precursor of “Westernism” and Pseudo-
Nationalism: Making of the Ottoman Modern Transformation 
 
      As has been suggested several times above, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry was a 
preeminent institution in the process of the Ottoman transformation in the 19
th
 century. 
This was because after the final collapse of the conventional prescription advocating 
stronger military stockpiling for the healing of all ills, it was the Ministry that had 
represented the novel and ambitious promise of ―salvation‖ through ―other‖ means. It was 
the Foreign Ministry that held the means to deal with and weather the dire situation. In the 
early Tanzimat period, the ministry was the institution which had the foremost and best 
direct contact with the ―West‖. The ministerial personnel were in everyday touch with the 
―Christian‖ powers, and therefore they had the advantage of following the latest 
developments closely in comparison to the other governmental offices. Hence, they were 
the ones who felt the urgency, acuteness, and graveness of the situation not only regarding 
diplomatic realities, but also regarding the technical retardation of the Ottomans. 
Furthermore, they ―possessed‖ the best available prescription for the healing of the ―Sick 
Man‖. Only they had the skills to apply the proposed remedy. They were the ones who 
were perfectly aware that a new and complete reorganization of the state and state affairs 
was not a matter of intellectual debate and preference, but an imperative. For these reasons, 
the Ottoman Foreign Ministry not only recruited and trained the bulk of the Tanzimat 
(Mustafa Reşid Pasha, Âli Pasha, Fuad Pasha) leadership, but also represented a role model 
for the desired new Ottoman civility. It assumed the role of the carrier of the Ottoman 
transformation before this model had been endorsed by the larger bureaucracy within a few 
decades. It is not a coincidence that Western observers of the Ottoman Empire found 
diplomats those with whom they most sympathized while considering them to be the most 
―Westernized and civilized‖.528  
      One example of how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was perceived to be the 
transmitter of the Western way of conduct and Western knowledge is the fact that 
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institutions such as the ―Council of Agriculture and Manufacture‖ and the ―Council of 
Quarantine‖ were established in 1838 under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Council 
of Agriculture and Manufacture was transferred to the Ministry of Trade in 1839.
529
 
Likewise, the ―Council of Public Education‖ was established in 1846 under the supervision 
of the ministry. Apparently, these committees were established under the ministry due to 
its proximity and access to the ―centers of modern/Western knowledge‖. The Foreign 
Minister was also the head of the Board of Health (Meclis-i Umur-ı Sıhhiye) and therefore 
de facto ―Minister of Health‖.530 Thus, the offices to monitor and improve public health 
were to be included in the Hamidian Foreign Ministry yearbooks. The Board of Public 
Education, founded in 1846, was also to be monitored by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.
531
 The diplomats functioned as intermediaries for the ―import of Western and 
technical knowledge‖ into the Ottoman Empire in addition to their diplomatic 
responsibilities. For example, it was the embassy to Paris that found, negotiated, and 
contracted two French forest engineers to come to Istanbul, supervise the forests, and 
establish a modern forestry office.
532
 The embassies were coordinating the recruitment of 
experts of all kinds of engineering, mining, medicine for the introduction of industrial 
production and establishment of modern public institutions in the Ottoman Empire and 
actively involved in this process. The first president of the board established to modernize 
Istanbul and create a modern municipal organization (İntizam-ı Şehir Komisyonu) was 
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Emin Muhlis Efendi, a diplomat and a chief official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
533
 
Apparently, his experience and knowledge he obtained in his years in Europe should be the 
reason of his appointment to this post. Likewise, ―Kamil Bey, the chief of protocol in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was the first director of the Sixth (municipal-DG) District‖ 
comprising of Pera, the European part of Istanbul. The board of Sixth District was created 
comprising of Europeans, non-Muslims and a few Muslims resident in the Sixth District to 
administer and develop Pera following the West European urban planning and urban 
developments.
534
    
     Apparently the pioneering role of the Foreign Ministry was not unique to the Ottoman 
Empire. On the contrary, the same pattern was visible in all the other non-Western 
modernizing states. Like the Ottoman case, the first generation of the Iranian 
modernization movement was comprised of employees of the Foreign Ministry who were 
assigned to posts in the Persian embassies in Europe. The Persian diplomats, who all came 
from the traditional bureaucracy not unlike the first Ottoman generation of reformers, were 
frustrated with their homeland‘s incapacity to adapt to the modern world.535  
―Persia‘s diplomats also assigned to the ministry of foreign affairs and themselves as 
members of it a pivotal role in bringing the new civilization to Persia. Malkam 
believed that the foreign ministry had the duty of acting as a channel through which 
the achievements and knowledge of Europe could be directed towards Persia. Others, 
as we have noted, believed that Persia‘s ambassadors abroad had a special mission to 
enlighten their government and people and lead both along the right path to 
progress.‖536  
―Those who were advocating reform in the 1860‘s were never a large group, and they 
were not a tightly knit one. But their contacts with one another and the fact that they 
shared many attitudes in common seems to have given them a certain group 
feeling...The diplomats urging reform in the 1860‘s also believed that their foreign 
experience and training better qualified and equipped them to guide the country than 
those who had not been abroad. In vaunting the superiority of the new arts and 
sciences of Europe, they were also suggesting that as Persians with a knowledge of 
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these sciences, they had a special claim to higher offices of the state
537…This elitist 
attitude, which owed something both to the Persian bureaucracy and to Islamic 
traditions, was closely bound up with the attitude to government that they looked on as 
the central guiding force in determining and directing the affairs of the people. They 
favored schools and newspapers because these offered a means for creating a better 
informed and better educated public. But this was at the same time a desire for 
newspapers, for instance, that would educate the public in ideas they believed suitable 
for Persia rather than as a means for permitting many schools of thought to compete 
for the people‘s allegiance.‖538  
In Persia, the role and active involvement of diplomats was arguably significantly stronger 
than in the Ottoman Empire due to the less institutionalized nature of the early modern 
Persian state. In China, the transformative, modernizing, and civilizationist functions of the 
foreign ministry far exceeded the missions of its Ottoman and Persian counterparts.  
―The activities of the Tsungli Yamen (the de facto Chinese Foreign Ministry) involved 
not only foreign affairs but also the promotion of modernization and defense projects. 
The office was concerned with the introduction of Western science and industry, 
modern schools, customs and the purchase of ships and guns
539…Functionally, the 
Yamen handled many duties far beyond the normal limits of a foreign office. In 
addition to diplomatic affairs, it coordinated almost the entire range of ‗Western 
affairs‘ (yang-wu) such as foreign trade, customs, education, overseas affairs, postal 
service, national defense, and cultural affairs. It oversaw the work of the Trade 
Inspectorate General of customs and indirectly supervised the port commissioners in 
consultation with the two trade superintendants. It was involved in mining, machine 
factories, telegraph construction, Chinese laborers abroad, missionary incidents, and 
the manufacture and purchase of guns and ships. Further, the Yamen supervised the 
two T‘ung Wen Kuan for the training of language students and future diplomatic and 
consular personnel. After 1867, when astronomy, chemistry, mathematics, and physics 
were added to the curriculum of the school, the Yamen defended this development 
against conservative opposition. All in all, the Yamen‘s activities were too diverse to 
be functionally efficient.‖540  
The same was true for the Japanese Foreign Ministry. ―In this quarter-century (the end of 
the late 19th century), the Foreign Ministers enjoyed high status since they had generally 
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played some role in the civil war or the imperial restoration that followed it. In a way, 
many of them were statesmen and enjoyed a prestige second only to the Prime Ministers of 
today. In some cases, they possessed an exceptional knowledge of foreign countries by 
virtue of having travelled abroad. Of the early Foreign Ministers the following had visited 
overseas before taking up office: Inoue Kaoru; Saionji Kimmochi; Mutsu Munemitsu; 
Enomoto Takeaki; and Aoki Shuzo.‖541 For the same reason, many Japanese foreign 
ministers subsequently became prime ministers, a pattern reminiscent of the Ottoman 
pattern in the Tanzimat era.
542
 In all of these four countries, bureaucratic modernizers were 
to introduce ―modern knowledge‖ to their people as well as minor officials. In all four 
countries, these bureaucrats were members of a small elite originating from the traditional 
elites of the preceding decades and centuries.
543
 
       In fact, the Ottoman statesmen and diplomats-to-be were exporters of their mission. 
The Persian modernization project was influenced by and modeled on the Ottoman 
modernization. Malkam Khan, the Persian ambassador to London and other capitals, and a 
pioneer and leading figure of the Persian modernization, was heavily influenced by 
Ottoman reformers during his post in the Persian embassy to Istanbul.
544
 While, he was a 
low-ranking official in the Persian embassy in Istanbul, he cultivated friendships with 
people such as Âli Pasha, Fuad Pasha, Ahmed Vefik Pasha, and Münif Pasha.545 His 
closeness to these names benefited him financially as well. When the Persian government 
stopped paying his salary (for reasons which remain obscure), he was granted a salary by 
the Ottoman Empire.
546
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       The transformation was not limited to the reorganization of the state. The officials‘ 
own conduct of affairs and their self-imagination changed as well. As pioneers and 
promoters of the modernization/Westernization process, 19th century bureaucrats endorsed 
and replicated a new way of ―officialdom‖ and ―refinement‖. The servant of the state 
turned into a civil servant. However, that does not necessarily imply the transformation of 
the pre-modern servant of the state into a rational, modern bureaucrat. The adaptations are 
not necessarily ―transformations‖. This ―process of adaptation‖ may be divided into several 
stages. Shifting of the structures of mentalities throughout the decades of the Tanzimat 
were examined in the previous chapters.  However, such a periodization should not be 
understood as a linear evolution from one world to another. Continuities as well as 
disruptions can also be observed. It may be a more insightful perspective to perceive the 
transformation not simply as the renunciation of the ―old‖ and adoption of the ―new‖, but 
instead as a complex historical process in which a new reference and value system was 
created coexisting with the previous reference and value system. Following this 
perspective, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry exemplifies a distinct internalization of 
modernity in a certain social-political milieu and weltanschauung. This selective reception 
of modernity by the Ottomans was not a phenomenon peculiar to the Ottomans. Rather, it 
was a pattern observable in other exemplary experiments of non-Western modernization. 
 
 
3.4. The Foreign Ministry in the Hamidian Era    
 
    Abdülhamid II preferred to appoint men originating from other civilian organizations to 
prominent posts in the Sublime Porte. Of the sixteen Grand Viziers of Abdülhamid, only 
one of them (Arifi Pasha) was a diplomat. Two others (Ibrahim Edhem Pasha and Safvet 
Pasha) served as ambassadors, but it would not be appropriate to regard them as diplomats. 
Of the ten foreign ministers of Abdülhamid, only three (Turhan Hüsnü Pasha, Arifi Pasha, 
Ahmed Tevfik Pasha) had extensive diplomatic backgrounds. Possibly, Abdülhamid was 
suspicious of the power of the Ministry and feared that he might be forced to share power 
with the ministry in foreign policy decisions once he allowed others some power in the 
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decision-making process.
547
 The memory of the dictatorial Âli Pasha and his close 
associate Fuad Pasha (who were known for their sympathies to Britain and France) should 
have been a warning for Abdülhamid not to favor diplomats in statesmanship. He might 
also have thought that appointing ex-ambassadors to posts in the foreign ministry or prime 
ministry might enable the countries where these ex-ambassadors had served to interfere 
and develop influence over the policy making of the Ottoman Empire. The suspicion of 
Abdülhamid was equally true for any individual of the Porte who might rise to challenge 
the supreme authority of the sultan as Said Pasha had. Instead, he preferred the Palace to be 
the sole authority in making foreign policy. He used to correspond with the ambassadors 
and consulates personally from the Palace and bypassed the Ministry and Grand Vizirate
548
 
as he did with governors and local officials.  
       Abdülhamid founded an alternative and coexisting bureaucracy in the Yıldız Palace. It 
was a very efficient and well-structured manifestation of a modern bureaucracy. The 
immense and orderly correspondence, their registration, and the documentation of the 
Yıldız offices clearly demonstrates that it was a modern-bureaucratic structure in terms of 
organization and methodology, albeit patrimonial in other aspects and rivaling and 
interfering with the regular offices and bureaucracy.
549
 
      On the other hand, it was the Hamidian period in which the ministry was 
professionalized and bureaucratized like the other bureaucratic offices. It was this period in 
which the modern Turkish Foreign Ministry as a professional Weberian bureaucracy 
emerged. Mahmud Esad Bey (later Pasha) was the first career diplomat to be appointed as 
ambassador after passing through necessary levels and promotions. He was recruited 
following his graduation and promoted consistently beginning from his first appointment 
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as the third secretary in the embassy to St. Petersburg and then serving as the second 
secretary and the first secretary in the embassy to Paris, besides his services in the ministry 
in Istanbul (a total of twenty years before reaching the rank of ambassador).
550
 Mahmud 
Esad Bey was first appointed as ambassador to Vienna in 1877 and then subsequently as 
ambassador to Paris in 1880. He also served as the ministerial undersecretary for one year 
in 1879.  By the 1880s, the Ottoman ambassadors were predominantly career diplomats 
who had begun their service as third secretaries in the 1850s. Furthermore, it was the 
Hamidian era in which appointments and promotions created career paths, which became 
regularized and standardized. New recruits were to be appointed as third secretaries and 
promoted in time. After they were promoted to the rank of first secretary, many served in 
the embassies to Balkan capitals as ambassadors or undersecretaries before they were 
appointed as ambassadors to the capitals of Western Europe. In short, in the Hamidian era, 
Ottoman representatives of the higher and lower echelons were predominantly professional 
diplomats who had risen within the ministry (with the exception of some military 
appointments to various ambassadorial posts).  
       The presence/representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was remarkably high in 
the senates of both the first and the second constitutional periods, demonstrating the 
prestige and distinguished place of the ministry. It is not possible to make a table and a 
comparative analysis of the senators due to the lack of stable career patterns for the 
Ottoman bureaucrats, especially with regard to the Senate of 1877. The names of those 
who rose up from the ranks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be appointed to the Senate 
in 1877 were Musurus Pasha, Ahmed Arifi Pasha, Ahmed Vefik Pasha, Ali Rıza Bey, 
Kostaki Antopoulos Pasha, and Server Pasha, not counting a few others who served in 
diplomatic posts briefly. A typical career pattern for a member of the Senate of 1877 
required an earlier appointment in the Şuray-ı Devlet (Council of State). For their lack of 
domestic experience, the diplomats were rarely appointed to the Şuray-ı Devlet and 
therefore lacked a very crucial stepping stone for promotion to either a seat in the senate or 
                                                 
550
 For a biography of Mahmud Esad Pasha, see Salname-i Hariciyye Nezaret-i Celilesi, 
(1306/1889), p. 537-538; Kuneralp, Sinan. ―Tanzimat Sonrası Osmanlı Sefirleri‖, in 
Soysal, İsmail (ed.), Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç, Ankara: Türk Tarih 
Kurumu Yayınları, 1997, pp. 113-114.  
204 
 
a position in the cabinet. In that regard, a diplomatic career was not as promising as a 
career in the military or in the civil administration.  
       In the early Tanzimat period, the lack of sufficient education and necessary knowledge 
permitted the diplomatic service to assume a privileged position by holding a monopoly on 
―Western knowledge‖. By the Hamidian era, the development of better communication 
facilities and access to Western printed materials rendered the privileged knowledge of the 
earlier decades more accessible.     
       The Senate convened in 1908 displayed the increasing prominence of the diplomatic 
service. The career diplomats who began their civil service careers in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, served only in the ministry, and developed distinct professional 
socializations and intellectual formations emerged as a group only in the second half of the 
reign of Abdülhamid II and constituted a sizeable number in the senate of 1908, which was 
in fact a council of the dignitaries of the Empire. The senators of 1908 with Foreign 
Ministry backgrounds included Gabriel Noradonkyan, Yusuf Ziya Pasha, Keçeçizade İzzet 
Fuad, Yusuf Azaryan Efendi, Abdülhak Hamid, Ali Galip Bey and Damad Ferit Pasha, 
disregarding those who served briefly in diplomatic posts. Several others began their 
careers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but then moved to other administrative offices at 
various points such as Dimitri Mavrokordato Bey, Ibrahim Faik Bey, Bohor Efendi and 
Nail Bey.
551
 All these figures were elected not only due to their impressive diplomatic 
careers but possibly also for their aristocratic genealogies. Almost all of the non-Muslim 
senators were from well-known (and therefore reliable) families. This was especially true 
with regard to the Greek senators. Thus, we can argue that the diplomats were 
acknowledged as constituting one of the most prestigious segments of the state elite 
(although lacking the political power and prominence normally accompanying this social 
prestige).   
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3.5. Changing International Environment and Changing, Transforming Identities 
 
       The Foreign Ministry tried its best to enable the Ottoman state to survive against all 
odds through its involvement in European diplomacy and its tackling of the delicate and 
robust matters the Empire had to face and resolve. The Ministry had not developed, but had 
pursued the idea that the Ottomans had to emulate the Westerners in order to survive. From 
correspondence, we may observe that, bearing the anxiety regarding the (non)future of the 
Empire in mind, the Ministry had contributed to the crafting of its imperial nationalism not 
necessarily by referring to a certain ethnicity (Turkishness), but by allegiance to a certain 
imperial center. In other words, their preoccupation and responsibilities were to create an 
identity formation. This identity formation was not an ideological preference, but the 
imposition of a raison d‟etat. Their structures of loyalty were also formed by their 
appreciation of the imminent and longer term threats to the Empire, and therefore to 
themselves, as an examination of the ambassadorial dispatches will reveal in the coming 
chapters. 
        A new Ottoman identity had been forged in the 19
th
 century, influenced by modern 
and medieval European traditions. The Ottoman imperial ideology inherited from the 
classical ages of the Empire had been redefined and refashioned in interaction with the 
modern European imperial pageantries and discourses. The synthesis and integration of 
different traditions created an entirely new Ottoman imagination. Of course, it is senseless 
to assume that the 19th century Ottoman imagination directly evolved from the earlier 
Ottoman imperial tradition. On the other hand, it is also important to recognize the critical 
role of the former Ottoman representations in the forging of the novel 19
th
 century Ottoman 
imperial symbolism. However, again we need to emphasize that it is the brand new modern 
framework that utilized the traditional Ottoman representation to propagate the new 
modern Ottoman imperium. The Ottomans were ready for the modern challenge at least in 
their politics of imagination. 
       The content and essence of the new imperial ideology (officialization of Ottomanism 
by the  1860s) is another subject for debate revolving around the questions of whether there 
was room for Ottoman universalism; whether the imperial ideology was merely window-
dressing for the control of the ―sovereign nation‖; whether this ―sovereign nation‖ was 
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comprised of Turks or Muslims.  An Ottoman imperial nationalism referring to various and 
not necessarily contradicting identities had developed in defense against European 
aggression. 
       The structures of loyalty of the diplomatic service will be investigated in the coming 
chapters. Some questions that may be posed are as follows: What were the motivations of 
the Ministry personnel in fulfilling their duties? Was their supreme loyalty towards the idea 
of the supra-national Ottoman Empire as believers in a Kaisernatioanalismus or did they 
nurture a superior loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty without a certain political agenda ? What 
did the imperial family and the sultan mean to the ranks of the Ministry? Was the dynasty a 
central figure in their conception of the political body they were serving ? How did they 
relate the survival of the Empire with Islam? For them, did the Ottoman Empire represent 
the realm of Islam and did serving the Ottoman Empire also imply serving religion and 
God? How secular were their political commitments? Were they ―political‖ in any sense 
beyond dealing with technicalities and bureaucratic niceties? Did they have a perception of 
representing Turks, ―the sovereign nation‖ among other Muslim ―nations‖, the ―Muslim 
nation‖ being the nation more sovereign than others ?552 Although no conclusive or even 
satisfactory answers will be given to these questions in the coming chapters, some 
preliminary observations will be made based on the limited evidence available. 
     The interrelations of Muslim identity (as a political modern construct rather than a 
personal faith) and imperial-dynastic discourse (based on various legitimizations) will be 
explored. As has been shown in many places, identity construction is a modern 
phenomenon and a consequence of modernity. In the Ottoman context, the identity-
formation was also directly related to European aggression against the Empire. Modes of 
identity-formations are strategies to react to the complexities of international, social, and 
political developments. 
       The Foreign Ministry‘s crucial efforts were directed towards incorporating the 
Ottomans into Europe proper. This was presumably a foundational motive in the 
construction of loyalties and ideological commitments in the diplomatic service. Instead of 
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being relegated to the collapsed nations/states, the Ottoman Empire had to be elevated to 
the league of European powers. The international situation was such that there was no third 
option. It was a zero sum game in which the Ottomans will lose everything or will be 
victorious in the end, victorious in the sense that the Empire will be stabilized and saved 
from collapse.  
      The founding diplomatic strategy of Tanzimat was persistently to seek an alignment 
with the ―West‖ (England and France against the Russians) and a strict adherence to the 
―order party‖. This ―French-British‖ connection was the basis of what had been labeled as 
―reformism‖. Being in alliance with the French-British bloc, the Ottomans were influenced 
by the ―French way‖. ―To gain internal strength and external legitimacy (in the eyes of 
France, the symbol of progress), the Empire must modernize itself.‖553 However, the 
Ottomans knew that these alignments were not between two equal parties but between 
states at two different levels. It was not up to the Ottomans, but up to the British to decide 
the future of the alliance. As is well known, the British decided to loosen the ties between 
the two states after observing the devastation of the Ottomans against the marching 
Russian army in 1877-1878. By then, the British realized that it seemed unsustainable to 
bet on the protection of the Ottoman Empire against the Russians. Britain gravitated to new 
alternative diplomatic policies and took Egypt as its new defensive border in the south 
against Russian aggression. Britain assumed the control of Cyprus (and subsequently 
Egypt) to sustain its new policy.
554
 By the 1880s, Abdülhamid was obliged to turn to 
Germany for a new partnership, a new move in his game of survival. The new partnership 
was not between two equal parties, either. The Ottomans were placing yet another bet on 
their survival. These diplomatic and strategic shifts and moves were influential in the 
redefinition of ideological fronts as well. The three modes of international alignments of 
the Ottomans (in the Tanzimat, in the Hamidian era, in the Unionist rule) were 
accompanied by three modes of modernizations and ideological dispositions.  
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     In such an environment, the self-representation of Ottomans became ambivalent. It was 
up to the Ottoman Empire itself to survive. These circumstances enforced Abdülhamid to 
fabricate an imperial grandeur. Although on the one hand, the very fear of being 
annihilated was pervasive, on the other hand, a certain pride in belonging to the pompous 
Ottoman imperial body was entertained to counter and avoid the fear. These two 
motivations were not necessarily contradictory. On the contrary, they complemented each 
other. The fiction of ―grandeur‖ magnified the obsession with being annihilated, and the 
fear of collapse motivated the construction of a fictitious grandeur in response.
555
  
       Abdülhamid strove to create an aura around himself. He personalized the Empire in 
himself. The traditional Ottoman self-representation was married to the 19th century 
modern European imagination and reached its zenith in the Hamidian era. In short, the 
Ottomans did not fail to present themselves as another prestigious and well-respected 
Empire.
556
 The limits of persuasion were yet another matter. The Hamidian Empire was in 
a sense the era of the ―invention of Empire‖.557  
      ―Empire‖ is one of the latest ―fads‖ of historiography and social sciences. While 
―Empire‖ used to be a specialty of a small circle of historians until recently not highly 
regarded by others, the retreat of nation-states in the 1990s has made ―Empire‖ an 
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attractive theme to study. Yet, Bernard Porter, one of the oldest scholars of ―Empire‖558 
and one of the foremost ―imperial historians‖ of the British Empire, criticizes the new, 
booming interest in ―studying Empire‖ arguing that the ―imperial rhetoric‖ was restricted 
to the ruling aristocratic class, and hence it would be inappropriate to discover the 
―imperial‖ elsewhere.559 Bernard Porter was particularly critical of the studies advanced by 
Mackenzie
560
 which purported to establish that ―Empire‖ was at the center of 19th century 
British society, politics, and culture. For Porter, ―Empire‖ was a class-related phenomenon 
and ideology.  Therefore, one must not be thrilled with the attraction of ―Empire‖. 
Nevertheless, the discovery of the Empire opened new horizons challenging the 
conventions of ―modern historical scholarship‖ which was mesmerized by the modern-
nation-states and tacitly took the premises of the modern nation-states for granted.   
     Impressed by these new horizons, Fujitani, a prominent historian of 19
th
 century Japan, 
writes; ―In this respect, I consider myself to be among a number of scholars of the so-
called emperor system who have begun in various ways to critique the view long espoused 
by Japanese Marxists of the koza school, as well as modernists such as Maruyama Masao, 
that treated the prominence of the monarchy in modern history as a reflection of and reason 
for the incompleteness of Japan‘s modernity. By resituating the emperor at the center of a 
modern panoptic regime, as I propose, we see not only that the cults of nation and emperor 
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were created in relatively modern times, but also that what has been called the emperor 
system, far from being characterized by its ‗feudal‘ characteristics, was central to the 
production of Japan‘s modernity.‖561     
      Apparently, what Fujitani did with respect to Meiji Japan (and Richard Wortman to 
imperial Russia
562
) was done by Deringil to the Hamidian Ottoman Empire.
563
 The 
premodern political structures all used mechanisms of legitimizations, but traditional 
strategies of legitimizations came following the construction and consolidation of political 
powers rather than vice versa. However, modern political structures should have a 
―mission‖ and ―meaning‖ from their very beginning. The political power struggle should 
never mean a merciless struggle for domination. The modern polities struggle for an ideal. 
This was the case for Great Britain, France, Russia, and also the 19
th
 century Ottoman 
Empire. What did the Ottoman Empire mean in the eyes of its reorganizers ? Or to 
formulate the question better, what did the reorganizers want the Ottoman Empire to mean 
? Furthermore, how much of this pursued ideal had been internalized ? 
       Of course, instead of speaking of the ―Empire‖, we need to historicize and 
contextualize the ―Empire‖. The Tanzimat was the introduction of a totally new and 
unfamiliar language. With Tanzimat, the self-imagination and self-representation of the 
Ottoman Empire were recast from the medieval to the ―modern‖. Whereas the Rescript of 
Tanzimat in 1839 may be seen within the traditional Ottoman political vocabulary
564
, the 
Rescript of Reform (Islahat Fermanı) in 1856 marked a drastic shift in taking and 
endorsing the ―modern‖ and ―universalist‖ (with regard to its subjects) discourse. The 
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spontaneous and necessary alignment of the Ottoman Empire with the European ―party of 
order‖ was strongly grounded in the Crimean War.565 The vocabulary and language 
employed in the Edict of Reform demonstrated the transformative role of the diplomatic 
alignment of the Ottoman Empire in the previous two decades with regard to political 
discourse and visions. The Rescript of Reform also symbolized the entrance of the 
Ottomans to the ―European family‖, following the wartime alliances with France and 
Britain and the signing of the Paris Treaty which admitted the Ottomans into the ―Concert 
of Europe‖.  
      The reign of Abdülhamid can be interpreted as the perfection and sophistication of the 
Tanzimat discourse dressed in authoritarian garb (not unlike the authoritarianism 
discourses of Russian czardom
566
, Prussia, and the European-wide conservative-
reactionary monarchism in reaction to the ―democratic‖ currents of the time). It was the 
zenith of Ottoman imperialism. The Hamidian era may be regarded as the maturation of 
Tanzimat after its infancy in the 1840s and its adolescence in the 1860s. It was the legal 
and institutional undertakings in the late 1860s, such as the new codes of Public Education 
(1869), Provincial Administration (1867), and Citizenship (1869), that set the ground for 
the Hamidian autocratic institutionalization. At the same time, the Hamidian regime was 
the foundational stage in the emergence of the Republic, not only in the microcosm of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but in the entirety of Ottoman statecraft. This was not only 
true in an institutional context. The men who had been educated and recruited to the state 
service in this reign would establish the Republic and constitute its bureaucratic and 
political elites.  
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     As has been tried to be established, international developments were at the center of 
changing and transforming Ottoman identities, cultural and intellectual formations, and the 
structures of mentality of the Ottoman bureaucratic establishment. Therefore, the Ottoman 
diplomatic service was at the hub of these shifts, formations, and transformations. In this 
foundational stage, the identity formation of diplomats was constituted by three 
complementary dynamics, one primarily ―political‖, the second ―structural‖, and the last 
primarily ―socio-cultural‖. The first one was the encounter with external actors ranging 
from Düvel-i Muazzama (Great Powers) to Armenian, Albanian, Arab dissidents, and from 
the social and cultural habituses of Europe to various political networks of Turcophobe and 
Turcophile tendencies. The second dynamic was international politics, entanglements, and 
rivalries. The last was their social culturalizations and social backgrounds which 
influenced and determined their reactions and perceptions in encountering political 
developments. In fact, it was the intersection of these three dynamics that led to the 
formation of a certain identity and cultural/ideological/mental formation.
567
 Moreover, the 
Hamidian regime‘s official views and stances (with the legacy of the Tanzimat in the 
background) had shaped their political, social, and cultural dispositions. Therefore, the 
international entanglements and encounters were constitutive in the intellectual formation 
of the Ottoman state elite in general and Ottoman diplomats in particular.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
A SOCIAL PORTRAIT OF THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE 
 
4.1. The Service Aristocracy: Who Were The Diplomats? 
 
       The 19
th
 - century Ottoman bureaucracy was a habitus with regard to its mores, 
internal codes of conduct, socialization and attitudes, and it also lacked Weberian structure. 
The visits of Ahmed İhsan in his travels have already been mentioned. When two sons of 
Hayrullah Efendi, Abdülhak Hamid and Nasuhi arrived in Paris in their teens to study at 
the Ottoman School and Saint-Cyr, respectively, they immediately went to the embassy. 
The ambassador, Cemil Pasha, welcomed them at the embassy. Abdülhak Hamid, who 
claimed to be the first Ottoman child ever in Paris,
568
 visited the embassy daily throughout 
his stay in Paris and was entertained by the ambassador. The child Abdülhak Hamid also 
became friends with the scribes Artin, who was to become Artin Dadyan Pasha, and Esad, 
who became Esad Pasha, the first career diplomat to be appointed as ambassador (first in 
Vienna, then in Paris). He also met Edhempaşazade Hamdi, the future Osman Hamdi Bey, 
who also happened to regularly visit the embassy while studying law in Paris.
569
 When 
their father, Hayrullah Efendi, arrived in Paris, he also immediately visited the embassy.
570
  
During his stay in Paris, he frequented the embassy regularly.
571
 We may observe that, the 
ambassadorial staff performed their daily routines in line with the habitus in which they 
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operated and from which they had been recruited in the first instance.
572
 Apparently, 
Ottoman embassies, besides attending to their professional obligations and preoccupations, 
served as the hub of an Ottoman network and an ―Ottoman club‖ where Ottomans 
belonging to the same social class met, socialized, and asked for help when necessary.
573
 
Ahmet İhsan, in his travels to Europe, visits the Ottoman embassy as soon as he arrives at a 
certain capital city. In his travel account, which was one of the earliest of the genre of 
Ottoman/Turkish touristic guides, he found worth mentioning to describe the physical 
aspects and qualities of the Ottoman embassies in the cities he visited as one of the most 
important information regarding the cities. His socialization and the intimate relations he 
nurtured with the staff in the embassies are instructive. For example, desperate to check if 
the new issue of his journal Servet-i Fünun was printed and in circulation, he obtained a 
copy of the latest issue of his journal from Rıfat Bey, the military attaché in the Berlin 
embassy.
574
 In Rome, Mahmut Nedim Bey awakened from his sleep to welcome Ahmet 
İhsan and hired the carriage of the embassy for Ahmet İhsan to wander in the city575. 
Ahmet İhsan found and befriended Katibyan Efendi in London, a new graduate of the 
school of engineering and a secretary in the embassy, who was a nephew of Hayik, a friend 
of Ahmet İhsan‘s from his high school, and they wandered around in the city together.576 
Ahmet İhsan met and befriended many Ottoman university students working as secretaries 
in the Ottoman embassies.
577
 Reading Servet-i Fünun and other journals, and socializing 
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within the same milieu inhabited by the privileged few, we may observe that, Ahmet İhsan 
and the staff in the embassies shared the same closed world. 
     One rejected applicant to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the future Mehmed Tevfik 
Bey, later governor, Minister of Finance and President of Şuray-ı Devlet (Council of State). 
He applied for a position in the Foreign Correspondence Office in the ministry after his 
graduation from Mülkiye in 1885.  Yusuf Ziya Bey (the future Ziya Pasha, the ambassador 
to Paris and Vienna) was a close friend of young Mehmed Tevfik‘s family. Therefore, 
young Mehmed Tevfik asked the acquaintances of his family to get him a post in the 
ministry. According to   Mehmed Tevfik‘s account, Ziya Bey had shown interest in the 
request of the young Mehmed Tevfik. He asked his brother, Mustafa Reşid Bey (Mustafa 
Reşid Pasha, the future Minister of Foreign Affairs), to arrange Mehmed Tevfik‘s 
employment through Naum Efendi (the future undersecretary of the ministry), then an 
official in the Foreign Correspondences Office. To his regret, no suitable post was arranged 
for the young Mehmed Tevfik. Instead, he was assigned to a less prestigious position in the 
Translation Office. Mehmed Tevfik resigned after three months to move to the Mabeyn 
(the chancellery of the Ottoman palace).
578
 Mehmed Tevfik Bey‘s application for 
employment and his short tenure is yet another demonstration of the intra-elite character of 
the Ottoman bureaucracy. He was admitted to the ministry not due to his merit but because 
he was the son of Şirvanlı Ahmed Hamdi Efendi, an educator and a high-ranking 
bureaucrat who served in various posts related to education (though he was a graduate of 
Mülkiye and his credentials were superior to any ordinary son of a bureaucrat). Young 
Mehmed Tevfik was not the only recruit appointed due to family connections. Galip 
Kemali‘s (Söylemezoğlu) employment in the Foreign Ministry was thanks to his father‘s 
post. At the start of Galip‘s bureaucratic career, his father was no less than the Head of the 
Committee of Recruitment (of Civil Servants).  Apparently, he secured the appointment of 
his son to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the office of Tahrirat-ı Hariciye.579 Abdülhak 
Hamid‘s appointment as a scribe to the embassy in Paris was arranged by Ibrahim Bey, 
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who was a relative of Abdülhak Hamid and son-in-law of Raşid Pasha, the foreign minister 
at the time.
580
 Given that Abdülhak Hamid came from a prominent family and had many 
family connections, all his appointments were made due to personal requests and some of 
his undesired appointments were annulled thanks to his connections.
581
 Young Mehmet 
Murad (yet to be Mizancı Murad) was appointed to an office (kalem) in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs thanks to the patronage of Midhat Pasha.
582
 After arranging the 
appointment of his younger brother Receb as an official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Ahmed Tevfik Bey (Pasha) thanked the sultan in a rather submissive tone rearticulating his 
obedience and allegiance to the sultan.
583
  
     In the pre-modern perception, this was the most reasonable and anticipated recruitment 
pattern. It was yet to be dubbed as nepotism in a culture in which oral communication was 
as reliable as, if not more so than, the written word. This was far from a bureaucratic 
culture of individualism and meritocracy. This was seen as the most reliable method for 
recruitment in a culture of orality before the culture of the text. It was the usual way of 
conduct in a system of references in which genealogies and family reputations were taken 
as more substantial credentials and references than personal achievements and 
competences. This was viable not only because there was no regularized official procedure 
of recruitment, but also because the recruitment pool was small and those who were within 
the circle knew each other, if not personally, at least by name. The recruitment pool would 
grow after the number of graduates of imperial colleges increased exponentially and 
class/social origins of the officials changed and became diversified. Recruitment patterns 
would become considerably regularized and formalized after the 1908 Revolution and after 
the purge (tensikat) of officials on a grand scale. In fact, as argued previously, the ―myth of 
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the bureaucracy‖ in its rigid Weberian definition was hardly applicable to the 19th century 
European bureaucraciesas well where patronage reigned.
584
   
     Nevertheless, efforts to transform the bureaucracy were attempted in the Western 
European polities at an earlier stage. The Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1853‘s Ottoman 
counterpart
585
 was to be undertaken in the Ottoman Empire only after the 1908 Revolution. 
The reaction to the bureaucratic machine of the Hamidian era and concerns with reform 
and modernization of the bureaucracy became one of the most pressing issues of the early 
Second Constitution Era.
586
 Hüseyin Cahid Bey was an outspoken critic of the Hamidian 
bureaucracy.
587
 For him, the inefficient bureaucracy was a product of the degenerate 
ancien régime (devr-i sabık) and was completely corrupt and self-interested. What he (and 
all the other reformers) proposed was recruitment based only on merit measured by 
objective and standardized examinations and promotions again based on merit measured by 
strict criteria.  ―Examination‖ became a magical word/concept in the writings of Hüseyin 
Cahid Bey and other political opinion leaders, as well as in the eyes of the 
parliamentarians.  
     The Hamidian bureaucracy can be characterized as a closed world in which personal 
relations were of primary importance. This was more evident in the highest echelons of the 
bureaucracy, where social exclusion and elitism survived after its dissolution in lower 
echelons of the bureaucracy. This culture was most manifest in the diplomatic service 
given that it was one of the most elite governmental offices. The end of the Hamidian 
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regime widened the pool of recruitment and weakened the intimate nature of the 
bureaucracy. However, the dispassionate Weberian bureaucracy never replaced the 
Hamidian bureaucracy. No such duality existed. This culture of bureaucracy was 
considerably modified but continued to reproduce itself.  
     Michael Herzfeld argues in his study on bureaucracy that ―the family provides an easily 
understood model for the loyalty and collective responsibility that citizens must feel 
towards the state.‖588 He also argues that; ―(t)here is no such thing as an autonomous state 
except in the hands of those who create and execute its ostensibly self-supporting 
teleology…To recover accountability, we should not simply revert to the Weberian ideal 
type of the legal-rational bureaucratic state. We should instead ask who makes each 
decision on the basis of ‗the law.‘ Restoring time and individuality to our analyses –the 
recognition of human agency- is the only viable defense against the reification of 
bureaucratic authority.
589‖ For the late Ottoman bureaucracy, and especially for the 
diplomatic service, where the staff was recruited from a small and intimate social milieu, 
Herzfeld‘s suggestions are particularly applicable. The perceptions of the state by the 
bureaucrats and their self-perceptions were to be understood within the metaphor of the 
―family.‖ This perception maintained a loyalty to the ―intimate state‖ and developed a 
―group identity‖ imagined and forged around the familiarized state. Thus, the state was not 
an entity above the clouds to be subordinated. It was the perceptions and self-perceptions 
of the members of this group that had constituted and developed the idea of the state, 
which was transcendentalized only to serve more personal goals and aspirations. The 
rhetoric of submissiveness and rhetorical obedience to the sultan, which was one of the 
hallmarks of this imperial culture, was also a manifestation of this familiarization process. 
For example, the thank you letters of Yusuf Ziya Bey for his appointment as ambassador to 
Vienna and the thank you letter of Mahmud Nedim Bey for his appointment as ambassador 
to Rome display the extent of level of submissiveness to the sultan.
590
 However, this 
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allegiance of obedience was less referring to submissiveness to authority than reiteration of 
adherence to a certain community (family) which was legitimized and upheld by a culture 
of hierarchy. The sultan was perceived as the pivot that enabled the maintenance of this 
habitus. The relationship established with the sultan and the symbolism employed in 
addressing the sultan was reminiscent of intra-family relations.       
       Despite the somehow aristocratic character of late Ottoman diplomatic service, the 
Hamidian diplomats were not financially secure. On the contrary, in their missions abroad, 
many suffered from financial problems arising from the financial difficulties the Empire 
was facing. Complaints to the sultan for the non-payment of the salaries of the 
ambassadorial staff abounded.
591
 The embassies were not financially supported adequately 
enough to be able to pay their routine daily and professional expenditures.
592
 The second 
military attaché of the embassy to St. Petersburg complained that he had been paid one 
salary for the preceding seven and a half months.
593
 It was not only the average officials 
who complained about unpaid salaries. Şerif Pasha, the ambassador to Stockholm and son 
of Kürd Said Pasha requested his back salary to be paid594. Tevfik Pasha, while he was 
ambassador to Berlin in 1899 asked for his back salary from previous years to be paid
595
. 
After eight years (in 1907), he reiterated his request asking the palace either to pay his 
unpaid salary or to remove him from his post.
596
 Izzet Pasha, the ambassador to Madrid 
and son of Fuad Pasha requested a loan from the treasury to be repaid by cuts in his future 
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salary.
597
 Mustafa Reşid Pasha, while serving as ambassador to Rome complained of the 
financial burden caused by his unpaid salary and expenditures.
598
 Apparently, only those 
who were able to bear such financial burdens could be diplomats, not unlike the European 
diplomatic services. Although many diplomats suffered financial burdens abroad, they 
enjoyed a privileged life in Istanbul and, more importantly, shared a culture of their own. 
More importantly, the social capital and prestige they entertained was more valuable and 
preferable than material wealth in a world where many benefits were enjoyed not based on 
cash but based on reputation and social respectability.  
       The annal of the Foreign Ministry published in 1889 (1306) provides us an opportunity 
to view the social portrait of the Ministry (as of 1889). A list of the officials of the Ministry 
is presented with information on the occupation of their fathers, their birthplaces, and the 
offices they held. Although three other annals of the Ministry were published during the 
Hamidian era, the best and most comprehensive information is provided in this annal. Only 
the data in this annal is suitable to prepare a statistical observation although the rich data 
on the social background of the officials in the other three annals are also employed 
throughout this chapter
599
. This survey of the middle and lower cadres of the ministry 
illustrates clearly that Hamidian diplomats were predominantly scions of state officials and 
members of this semi-closed world. The ranks of the fathers of the diplomats vary 
significantly. The sons of grand viziers, governors, and ministers worked together with the 
sons of minor officials. These minor officials whose sons became diplomats predominantly 
worked in offices in the capital rather than in the provinces. For example, of the 35 
Muslims who were employed in the ministry working in Istanbul as of 1889 and who are 
listed in the annals of the ministry, only eight were not born in Istanbul. Of these eight, 
only three of them were sons of provincial officials. That is, of the 27 officials who were 
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sons of officials, only three of them were born outside Istanbul. The others not from 
Istanbul were fathered by ulema (2), local notables (2) and merchants (1). In short, a 
typical official in the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs was raised in Istanbul in the 
family of a state official. Some also had grandfathers who were state officials that had been 
recruited in the very early phase of Tanzimat. Of all the officials of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs counted (a total of 152) and listed in the annals of the ministry for the year 1889
600
 
including the consulates, only 28 were born outside Istanbul. However, some were born 
outside Istanbul while their fathers were serving in the provinces – for example, the 
magisterial Sadullah Pasha, who was born in Erzurum while his father was serving as the 
governor of Kurdistan. Therefore, not all of those  born out of Istanbul can be regarded as 
recruits from the provinces. Of these 28, some others were sons of minor provincial 
officials and three were sons of provincial ulema. Two of the Muslim officials were born 
out of the domains of the Ottoman Empire: one in Anapa in Crimea, the other in Circassia. 
The map of the births of the Muslim and non-Muslim officials does not display any 
meaningful variation. The Arab lands, Macedonia, and Anatolia seem to be equally 
represented. The only meaningful variation observed in the geographical distribution of 
their births is the prevalence of Istanbul as a birthplace. 
      In the yearbook of the ministry printed in 1889, brief personal information for the 152 
officials was provided.
601
  Of these, 98 were Muslims. The remaining 54 were non-
Muslims. Of these 54 non-Muslim officials, 25 were Armenians. The number of Greeks 
working in the ministry was 15. The remaining 14 non-Muslims were Catholic/Orthodox 
Arab, Jewish, Bulgarian, or European
602
. Of the Muslims, 73 were scions of state officials 
of varying ranks. Of the non-Muslims, 29 were scions of non-state official fathers. Only 14 
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of the non-Muslims were the children of state officials. The remaining six had fathers with 
a nationality other than Ottoman.  
      We observe an upward mobility within the generations. For example, Irfan, the senior 
secretary of the London embassy was the son of an official in Directorate of Forestry in the 
province of Selanik.
603
 Although the prestigious posts of ―full 
ambassadorships‖[ambassadors to Berlin, London, St. Petersburg, Paris, Rome, Vienna, 
Teheran were ―full ambassadors‖ (büyük elçi) whereas ambassadors to capitals such as 
Athens, Belgrade, Washington, Den Haag were ―orta elçi‖s (middle ambassadors)] were 
predominantly restricted to the scions of dignitaries and families of high-ranking 
bureaucrats, there were also exceptions. For example, Mahmud Esad Pasha, the 
ambassador to Paris, was the son of a minor ulema in Izmir. Mahmud Esad Pasha owed his 
impressive rise in the civil service to his enrollment in the Ottoman School in Paris. He 
joined the Bab-ı Ali Translation Office after his graduation from the Ottoman School. He 
was posted to the embassy in St. Petersburg after his years in the Translation Office from 
where he was promoted regularly every five years before he was appointed as the 
ambassador to France in 1885.
604
  
       Others did not enjoy such upward mobility. Several scions of sadr-ı azams, ministers, 
and generals were assigned modest positions and most held on to mediocre offices before 
their retirements. Even though they lived prosperous lives thanks to their backgrounds, 
they could not transfer their financial and familiar assets into ranks and offices. In that 
sense, Ottoman statecraft differed from the 19
th
- century British statecraft, the aristocratic 
nation par excellence, or Prussian statecraft, where the integration of the aristocracy and 
the bureaucratic estate (Beamtenstand) privileged the aristocrats. It has to be noted that the 
scions of Ottoman dignitaries comprised a considerable portion of the diplomatic corps. 
This was most visible in the posts of full ambassadorships. Full ambassadors of the 
Hamidian era, such as Sadullah Pasha, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, Yanko Fotiyadi Pasha, Yusuf 
Ziya Pasha, Salih Münir Pasha, Ahmed Arifi Pasha, and Musurus Pasha, were all men of 
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aristocratic and illustrious backgrounds
605
. Apparently, the ministry was a prestigious 
office where the sons of Ottoman dignitaries hastened to draft their sons.   
        Abdülhamit Kırmızı‘s survey of the social origins of the governors is to some extent 
compatible with the findings presented above on the social origins of the officials of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs based on the ministry‘s four annals.606 Kırmızı also finds that 
the sons of officials made up a high percentage of governors. Sons of local notables and 
dynasties, ulema, and merchants comprised the remaining office-holders. However, it is 
remarkable that the percentage of governors descended from state officials is significantly 
smaller in comparison to diplomats. The most likely reason for this difference might be 
attributed to the necessity of having sufficient fluency in French to serve in the ministry, 
which consequently privileged the sons of state officials who had greater access to French 
learning. The officials‘ sons were more likely to be enrolled in the prestigious schools 
where they could master the French language. Furthermore, they grew up and were 
socialized in environments where one was more prone to French learning. Moreover, their 
being raised in an environment where one could develop a more cosmopolitan cultural 
formation and be more prone to acquire knowledge relevant to the diplomatic service 
should have favored the sons of officials. However, as suggested above, Kırmızı‘s survey 
and the findings provided here indicate the predominance of the sons of officials in the 
state bureaucracy, which produced a distinct cultural intimacy closed to outsiders. The 
outsiders had to endorse the specific codes of conduct to be fully admitted and assimilated 
into this cultural and social world.    
       Some recruiting might have served to prove the loyalty of the âyân dynasties to the 
state. It can be observed that numerous scions of local dynasties were recruited to the 
Ottoman diplomatic service. This phenomenon probably indicates a strategy by the local 
elites to integrate their descendants and family into the state. The early Tanzimat-era 
witnessed the destruction of the power bases of many local dynasties in the course of the 
policy of centralization. The devastation of the local dynasties was followed by their 
                                                 
605
 For the biographies and social origins of the Hamidian ambassadors as of 1889, see 
Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1306/1889), pp. 530-560. 
606
 Kırmızı, Abdülhamit, Abdülhamid‟in Valileri, İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2007, pp. 69-
70. 
224 
 
displacement and resettlement in Istanbul, or exile to distant localities. This process was to 
some extent semi-voluntary in the sense that the local dynasties, once they accepted their 
new status, were granted attractive opportunities in the capital and welcomed. Given the 
pros and cons, many members of these dynasties ―collaborated.‖  The Bedirxans, 
Karaosmanoğlus,607 Menemencioğlus608 and Çapanzades609 raised the new generations of 
their families in the modern schools of Istanbul and in a few in Europe, and gave their best 
sons to the service of the state.  
       The transition and interconnectedness between the local notables and the state was a 
phenomenon that existed before the advent of the Tanzimat, especially in the post-classical  
centuries as the provincial elites consolidated their power in their localities. The delicate 
balance and mutual recognition between the Istanbul and local power holders was the 
backbone of the Ottoman control of Anatolian and Roumelian lands in the post-classical 
Ottoman Empire. The center and the provincial elites were in a relationship consisting of 
bargain and compromise rather than a clash and zero-sum game.
610
 Nevertheless, the âyân 
did not bother getting their sons recruited into the central administration, but rather trained 
them to rule over their own land and possessions. The center was not yet attractive enough. 
The pull and push factors were not sufficiently strong. As the center increased its relative 
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(as well as absolute) power vis-à-vis the provincial elites, this relationship evolved into one 
of submission and obedience. This did not, however, mean that this obedience was 
necessarily disadvantageous to the submissive provincial elites as long as they benefited 
from the new opportunities offered to them. As Nagata noted, the âyân were not 
annihilated in the reign of Mahmud II. On the contrary, they survived, rehabilitated 
themselves, and assumed power within the Tanzimat local administrations.
611
 Those whose 
local powerhouses were uprooted sought other lucrative and desirable options. They found 
means to adapt to the changing circumstances, albeit not under favorable conditions. ―By 
1820, the center had asserted its control over all of Anatolia and Eastern Rumelia although 
occasional clashes with lesser notables persisted for a time. Those notables who adjusted to 
the new reality of a strong and assertive center continued to wield economic power well 
into the twentieth century.‖612   
 
 
4.2. Assimilating and Integrating the Local Aristocracies: Periphery Marries the 
Center 
 
      In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we encounter several descendants of Babans and 
other Kurdish tribal leaders, Turcoman chieftains, local Albanian dynasties, and Crimean 
aristocrats from the family of the Crimean khans
613
. The recruitment of the Circassian 
tribal chiefs should be regarded as a distinct sub-category. Although many descendants of 
the Circassian tribal leaders (for obvious reasons) were recruited into the Ottoman military 
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after fine educations, we encounter only one descendant of a Circassian tribal leader, 
Mehmed Şemseddin Bey,614 within the ranks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.615  
     One of the most established figures in the ranks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with 
a local dynastic background was Numan Menemencioğlu. His father, Rifat, was a high-
ranking bureaucrat who served as the governor of Baghdad, Minister of Finance, and 
President of the Senate, and he married the daughter of Namık Kemal, thus integrating 
himself into the culturally exclusive world of the Istanbuliot bureaucracy. His son, Numan 
entered the Ottoman diplomatic service in 1914 as the third secretary at the embassy in 
Vienna. He graduated from Saint-Joseph Lycée before studying law at the University of 
Lausanne.
616
 In other words, he followed the smooth path of a son from a well-to do family 
and enjoyed the comfortable life of an aristocrat. Looking at him more closely, Numan 
Menemecioğlu defies categorizations. From a family of local Turcoman notables in Cilicia 
by birth, his kin were well assimilated into the Ottoman aristocracy; he, himself, served as 
a loyal servant of the Republic in Ankara. His father‘s marriage to the daughter of Namık 
Kemal, who belonged to a family of the state aristocracy, and therefore acquiring from 
these family backgrounds different social and political values, further complicates the 
social background of Numan Menemencioğlu. Beginning his career in the Empire and 
being the most important person in the conduct of foreign affairs in the late 1930s and 
early 1940s of the Republic, he embodied the multifacetedness of the late Ottoman 
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bureaucracy.
617
 Numan‘s brother, Edhem Menemencioğlu, born in 1878, had a career in 
the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1906 to 1927 and briefly served as 
ministerial undersecretariat in 1916. Edhem Menemencioğlu, who taught courses on 
international law, private international law, and diplomacy at the School for Civil Service 
(Mülkiye) after his departure from the ministry, had an impressive career.618 Turgut 
Menemencioğlu, the nephew of Numan, was also a high-ranking bureaucrat of the 
Republic, and held the posts of ambassador to the United Nations and to Washington. In 
short, the Menemencioglu family illustrates the path of a 19
th
- century provincial family 
joining the imperial bureaucracy from the periphery and surviving in the 20
th
- century 
Republican bureaucracy.     
       Another provincial dynasty, the Baban family, was also represented in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Kürd Said Pasha served as the ambassador to Berlin between 1883 and 
1885, in addition to his eleven-year tenure as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. His son, the 
famous Şerif Pasha, who claimed to represent the Kurds after the Armistice of Mondros in 
1918, entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after serving as a military officer. Another 
member of the family who advanced in his career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
Halil Halid Bey, who also served as the ambassador to Belgrade and Teheran.
619
 The father 
and son Babanzades (and Halil Halid) may be seen as exemplifying an apparent case of the 
assimilation of the periphery into the center. The father, Kürd Said Pasha, was born in his 
hometown of Suleymaniye (present day Iraqi Kurdistan) in 1849. His birth was just two 
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years after the destruction of the independence/autonomy of the Baban emirate.
620
 He was 
raised in Istanbul, where his family had to resettle. After graduating from Mekteb-i Sultani, 
he entered state service in the Translation Office. He was employed in a variety of posts in 
different governmental offices before he got his appointment as the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (and subsequently as the ambassador to Berlin). His son received a better 
education. Following his graduation from the Mekteb-i Sultani, he enrolled in the 
prestigious Saint-Cyr Military Academy in Paris. He was appointed as the military attaché 
in Brussels and subsequently in Paris. He was appointed as the second secretary in the 
embassy to Paris before his appointment as the ambassador to Stockholm. He was married 
to Emine Hanım, the granddaughter of Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pasha. His liberal politics in 
opposition to the Unionists and his conversion to Kurdish nationalism after his decades-
long aristocratic/imperial leanings reflects the permeable nature of identities and 
dispositions.  
        The Babans were a good illustration of the refashioning of an aristocratic family, 
uprooted from its own soil, but having accommodated to the new opportunities and 
benefits of the centralized Empire. Many members of the Babanzades became prominent 
Ottoman bureaucrats, and with the emergence of an autonomous public space, leading 
Ottoman/Turkish intellectuals, ideologues, etc. They were also leading early Kurdish 
nationalists.
621
 The process by which Şerif Pasha, the loyal Ottoman diplomat, became a 
Kurdish nationalist seeking an independent Kurdistan is representative of the complexities 
and permeabilities of the ―ideologies‖ of the time. The contribution of Babans both to the 
emergence of a Kurdish nationalism and to the Ottoman imperial grandeur simultaneously 
was not a contradiction. These were strategies of the members of the grand families of 
yesterday, who were trying to determine the best way to survive and to preserve and foster 
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their power in transforming circumstances.
622
 The varieties of the strategies employed by 
different individuals, and even the strategies employed by these certain individuals in the 
different phases of their lives, may differ but the concerns behind these strategies are the 
same. One intelligent strategy was to be incorporated into the imperium and be a part of the 
imperium, if not a major stakeholder in it. Moreover, such a course was welcomed and 
even encouraged by the state. Thus, we observe the emergence of a new state elite with 
aristocratic backgrounds assimilated into the service of the state.
623
 This process was not 
unlike the ―stick and carrot tactics‖ of the French absolutist monarchs in gathering the 
French aristocrats at Versailles.
624
 
      The maneuvers of Şerif Pasha, the recruitment of the members of notable Kurdish 
families into the Ottoman state, and the generation of Kurdish nationalism by other family 
members posed no contradiction. At a time when identities were not forged and fixed, 
oscillations and shifting loyalties were to be expected. In the absence of identity politics, 
the primary concerns of these actors were adaptation to the new circumstances at an 
optimum level. They may prefer ―exit,‖ ―loyalty‖, or ―voice‖ at a given time and then 
switch to another option at a later time when their interests were best served by that 
option.
625
 
      In fact, there was no strict separation between local dynasties and the Istanbul 
aristocracy. In a way, Tanzimat may be interpreted as the gradual move of local notables to 
Istanbul. The greater families‘ accession to the center was more spectacular and came 
about later. Nevertheless, most of the first-generation Tanzimat statesmen were scions of 
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local notable families who had previously opted to move to the center. Aristocratic families 
of Istanbul such as the Samipaşazades were all recent newcomers to Istanbul who had left 
their Roumelian homelands not long before. As pointed out earlier in the study, such grand 
names of Tanzimat as Fuad Pasha, Münif Pasha, Midhad Pasha, and Ahmed Cevdet Pasha 
can be seen in this light. They were all descendants of small notables and ulema in the 
provinces.
626
 One difference between them was the voluntary accession of the early 
recruits who had a smaller stake, less glory, and less prestige to lose by leaving their 
homelands; therefore, opportunities and posts in Istanbul were more attractive and 
adventurous for them. This contrasted with those who were forced to accommodate the 
new realities as their last chance.    
    The background of Mustafa Reşid Pasha (not to be confused with the ―Great‖ (Koca) 
Mustafa Reşid Pasha for whom he was named), the last of the Ottoman foreign ministers 
and ambassador to Bucharest, Rome, and Vienna, nicely reflects the move, adaptation, and 
promotion of a local notable family. The Müftüzades were an Evlad-ı Fatihan 
(Descendants of the Conquerors) family and the holders of the office of the mufti of 
Ioannina (present-day northwestern Greece). The office belonged to the family, and sons 
replaced fathers. The family‘s respectability did not originate from the ownership of land, 
but, not unsurprisingly, the family owned vast lands that enabled them to live prosperously 
when they moved to Istanbul. Due to the family‘s religious titles and indirect affiliation 
with the state, the adaptation to the changing circumstances was not easy. After Mahmud II 
abolished the practice of hereditary succession to Roumelian mufti offices, the family 
moved to Istanbul to seek more attractive prospects.  Şakir Mehmed Bey became a protégé 
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of Mustafa Reşid Pasha (hence the name given to his son) and advanced in his career, 
serving as the head of the State Financial Council (Meclis-i Maliye).
627
 Both of his sons 
graduated from the Mekteb-i Sultani. Being thus eligible for admission to the ministry, they 
began their careers in diplomacy, and both subsequently became ambassadors. Thus, the 
Müftüzades constitute an example of the identified pattern in three generations. Like the 
Müftüzades, many sons of other families with notable backgrounds that had settled in 
Istanbul entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Two more examples of this pattern are 
Mahmud Hamdi Bey, the Head of the Personnel Registers (Sicil-i Ahval) of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, whose origins went back to a dynasty in Nevrekob (present-day Goce 
Delcev, in southwestern Bulgaria) and Mehmed Nuri Bey, who was an official in the same 
department in the ministry and whose origins went back to a local dynasty in Serres 
(present-day northeastern Greece). The other sons of these dynasties were apparently 
distributed to the other governmental offices (kalems) and constituted a significant portion 
of the late Ottoman bureaucracy.
628
 The old house of the Köprülüs was also represented in 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Ahmed Ziya Bey, who was the grandfather of the 
historian Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, and who served as the ambassador to Bucharest between 
1885 and 1888.
629
 The Keçecizades, after Keçecizade İzzet Molla and his son Fuad Pasha, 
secured posts for many of their sons in various governmental offices, including the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during the late Tanzimat period. The Samipaşazades, a family 
of religious scholars from the Peloponnesus, emerged as another distinguished family after 
Abdurrahman Sami Pasha had to settle in Istanbul after Greek independence and a sojourn 
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in Egypt in the service of Mehmed Ali.
630
 The mansion of Abdüllatif Subhi Pasha, the son 
of Abdurrahman Sami Pasha‘s son, became a meeting place of the secluded Tanzimat elite 
where intellectual, literary, and cultural exchanges took place and networks of patronages 
developed.
631
 Two of his brothers, Sezai and Necib (and one of his grandsons, Resmi
632
), 
became diplomats. One of the prominent families of the Tanzimat elite, its members 
displayed the unity and divergence of the ideological orientations of the sons of the 
Tanzimat. The family had one prominent Young Ottoman (Ayetullah Bey), one early 
novelist (Sezai), and one prominent Turkist, first as a Unionist and then as a Kemalist 
(Hamdullah Suphi). Abdurrahman Sami Pasha was the Minister of Public Education of 
Mustafa Reşid Pasha in the years between 1857 and 1861. His son Abdüllatif Subhi Pasha 
served as the Minister of Public Education for Abdülhamid (1876-1878). Abdüllatif Subhi 
Pasha‘s son, Abdurrahman Sami Pasha‘s grandson, Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver) was the 
Minister of National Education of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) (1920-1, 1925).633 He was 
later appointed as ambassador to Bucharest as a de facto exile after the abolition of Turkish 
Hearths and its incorporation into the RPP as People‘s Houses, over which he presided.634  
The Söylemezoğlus were another local family of notables from Kiğı (present-day eastern 
Turkey) that obtained positions for many of its members in governmental offices. These 
included İbrahim Edhem Pertev and Galip Kemali, who got posts in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs
635
.     
      Another example of the shifting and changing loyalties and identities reminiscent of the 
political trajectory of Şerif Pasha was the flight of Abdürrezzak Bedirxan. Beginning his 
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career in the diplomatic service, he served as the third secretary in St. Petersburg and then 
in Tehran. While he was serving in Russia, he became acquainted with many Russians and 
developed connections. He then left the diplomatic service and took refuge in Russia to 
pursue pro-Kurdish activities. Later, he was pardoned by the Ottoman state
636
 but exiled 
and subsequently executed during the World War I. Loyalties were not mutually exclusive. 
Abidin Pasha, one of the Foreign Ministers of Abdülhamid was at the same time a 
sympathizer of the Albanian League and, according to a European observer, was alarmed 
by the territorial demands of Greeks during his tenure due to his Albanian background and 
instincts.
637
 Turhan Pasha, the Ottoman ambassador to St. Petersburg (and ex-ambassador 
to Rome and Madrid) left the diplomatic service to be the prime minister of the newly 
founded independent Albania.
638
 Another Albanian diplomat who not only served as 
ambassador to Sofia and Bucharest but also served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
1920 and 1921, Abdüllatif Safa Bey, was a member of the local Albanian  dynasty of the 
Frasheri family and was the nephew of Şemseddin Sami and Naim Frasheri, one of the 
pioneers of Albanian nationalism.
639
 The Albanian identities and Ottoman/imperial 
identities and loyalties did not contradict each other.
640
 They may have complemented one 
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another in specific cases, given that the Albanian League was originally founded in 1878 
by Albanians who wanted to defend their Albanian lands from Christian ambitions 
641
 in 
reaction to moves by Christian Slavs and Greeks
642
. Notable Druze families contributed to 
the Ottoman diplomatic establishment, too. Muhammad Arslan, a distant cousin of Shakib 
Arslan, served in the Hamidian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
643
 Osman Adil Bey, the son of 
Hamdi Bey, the Dönme mayor of Salonika and a member of one of the leading and 
influential Yakubi Dönme families served in the legal department of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs at a time when Dönmes increasingly began to join the imperial 
governmental offices
644
. In short, many non-Turkish Muslim recruits of the ministry 
manifested overlapping loyalties and identities. In that regard, the Ottoman Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs was more inclusive than the German Foreign Office, where Catholics were 
significantly underrepresented and the very few Jews were discriminated against,
645
 and 
more inclusive than even the British Foreign Office, where non-conformists, Jews, and 
Scotsmen were ―conspicuously absent.‖646 Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that 
notables from various ethnicities were united in one aspect. The fact that non-Turkish 
Muslims (not unlike their ethnic Turkish colleagues) came predominantly from high class 
origins also arguably demonstrates the limits of inclusion, not only with regard to non-
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Turks but also with regard to Turks. Their social prominence, aristocratic backgrounds, and 
respectability (and education in the same imperial colleges for the forthcoming 
generations) were the common denominators. Thus, these newcomers to the state machine 
were welcomed with due respect for their heritages and social respectabilities. Ethnicity 
may have divided them, but their social backgrounds united them as long as this 
commonality remained compelling and rewarding. 
     Assimilation and integration of the peripheral elites is analogous to a marriage, where 
the center was the groom and the peripheral elites were the bride. Apparently, this was a 
strategy of the center, partially derived from conventional Ottoman practices and partially 
from the practicalities of the nascent modern state. Nevertheless, Abdülhamid developed a 
special concern to contact, co-opt and incorporate the peripheral elites, a practice that 
would deteriorate after the end of the Hamidian regime.
647
 
 
     
4.3. Non-Muslims        
 
      Different from the Muslim officials, non-Muslims working in the Ministry of Foreign 
Ministers were the scions of merchants and financers, as well as officials. The considerable 
number of Armenians whose fathers were sarrafs is also telling. Of the 25 Armenians 
employed in the ministry as of 1889, six of them were the children of sarrafs. Their efforts 
to get their sons recruited into the civil service reflect the interrelation between the state 
and its financiers and the efforts of the financers to integrate their family into the state. In 
this closed world, the state was the main benefactor, and people wanted to get close to it. 
The high level of recruitment highlights the possible connections and networks between 
the state and the sarrafs. The tendency for the sarrafs to have their sons and descendents 
recruited into the positions within the state makes one think that this intimate connection 
between the sarrafs and the state is one that cannot simply be reduced to material interests.  
     Two prominent (almost legendary) Armenians of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were 
both descendants of subcontractors to the palace and indirectly servants of the palace. 
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Gabriel Noradonkyan was the son of Krikor Noradonkyan, the chief supplier of bread to 
the military. Artin Dadyan was from a family of barutçubaşı, his grandfather Arakel 
Dadyan being the last appointed barutçubaşı in the reign of Mahmud II. The Manas 
family, many of whose sons were recruited into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, served as 
the palace painters from the 17
th
 century to the early 19
th
 century.
648
 The traditional 
Ottoman governmental subcontracting practices given to Armenian artisan families as 
hereditary family businesses enabled their descendants living in the age of the market to 
reestablish their affiliation with the Ottoman state in the changing environment at a time 
when personalized subcontracting practices were no longer tenable and when the Ottoman 
state was undergoing reorganization and eliminating its personalized attributes in favor of a 
depersonalized modern state. In such circumstances, the new form of incorporation into the 
state consisted of the recruitment of its members as (prominent) state officials. Ironically, 
family businesses and ―special relations‖ between the Armenian amira class and the state 
continued in modified form. The premodern mode of relations was adapted into the 
modern practices of a bureaucratic state. The mode of relation had changed but the 
beneficiaries of the old practices survived. Whereas previously the privileged non-Muslim 
families were incorporated into the state through indirect and semi-official mechanisms, 
with Tanzimat they formally became part of the state. The continuity within change is 
striking in the case of the adaptation of the relation between ―state Armenians‖ and the 
state.
649
 The relations between the Greek Phanariot families and the Sublime Porte also 
became more formalized several decades after the Greek rebellion. Although socio-
economic dynamics and conditions formed the backbone of the special relationship 
between the Sublime Porte and the amira class and Phanariot families, it was formed at a 
very personal level. One example of the integration and persistence of personal ties with 
the state and its transformation into adherence to the state was the recruitment of the two 
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sons of Mavroyeni Bey, the personal doctor of Abdülhamid, into the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs
650. Although Yanko pursued a modest career, Aleksander‘s impressive career 
included the post of ambassador to Vienna.
651
 In short, the world and fortunes of the 
privileged non-Muslim dignitaries continued to be constructed around the state. 
      A few non-Muslim dignitaries of the Foreign Ministry were appointed to the Senate in 
1908. Excluding Bohor Efendi and Dimitri Mavro Kordota, who had left their diplomatic 
careers at some point, Manuk Azaryan and Gabriel Noradonkyan were two prominent 
figures of the ministry. Manuk Azaryan was an erstwhile undersecretary of the ministry in 
1909
652
, and Gabriel Noradonkyan was, as mentioned above, the long-time legal counselor 
of the ministry. In the Senate sessions, they emerged as among the most active members of 
the Senate. It has to be pointed out that Senate discussions were conducted very differently 
from parliamentary debates. Whereas there were heated debates in parliament, the Senate 
was a milieu for the dispassionate and calm exchange of views. Although several different 
opinions were held and expressed by the senators, all these differences of opinion were 
discussed calmly, as if these differences of opinion were merely technical matters that were 
bound to be resolved. In other words, all the members appeared to disregard ―politics‖ and 
acted as bureaucrats rather than politicians, hence continuing the code of conduct of the 
Şuray-ı Devlet. All the members spoke as responsible non-partisan servants of the 
imperium whose only concern was its advancement.  
     Whenever non-Muslim senators discussed matters pertaining to religion, they would 
routinely point to the tolerance shown by the imperium to Christianity and to Christian 
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religious sermons reiterating their loyalty and reverence.
653
 Azaryan presented the 
Christian faith as ―pertaining to the individuality‖ ―which is protected and secured by the 
Ottoman Empire‖ and reiterated that Christianity was one of the three legitimate faiths of 
the populace of the Empire and the Christian faith‘s political significance was limited to 
the conduction of Christian millets‟ communal affairs and Christians were part of the 
Ottoman political nation.
654
 Gabriel Noradonkyan also emerged as the dispassionate 
technical expert providing expertise in legal and administrative issues and instructing the 
senators. His speeches were always technical and informative. Azaryan also assessed the 
issues discussed from the point of view of the imperial interests in a calm and dispassionate 
tone. Apparently, both of these senators came from the Armenian amira, born in Istanbul 
to wealthy and respectable families. Therefore, they were natural candidates for 
appointment as senators. Nevertheless, it has to be mentioned that they were prominent 
figures in Armenian communal affairs and, therefore, had representative quality. Azaryan 
assumed the post of the secular head of the Armenians and was the head of the general 
assembly of the Armenian community.
655
 He was prominent in the Armenian communal 
affairs run by the Armenian elites of Istanbul and was an opponent of the rural and East 
Anatolian Armenian revolutionaries and militants
656
.   
      There is a striking contrast between Greeks and Armenians in terms of their fathers‘ 
occupations. Of the 25 Armenians counted in the 1889 annal of the Ministry, only four had 
a father serving in the Ottoman state. In contrast, of the 15 Greeks counted, six had a father 
employed in the civil service. Minor officials in the diplomatic service had Greek fathers 
who were merchants.  These included, for example, Istavriki Kiryagidi, a certain 
Konstantin, and Azgoridi Nikolaki, whose fathers were Kiryako, Anesti, and Istavriki 
Ezgoridi from Erdek (on the southern shores of Marmara Sea), respectively. Although two 
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Greek officials of the ministry, Mihalaki Akselos and Aristidi Akyadis, had fathers who 
were officials of relatively more humble origins, in general the Greeks who joined the 
ministry had fathers who were officials of prominence and not minor officials. They 
belonged to the old Phanariot families
657
 or the protégés of the established old Phanariot 
families (such as Musuruses) who were incorporated into the Ottoman state machine via 
established Phanariot families. This observation is equally valid for the social origins of 
prominent Greek bureaucrats and senators as a whole. Logofets, Mavrokordatos, 
Mususruses, Aristarchis, Karacas (of originally Romanian origin) filled the ranks of 
holders of Ottoman posts, especially diplomatic posts where they could serve the Ottoman 
state and their family prospects and reputations simultaneously. Whereas the Greeks of 
more humble origins were minor officials, the scions of Phanariot families were 
ambassadors, ambassadorial counselors, or holders of other high-ranking offices. From the 
Phanariot families, as of 1889, two Mavroyani brothers (Aleksandr and Dimitri), two 
Karateodori brothers (Etienne and Aleksandr) and the father and son Fotiyadis were in the 
diplomatic service. One Karaca was the Ottoman ambassador to Stockholm and Den Haag. 
His father was the ex-ambassador to Den Haag, and the son assumed the office as if it was 
a right of patrimony after twenty one years. In that regard, these Phanariot families 
resembled the local dynasties of Turkish, Kurdish, or Albanian origin incorporated into the 
centralizing state. The role of marriage in this incorporation was as important among the 
Phanariot families as it was with the Muslim local notable families. The Phanariot families 
also intermarried and maintained themselves as a closed community and thus retained their 
privileged status
658
. 
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     While the Ottoman state gave its due to its loyalist Greek families of repute and dignity, 
it opened the way to the aspiring young Armenians to be promoted in the Ottoman 
diplomatic service. Apart from the reputable families, Greeks seemed distant to the 
Ottoman state. The Greek communities of Anatolia and Macedonia were almost invisible 
in Istanbul. The background of the Armenian officials examined in the annals discloses a 
different picture. Armenians from different social and economic backgrounds, with or 
without any connections to the state, were recruited. The mixed and diverse backgrounds 
of the Armenian officials show that Armenians were comparably more ―integrationist‖ 
whereas Greeks remained outside of the Ottoman political and administrative edifice. Of 
the 15 Greeks serving in the ministry, only one of the officials was born outside Istanbul 
(Meleka Yanapoulo, the consulate general to Trieste, born in Lesbos) disregarding Ianko 
Karaca, who was born in Berlin. In contrast, Armenian officials serving in the ministry 
were born in various peripheral cities such as Aleppo, Edirne, and Izmir. The Armenian 
modernizing educational infrastructure also spurred an upward mobility for many 
provincial Armenians to prosper and establish an Armenian intelligentsia residing in 
Istanbul who could join the Ottoman bureaucracy
659
. Nevertheless, certain Armenian 
families who were prominent within the Armenian community and had acquired their 
wealth and prominence due to their connections with the palace and the state, known as the 
amira,  supplied a considerable portion of the officials of the ministry, e.g., Dadyans and 
Manas as indicated above.
660
 Service to the state was also a hereditary family business. 
Many Armenian diplomats and officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were sons of 
diplomats and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials
661
. Ohannes Kuyumcuyan, an 
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undersecretary of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the son of Bedros 
Kuyumcuyan, a member of the Şuray-ı Devlet and a protégé of Âli Pasha662. 
      One striking finding in the annal of 1889
663
 is that the non-Muslim officials were much 
more likely to be born in Istanbul than non-Muslim officials. Whereas 25% of the Muslim 
officials were born outside Istanbul, this was the case for only 12% of non-Muslim 
officials (excluding non-Muslim officials of foreign origin). The higher percentage of non-
Muslims born in Istanbul is yet further evidence of the relationship of the non-Muslims 
with the state. Although the non-Muslims of the capital tended to join the ranks and worlds 
of Ottomanism, there were fewer propensities for non-Muslims from the provinces to join 
the Ottoman ranks and be integrated into the system.  It may be argued that the politics of 
Ottomanism was not free from class relations. Here, we observe the development of a class 
formation based not only on economic opportunities and economic relations, but also on 
state and geographical affiliations. ―The new-fangled official ideology (Ottomanism-DG) 
fared well in social strata already benefiting from the Pax Ottomana. Greek Phanariots, 
members of the Armenian amira class, and Bulgarian merchants who imported garments 
from Manchester and sold them in Aleppo were the typical enthusiasts of an ideology that 
promised to remove the social disabilities afflicting non-Muslims. Wider swaths of the 
Ottoman population, such as Bulgarian peasants who continued to chafe under their 
Gospodars, or Christian Bosnian and Herzegovinian peasants serving Muslim landowners, 
derived little benefit from the new ideology.‖664 Although recent studies665 have 
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established that Ottomanism was not marginal within the non-Muslim communities of the 
Ottoman Empire, it found support predominantly among the elites of these communities. 
The politics of Ottomanism also enabled these communal elites to dominate their 
coreligionists. Although these communities had had patriarchal and hierarchical social 
organizations previously, the new environments of the 19
th
 century intensified the power of 
the communal elites thanks to the politics of Ottomanism and new ways of communicating 
with the Ottoman state. The Ottoman state subcontracted the allegiance of its non-Muslim 
communities to the communal elites. Thus, we observe an overlapping of interests between 
the Ottoman state and the communal elites. These imperial non-Muslim Ottomanists were 
also the leaders and prominent figures of their respective communities. For example, as 
indicated above, Azaryan, the undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry and senator, assumed 
the position of chairman of the Armenian cismani meclis (Spiritual Assembly) in 1909 and 
became the chairman of the Armenian patriarchy‘s ―secular assembly.‖666 Apparently, 
―democratization,‖ enhancing educational opportunities, and vertical mobilization for a 
larger segment of the communities would not only destroy this patriarchal structure, but 
also the promises of Ottomanism.
667
 
        The Greek Revolution of the 1820s was one of the major causes of the reorganization 
of the Translation Office. Once the Greeks became suspect and viewed as untrustworthy, 
new cadres of Muslim origin had to be trained and recruited
668. ― ‗Greeks‘ former 
preponderance as non-Muslims in official and semi-official positions had declined 
drastically following the Greek Revolution of the 1820s…Greeks had gone into eclipse as 
officials, so opening the way for the Armenians to become the chief beneficiaries of 
Tanzimat egalitarianism. Referred to then as the millet-i sadıka (faithful people or nation), 
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the Armenians retained this prominence until the last quarter of the century, when 
nationalist conflict disrupted the Ottoman-Armenian relationship… Had the Empire lasted 
longer, it is interesting to speculate whether Ottoman Jews could have succeeded 
Armenians as the leading non-Muslim minority in official service, as the Armenians had 
supplanted the Greeks… It is interesting that the last Translator of the Imperial Divan 
(Divan-ı Hümayun Tercümanı), a position that Greeks monopolized for over a century until 
1821, was a Jew, Davud Efendi.‖669 The fact that in Findley‘s survey Jews constitute the 
youngest ethnic group in the Ministry of Ottoman Affairs
670
 seems to be evidence 
supportive of this speculation.
671
  
       Differentiating between the lower echelons of the ministry, the middle ranks and the 
higher echelons provides further insight into the ethnic makeup of officials. As of 1889, of 
the 71 officials of the middle and lower ranks serving in Istanbul (those who were paid 
5,000 guruses or less a year), 54 were Muslims and 17 were non-Muslims. Of the 54 
Muslims, 44 were the sons of state officials of different ranks and positions. Of the 17 non-
Muslims, five were the sons of state officials, whereas 12 were sons of merchants or 
financiers. They were born predominantly in Istanbul.  
      An examination of the highest ranking officials in the ministry in 1889 as listed in the 
annal of the Ministry provides similar findings. Of the seven Muslims in posts of major 
significance, six were sons of state officials. Of the four non-Muslims of equal rank, none 
were scions of state officials. According to these figures, there is no significant 
differentiation based on the rank of the posts. The primary distinction was apparently based 
on the religion of the officials. The social and economical backgrounds of minor and 
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prominent officials are similar. This statistic is yet another demonstration of the different 
modes of social production of social (and economic) capital for Muslims and non-Muslims. 
Whereas the recruited Muslims came from a considerably small closed group welded 
around the state, the non-Muslims came from different backgrounds. This demonstrates the 
diversification of the development of the non-Muslims‘ social (and economic) capital, 
which was more productive than that of the Muslims.  
    A cursory look at employment within the ministry would reveal that Armenians 
constituted the intellectual backbone of the ministry.
672
 The legal and technical offices 
were filled by them. ―The special association of the Armenians with the Foreign 
Correspondences Office went back to its earlier years, when, at the end of the Crimean 
War, Sahak Abro, an able Armenian official well regarded by the Tanzimat leadership, 
became head of the Office and –a familiar motif- made of it something like a preserve for 
people he found congenial, namely, his coreligionists. By the end of the Hamidian period, 
however… the Office was losing its predominantly Armenian character.673‖ A comparison 
of the officials working in the ministry as listed in the annals of 1889 and 1902 shows a 
slight but consistent decrease in the employment of Armenians.
674
 Muslim youngsters who 
in the 1890s were learning the skills of writing erudite memorandums in French and 
developing their capabilities had risen to the high-ranking professional positions of the 
Ministry. Among them, for example, was the undersecretary of the ministry during the 
time of the Unionists, Reşad Hikmet Bey.675 Another legendary name in the Ministry was 
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Ibrahim Hakkı Bey (later pasha), who was appointed as one of the legal counselors of the 
Ministry. ―The appointment of one so young as the government‘s counselor on 
international law aroused surprise. But the appointment had a larger significance, too. For 
the Empire had until then employed foreign experts in these positions. The simultaneous 
appointments of İbrahim Hakkı and Gabriel Noradounghian presented Ottomans with 
exciting proof that the Empire could produce its own experts for this function.‖676 After 
Ibrahim Hakkı‘s long tenure, no Muslim as impressive as Ibrahim Hakkı emerged. The 
Armenians continued to hold on to the key positions like the legal counsellorship, 
undersecretariat, and assistantships to these two positions even after the Revolution of 
1908, when Turkification had manifested itself. Of the 286 officials of the enlarged 
ministry listed in the yearbook of the Ottoman Empire for 1906, only 40 were non-Muslim, 
which indicates a dramatic decline over the years.‖677 Ohannes Kuyumcuyan retained his 
position as the undersecretary until he was replaced by Said Bey in 1912 and Hrand Abro, 
the son of Sahak Abro, continued to serve as the legal counselor. One British report noted 
that the replacement of the undersecretariat by a Muslim after a long time may render the 
undersecretariat more influential. The report assesses Ohannes Kuyumcuyan as ―possessed 
of a good knowledge and some knowledge of affairs‖ but ―as under-secretary…timorous 
and unenterprising.‖ Said Bey; ―as a Moslem he may, perhaps, have a greater share in the 
counsels of the ministry.‖678 Reşad Hikmet, the next ―Moslem‖ undersecretary will be a 
man of respect and a person whose opinions and suggestions are considered by the prime 
minister and foreign minister. Although the new and younger recruits were significantly 
Muslim (with some Jewish), the higher offices continued to be held by non-Muslims (and 
predominantly by Armenians). According to the salname (annal) in 1910 (1326), of the 46 
officials holding the highest posts, 35 were Muslims and 11 were non-Muslims
679
. This 
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was a sharp decrease in comparison to twenty years earlier. Two years later, the ratio 
remained more or less the same. Of the 46 high-ranking officials, 34 were Muslims and 12 
were non-Muslims. A sharper decline in the representation of non-Muslims was observed 
with the advent of the World War. World War I was used by the Unionist leadership as an 
opportunity to Turkify capital, employment, and any other area.
680
 The Turkification in the 
Ottoman diplomatic service was achieved to a considerable degree. According to the 1918 
(1334) annals, of the 52 officials in Turkey, only seven were non-Muslims
681
. These seven 
non-Muslims were old timers such as Aleko Kasap, Hasun Efendi, and Hrand Abro Bey. 
No non-Muslim was promoted to a prominent position. Only some professionals were kept 
in their positions to practice their expertise. The degree of Turkification in the embassies 
was much more visible. Whereas in 1912, a significant portion of the staff was non-
Muslim, in 1918 all the staff in the embassies was Muslim with very few exceptions. Not 
surprisingly, by 1926, no single non-Muslim remained within the ministry which moved to 
Ankara
682
. 
 
    
4.4. Apprenticeship for the Modern 
 
       The Ottoman Foreign Ministry also served as a school for men of various interests. 
The Foreign Ministry was a prestigious office attractive for many fathers. Many caring 
fathers with good connections directed their sons to the craft of diplomacy. With the 
profession of diplomacy, these sons attained satisfactory incomes, not to mention relatively 
light workloads, which enabled them to pursue their personal interests. Arguably the most 
famous diplomat of the ministry within this category was Abdülhak Hamid, who served in 
several consulates and embassies, including Paris, Den Haag, and London, and wrote 
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literary pieces while serving in the embassies (and enjoying London and Paris).
683
 
Although he was known to succeeding generations as a poet, a gentleman, and a man of 
letters, he was a full-time diplomat by occupation. Although, he was known for his 
disregard of his professional obligations and duties, in his memoirs, he depicted himself as 
a diligent and committed diplomat.  
       Others had begun their careers in the Foreign Ministry but left after briefly serving in 
the diplomatic service. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was seen as a prestigious office in 
which many sons of the high-ranking public servants who turned out to be men of high 
significance served for a short time (one to three years on average). Predominantly, they 
served in the Office of Translation to master their French (or in the Office of 
Correspondence). Short-time officials of the ministry included Recaizade Mahmut Ekrem, 
Mizancı Murad, İsmail Kemal, Hüseyin Nazım Pasha, Ferit Kam, Babanzade Ahmed 
Naim, and Avlonyalı Ferit. Mizancı Murad was recruited in the Translation Office at a 
time when state officials with the proficiency to master diplomatic French were few. Thus, 
the French fluency he had acquired in the Russian gymnasium was incomparably 
exceptional.
684
 Others were recruited in the ministry at the beginning of their careers. 
Avlonyalı Ekrem worked in the Legal Department of the Ministry while studying in the 
Law Faculty.  His was a de facto part-time job due to the fact that he was the nephew of 
Avlonyalı Ferid Pasha.685  
      Another short-term official in the ministry was Halid Ziya (Uşaklıgil). Halid Ziya 
failed to be recruited to the ministry.  This very much disappointed his father, who was 
highly desirous of such a career path for his son. Halid Ziya‘s father had asked two 
acquaintances, Agop Pasha, the Overseer of the Imperial Treasury, and Mustafa 
Mansurzade, the Minister of Education, to arrange the recruitment of his son into the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Young Halid Ziya went to Istanbul from Izmir with the dream 
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of being appointed to the embassy in Paris, the city with which he was fascinated. To his 
misfortune, just after young Halid Ziya visited Mustafa Mansurzade, Mansurzade was 
deposed. Agop Pasha, the other acquaintance of Halid Ziya‘s father, advised young Halid 
Ziya not to enter the civil service, but instead to join his family‘s business as entering into 
trade was more beneficial to the interests of the state than serving it as a official. Agop 
Pasha acknowledged that the state needed competent officials, but he believed that these 
officials should be recruited not from the families of prominent tradesmen, but from more 
humble sections of the society. It was more important for the state to have trained people in 
trade and industry.
686
 The Uşakizades were one of the few prominent Muslim merchant 
families in Izmir among the many Greek, Jewish, and Levantine merchant families. 
Needless to say, their position was rather precarious, and they experienced daily conflict in 
the economic, social, and political spheres. Halid Ziya‘s short experience in the Directorate 
of Foreign Affairs combined his concerns as a member of an Izmir merchant family of 
Turkish origin and a state official. He and his colleagues in the directorate displayed the 
skepticism of the state officials towards the non-Muslims of the Ottoman Empire as well as 
towards the Europeans. Knowing that the local non-Muslim merchants that held the 
nationality of a foreign country (especially Greece) were privileged before the law, the 
officials felt as though they were vanguards in the fight to defend Turkishdom (in the 
economic war) against the bloodsucking non-Muslims. As a member of an Izmir merchant 
family, Halid Ziya must have had such concerns much more fervently as openly indicated 
in his memoirs.
687
    
       Remembering the episode of his failure to be recruited into the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Halid Ziya acknowledged that after more than forty years, he was still thrilled to 
imagine a career path in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs serving in the embassy in Paris. 
Nevertheless, he served for a while in Izmir as the assistant to the foreign affairs 
director.
688
 Halid Ziya, the failed diplomat, contrary to the mercantilist advice of Agop 
Pasha, did not enter into family business, but opted to settle in Istanbul as a man of letters 
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(and serving in various governmental offices to make his living). However, Edhem, the big 
brother of Halid Ziya, ―although graduated from law school in Istanbul,‖ engaged in the 
family business in Izmir, disavowing bureaucratic prestige.
689
  
      The failed diplomat Halid Ziya brought up his two sons as diplomats. His son, Bülent 
Uşaklıgil, served in Paris as the Turkish ambassador and died as the ambassador of Turkey 
to Paris. Apparently, diplomatic service continued to be an occupation desired by the well-
off families, especially due to the prestige it provided. 
       Halid Ziya‘s circle included many young men serving in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The deposition of Mustafa Mansurazade and the illness of his mother may have 
hindered his prospective career in the diplomatic service, but other youngsters with literary 
interests were admitted to the ministry and were known for their literary works rather than 
their deskwork. Besides the ―greatest poet,‖ some personalities who are known to posterity 
for activities they pursued out of their office were Samipaşazade Sezai, Saffeti Ziya, Reşit 
Saffet (Atabinen), and Ahmet Hikmet (Müftüoğlu). Serving at the embassy in Paris, the 
literary capital of the world, was an aspiration most of them shared with young Halid 
Ziya.
690
 A small circle of friends from similar backgrounds made up a significant portion 
of the staff of the ministry, as we can see from the literary recollections of the time. In fact, 
it was the same pool from which the early men of letters and diplomats were obtained, as 
established earlier in this study.    
       These were personalities whose principal life-time contributions, concerns, and 
preoccupations were irrelevant to their professional work. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
trained the new early 20
th–century generation, a function it had had during the early 
Tanzimat period. This is not because the ministry taught and motivated its staff to be 
pioneers in various fields. Rather, it had to do with the fact that it was the imperial recruits 
who had the social and intellectual capital to be entrepreneurs and pioneers in introducing 
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the aspects of the modern West.  They opted for a career in diplomacy principally because 
it provided them with free time, comfortable lives, income, prestige, and connections. 
Furthermore, brought up in a particular habitus, they knew no alternatives. Their positions 
and connections also facilitated the pursuit of alternative careers. It is unsurprising to 
observe that the diplomatic service contributed to pioneering more than other governmental 
offices did thanks to its close contacts with the West in general and its cosmopolitan 
nature. The opportunity they had to be in proximity to the means of communication and 
exchange of ideas with the West enabled them to import many previously unknown ideas 
and insights.  
       The diplomatic service also assisted the emergence and development of the 
Ottoman/Muslim satire. Cemil Cem, the founder of the satirical journal Cem, served in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Being the son of Cemal Pasha, a military doctor, he graduated 
from law school. After his graduation, he joined the diplomatic service and served in the 
consulates of Nice and Toulouse before being appointed to more prestigious posts in the 
embassies to Rome and Paris. He regularly contributed to the satirical journal Kalem while 
serving in posts in Paris and Vienna between 1908 and 1909. He resigned from the 
ministry to publish his own satirical journal. He founded Cem in 1910. After his 
resignation from the government, he never assumed any bureaucratic post except for 
serving briefly as the Director of the School of Fine Arts. Throughout his life after his 
resignation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he made his living drawing cartoons and 
painting, which was unthinkable before 1908.
691
 
        Heinzelmann wrote that the first Muslim cartoonists (who emerged only in 1908 after 
the near monopoly of Armenian cartoonists in the Tanzimat and Hamidian eras) were 
predominantly ex-officials, civil or military
692
. Most of them resigned from their posts just 
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after 1908, believing that it was an opportune time for free expression of their opinions.
693
  
1908 may be characterized as a milestone that ensued the development of a non-official 
sphere, as officials began working in non-state (private) positions or were self-employed. 
Nevertheless, ironically this was a break with the state only in terms of leaving the civil 
service. On the other hand, it meant an extension of the official sphere with regard to the 
emergence of new classes of free professionals maintaining the views and habitus they had 
acquired and internalized throughout their ―education‖ in state service. Thus, they 
reproduced and extended a particular state-centric worldview, political cosmology, and 
cultural/intellectual formation. Therefore, we may suggest that, the Turkish middle class 
and the free professions emerged and developed in the image (and custodianship) of the 
state.  
      Although the Armenian and other non-Muslim printing activity and newspapers were 
commercially profitable, the Turkish language printing, publishing, and newspapers 
continued to be predominantly non-commercial or promised only modest profits or 
commercial value. This rendered the Turkish press a part-time voluntary pursuit of civil 
servants motivated by political concerns and goals, and not a strictly professional 
occupation. Thus, Turkish printing and publication retained its character as an extension of 
the official mind. Nevertheless, with slow but gradual commercialization and 
capitalization, Turkish printing and publishing became more commercial and more 
emancipated. It was the civil servants who had moved from governmental offices to private 
bureaus beginning with Agah Efendi, Şinasi, and Namık Kemal in the 1860s to establish 
the journalism of the Second Constitutional period
694
. Hence, it was the original state-
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funded capital accumulation that had financed the emergence and development of the 
materially non-profiting printing and publishing sector. 
      Another transfer to the arts from diplomacy was Burhanettin Tepsi, a pioneer of 
Turkish theater. Coming from a family of diplomats, he was recruited into the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs after his graduation from the Mekteb-i Sultani. In his daily routine in the 
ministry, he spent most of his time reading and studying the latest plays of Paris. Thanks to 
the interference of the sadr-ı azam Avlonyalı Ferit Pasha, he was sent as envoy to Paris, 
where he had the opportunity to follow theater and buy the texts of the latest theatrical 
oeuvres. After a few years in the ministry, he resigned to pursue an artistic career 
abroad.
695
 
      Sports also benefited from the contributions of the diplomats. The first Turkish soccer 
team, the Black Stockings, was founded in 1901 by Mehmed Raşid Bey, a career diplomat, 
along with Fuad Hüsnü Bey, the son of Admiral Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha. He was elected as 
the president of the club and assigned as the coach of the first Turkish soccer club in its 
only match against the local Greek soccer club before the Black Stockings team was closed 
down by the public authorities and Mehmed Raşid exiled to Iran to serve in the embassy to 
Teheran.
696
 Another Ottoman diplomat, Reşid Saffet Atabinen, served as the head of the 
Turkish Olympic Committee between 1933 and 1936.
697
 
       The civil service‘s fostering of the arts and humanities was not limited to its 
recruitment. Most of the first generation of artists, scientists, journalists, and pioneers in 
the free professions were scions of bureaucrats. The relatively comfortable material 
opportunities of these families facilitated the emergence of the first generation of the 
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practitioners of the modern professions.
698
 The comparably high incomes of their fathers 
provided the capital needed for the development of non-productive or at least non-profit 
endeavors. Simply put, for a non-productive sphere which does not produce any surplus to 
flourish, an already accumulated capital had to be amassed and transferred. For the non-
Muslims, this original capital was provided by finance, commerce, and industry given that 
most of the pioneers in the arts were the scions of merchants and financiers (resembling the 
West European pattern).
699
  The remuneration provided by the state in the form of 
―salaries‖ and other pecuniary rewards served the same function for Muslims. 
      The networks and patronages developed as important mechanisms for political, literary, 
and intellectual advancement. Apparently, blood relations and relations based on marriages 
were also very significant factors in the Tanzimat. A map that demonstrates these relations 
would be illuminating. Such a map would also display the intertwined character of the 
families. The Tanzimat elite was not only small and secluded, but also interwoven and 
integrated. Moreover, the political, intellectual, and literary realms were not 
distinguishable from each other. They were all intertwined. Thus, it would be interesting to 
look at the genealogies of the late Ottoman (and early Republican) men of letters. Being 
men of letters required free time, good educations, and financial support. Therefore, a 
typical man of letters in the late Ottoman Empire was (and had to be) a scion of a two-
generation family of bureaucrats, whether descended from a high-ranking bureaucrat or a 
low-ranking civil servant.
700
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    More interestingly, an analysis of the late Ottoman literature will show that late-Ottoman 
literature was a closed sphere. It was written by the members of a certain community, read 
by the members of the same community, and narrated the worlds and lives of the members 
of that community. The characters, the plots, and the themes of these literary works strictly 
addressed the world of the governing elite. Thus, this literature was unintelligible and 
incommunicable to the non-members of the governing elite. Given that the readers‘ market 
was predominantly restricted to the members of this habitus and to the aspiring youth 
emulating this habitus, the wider populace was neglected. The themes and inspirations of 
the literary works reflected the intellectual upbringing and social milieu of the authors.
701
  
                                                                                                                                                             
Istanbul and joined the janissaries. Selim Ağa‘s son served as a judge. Mehmet Şakir Recai 
Efendi, Mahmud Ekrem‘s father, continued the family‘s gradual upward mobility by 
serving as Takvim-hane Nazırı. Mahmud Ekrem was born in 1847 in Recai Efendi Yalısı 
in Vaniköy as a scion of an established family. As a further note, Mahmud Ekrem began 
his civil service career in 1862 in the Hariciye Mektubi Kalemi, where he met Namık 
Kemal and Ayetullah Bey. He continued his civil service career in various posts in the 
Ministry of Finance and then in the Council of State. A very similar pattern is seen for 
Abdülhak Şinasi Hisar (see Karaca, Nesrin Tağızade, Abdülhak Şinasi Hisar‟ın 
Eserlerinde Geçmiş Zaman ve İstanbul, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1998). His family‘s 
origins went back to Ali Pasha of Tepelen. His great grandfather, Selim Sırrı Pasha, a 
grandson of Ali Pasha of Tepelen was the last guardian of Belgrade before Belgrade was 
evacuated. After the evacuation, he moved to Istanbul, where he rose in the central 
bureaucracy to the position of vizier. His son served as an official in Tophane-i Amire. 
Abdülhak Şinasi was born in his grandfather‘s yalı (seaside mansion in Bosphorus) in 
Rumelihisarı as a descendant of an established Istanbul family. Although today he is 
remembered as a man of letters detached from the colorless actual world and a desperate 
nostalgic in search of the Ottoman lost time, he made a long career in European firms 
active in Istanbul. He became a civil servant in 1924 when Regié was taken over by the 
state, where he was an official. Interestingly, he left his beloved Istanbul and moved to 
Ankara to serve as the Secretary of the Balkan League. He was appointed as a legal advisor 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1931. He worked in the preparation of the Montreaux 
Protocol. He worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 1945. He published well-
known novels and books, such as Fahim Bey ve Biz (1941), Boğaziçi Mehtapları (1942) 
and Çamlıca‟daki Eniştemiz (1944) while he was a civil servant in the Foreign Ministry. 
Fahim Bey ve Biz is the story of a young recruit of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry and is a 
parody of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry.  
701
 This observation is applicable to all the first generations of Ottoman novelists. When 
Nabizade Nazım penned a novel (or a long story) in which the setting was a remote village 
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      Needless to say, the decisions of young men to seek artistic careers were not well 
received by their disappointed parents, who had anticipated seeing their sons as high 
ranking imperial bureaucrats or officers, and not despicable artists, as we can observe in 
the memoirs.
702
  In contrast to Europe (and non-Muslims of the Ottoman Empire and 
Istanbul), where capital had been amassed from commerce and industry, in the Ottoman 
Empire the state became the main supplier of the capital for the emergence of an 
autonomous sphere for the fine arts and the humanities. This support was not limited to 
financial resources. The state also provided the intellectual capital through the training it 
provided in the imperial high schools and colleges. These scions of the civil service who 
opted for the fine arts and literature also received their training in schools established to 
train civil servants. It is no coincidence that the Military Academy produced the pioneers 
of the fine arts. Technical skills taught as a part of the military and engineering curriculum 
enabled many youth to encounter the fine arts for the first time. Şeker Ahmed Pasha, Halil 
Pasha, Hüseyin Zekai Pasha, Hoca Ali Rıza and Celal Esad (Arseven) are some examples 
(and pioneers of Turkish painting) of individuals who had been recruited into the fine arts 
while in the Military Academy.
703
 Şeker Ahmed, who may be regarded as the first Ottoman 
painter in the Western sense, made his way to study art in Paris thanks to his education in 
the Military Academy, where he learned painting for the first time.  He made his career in 
the military for more than thirty years and was paid as a civil servant, in contrast to the 
free-lance artists who depended on the sales of their work for an income. 
       In the fine arts, the first generation of artists was composed of, almost without 
exception, the scions of civil servants, and particularly high-ranking ones.
704
 One exception 
was the theatre, where the bulk of the early performers had been recruited from traditional 
                                                                                                                                                             
unique habitus of the officialdom brilliantly as an insider. What is also so striking in 
Güntekin‘s novels is the lack of almost any difference from the Empire to the Republic as 
his clerks continued their routines. In his novels, their habitus remains uninterrupted. 
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street theater; in other words, it was it was performed by self-made people of lower class 
origins.
705
 A few of the early men of letters came from mediocre origins in contrast to the 
pioneers in the fine arts who came predominantly from families with civil service 
backgrounds. This was due to the fact that it did not require expensive and time-consuming 
training unlike the costly and extensive training required for the fine arts.  
      The late Ottoman pattern to an important extent resembles pre-revolutionary Russia. 
―(T)he Russian imperial bureaucratic elite was very much a part of the highly cultured 
world of pre-revolutionary-educated society. In no field was that more true than in that of 
music. A.S.Taneev was the first cousin of Serge Taneev and a close friend of P.I. 
Tchaikovsky. The latter was educated alongside future members of the State Council, at 
the School of Law, just as N.V. Rimsky-Korsakov and Mussorgsky, along with Serge 
Rachmaninov, himself a good friend of Nicholas II‘s brother Mikhail, all came from 
families of the Russian landowning gentry.‖706  Lieven remarks that the Russian traditional 
upper class‘ ―contribution in the fields of literature and music was far more impressive 
than those of any of their European peers.‖707 This is hardly unexpected given the social, 
economic and political organization of Russian society and the state. The same observation 
is equally true for the Ottoman social, political, and economic organization.
708
 Apparently, 
                                                 
705
 For the emergence of modern Ottoman theater, its Armenian pioneers, and Muslim 
latecomers, see And, Metin, Osmanlı Tiyatrosu, Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 1999. 
706
 Lieven, Dominic, Russia‟s Rulers under the Old Regime, New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1989, p. 204. 
707
 ibid., p. 206. 
708
 Some examples of the scions of state officials of the Ottoman Empire played pioneering 
role in the development of Western music in Turkey are as follows: Cemal Reşit was the 
son of Ahmed Reşid; Sadeddin Arel was the scion of a family of high-ranking ulema 
including his grandfather, Mehmed Emin Efendi, who served as the kazaker. His father 
was a religious scholar and a member of the committee that prepared the 1876 
Constitution. (Öztuna, Yılmaz, Türk Musikisi Ansiklopedisi, Ankara: Milli Eğitim 
Basımevi, 1970, pp. 45-46.) Ulvi Cemal Erkin was the son of Mehmed Cemil, a high-
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we do not observe a similar pattern in countries such as Britain, Germany and France, 
where bourgeoning middle classes were the driving force of ―modernity‖ and the 
promoters of newly developing cultural habitus. It was predominantly the sons of middle 
classes who were the pioneers in the arts and sciences. In these countries, the aristocratic 
elites were pushed into the bureaucratic world and left the spheres that had developed 
independence from the state to the middle class, which was intellectually more adept and 
more comfortable with modernity. Therefore, the roles of the elites in these countries were 
to retain and reproduce spheres of power for themselves, but not to invest power in the 
future.
709
 Likewise, the spheres independent of the state were the dynamic forces shaping 
the future of these nations in contrast to the Russian and Ottoman/Turkish cases, where the 
state was the chief initiator and harbinger of modernity and the modern professions.  
     With regard to the contribution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the fine arts, the 
example of Muhsin Ertuğrul, the pioneer of Turkish cinema, who was the son of Hüseyin 
Hüsnü Bey, a cashier of the ministry can be given.710 Definitely, Nazım Hikmet, whose 
father Hikmet Bey worked in the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs and served as the 
Ottoman consul in Hamburg, can be regarded as the most ―spectacular‖ scion of an 
Ottoman diplomat
711. Sedad Hakkı Eldem, one of the foremost 20th century Turkish 
architects, was the grandson of Grand Vizier Edhem İbrahim Paşa, a descendant of a late 
Ottoman aristocratic family, and the son of İsmail Hakkı Alişan, who as an official served 
in the Ottoman Foreign Ministry from 1891 to his retirement in 1925
712. The Ertegün 
brothers, the Turkish-American music executives, were the sons of Münir Ertegün, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
emergence of contemporary music in Turkey. Erdem Buri, a pioneering jazz musician, was 
a member of the Samipaşazade family (Kocamemi, Fazıl Bülent, ibid., pp. 172-74). 
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ambassador of Turkey to United States (between 1934 and 1944), who began his career in 
the Ottoman diplomatic service in 1908 just before the Revolution of 1908 and advanced in 
his career due to his impressive legal expertise
713
.   
      Gendering the theme, not unsurprisingly, the same pattern is much more evident in the 
case of the recruitment of females into the modern professions. If providing a good 
education for sons requires a certain level of prosperity, it is much more so for the 
education of daughters. It is, obviously almost impossible for a woman of modest 
upbringing to enter the arts and the modern professions. Thus, early feminists and 
pioneering women in different fields were all the daughters of civil servants. Moreover, 
they were predominantly the daughters of high-ranking bureaucrats and men of 
prominence.
714
  
       It is also very significant to note that, for a long time, Ottoman Muslim medical 
doctors were civil (or predominantly military) servants rather than free professionals. 
Although medical doctors of non-Muslims origins had been practicing their professions 
independently, in the case of medical doctors of Muslim origins, it was the official 
positions where the first medical doctors proved and improved themselves. A similar 
observation is valid for the law and lawyers. Muslims learned the intricacies of modern law 
in governmental offices. The many legal offices of the state established in the Hamidian 
era to apply modern Western laws and to regulate the commercial laws prepared Muslim 
graduates of law faculties to train themselves to be lawyers after gaining experience in 
these offices. The professors of the first universities and high schools of the Ottoman 
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Empire were also predominantly comprised of ex-officials and scions of officials and thus 
academic studies and natural and social sciences were also initiated and advanced by this 
caste, arguably in line with the epistemological premises held by this caste. Thus, the free 
professions of law and medicine and academia developed as apprenticeships with the 
state.
715
   
     Thus, we can argue that the state became the bedrock for free professionals such as 
medical doctors,
716
 lawyers, engineers, pharmacists, and academicians.
717
 It provided not 
only the primitive accumulation of capital for the development of the free professions 
among Muslims but also, due to the origins of the pioneers of these professions, it exported 
the particular cultural, intellectual, and ideological formations welded around it.
718
 
 
 
         4.5. Merry Marriages 
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      Marriages serve a purpose in the establishment and consolidation of elites and elite 
cohesion. Before the advent of the ―love marriage,‖ marriage was an institution of social 
exchange. Daughters and prospective wives were assets to be employed efficiently
719
. 
Marriages were to provide financial means, connections, and entitlement for the father of 
the bride (the owner of the asset) and the groom (purchaser of the asset), and both parties 
would try to maximize their profit by making optimal choices.
720
 One of the functions of 
marriage was the integration of the holders of the financial means into holders of titles of 
social prestige and political power. This was due to the contradictory political/economical 
environment of early modern Europe in an age of capitalist accumulation when the 
economically powerful lacked the means to transfer their financial power into real power 
and the economically vulnerable held political means. Marriages also provided the means 
through which those who wanted to be incorporated into a certain caste could circumvent 
their lack of blue blood lineages.  
      A prevalent pattern of marriage (especially observable in early modern Europe), in 
which both parties were satisfied with the conclusion of the marriage, consisted of an 
arrangement between a son of a socially aspiring and ascending family and a daughter of a 
socially deteriorating family that was superior in social prestige, but inferior in actual 
terms. This pattern of marriage was exercised extensively in ancien régime France, where 
the aristocracy tried to slow its decline, and the bourgeoisie wanted to be ennobled.
721
 
Nevertheless, in stable economic, social, and political environments, the ―normal‖ practice 
of aristocratic marriage was endogamy, sons of nobles marrying daughters of nobles.  
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       Ottoman upper-class marriage patterns had changed from a certain mode of marriage 
in which the marriage was perceived as simply a man‘s taking a woman to maintain his 
lineage to a mode of marriage in which the bride was an asset providing benefits both for 
her father and for the groom. In the Classical Ottoman Age, a man of prominence was to 
marry a modest bride or a freed concubine. This pattern avoided the development of 
aristocratic lineages. This mode of marriage was also compatible with the household 
structuring of the Ottoman polity in which the patriarch of the household was the sole 
authority and the intactness of the households was to be maintained as long as allegiance 
was owed to a single authority. Not unexpectedly, intimate life was the sphere where the 
influence of Westernization and modernization had a very slow and gradual impact.
722
 Old 
marriage patterns, which had persisted for a generation after the Tanzimat, were replaced 
by a new marriage pattern in which marriages were arranged between the scions of two 
equal or compatible families. The marriage connections of Abdülhak Molla‘s family and 
Ahmed Tevfik‘s daughters‘ marriages,723 which will be discussed below, are just two 
prominent examples of this trend. Curiously, although Abdülhak Molla had married a 
woman of respectable descent, his son, Hayrullah Efendi, married a concubine. Likewise, 
Abdüllatif Subhi Pasha was married to a woman of slave origin.724 Nevertheless, these 
were the last and (partially exceptional) examples in the new era of Tanzimat. Tanzimat 
grandees such as Ahmed Midhat Efendi, Abdülhak Hamid, and İbrahim Hakkı were among 
the last sons born to Circassian concubines. Concubinage was seen by the new generation 
as a barbaric anachronism to be eliminated and replaced by affectionate marriage.
725
 As the 
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structures of political legitimacy and the organization of the political order were 
transformed, marriage patterns changed
726
 along the same lines, and a new domestic ideal 
developed.
727
 The new mode of marriage was a derivation of the (European) aristocratic 
endogamous marriage practice in which marriages were arranged between two equal 
parties, or at least between two parties of same origin, unless they were forced to do 
otherwise.
728
 The 19
th
 century European bourgeoisification of marriage partially influenced 
the transformation of 19
th
-century Ottoman marriage patterns as well.
729
 Third-generation 
Tanzimat members were influenced by the idea of bourgeois affectionate marriage (albeit 
limited to the sons of the bureaucratic elite) via French novels (and very early 20
th
 century 
Ottoman novels such as Aşk-ı Memnu and Eylül) and acculturalization. In practice, 
however, marriage patterns continued to replicate those of the earlier generation. At the 
same time, the anachronistic imperial institution of the harem had become an 
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embarrassment to the Ottoman aristocratic elite
730
 and in time led to the dissolution of the 
Hamidian harem by the Young Turks.
731
  
      During the Tanzimat, we observe two general trends of marriage: intermarriages within 
the same social layer and marriages between the scions of two different, but converging 
social groups, e.g., provincial merchants and dynasties with aristocrats in Istanbul. An 
example of the prevalence of this inter-marriage is given from the Abdülhak Molla family. 
Abdülhak Molla, the chief doctor of the palace, was married to the daughter of Naci 
Efendi, the head of the Translation Office and, hence, the aunt of Ahmed Vefik Pasha. 
Nasuhi Bey, the grandson of Abdülhak Molla, the son of Hayrullah Efendi, and the brother 
of Abdülham Hamit, was married to the daughter of Rıza Pasha, the chief of staff. 
Mihrünnisa Hanım, the sister of Nasuhi was married to the son of Fuad Pasha. Therefore, 
Abdülhak Hamid, a descendant of the family, had the chance to work with many of his 
relatives in the diplomatic service. While he was the ambassador to Den Haag, his second 
secretary was one of his relatives by marriage, Mehmed Ali Bey.
732
  These marriages 
reestablished and reproduced the coherence and convergence of the closed circle of the 
Tanzimat elite. In short and with slight nuances, Tanzimat marriages were exclusively 
inter-elite marriages.   
      Some diplomats, such as Ahmed Tevfik Pasha
733
 and Mustafa Reşid Pasha734, arranged 
royal marriages for their sons. Necib Bey, while he was a scribe in the embassy in Paris, 
was married to Mediha Sultan, the daughter of Abdülmecid. Necib Bey became Necib 
Pasha through this marriage. This marriage was probably arranged due to the prestige of 
Abdurrahman Sami Pasha, the father of Necib (and Sezai), a highly respectable and strong 
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personality during the Tanzimat period, who developed an extensive patronage network.
735
 
After the sudden and unexpected death of Necib at an early age, Mediha Sultan married a 
colleague of Necip, Ferid, then a scribe in the embassy in London.
736
 Apparently, this 
marriage enabled young Ferid to be appointed to the Senate after 1908 and facilitated his 
career. Some diplomats married women from non-Ottoman royal families such as Şerif 
Pasha, who married a member of the Kavalalı dynasty.737 Houlusi Foad became part of the 
Kavalalı dynasty by marrying the granddaughter of Ismail Pasha.738 Intra-marriages 
between the members of the diplomatic service were also prevalent. A marriage was 
arranged between Sadullah Pasha‘s granddaughter (Asaf Sadullah‘s daughter) and Tevfik 
Pasha‘s son.739 Abdülhak Hamid arranged the marriage of his daughter to Emin Bey, who 
served in the ministry as ambassador to Teheran (a post once filled by Hayrullah Efendi) 
and Director of Political Affairs
740
. Naum Paşa, the Ottoman ambassador to Paris was 
married to the daughter of Franko Paşa, an undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the sister of Franko Paşa‘s sons who were also serving in the Ottoman 
diplomatic service.
741
 Esat Cemal (Paker), whose memoires will be utilized extensively in 
this study, was married to Osman Hamdi Bey‘s daughter and thus entered a family of 
diplomats.
742
  
      This pattern enabled the unification of a single state aristocratic grouping that 
dominated the high-ranking bureaucratic positions and had the financial means to maintain 
a relatively prosperous lifestyle.  
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      Another area in which the diplomatic service pioneered was marriage to European 
women. One apparent reason for the frequency of marriage to European women was 
because diplomats were not allowed to take their wives with them to the countries in which 
they were serving. The first ambassador to marry a European was İbrahim Haydar Bey, the 
ambassador to Vienna. In 1867, he married a Hungarian woman.
743
 Nevertheless, the 
Ottoman ambassadors and diplomats could not arrange marriages with the daughters of the 
European aristocrats. Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, a member of the Crimean khanate family, 
married the daughter of a Swiss policeman
744
 whom he met in Athens while she was 
working as a governess. She was looked down upon within diplomatic circles because of 
her lower class origins. Likewise, Mustafa Reşid Pasha married an Italian woman of low 
origins, which cost him the ambassadorship to London because the British government did 
not want to include a European woman of low origins in the royal protocol. Mustafa Asım 
Bey, ambassador to Sofia and Teheran and foreign minister for a short time, was married a 
Viennese woman.
745
 Asaf Sadullah, son of Sadullah Pasha and himself also a diplomat, 
was married to a German woman. Celal Münif‘s first wife was American746. İbrahim 
Edhem, who remained a low-ranking official in the headquarters of the ministry in Istanbul 
and in the foreign legations of the Ottoman Empire, married a Frenchwoman
747
. Other 
diplomats married women of better origins.  For example, Mehmed Rifat Pasha married the 
daughter of a Russian general who converted to Islam after the marriage.
748
 In contrast to 
his Muslim colleagues, Musurus Pasha was successful in marrying off his daughter to the 
general secretary of the Italian embassy in London. The son-in-law of Musurus Pasha 
would later be appointed to Istanbul.
749
 Malkom Khan, one-time Persian ambassador to 
                                                 
743
 Kuneralp, Sinan, ―Tanzimat Sonrası Osmanlı Sefirleri,‖ in Soysal, İsmail (ed.), Çağdaş 
Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1997, p. 117. 
744
 Okday, Şefik, ibid, p. 13. 
745
 Lütfi Simavi, Sultan Mehmed Reşad Hanın ve Halifenin Sarayında Gördüklerim, 
Kanaat Kütübhanesi, 1340, p. 96. 
746
 BOA, HR.İM 227/68, 18 July 1928. 
747
 Çankaya, Ali, ibid, vol. III, p. 194. 
748
 Çankaya, Ali, ibid, v. III, p. 92; Kuneralp, Sinan, ibid, p. 117. 
749
 Abdülhak Hamid… p. 177. 
266 
 
Istanbul and London, an Armenian convert to Islam, and the pioneer of Persian reforms 
married a woman from the Dadyan family while he was serving in Istanbul and became the 
son-in-law of the Dadyan family.
750
 
       The Ottoman Foreign Ministry resembled Austria in that it enjoyed the fruits of 
favorable marriages. Although it is beyond the capabilities of the author to list 
comprehensively the marriage patterns of the diplomats, the anecdotal evidence shows 
three things. Firstly, the diplomats entered into auspicious marriages and, thus, established 
good connections. Secondly, intra-marriage within the group (in-marriage) was common. 
Thirdly, diplomacy turned into a family profession in which succeeding generations were 
recruited into the diplomatic service. The genealogical continuity of the cadres of the 
ministry was partially explained by the marriage patterns.
751
 
 
 
4.6. Fortunate Sons 
 
      Osman Hamdi‘s father, Ibrahim Edhem, served as ambassador to Berlin in 1879 and 
ambassador to Vienna between 1879 and 1882. Originally a Greek from Chios, he was 
captured, enslaved, and sold to Hüsrev Pasha, who sent him to Paris to study mining 
engineering. His skills led him to appointments to various posts from the military to 
diplomacy in addition to his later political appointments as the Grand Vizier, minister of 
foreign affairs, and minister of the interior. He raised sons who rose to prominence. Osman 
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Hamdi‘s ―brothers served the state in various capacities…While his brother Mustafa 
became a customs agent and his brother Galip Ibrahim became the first Ottoman 
numismatist, his youngest brother, Halil (Edhem), followed in Osman Hamdi‘s footsteps as 
assistant director of the museum after the latter‘s death in 1910. He later played a 
significant role in the transition of Ottoman cultural institutions in the Turkish Republic 
and served as a member of parliament from 1923 until his death in 1935.‖752 Osman 
Hamdi, who probably spoke French at home in his childhood, developed his interest in the 
arts thanks to the high-level administrative posts of his father. Cosmopolitanism, fluency in 
French, encounters with ―Western culture‖, and more importantly, connections and 
financial means were bestowed by the mechanisms of officialdom. Osman Hamdi‘s 
refinement and elegance is a perfect example of the creation of a self-made and self-styled 
aristocracy in two generations.  
       Osman Hamdi‘s entry into the world of the arts was possible within this environment 
and set of circumstances. He could renounce a fine career the bureaucracy offered him. He 
was sent to Paris to study law. ―However, he soon decided to pursue his interest in painting 
instead, left the law program, and trained under the French Orientalist painters Jean-Léon 
Gérome and Gustave Bolunager.‖ He was called back to Istanbul by his father, who was 
concerned by his son‘s turning into a vagabond in Paris,753 When Osman Hamdi returned 
to Istanbul from Paris, where he had a fanciful and uncommon life, he was posted to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he was appointed to several positions. He also served 
for one year in Baghdad in the retinue of Governor Midhad Pasha. It was not yet 
acceptable for a scion of a high-ranking Ottoman bureaucrat to live completely out of the 
world and shelter of the government. Furthermore, there was as yet no social sphere in 
which a Muslim could make such a living. Thus, Osman Hamdi pursued the career of a 
typical official. In 1881, he was appointed as the director of the imperial museum. He 
became the director of the Academy of Fine Arts and thus combined his interests and his 
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responsibilities to the public and to the family name.
754
  Moreover, the first artists 
perceived their art and profession as being in line with their political loyalty to the state 
(and the nation embodied within the state).
755
 The process whereby artists began 
questioning their innate loyalty to the state and became (at least moderate and loyalist) 
dissenters began only after the 1908 Revolution. Even after that, the artists and men of 
letters never equaled the level of radicalism and dissent of their European and Russian 
counterparts.       
     This was particularly true because serving in state service was inherited from the 
family. It was not perceived as a career or a profession. It was rather the habitus in which 
fortunate sons felt comfortable and which they did not easily or voluntarily leave.  Many 
sons followed in their father‘s footsteps.  Mehmed Cemil, the son of Mustafa Reşid Pasha, 
served as the ambassador to Paris three different times over a 3-year period and was 
appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1872.  Two sons of Mustafa Reşid, 
Mehmed Cemil and Ali Galip, served as Ministers of Foreign Affairs for very brief 
periods. Mustafa Reşid Pasha‘s two grandsons, Mehmed Tevfik and another, Mustafa 
Reşid Beyefendi, also served in the Hamidian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Istanbul. Fuad 
Pasha‘s son, İzzet Fuad Pasha, was the ambassador to Madrid between 1900 and 1908.  
Celal Münif, son of Münif Pasha, became a career diplomat serving in various posts in 
Ottoman embassies abroad before being appointed as the Director of Protocol of the 
Republican Foreign Ministry in 1924.
756
 Arifi Pasha‘s son, Mustafa Şekip Bey, was the 
ambassador to Stockholm. Given that Arifi Pasha‘s father, Şekip Pasha, was also an 
ambassador and later Minister of Foreign Affairs, three generations of the family worked 
in the ministry. Individuals in two different generations held the position of foreign 
minister. Four Franko brothers, Yusuf, Nasri, Fethi, and Feyzi, were sons of the former 
governor of Lebanon, Franko Pasha, and served in the Ministry simultaneously. Mustafa 
                                                 
754
 Shaw, Wendy, ibid, p. 99. 
755
 For this transformation, see Artun, Deniz, ibid. 
756
 Budak, Ali, Münif Paşa, İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2004, p. 86; Abdülhak Hamid… 
p 357. 
269 
 
Reşid and Yusuf Ziya, Agah Efendi and Şakir Pasha, and Ahmed Cevad and Şakir were 
brothers who both served as ambassadors
757
.  
     As pointed out previously, genealogical continuity was particularly prevalent in the 
non-Muslim officials. Kostaki and Stefanaki were father and son ambassadors to London. 
The embassy to London operated practically as the private property of the Musurus family 
until 1874, when all the officials in the embassy were relatives of Kostaki Musurus Pasha. 
The staff included the ambassador Stefanaki Musurus Pasha, his brother, his two sons, and 
his son-in-law.
758
 The military attaché appointed in 1874 was the first non-Musurus 
recruitment. The state of affairs at the London embassy, the privileges held by Musurus 
Pasha, and the appointment of his son Maurus can be seen as artifacts of the pre-modern 
practice of giving posts as family possessions. Artin Dadyan, the long-time secretary 
general of the Ministry of Foreign Ministry, recruited his son, Diran, into the ministry. 
Diran worked as an administrative official in the ministry in Istanbul
759. Artin Dadyan‘s 
brother, Arakil, also briefly served as translator in the embassy in Paris.
760
 Hrant 
Noradonkyan, whose brother Gabriel Noradonkyan was the grey eminence of the ministry, 
also served in the ministry as assistant counselor in the Legal Council
761
. Hırant, the son of 
Sahak Abro who was also the long-time Head of the Office of Foreign Correspondence, 
became a preeminent legal expert in the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs
762
. Naum 
Paşa‘s son also entered the Ottoman diplomatic service763. The same was true for Said Bey, 
the son of Jewish Davud Efendi, the long time chief translator of the Ministry of Foreign 
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Affairs.
764
 Ahmet Rüstem, the Ottoman ambassador to Washington, was the son of the 
Polish aristocrat, émigré, and convert, (Nihad) Bilinski, who also served in the Ottoman 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
765
. 
    Asaf Sadullah, Sadullah Pasha‘s son, worked as the secretary in the Berlin embassy 
while his father was the ambassador to Berlin. Nusret Sadullah, another son of Sadullah 
Pasha, who became the ambassador to Den Haag in 1915, appears to be an exception to the 
absence of European-style ―monarchism‖. He resigned from the diplomatic service after 
the proclamation of the Republic due to his loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty and went into 
self-exile in Nice, where the members of the Ottoman dynasty had settled. Abdülhak 
Hüseyin, the son of Abdülhak Hamid, began his diplomatic career in Den Haag and 
London working with his father
766
 and died while he was the charge d‘affaires in 
Washington during World War I after replacing Ambassador Ahmed Rüstem.  Mehmed 
Su‘ad, who served in the offices of the Legal Councilor and the Translation Office, was the 
son of Asım Pasha, a Minister of Foreign Affairs for Abdülhamid, and was not a career 
diplomat.
767
  
     This pattern was not unique to the Ottoman case. On the contrary, the Ottomans 
reproduced the European pattern. In France, ―(t)he profession could at one time have been 
considered a kind of caste…an aristocracy that was permitted to elect its own 
members…There have been in France, both before and since the Revolution, dynasties of 
diplomats…There have also been instances of brothers following parallel diplomatic 
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careers.‖768 In Austria-Hungary, ―employment in the foreign service was almost a family 
affair. Indeed, once a new family had gained a foothold in the Foreign Ministry it was 
almost a rule that the sons, even the grandsons, remained in this profession.‖769 In the 
Netherlands, offices were ―handed down from father to son, uncle to nephew.‖770 In 
Russia, ―(p)laces in the diplomatic corps were generally reserved for men born into the 
gentry. In fact, a diplomatic career was often passed down through the family.‖771 In short, 
genealogical continuity was a European-wide phenomenon. ―These (Foreign Office-DG) 
staffs were small and their members personally known to their chiefs. Gradually, positions 
came to be handed down from generation to generation. The same family names appeared-
fathers and sons, brothers, uncles and nephews. There were many ‗closed shops.‘ 
Successive generations of civil servants were often related to one another through descent 
or marriage.‖772 The genealogical continuity was a corollary of the aristocratic quality of 
the diplomatic services. Though, many ―diplomatic dynasties‖  lacked impressive 
aristocratic credentials, they became de facto magnate families or nobles of the robe in the 
19
th
 century style by associating themselves with the most prestigious offices of the states 
and became families of prominence. This was especially the case in France, where some 
dynastic families of the foreign office were of middle class origin. State service was an 
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elite-processing mechanism converting aristocracies of lineage to state aristocracies 
creating their own aristocratic lineages. 
 
 
4.7. The Legacy of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry 
 
       Needless to say, genealogical continuity survived the Empire. Salih Münir Pasha‘s 
nephew, Melih Esenbel, served as Turkey‘s long-time ambassador to Washington, 
ambassador to Tokyo, the general secretary of the ministry, and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
for a very short while. Diplomacy was a family business on Melih Esenbel‘s father‘s side, 
as well. His maternal grandfather, Şemsettin Ziya, a descendant of the Ramazanoğulları, 
was another Hamidian diplomat.  Melih Esenbel was the product of an intra-marriage 
within the diplomatic service given that there were diplomats on both sides of the family.  
      Selim Sarper, Turkey‘s ambassador to Rome and Moscow, secretary general of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Foreign Minister between 1960 and 1962, was the 
nephew of Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu.  Yüksel Söylemez, the son of a nephew of Galip 
Kemali was another diplomat raised in the family. Hüsrev Gerede, military officer-turned- 
diplomat during the Republic, who served in the key post of ambassador to Berlin during 
World War II, was the son-in-law of Söylemezoğlu. However, the diplomatic genealogy of 
the family began not from Galip Kemali but from Kabuli Pasha, the father of Galip 
Kemali, who served as ambassador to Vienna.  Seyfullah Esin, a descendant of both 
Sadullah Pasha and Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu, served as ambassador to Bonn, Cairo, 
and the United States. Seyfullah Esin was married to Emel Esin, who was the daughter of 
Ahmed Ferit Tek, a Young Turk who became a career diplomat in the Republic, serving as 
ambassador to London, Warsaw, and Tokyo.  
     We meet the Uşaklıgil family again in the marriage of Cevat Açıkalın, the influential 
secretary-general of Minister of Foreign Affairs
773
 and son of Ali Cevad, the imperial 
secretary to Abdülhamid, to Mevhibe Uşaklıgil, the sister of Latife, the niece of Halid 
Ziya, and the aunt of Bülent Uşaklıgil. Cevad Ezine, the late Ottoman and early Republican 
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ambassador and a descendant of a prominent family from Ezine (a town in the Çanakkale 
province of modern Turkey) married the daughter of the illustrious Halil Edhem Bey and 
became the son-in-law of an aristocratic Istanbuliot Ottoman family. These two marriages 
were examples of the incorporation of two diverse elites. Hulusi Fuad Tugay, the son of 
Deli Fuad Pasha and himself served as an ambassador of Turkey, married the 
granddaughter of Khedive Ismail Pasha and son of Mahmud Muhtar Pasha, the Ottoman 
military commander and the ambassador to Berlin between 1913 and 1915.
774
 This 
marriage was yet another marriage which connected diverse elites. The Republican cadres 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to be the scions of late Ottoman civil servants. 
Prominent figures of the Republican diplomatic service such as Fatin Rüşdü Zorlu (and his 
brother Rıfkı Rüşdü Zorlu), Muharrem Nuri Birgi (and many other prominent ambassadors 
such as Nureddin Vergin, İsmail Erez, Pertev Subaşı and Nüzhet Kandemir) were 
descendants of Ottoman pashas.
775
 Hasan Esat Işık, the ambassador to Paris and Moscow, 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Defense, was the son of Mehmed Esat 
(Işık), one of the pioneering medical (military) doctors and medical bureaucrats of the 
Ottoman Empire. Among others, Süreyya Anderiman, the Republican ambassador to 
Tokyo, was the son of Mehmed Süreyya Bey,776 who began his diplomatic career in 1892 
and served as Ottoman consul and ambassadorial secretary in various posts throughout the 
Hamidian era before becoming the Director of Protocol in the Republican ministry in 1931. 
Mustafa Reşid Paşa‘s son, Basri Reşid Danişment, was also a Republican ambassador. 
Sons of Ottoman figures as diverse as Tunalı Hilmi (İnsan Tunalı), Ebubekir Hazım 
(Tepeyran) (Celal Hazım Tepeyran), Ali Kemal (Zeki Kuneralp), Bursalı Mehmed Tahir 
Bey (Bedri Tahir Şaman), Ali Fuat (Türkgeldi) (Âli Türkgeldi) and the grandsons of Kamil 
Pasha (Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Hilmi Kamil Bayur), Tunuslu Hayreddin Paşa, Fuad Paşa 
(Şevket Fuad Keçeci being the grandson of both Fuad Paşa and Tunuslu Hayreddin Paşa), 
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Halil Rıfat Pasha (Fuad Simavi777) İbrahim Edhem Pasha (Sadi Eldem)778 and Ali Kemal 
(Selim Kuneralp, son of Zeki Kuneralp) served as Republican diplomats and 
ambassadors.
779
 
     In short, the degree of continuity of the cadres of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
terms of blood lineages from Empire to the Republic is enormous. It has been argued 
previously that the critical threshold of the founding of Turkish modernity and the modern 
state was surpassed by the Tanzimat and Hamidian elite and that there was continuity from 
the Hamidian aristocratic culture to the Republican culture with certain breaks and 
alterations. This continuity can be established not only in ideological terms, but also in 
genealogical sense. 
     The ―imagined state elite‖ persisted in holding the major positions within the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. The idea of the state for the members of this elite was not an external 
reality. On the contrary, the state was part of their daily life. The state was a concrete and 
intimate reality. It was not sacred and transcendental.
780
 On the contrary, it was very real 
and familiar. It was their own. The state was internalized, familiarized, and personalized. 
The state was not something to which they should be servile, but the pivotal symbol of 
their sense of belonging and the safe harbor in which they felt secure. It was the polar star 
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in their mental cosmology which made them confident in the eternity of the universe and 
provided ontological security.
781
 From this ―cultural intimacy‖, they also invented a 
national imagination which linked the state, the nation, and themselves and attributed the 
nation ―national characteristics‖ they themselves attained themselves in their habitus.  
     The state became more ―sacred‖ and ―transcendental‖ in the 20th century as the 
bureaucracy became more formalized, depersonalized, and defamiliarized, and thus state 
lost its humane touch and its immediate proximity. The state also lost its embeddedness 
within the culture of a certain class formation. It lost its very personalized aspects and its 
emotional contact with its constituency. It ceased to be flesh and blood although the very 
19
th
 century perception of the state persisted in the minds of the state elite who exported 
this perception of the state to masses.
782
 Thus, a certain imagery was disseminated. It was 
no coincidence that the Republican Ministry of Foreign Affairs was one of the institutions 
that was able to partially avoid formalization and anonymization. It could keep its corps 
d‘esprit, retain the ―closed shop‖ nature of the 19th - century (Ottoman) bureaucratic 
habitus, and be harbinger of a (state-centric) distinct nationalism and national imagination 
embedded within a certain culturalization.   
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          CHAPTER V 
 
 THE ROUTINE OF THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE AND ITS ENCOUNTERS 
ABROAD 
 
5.1. Defending the Hamidian Autocracy Abroad 
 
       A habitual assumption regarding the cadres of Foreign Ministry is that they are 
primarily interested in ―international‖ affairs, unlike the other bureaucratic offices. 
However, only a small percentage of the office work of the Foreign Ministry relates to the 
conduct of foreign relations. This is true for all foreign ministries, but it was much more so 
regarding the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. The chief tasks of the Ottoman Ministry were the 
supervision of the activities of Ottoman nationals and especially the activities of the 
dissidents and non-Muslims abroad, the tracking of the local press‘s commentaries 
regarding the Ottoman Empire and the sultan, in addition to many technical matters, such 
as the pursuit of the commercial and legal rights of Ottoman residents abroad. In short, in 
an age of internationalization, or in Hobsbawms‘s Age of Empire , foreign policy was not a 
matter of technicality in isolation from domestic politics and political struggles. The 
Ottoman representatives were not mere technicians, but civil servants whose duties and 
policies were shaped by the domestic concerns of the Hamidian regime. A separation of 
foreign policy and internal policy was untenable. However,  the diplomatic service was not 
a garrison of the Hamidian regime, either. In some ways, the Ottoman diplomats were at 
the very center of the Hamidian political structures, given their representation of the 
Hamidian establishment abroad. Yet, given their closeness to the international world, they 
constituted a privileged small group freed from the restraints of the Hamidian 
establishment.    
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       Different embassies specialized in the pursuit of different national dissident groups. 
For example, the correspondence of the embassy to Washington abounds with 
documentation of the activities of the Armenians, whether they were dissidents or not. Not 
only did the bulk of the diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and United 
States consist of the status of missionary schools and the problems deriving from the legal 
problems faced by Armenians in obtaining American citizenship, but we also observe that 
the Ottoman embassy to Washington‘s specific task was the monitoring of Armenian 
activities (rallies, demonstrations, publications, organizational works) in the United States. 
Although the tracking of Armenians residing in the United States had been a regular 
activity of the embassy in Washington prior to 1890, with the rupture of the Armenian 
insurgencies, it became the principal preoccupation of the embassy. Prior to 1890, 
dispatches written by the embassy remained infrequent. These dispatches were written 
down not for urgent matters, but as regular dispatches every two weeks or so. With the 
explosion of the Armenian insurgency, the embassy to Washington‘s workload increased 
drastically. 
     These dispatches included the regular supervision of the Armenian press in the United 
States
783
 with a specific focus on the New-York based Haik
784
, a close surveillance of the 
American press and their commentaries on the Armenian events, the writing of disclaimers 
to the relevant newspapers to be printed, and the lobbying of congressmen with pamphlets, 
et cetera. In 1896, the tekzips (disclaimers) had been gathered and published as a separate 
pamphlet to be distributed to congressmen.
785
 In 1890, the embassy submitted a 
comprehensive report, an overview of the Armenian press in the United States
786
. It was 
recommended in 1896 that some American newspapers, such as the New York Herald
787
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and the Washington Post
788
, be denied entry to the Ottoman Empire due to the insulting 
pictures they published regarding the Armenian events. The embassy also regretted that the 
unfounded reports relayed by the Armenian press had been publicized by the American 
newspapers.
789
 As counter-propaganda, texts written by the Matbuat-ı Ecnebiye Kalemi 
(Office of Foreign Press) were published in the American media.
790
 In this regard, Ahmed 
Rüstem Bey, who was appointed as the ambassador in Washington in 1914 but who had 
been working in the Washington embassy in various posts previously, was the Turkish 
diplomat who did the most to combat the negative propaganda. He actively pursued a 
counter-propaganda policy by publishing articles in prominent American newspapers and 
making statements to the American newspapers. His Polish origins and European erudition 
should have facilitated his communication with Westerners and allowed his skills to 
impress and convince them.
791
 Reports also summarized the articles printed in prominent 
newspapers. For example, the embassy noted in 1895 that the newspaper ―Sun‖ had argued 
that the Armenians were victorious vis-a-vis the Ottoman state with regard to their 
improved relations with the European powers.
792
 The embassy also dispatched the 
publications of Armenian newspapers to Istanbul. As an example of the dangerous deeds of 
the Armenian press based in New York and in other cities, the embassy noted that the 
Armenian press in the United States had requested Britain to be involved in Armenian 
affairs in order to protect the rights and interests of the Armenian people.
793
  
       As the principal concern of the Ottoman Empire in its diplomatic relations with the 
United States of America was Armenian affairs, the predominant preoccupation in the 
diplomatic correspondence of the USA with the Ottoman Empire was the same as can be 
gathered from the yearbooks ―Foreign Relations of the United States‖. The number of 
documents regarding diplomatic relations with ―Turkey‖ included in the yearbooks is very 
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small vis-a-vis the excessive amount of documents on other European and Latin American 
countries. Furthermore, no political report of ―Turkey‖ was seen as necessary to be 
included in the yearbooks. The selected dispatches written from Washington to the 
embassy in Istanbul and from the embassy in Istanbul to Washington were covering the 
problems the missionaries and their schools (especially the Euphrates College in Harpoot) 
were facing. The selected documents were on the ―maltreatment‖ and ―murderous attacks‖ 
on the Armenians. Also, a lot of paperwork was devoted to the naturalization of Armenian 
residents of Ottoman nationality, and the problems the naturalized Armenians residing in 
America were facing regarding inheritances and legal rights
794
. In short, the diplomatic 
relations with America meant predominantly ―Armenian dissidence‖ for the Ottoman 
diplomatic service.
795
 It was no coincidence that Ahmed Rüstem Bey, after serving long in 
the embassy to Washington, wrote a book in Switzerland defending the Ottoman policies 
regarding the massacres of 1915.     
       Of course, although dominated by Armenian-related activities, the only occupation of 
the embassy was not police work. The embassy regularly reported the latest developments 
in the American political system. A regular report in 1898 informed Istanbul about the 
aggression between Nicaragua and Costa Rica which could have triggered a war between 
those two countries.
796
  The embassy also followed the crisis over the Panama Channel in 
1903 and the involvement of the United States in these affairs that resulted in the 
independence of Panama from Colombia.
797
 The embassy also relayed information about 
South American politics since South American politics constituted the main interest of the 
United States government in international politics. Several reports informed Istanbul on the 
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international and domestic politics of countries such as Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia, and 
Mexico. 
       As the embassy in Washington was specialized in the pursuit of Armenian activities, 
the embassy in Rome was specialized in monitoring Albanian dissidents or ―potential‖ 
dissidents. There was no timeframe in which the preoccupation of the pursuit of dissidents 
increased significantly. On the contrary, this was a constant concern. From the 1870s 
onward, there was a continuous concern about Albanian activities in Italy (as well as in 
Austria, Greece and to a lesser extent in Romania). The level of vigilance remained 
constant before the Albanian rebellion of 1911 when the Albanian problem turned out to be 
a primary and immediate concern for Istanbul.  
       In contrast to the Armenian activities in United States, the Albanian dissidence in Italy 
was disorganized and personal. However, that does not mean that the embassy in Rome 
was less concerned as the routine dispatches reporting the latest Albanian activities 
demonstrate. It was one of the main tasks of the embassy although in contrast to the 
embassy in Washington reporting Albanian dissidence comprised a relatively insignificant 
portion of the immense load of paperwork.  
       A report in 1886 relayed that the Albanian émigré community in Bari was trying to 
finance a newspaper and an institute in the Albanian language.
798
 The embassy was 
particularly alarmed when in 1880, two Albanian dissidents, Ali Hilmi and Süleyman 
Sami, moved from Athens to Rome. The embassies in both capitals sent dispatches 
relaying their information on these dissidents. The dissidents were chased in Rome.
799
 
Suspicions were raised that they would move to Vienna. However, in the end the dissidents 
asked for permission to return to the Ottoman Empire after failing to advance their 
activities.  
       The task of the embassy was much simpler because the Albanians in Italy lived on 
their own and were not in regular contact with the indigenous people and the leaders of 
public opinion. In short, although the occupation of the embassy in Washington was a 
sophisticated and multi-faceted job, the job of the embassy in Rome remained a policing 
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activity. As pointed out above, the embassy had much more political obligations and 
important duties such as following the Italian intentions with regard to the Ottoman Empire 
and with regard to the other European powers. The other embassies which were occupied 
with the Albanian dissidence were Athens, Bucharest, and Vienna.  
       One of the main preoccupations of the embassies was the portrayal of the Ottoman 
Empire in the press. All the embassies were equally concerned with the advancement of the 
image of the Ottoman Empire. Of course, the general perception and portrayal of the 
Ottoman Empire was negative, and this was perceived as a principal threat to the interests 
of the Empire. Of course, embassies were not only relaying information on the mood of the 
local press. They were also active in changing and transforming the negative presentation 
of the Ottoman Empire. For example, a dispatch from the embassy informed Istanbul that a 
newly founding Vienna-based newspaper was planning to employ a correspondent in 
Istanbul, and the embassy requested/suggested that the Ministry be involved in the process 
so that the future correspondent would be sympathetic to the Ottoman Empire.
800
 Every 
embassy was so paranoid about the negative coverage of the Ottoman Empire in their local 
press that a dispatch from Vienna portrayed the press of Vienna as ―the center of the anti-
Ottoman coverage in Europe‖.801  
       It has to be said that it was Abdülhamid who had aspired to influence, lead, and 
manipulate the Western press after the relatively passive stance of his predecessors. His 
personal policy of developing contacts with Western correspondents had brought up a 
general concern for struggling with and manipulating Western media. The interest in the 
foreign press was a top-to-bottom affair. Abdülhamid‘s first act in this issue was trying to 
influence English public opinion by publishing the letters of Admiral Hobart in the 
prestigious newspaper, The Times, in 1877.
802
 Abdülhamid developed close relations with 
the correspondents in Istanbul. In 1878, he awarded Ottoman insignia to three of the seven 
French correspondents resident in Istanbul.
803
 Since then, he continued to follow the 
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Western press coverage personally.
804
 Although Abdülhamid had established a bureau in 
the Yıldız Palace to follow foreign press coverage, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
always active in tracking the foreign coverage and taking action when necessary. 
       The issue of ―public opinion‖ became an obsession throughout the reign of 
Abdülhamid. We know that ―public opinion‖ became a novel factor to be considered and if 
possible controlled by the reign of Mahmud II.
805
 Throughout the Tanzimat, with the 
emergence of newspapers, it became apparent that public opinion had become a significant 
factor that had to be dealt with accordingly. For the first time, subjects and the minds of 
those subjects were a matter of concern. The idiom ―efkar-ı umumiye‖ emerged and 
assumed a great importance.
806
 The state was obliged to measure, respond to, and lead 
public opinion. This concern became almost an obsession for Abdülhamid.  
      Newspapers were treated as acid tests of public opinion. In fact, excerpts from 
newspapers were not only sent to Istanbul as ―annexes‖ to dispatches, but also comprised 
the bulk of the dispatches themselves. Sometimes, insignificant and minor press coverage 
caused scandals and uproars and caused a heavy load of dispatches to be sent from both 
Istanbul and the embassy in question. Nevertheless, in the diplomatic dispatches, it was 
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elections which were seen as the primary (and direct) manifestations of public opinion.
807
 
The diplomatic service was underlining the role of public opinion expressed via political 
parties and via other means of the expression of public opinion. The anti-Ottoman mood of 
the public in Britain during the Russo-Turkish War had left a devastating impact on the 
Ottoman diplomatic service. For this reason, party politics in Britain was carefully 
followed. Reports on the party lines and positions were meticulously dispatched to Istanbul 
from Britain. A comparable concern regarding partisan divisions and disputes was also 
displayed in France, Italy, and other parliamentary regimes. Unsurprisingly, the 
correspondence from the embassies in Germany and Russia lacked tracking of a ―public 
opinion‖.  
      Ironically, Britain was the country where artificial manipulation of public opinion was 
least possible due to its developed civil society and open public political debates. It was 
also the country where public opinion exerted the most pressure on the foreign policy of 
the British cabinet. Knowing this, the Ottoman diplomatic corps showed a special concern 
for public opinion in Britain as became clear from the long reports assigned to it.
808
 
Paradoxically, although it was least likely to influence public opinion in Britain via 
authorized publications, paying affiliated journalists, and other ―artificial‖ means, it was in 
Britain where the most effort was exerted and the incomparably highest expenditures were 
made.     
       With the emergence of the Armenian events in the 1890s, this issue began to haunt all 
the embassies
809
. Although the massacres caused diplomatic tensions, the most disturbing 
repercussion of the events was the uproar of the public opinion and the press rather than 
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the relatively mild reactions of the European governments. All the embassies struggled 
with the growing bad reputation. The severest pressure was on the shoulders of the 
embassy in London as the British had the most organized and most outspoken civil society 
with Protestant/humanitarian reflexes
810
. Moreover, the Bulgarian atrocities had displayed 
the enormous role of public opinion and public agitation in the making of foreign policy in 
Britain.
811
 The embassies felt a strong urge to defend the empire‘s honor and their own 
although this experience also instigated an escalating reaction to the sultan‘s corrupt 
reputation in the eyes of the diplomatic service. The Young Turks in exile also cultivated 
contradictory sentiments regarding the Armenian events. They oscillated between 
cooperating with the Armenian organizations in Europe and defending the actions of the 
Ottoman government as legitimate self-defense against a bloody insurrection.
812
   
       From 1890 onwards, the embassies dispatched an abundant number of reports related 
to the Armenian problem. Four embassies were sending by far the highest number of 
reports on the issue: the embassies to St. Petersburg, Washington, London, and Paris. As 
mentioned above, these reports constituted the main paperwork of the embassy to 
Washington whereas the ―Armenian work‖ was one of the main activities in the other three 
embassies. The importation of any publication into the Ottoman Empire that reported on 
the Armenian issue was to be prevented. Therefore, the embassies informed on the harmful 
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contents of publications and proposed the prohibition of publications or certain issues of 
publications in the Ottoman Empire.
813
 It is not surprising to observe that the embassies in 
Vienna and Berlin did not find much to report to Istanbul. In the Hamidian era, Berlin and 
Vienna emerged as two reliable and unwavering allies of the Ottoman Empire in which any 
kind of unruly or seditious activity of dissent was not permitted or sympathized with. On 
the contrary, the German diplomatic service even requested friendly countries such as 
Switzerland to disallow any activity of the Ottoman dissidents within their territories
814
. 
Although the number of dispatches on the Armenian issue erupted in 1890, after the 
quietening of the Armenian events in the late 1890s, dispatches of the same ilk continued 
to be sent until 1908. Only a slight decrease is observable after the pacification of the 
Armenian problem in the late 1890s. In the eyes of the diplomats and the center, the affair 
had calmed down only temporarily, and therefore vigilance and readiness for a prospective 
eruption of the affair had to be maintained. This shows the extent of the impact the 
Armenian phenomenon had on the psyche of the Ottoman center. It may be also argued 
that the constant Armenian threat and subversiveness nurtured the development of a sense 
of ―we‖ against ―them‖ (Armenians), and subsequently this sense of ―we‖ was transferred 
into an awareness of Turkishness, the only loyal element within the Ottoman Empire.  
       Ottoman officialdom kept its level of vigilance and alarm regarding the Armenian 
problem. Armenians abroad continued to be monitored and their activities reported. All the 
Armenians, whether they were students, peasants, people seeking their fortune, or political 
activists, were individually identified by files containing short biographies and information 
about their physical appearances. The movements of Armenians (especially when in 
groups) were followed and reported. In that regard, the Ottoman representatives abroad 
displayed the quick consolidation of a modern state seeking to know its own subjects in 
detail, given that in the Ottoman Empire citizenship had only been established in 1869. 
Nevertheless, the dimensions and effort of documenting and identifying were at a very 
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modest scale in comparison to the provincial administrative offices from which reports and 
dispatches identifying and documenting were flowing abundantly.  
 
 
5.2. Opposing Young Turks 
 
       Apparently, the activities of the Young Turks were another issue to be addressed by 
the Ottoman foreign representatives. Regular reports on the activities of the Young Turks 
and informative memoranda were continuously sent from the embassies to Istanbul.
815
 The 
rich reports on the activities of the Young Turks and analyses of their personalities took a 
considerable amount of ambassadorial and consular work. When Ali Haydar Midhat, the 
son of Midhat Pasha, left İzmir for Paris for subversive activity, he was contacted by the 
relevant Ottoman representatives personally both in Athens and Marseilles.
816
 One report 
just after the move of Kemal Bey, the grandson of Midhat Pasha, to France, suggested that 
Kemal Bey‘s participation in the Young Turks should be avoided, by employment abroad 
if necessary.
817
 Ahmed Rıza Bey, İsmail Kemal, Ali Nuri (Gustaf Noring), and Edhem 
Nuri were the figures whose activities were most frequently reported.
818
 However, 
Mahmud Celaladdin Pasha who joined the Young Turks in Paris was the dissident who 
was most carefully and exhaustively followed and tracked at every opportunity. Loads of 
reports were amassed and dispatched to Istanbul.
819
 His desertion to the Young Turks 
shocked and panicked Abdülhamid and his establishment. The scare Mahmud Celaleddin‘s 
desertion evoked reverberated in the continent wide communications concerning Mahmud 
Celaleddin. All the Ottoman diplomatic legations were on the alert for the possible moves 
of the renegade spy master. His short stay in Greece to get into contact with the Albanian 
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revolutionary committees organized by Ismail Kemal who voyaged to Corfu from Southern 
Albania created an immense uproar. His activities in Greece created a continent wide alert 
in the Ottoman legations. His journey was reported day-to-day by the relevant 
representatives. His short stay alarmed Istanbul. The Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
tried every means to persuade the Greek government to expel the renegade spy master. The 
rebuff of the Greek government was regretted by Rifaat Bey, the ambassador to Athens 
who admitted that Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha was a figure of sympathy for journalists, 
parliamentarians, and even ministers. He also related the negative response of the Greek 
authorities, who asserted that such an expulsion would be contrary to the spirit of their 
constitution. Thus, concluded Rifaat Bey, who was desperate to accomplish the tasks given 
to him, Greece provides ―liberty of action to the anarchists‖. Nevertheless, at the end, 
Mahmud Celaleddin was forced to leave Greece, not for his ―anarchist activities‖ but ―out 
of his own will‖ as imposed by the Greek government. His departure from Greece via 
Corfu was instantly communicated to Istanbul with relief by Rifaat Bey who got definite 
information from the consul general of the Ottoman Empire in Corfu. He landed in 
Brindisi, and this was reported by the Ottoman embassy in Rome. Simultaneously, Salih 
Münir Bey, the ambassador to France was informed that Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha might 
be on his way to France. The exchange of dispatches included brainstorming on how to 
react to Mahmud Celaleddin‘s prospective arrival in France. The embassy in Rome kept 
Istanbul informed continuously until Mahmud Celaleddin left Italy for Switzerland. His 
activities in Switzerland, where he tried to organize the Young Turks in Geneva under his 
leadership, were followed very closely by the Ottoman consul general in Geneva, Baron 
Richthofen. Baron Richthofen sent regular and bulky reports to Istanbul on the moves of 
Mahmud Celaleddin. 
      The principal reason for the panic that emerged with the desertion of Mahmud 
Celaleddin was the sympathy expressed by European public opinion towards him. The 
European press portrayed Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha as a liberal and an able opponent of 
Abdülhamid who might challenge and seize his authority as he was acknowledged to be 
capable of such a takeover due to his impressive political background, intellectual 
credentials, and royal marriage.    
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       Since his pro-British sympathies were well known, Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha 
contacted Britain support. These maneuvers alarmed Abdülhamid who feared Mahmud 
Celaleddin would ―translat(e) it into a movement of the pro-British wing of the Ottoman 
bureaucracy and instructed Ottoman diplomats to scrutinize the affairs of his brother in-
law. Later, the palace tempted Damad Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha to return with an offer of 
£ 50,000 and shares in the concession that he had been trying to acquire for a British 
company. Later in England, Anthopulos Pasha made him a new offer, and finally Turhan 
Pasha added some inducement in order to persuade him to return.‖820 Although 
Abdülhamid failed to convince his brother in-law to return, his diplomatic efforts enabled 
the British to give a cold reception to his request for support. Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha‘s 
efforts to seek assistance from Germany and France also failed. Mahmud Celaleddin‘s 
desertion resulted in one of the most coordinated and extensive flurries of Ottoman 
diplomatic activity involving various diplomatic posts in Europe.   
       Although regular reporting of the subversive activities of the Young Turks was a 
permanent task of the diplomatic representatives, the number of reports on subversive 
activities exploded in 1898 and declined by 1905. The years 1900, 1901, and 1902 were 
years of heightened panic and tension as we can observe from the unprecedented amount 
of work devoted to the subversive activities in these three years. These years were also the 
years of Abdülhamid‘s aggressive purge of the Young Turks. After Abdülhamid 
successfully countered the Young Turks, things calmed down from 1902 onwards. 
Nevertheless, the tracking of any Ottoman citizen within the area of responsibility of any 
diplomatic post continued to be a primary concern regardless of the potential threat the 
individual in question posed. Students, merchants, and others were to be tracked with equal 
diligence. 
      Salih Münir Pasha in Paris was the chief antagonist in the eyes of the Young Turks. He 
was the willing master spy of the sultan and pleased Abdülhamid with his impressive 
service.
821
 Salih Münir Pasha played the role of the intermediary between Abdülhamid and 
European diplomatic representatives by using his personal diplomacy and became a 
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confident of the sultan.
822
 Being the son of Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha, who was a high-
ranking bureaucrat and Minister of Public Works in the Hamidian age, probably helped in 
gaining the trust of the sultan. He was rewarded for his loyalty with his long tenure as the 
Ottoman ambassador in Paris from 1895 until the fall of Abdülhamid. He chased the 
Young Turks carefully on every occasion and reported all their malice to his master. He 
was responsible also for Switzerland and Belgium. He tracked down the Young Turk 
committees in Geneva with equal determination as well.
823
 However, Salih Münir Pasha 
was no subservient loyalist. He was also a master of double-dealing. He asked for pay for 
informing the sultan of the subversive activities of the Young Turks. Unless he was pleased 
financially, he preferred to keep the information for himself. Moreover, he also invented 
conspiracies to squeeze money out of the sultan. The privileged ambassador visited 
Istanbul several times a year as he managed to keep his halo of immunity. His capacity to 
intrigue rendered the Yıldız Palace incapable of subordinating him. He succeeded in 
keeping the trust of the sultan.  
      Not surprisingly, he was dismissed immediately after the takeover of the Young Turks. 
He was degraded, and his title of ―Pasha‖ was revoked. He was persecuted for his dealings, 
and his possessions were confiscated. He was forced to leave the Ottoman Empire. He was 
denied a pension until 1913.
824
 Only in 1925 he could return to Turkey.
825
 Salih Münir 
Pasha was one of the few victims of the Young Turks as he was one of the prominent 
symbols and arch-villains of the corrupt regime of Abdülhamid in the eyes of Young 
Turks. He was also the only major figure from the diplomatic service who encountered 
such a demonization. Apparently, he was purged and eliminated not for ideological 
reasons, but for personal maneuverings. The diplomatic service in general was relatively 
free of the disgrace of cronyism with the corrupt regime. The governors and military 
officers had much more chance to promote their own interests and benefit from the regime.  
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In comparison, the Ottoman diplomatic service never enjoyed the prestige and privileges of 
the German diplomatic service within the autocracy that would have enabled them to be 
one of the pillars of the autocracy.
826
  
      Although the toughest and most extensive work was performed by the Paris embassy, 
all the other embassies were carefully tracking any Young Turk activity and their contacts 
within their areas of responsibility. Necib Melhame, the brother of the ill-reputed Selim 
Melhame, was appointed as the undersecretary to the embassy to Paris with the specific 
mission of ―buying‖ Young Turks. However, his corruption obliged the French 
government to declare Necib Melhame ―persona non grata‖, and he was deported. 
Although Abdülhamid appointed his favorite as the Commissioner to Bulgaria, his 
corruption ended with the Bulgarian government‘s deportation of Necib Melhame, 
declaring him again persona non grata.
827
 Gadban Efendi and Necib Melhame, both 
Christian Arabs, were Abdülhamid‘s special appointments to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs with the specific purpose of tracking down Young Turks, and they acted as 
Abdülhamid‘s personal informants and intelligence officers. Nevertheless, except for these 
figures, Abdülhamid did not interfere with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
       An important point we have to address is the personal convictions and views of the 
members of the diplomatic service. The considerably high number of diplomats who joined 
the Young Turks makes us think that, apart from their obligation to perform their office 
work and their concern for future promotions, diplomats had not much enthusiasm and 
conviction in tracking down the Young Turks. Beginning from Kanipaşazade Rifat Bey, a 
scribe in the Paris embassy who joined Namık Kemal and his entourage when they left the 
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Ottoman Empire for Paris, many others opted to join the Young Turks.
828
 Samipaşazade 
Sezai, while working in the İstişare Odası (Counseling Office) of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, decided to join the Young Turks and moved to Paris in 1901.
829
 Reşid Sadi Bey, 
the chief secretary of the London embassy, participated in the conspiratorial meeting 
organized by Prince Sabahaddin and İsmail Kemal in London in 1903.830 The observation 
that these officials seemed indifferent and lacking any conviction while performing their 
professional duties seems valid for the entire Hamidian bureaucracy as can be deduced 
from the memoirs of the officials as suggested previously. Of course, it is dangerous to 
make any such generalization. Many other officials, who were generally older and scions 
of the first Tanzimat generation, were loyal, not necessarily to the person of the sultan, but 
to the idea of the Ottoman polity. Lastly, careerism also had to be a decisive motivation in 
generating loyalty and conservative attitudes. It would be more accurate to reconstruct the 
conflict between the Young Turks and the palace not as an exclusively ideological clash, 
but a function of the unfulfilled expectancies of the newly rising educated generation, who 
felt that their merits and their superior Western-style education were not rewarded 
adequately, vis-a-vis those who owed their social status and offices to traditional and 
patrimonial loyalties, connections, and old-style education. Once the new generation were 
satisfied, they were prone to abandon their opposition and keep their personal opinions to 
themselves unlike the Russian opposition where the opponents of the regime were forced 
to give up their relationship with and loyalties to the regime completely.  
     After a compromise was reached between Abdülhamid and the Young Turks, ―İshak 
Sukuti and Abdullah Cevdet became medical doctors at the Ottoman embassies in Rome 
and Vienna; soon after, Tunalı Hilmi was appointed scribe to the Ottoman embassy in 
Madrid.‖831 The age old, pre-modern Ottoman practice of appointing dissidents to state 
offices illustrates the complicated nature of politics. Abdülhamid could be confident that 
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these Young Turks would not confuse the minds of the staff in the embassies. His 
confidence derived not from his trust in the ideological and personal perfection of the staff 
in the embassies but from his recognition that the Young Turks would immediately cease 
to propagate their subversive ideas once they were subordinated to the palace. For 
example, one report suggested that if Kadri Bey, who had previously been a contributor to 
the subversive Saday-ı Millet (Voice of the People) published in Bucharest and was 
subsequently appointed as consul to Kraguyevaç, was not paid his salary, he would go 
back to Bucharest and continue his subversive activities.
832
  
     Abdülhamid followed the same policy with regard to Halil Halid. Halil Halid departed 
from the Ottoman Empire for Britain to pursue his opposition politics and worked for the 
opposition newspaper of Selim Faris printed in London. He was persuaded by Abdülhamid 
in 1897 to quit the newspaper and to be employed as the second secretary in the Ottoman 
embassy to London.
833
   
     In the previous chapter, it had been pointed out that sharing the same social milieu, 
experiencing similar processes of socializations and therefore being part of the same state 
elite, Young Turks could be recruited in the embassies upon deference to the sultan. The 
world of Ahmet İhsan (as depicted in the previous chapter), the Young Turks, and the 
embassies was a familiar/habitual one in which conflicts and compromises were more 
personal than we may appreciate from outside and thus could be reconciliated in personal 
level.
834
 The tone and discourses employed in the ―submission letters‖ of the Young Turks 
can be analyzed in this regard. In them, they were enforced to depict themselves as 
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wrongly rebelled to the order in which they were taken care of and thus breached the code 
of conduct of this cultural intimate world. 
835
 Although, apparently this discourse is 
imposed on them, given that Young Turks predominantly came from the same social 
milieu (or at least trained in schools where they experienced a similar socialization process 
and were assimilated to this culture) reconciliation with them and recruitment of the 
apologetic Young Turks in the embassies was possible. Thus, the Hamidian regime could 
develop its mechanisms of repression without ever using physical violence. The executions 
the Young Turks committed after the suppression of the Incident of March of 31 heralded 
the beginning of a new era in which political disagreements were no more seen as an 
intrafamily problem, but genuine, irreconcilable political enmities. Therefore, in this new 
world, there was no room for compromise as the legitimacy of politics was acknowledged 
and ―age of politics‖ had emerged. 
 
   
5.3. Connecting Two Worlds Apart 
 
       The position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was unique in the sense that it 
functioned as the intermediary institution between the ―foreigners‖ and ―Ottomans‖, 
between ―Muslims‖ and ―non-Muslims‖, and between ―provincial Ottoman officials‖ and 
―high-ranking bureaucrats in Istanbul‖ as it coordinated the implementation of the Ottoman 
―reform‖ (i.e., reform of the situation of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire) in an 
interactive bargaining between the parties.
836
 The local officials reported their 
implementation of the ―reform‖ as well as the general situation regarding the relations 
between Muslims, Christians, and the state. Not surprisingly, most reports were optimistic 
regarding the implementation and the results of the ―reforms‖. On the other hand, many 
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complaints were voiced by the missionaries, the representatives of the local churches, and 
the consuls of the European powers, and these needed to be communicated to the offices in 
charge or to be reviewed by the Ministry itself.
837
  
      Of course, the ministry also collected reports from the local governmental offices 
(governorships, district administrations, military garrisons, police) reporting the subversive 
military, political, and non-political activities of Armenians, the communications and 
relations between the foreign consuls and the Armenians, et cetera. These reports were 
transmitted to the Prime Ministry. In short, the ministry was in the center of a web of 
communications between distant parties. At the same time, it conveyed communications to 
alleviate the situation and to execute the coordination of the progress of the counter-
insurgency by managing its international dimensions. For example, with the 1900s, 
Roumelia became a very important concern of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It 
transmitted the international dynamics of the Roumelian problem and coordinated the 
pursuit of the Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian brigands moving back and forth between the 
Ottoman Empire and their ―homelands abroad‖.838 In the correspondence of the Ministry, 
Roumelia emerged as a priority issue with the end of the 1890s. The Roumelian problem 
was a multilayered and multi-faceted one in which diplomatic, political, law and order, and 
ideological dimensions were intertwined. Therefore, it needed the instant follow-up of 
various dynamics simultaneously. 
       This task of the Ministry regarding the non-Muslims partly derived from the fact that 
the supervision and administration of the Ottoman non-Muslim millets had been managed 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 1876. “Mezahip Odası” (later called Deva-i 
Hariciye Kitabeti) was established to administer the records of the non-Muslim millets and 
coordinate their relations with the state. Mezahip Odası was also charged with handling the 
legal disputes among non-Muslims and Muslims.
839
 ―Mezahip Odası” was transferred to 
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the Ministry of Justice in 1877 with all the tasks of the office maintained due to the 
recognition that non-Muslims were subjects of the Ottoman Empire like the Muslims.
840
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs partially acted as the overseer of the ―reforms‖ due to its 
intermediary role between the clashing parties. 
       Given the interconnectedness of the external and internal politics of the Ottoman 
Empire, it is hard to perceive the Ottoman Foreign Ministry as merely the coordinator of 
foreign relations. For example, the concerns of the Inspectorship of the Province of 
Roumelia were a major preoccupation of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. The Ministry 
corresponded with the relevant embassies to track necessary information to inform and 
assist the inspectorship.
841
 Apparently, the inspectorship of the Province of Roumelia is a 
good example of the interconnectedness of domestic and international politics. 
Nevertheless, the Inspectorship of Province of Roumelia was not the only Ottoman 
governmental office assisted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Any governmental office 
in need of information was provided with that information and logistics by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Indeed, this was one of the crucial responsibilities of the Ministry. 
Security concerns of the Dahiliye were an important task of the Prime Ministry. The 
―şekavet‖ (brigandage) activities of Balkan nationalists were tracked by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in coordination with the Dahiliye.
842
     
       The Foreign Ministry conveyed the dispatches of the embassies to the relevant 
ministries (predominantly Dahiliye and Zabtiye) through the Prime Ministry.
843
 The 
ministries and the prime ministry were also in touch with the Foreign Ministry for attaining 
the necessary information and consultation. These included the reliability of individuals of 
foreign nationalities (as well as the Christians of Ottoman nationality regarding their 
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possible activities and connections abroad), possible foreign contacts of the local activists, 
et cetera. 
      It is important to bear in mind that the Ottoman Empire had a very centralized 
organization in which every communication was passed through the Prime Ministry. The 
Prime Ministry was informed of any communication between any two governmental 
agencies.
844
 The Prime Ministry was acting in the name of the sultan, and this status 
endowed the Prime Ministry with immense power. The organizational structure of the 
Sublime Porte was instituted taking the Prime Ministry as the center and the ministries as 
conductors of daily business rather than independent bodies. Thus, it was no coincidence 
that the Ministries of Internal and Foreign Affairs were both working in the building 
complex of the Prime Ministry. Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its routine 
cannot be dissociated from the other governmental offices. This is true also with regard to 
its ideological build up as reflected in the official documents and correspondence. 
 
 
5.4. From Sedition to Anarchism: Enemies of the State 
 
       The Hamidian official language used when referring to Armenian affairs was 
strikingly ―archaic‖. As Grigor Suny has observed, we cannot assess the Turkish-Armenian 
conflicts as the outcome of ―two competing nationalisms‖ but rather between the rising 
Armenian nationalism and ―state imperialists‖ who were ambivalent and vexed facing a 
threat they could not comprehend in an age of nationalism.
845
 The official language is not 
only dehumanizing, but also self-confidently and arrogantly state-centric. First of all, in the 
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eye of the Ottoman bureaucrat, Armenian disorders were “Ermeni fesadı denilen asar-ı 
şekavet” (signs of brigandage known as the Armenian conspiracy). Armenian activity was 
imagined and defined as merely brigandage in its pre-modern and pre-political sense. Thus, 
the response to the Armenian militancy was police action. The Ottoman embassies and 
consulates were to undertake police action such as informing Istanbul regarding the moves 
of the Armenians and demanding the persecution of the Armenians by the host countries. 
Thus, no agency was conceded to Armenians. As indicated previously, this perception was 
equally applicable to any of the rebellious ethnic groups such as Serbians, Greeks, and 
Bulgarians and derived from the state-centric vision of the Ottoman bureaucratic world. 
“Yüz bulmak” was a frequent official label depicting the attitude of the non-Muslim 
communities who were to be only stimulated and manipulated by external forces.
846
      
     The innocent Armenian folk who were yet to be ―encouraged‖ by external forces was 
carefully dissociated from the Armenian “tertibat-ı fesadiyye‖ (conspiratorial organization) 
in an imperial benevolence.
847
 This was because, as the developing official discourse 
argued, the Armenian community lived peacefully and faced no difficulty in practicing its 
religion and religious ceremonies with the grace of the Ottoman Empire, and therefore the 
Armenian brigandage was irrelevant.
848
 Nevertheless, probably partially for reasons of 
practicality, Armenian militants in official correspondence were described simply as 
―Armenians‖, which establishes an image that ethnicizes political activity, includes all the 
members of the ethnic group, and subsumes them within a single politicized community. 
Thus, although the official discourse uses an archaic state-centric language that curses 
those who were not grateful for the benevolence of Ottoman rule, it transforms through 
repetition into an ethnically sensitive state-nationalist if not nationalist language.      
      It is interesting to compare and contrast the language used between the Ottoman 
governmental offices and between Ottoman officialdom and their foreign counterparts. The 
Armenian bands were termed as ―erbab-ı fesad‖, “eşkiya”, “Ermeni fesadesi”, “erbab-ı 
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iğtişaş”, ―Ermeni müfsedatı‖, “fesad komiteleri” (intriguers, brigands, Armenian 
conspiracy/sedition, conspiratorial committees) in the interdepartmental correspondence of 
the Ottoman state.
849
 The label of ―erbab-ı fesad‖ and others were dropped in the 
dispatches of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conveyed to its foreign counterparts. 
However, it looks that ―erbab-ı fesad‖, a specific concept meaningful only in its 
Ottoman/Islamic background was also excluded in the (French language) intraministerial 
correspondence of the Foreign Ministry and not translated into French. The same was true 
with regard to the language employed in reporting on the Young Turks. For example a 
dispatch sent to Abdülhamid in Turkish from the Ottoman consul general in Geneva 
defines Geneva as ―her kısım erbab-ı müfsedat ve melanetin ilticagahı850‖ (the haven of all 
kinds of seditionists). Apparently, these terms were very emotionally loaded and bound to 
lose their specific references when translated into French and more so when translated into 
diplomatic French. The same dispatch defined the journal ―Osmanlı‖ as ―Osmanlı nam 
melanetkarane”.851 We observe that the use of French as the language of communication 
tempered the tone of the discourse as any language was another medium in which the 
discourses were reconstructed according to the references of the language. The French 
language with its ―civilizationist‖ and ―objective/rational‖ sounding nature in the eyes of 
the Ottoman bureaucrats remained aloof from the discourse and vocabulary of the 
Ottomans. The fact that it was accessible to any foreigner should also have forced the 
producer of the texts to accommodate to a new mental milieu and develop strategies 
specific to the language of conduct.  In the French-language reports, the erbab-ı fesad 
turned into Armenian anarchists, transforming the age old seditionist and unruly subjects of 
the Muslim polity into modern conspirators aiming to destroy the social order.
852
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     The 1890s were also the peak of anarchist activism and assassinations throughout 
Europe (and the United States). It was a preeminent concern of the European governments. 
The 1890s were a decade in which several heads of the state had been assassinated. Sadi 
Carnot, Umberto I, and McKinley were murdered by anarchist assassins following the 
killing of Alexander II in 1881 by the Narodnaya Volya.
853
 The activities of the anarchists, 
as well as the persecution of the anarchists, were seen as important news to be dispatched 
to Istanbul. Anarchism was a common threat to the states, the established order, and the 
ruling elites of Europe. This aspect was underlined by the Ottoman diplomats as they were 
aware that all the established elites were floating on the same ship. Such an understanding 
was developed as early as the Congress of Vienna in which the representatives of the 
European powers agreed to intervene in the case of a popular unrest or rebellion. This 
policy was implemented many times between 1815 and 1830 before such interventionism 
became unproductive and even counterproductive.
854
 Given that Armenian Dashnaks, 
Hncaks, and the Bulgarian IMRO were all influenced by the socialist and anarchist 
currents and militancy, the Ottoman state aimed to influence European governments by 
referring to the subversive programs of these movements. The Ottoman state also tried to 
learn to combat anarchism from the methods and strategies of the European 
governments.
855
 Regular information was conveyed by the embassies such as the passing 
of new bills to combat anarchism
856
 and the pursuit of anarchists of various countries.
857
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The Russian revolutionaries were also followed and reported 
858
. Anarchism among Italian 
workers in Istanbul was monitored as well.
859
 
       The Foreign Ministry was alarmed by the ―anarchist international‖. It pursued not only 
those who posed a threat to the empire but also those who might present a danger to the 
other empires and states. This was the undertaking of a responsible state showing solidarity 
with its fellow states. A certain Alexandre Mikolovich (in French spelling), a Serb by 
nationality, had left Istanbul for Copenhagen with two bombs for a task he undertook for 
the Polish revolutionary committee. Due to a request made by the Danish Foreign Ministry 
to the Ottoman consul general in Copenhagen in early May 1885, the Ottoman Foreign 
Ministry investigated the activities and connections of the aforementioned revolutionary in 
Istanbul for two weeks. The investigation concluded that Mikolovich resided in İstanbul at 
the Hotel Britannia. The Ministry deepened the investigation by requesting the Ottoman 
legations in Vienna and Budapest to investigate and report on the activities of Mikolovich 
while he stayed in Vienna.
860
 This case was just one of the examples of the investigation of 
suspicious anarchists and revolutionaries by the Ottoman Empire, not for its immediate 
interest and police activities, but for its imperial reflexes and imperial solidarity. Therefore, 
the Ottoman Empire rightfully expected the other European states to inform Istanbul 
regarding the Ottoman dissidents and revolutionaries and take action when necessary. The 
Foreign Ministry investigated various suspicious individuals who were assumed to pose a 
threat to the public and political order of the Empire. Many Greek nationals and other 
individuals holding Balkan nationality fell into this category.  
       The Ottoman establishment was cognizant of the anarchist dispositions of the 
Armenian revolutionary committees and their links to the anarchist currents in Europe. 
This dimension facilitated Ottoman demands on the European powers regarding the 
surveillance of Armenian revolutionaries. Legations abroad were in pursuit of informants 
to access intelligence. Although there were several irrelevant intelligence reports provided 
by informants not in the interest of the empire, many other informants notified the Ottoman 
                                                 
858
 BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 24/30, 1313 Za. 6. 
859
 BOA, HR.SYS 1759/3 (correspondences 22 June 1898 to 18 April 1899). 
860
 BOA, HR.SYS 1822/8, 22 May 1885. 
301 
 
representatives regarding the activities of the Armenian revolutionaries abroad.
861
 For 
example the Ottoman embassy to Washington conveyed that Ali Ferruh Bey was informed 
that a certain Vartan Bulguryan, aged thirty-five, departed New York for Moersina with 
dynamite, arms, and money.
862
 Another move of Armenian revolutionaries was dispatched 
from Tblisi. According to the consul in Tblisi, Essad Bey, four Armenian exiled 
revolutionaries arrived in Tblisi.
863
 Every small move of the Armenians was meticulously 
followed.
864
 These accounts display the modern individualist anarchist aspects of the 
Armenian revolutionaries besides their rural origins and motivations, coming as they did 
from the poor localities of Ottoman Armenia. 
      The Ministry was involved extensively in the investigation of the failed assassination 
of Abdülhamid by a Belgian anarchist in the service of the Armenian revolutionary 
committees by activating its channels of international communication. The investigation 
was conducted by requesting the Ottoman legations in various countries, as well as the 
European embassies in Istanbul, to provide extensive information on the persons involved 
in or related to the failed assassination. The final report was prepared in light of these 
communications and information-gathering by a commission and later published as a 
separate book in 1905.
865
  
      With the reign of Mahmud II and the Tanzimat, we encounter the emergence of the 
―rhetoric of tolerance‖. The Ottoman imperial system of managing religious and 
confessional groups began to be consecrated as ―tolerance‖, and this concept, which is a 
very historicized notion, became eternalized and adapted to the classical age of the 
Ottoman Empire although it was only after 1856 that the non-Muslims were admitted 
(reluctantly or not) into the political nation.  Needless to say, the ―rhetoric of tolerance‖ 
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was an imperial discourse. It also implies that the maintenance of tolerance is conditioned 
on the Armenian community‘s tacit consent to the hierarchy between the millets. 
―Tolerance‖ is a contract not signed by two equal and legitimate parties but imposed on 
one of the parties. The Armenian revolutionary organizations had challenged this tacit 
consent. The conceptualization of the Armenian militarized organizations is also 
interesting. Rather than being nationalists, they were perceived and indicted for being 
anarchists and corrupters. Moreover, they were socialists. As has been suggested 
previously, the rhetoric that was employed by the state described Balkan nationalist 
movements not as free agents, but as pawns of foreign powers (especially Russia), and not 
as serving the aspirations of nationhood, but as supporting anarchy and chaos.
866
 
     Ottoman officialdom denied that nationalism was the motivation of the Armenian 
organizations. This discourse was careful to differentiate between the corrupting minority 
of Armenians and the majority of Armenians, who were innocent and loyal subjects of the 
sultan but who could potentially be led by the corrupting minority due to their naivety (and 
ignorance). Reproducing the Islamic legal notions of order, peace and war, because the 
Armenian militant organizations had rebelled against the legitimate order and, therefore, 
against peace, any violence inflicted on them was perceived as legitimate and even 
necessary. Within this perception, the Ottoman administrators did not feel that they 
transgressed the boundaries of legitimacy when they employed undue violence not only on 
the militants, but also on those who were influenced by them.
867
  
       The ministry got notifications of the latest activities of the Armenian nationalist 
organizations from the local governmental offices written in this language and vocabulary. 
The ministry was supposed to use this information to respond to the international pressure 
regarding the ―oppression of the Armenians.‖ As expressed above, the reports and 
dispatches of the Ministry were self-assured of their righteousness and regarded the 
problems as a matter of discipline and order within a very Islamic and imperial 
conceptualization. For Abdülhak Hamid, all the articles published under titles such as 
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―massacres in Anatolia and Roumelia‖ (perpetuated by Turks) were outright blatant libels 
and only the writers of these articles believed in these lies.
868
 What the Ministry tried to do 
in its efforts to whitewash the Ottoman policies was the merging of the very traditional 
discourse imposed by the Islamic legacy and the modern (and European) discourse of 
rights and liberties. In one regard, the Ministry polished and reinvigorated the very 
Ottoman discourse and rendered it politically correct and compatible with the modern 
political discourses of legitimacy. Nevertheless, this was not a distortion, but a 
rearticulation of the concerns of the Ottoman officialdom in a language more 
communicable to the European discourses of legitimacy. The Ministry seemed to agree 
with the premises of these reports sent from the provinces given the fervor expressed in the 
intra-ministry dispatches against the European interference to the Ottoman Empire and 
their abuse of the conditions of the non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. In fact, the 
disagreement between the Ottoman officials and the Westerners‘ indictments derived from 
different perceptions of state, violence, and legitimacy structures. Furthermore, such an 
encounter is a site where the rhetoric of confrontation was produced and reproduced.
869
 
       In short, the international dimensions of the Armenian issue display the centrality of 
the Armenian factor in the constitution of Turkish nationalism. It should also be said that 
extreme alarm can not be regarded as a symptom of paranoia given what had already 
happened (the loss of Bulgaria which is another episode constitutive of Turkish 
nationalism) and what would happen (in the Balkan wars, the loss of Crete, et cetera). 
Another impact the Armenian events had generated was the frustration the Ottoman 
officials experienced. Ottoman officialdom regretted the fact that the Westerners only 
listened to the ―other side‖ and had to surrender to the anti-Ottoman agitation instigated by 
public opinion. This sentiment of frustration resulted in a gradual rise in anti-Westernism 
and anti-imperialism throughout the Hamidian era before it became a clear aspect of the 
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Young Turk regime.
870
 The Armenian factor is decisive in the constitution of Turkish 
nationalism not only due to the sedition and attacks of the Armenian militants and 
nationalists against the Ottoman center, but also due to its internationalizing dynamic. 
      During the Tanzimat, the ―enemy‖ was Russia as it had been for the previous century 
and a half.
871
 Apparently, this enmity had a long history. The Tanzimat maintained the 
traditional concerns, fears, and anxieties of the Ottomans which were primarily based on 
the possibility of  an attack from the neighbor to the north. What we observe with the 
Hamidian era is the alteration of the modes of enmities and the emergence of an 
unprecedented mode of enmity. First of all, this novel mode of enmity was deracinated, 
diffused, and unspecified. It did not have a particular, attainable, and identifiable focus. It 
was rather a perpetuated perception of immediate threat from anywhere and everywhere. 
Constant caution and vigilance had to be maintained to face this new mode of enmity. The 
principal object of this enmity was the emerging and rising threat and perceived threat 
from the non-Muslims and their economic advancement. The hostilities perpetrated by the 
non-Muslim brigands and the unruliness of the non-Muslim populace were not new. The 
methods to subdue these disturbances were not new, either. However, the intensification, 
politicization, and internationalization of these unrests created a completely novel situation 
which triggered an intense fear and panic on the side of the Ottoman center. Friendly 
Britain, a country adored in the Tanzimat, revoked its support of the Ottoman polity and its 
reform program. This development encouraged the non-Muslim militants and activists. It 
also created an intense disappointment and frustration for the Ottomans. The tension 
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between the Ottomans and Britain was not similar to the hostility between the Ottomans 
and Russia. This hostility was not limited to the military realm. The traditional modes of 
enmity as had existed between the Ottomans and the despicable Russians were no longer 
applicable in this new world. Domestic policy and foreign policy were no longer separate. 
Foreign policy could no longer be isolated. In these circumstances, a deep mistrust 
developed towards the outer world as the only genuine concern of the Ottoman center was 
to hold on to what it already had, and the outer world seemed not to sympathize with the 
defensive concerns of the Ottoman Empire. Nobody was a ―friend‖ of the Ottomans, and 
no one was to be trusted. On the domestic scene, no Christian (and in later stages no non-
Turk) was to be trusted or relied upon for cooperation. Therefore, the Hamidian era gave 
birth to a constant fear, the perception of an imminent threat, and the demonization of the 
outer world. Apparently, it was the diplomats who experienced this frustration personally.  
 
 
5.5. The Dusty Desk of the Weberian Bureaucrat? 
 
       Unsurprisingly, the most detailed, meticulous and informative political reports were 
dispatched from the London embassy. This was obviously due to the fact that Britain was 
the most important country regarding European affairs in general and Ottoman affairs in 
particular. These regular dispatches were also superior in their content and in their level of 
analysis. They were longer as well. They were also prepared not to report recent 
developments or incidents, but to pen down on regular basis summaries of all the latest 
developments and debates worth considering. In that regard, they were much more 
professional, informative, and routinized. Other evidence indicating the level of 
professionalism was the absence of any press sources. Presenting numerous journal 
articles, which was an important preoccupation of the Ottoman diplomatic service, was a 
sign of lack of substantive sources and the capacity to develop an analysis of its own. 
These reports surveyed British politics, regularly reporting the latest political 
developments, and were centered on the parliament. It is also noteworthy of mention that 
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the British reports concentrated much more on parliamentary politics, rather than the 
execution of cabinet policies.
872
 
       The alignments in the parliament made up a significant portion of the political reports. 
The two parties and their policies were carefully examined as the Ottoman diplomatic 
corps were attentive to the shift in British policy towards the Ottoman Empire. Different 
predispositions of the two parties were observed with maximum attention. Of course, 
Gladstone, whose name had been associated with the anti-Turkish campaign he launched 
during the Russo-Turkish War in 1876-77, thereby gaining notoriety in the eyes of the 
Ottoman state elite, had created policies with enduring ramifications for the Ottomans. 
From then on, his stance became a principle reference for liberal politics with very 
negative connotations. The efforts of Armenian committees based in London to contact 
him and attempt to engage him in their campaign against the Ottoman state were followed 
with disquiet.
873
 In the 1880s, the Irish problem triggered a division within the liberal ranks 
as the liberals who were against ―Home Rule‖ left the party to form a liberal unionist 
group. This group was more sympathetic to the Ottoman cause. This arduous conflict was 
carefully noted by the London embassy.
874
 The dispatches display an overt sympathy 
towards the Conservative Party as opposed to the Liberal Party, and the electoral and 
parliamentary successes of the Liberals were relayed with unease.  
      Apparently, the delicacies of British politics had a prominent impact on British foreign 
policy. The intricate and multi-dimensional issues had been well scrutinized and analyzed 
by the embassy reports which were masterfully prepared in a manner far superior to the 
reporting of any other embassy. In these reports, domestic political developments and 
foreign policy orientations were analyzed in tandem. It is a question to what extent the 
diplomats and administrators of the Ottoman Empire could analyze the impact of domestic 
politics and party politics in the making of foreign policy. Given that, Abdülhamid was 
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nominating the prime ministers considering the attitudes and dispositions of the foreign 
powers; this dimension should have been realized to a certain extent although dynamics of 
party politics and authoritarian polities are apparently very different.     
        Strictly technical analyses were employed by the embassies. An exception to the cold-
bloodedness of the reports was a report dispatched after the passing of the Home Rule Bill 
in the House of Commons in 1893. The dispatch regarded this new bill as, ―a formidable 
and dangerous innovation leveled against the English ‗ancient constitution‘ ‖. The dispatch 
suggested that this bill would probably be vetoed by the House of Lords. The dispatch also 
noted the hostile attitude of the ―Gladstonians‖ during the parliamentary sessions against 
the opponents of the bill
875
. After summarizing the content of the bill, the dispatch ended 
with the analysis that Gladstone and the radicals leaned on the newly emerging and 
developing class of laborers and the lower orders. It was noted that the role of this class 
was so significant that it had the power to shape the composition of the House of 
Commons. Apparently developing a class perspective, the embassy observed the 
transformation of British politics due to its democratization, which was alarming for the 
Ottoman Empire. In the dispatch, the fervent anti-Gladstonianism which will be a recurring 
theme in Ottoman intellectual formation, was very strong, seeing Gladstone as the figure 
who was responsible for the collapse of the traditional British-Ottoman common 
understanding.
876
 Furthermore, the new radicals (many of them from the free professions 
and not from the ―landed interests‖) who were transforming the traditional Whig character 
of the Liberal Party were followed with unease. The Ottoman diplomatic service knew well 
that they could speak and compromise with people coming from a similar social and 
cultural background.     
       One remarkable aspect of the nature of the political reports of the embassies was their 
―mechanisticism‖. By ―mechanisticism‖, we mean the dull and technical accounting of the 
highly politically sensitive and even precarious matters. The routine follow-up of the St. 
Petersburg embassy of Pan-Slavism or the routine follow-up of the Dreyfus Affair by the 
Paris embassy display such a remarkable ―dullness‖. Reading the political reports, it is as if 
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the Pan-Slavs were not agitated Russian expansionist warmongers yearning for Russian 
domination over the Ottomans and as if the Dreyfus affair had not divided France into two 
over a very hard-edged and emotional dispute. Loads of dispatches reporting the Pan-
Slavist meetings and organizations and Pan-Slavists‘ articles published in the prominent 
newspapers and journals of Russia (with the copies of the articles included in the files as an 
appendix) were blithely penned down as mere informative accounts.
877
 Likewise, issues 
such as the Irish problem in Britain were recounted constantly as if it had no Ottoman 
repercussions, as if it were only a matter of technical dispute between the conservatives 
and liberals, and, within the liberal party, among the radical and liberal unionist factions. 
These observations would lead us to assume that the Ottoman diplomats were cold-blooded 
technical experts, not moved by national interests of any sort. These dispassionate and 
boring reports that contained only factual information without any passionate comments 
exemplify the deskwork of a Weberian bureaucrat. The reports were predominantly fact-
based. That is to say, the reports were composed to convey the latest developments without 
making pretentious judgments. This is a distinction between a bureaucrat and a politician.  
The bureaucrat leaves the assessment to the reader of the report, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs.  The same observation can be made also for the reporting of the provincial 
administrators who developed a new language towards their ―subjects‖. The 19th century 
Ottoman bureaucratic language endorsed the dispassionate language of its European 
counterparts which indicates a radical break from their predecessors. However, in light of 
the extra-documentary information we have, we must assume otherwise.
878
 How to assess 
this striking contradiction? 
       As has been suggested, the same observation can be made for military officers as well. 
The professionalism of Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha was already discussed.  His field work 
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was to suppress any rising against the imperial order.
879
 The military officers, who were 
passionate and fervent nationalists by definition, also displayed an impressive 
professionalism and disinterested documentation of events. They had the habit of 
documenting everything they deemed necessary and elaborated on them to render their 
arguments explicable. In short, these military officers were professionals not only in their 
deskwork, but also in their memoir writings. Kazım Karabekir is arguably the first name to 
be mentioned in this category. His well-documented massive output goes along with his 
fervent and aggressive nationalism and militarism.
880
 His output epitomizes the meticulous 
nature of the deskwork of the military bureaucrats as well as the civil bureaucrats, 
regardless of their ideological orientations.  
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 Kazım Karabekir‘s works make up more than thirty volumes. However, his output is 
remarkable not in its gigantic size but in his tidiness and his delicate documentation of the 
material he covers. Kazım Karabekir may be regarded as a militarist who believed in an 
autarchic Turkey dedicated to the well-being of Turks, as can be deduced from his works. 
However, regardless of his ideological predispositions, he exemplifies a hard-working and 
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      At a time when a written text was perceived as semi-sacred and seen as having the 
power to reveal the truth and only the truth, writing was a serious and intense activity, very 
different from the experience of writing one century later.
881
 ―Writing‖ had an authoritative 
quality. Likewise, ―writing‖ as a formal activity was a ―serious‖ task to be undertaken 
accordingly. Its significance diminished drastically in an age of informality and 
relativization of truth. A text had an unprecedented authoritative power in the 19th century 
before its diminution in the 20th century.  
      The aesthetics of handwriting was also a very important concern for the quality of the 
document. Elegance and mastery in handwriting were not seen as technicalities of 
secondary importance, but were perceived as skills of primary importance, worthy of being 
acquired. The aesthetics and quality of their handwriting was an important asset for young 
diplomats seeking promotion. The young diplomats were assisted by their mentors in 
developing their handwriting styles and the language used in their dispatches.
882
 
Bismarck‘s imposition on the German diplomatic service of stringent standards for 
meticulous handwriting is well-known. ―A diplomat who wanted to make an impression on 
the chancellor would also do well to have a scribe whose handwriting pleased him. Even 
the color of ink and the quality of letterheads fell under the chancellor‘s scrutiny.‖883 Of 
course, it was not only handwriting that mattered to Bismarck. He was very concerned 
about the straightforwardness, literary quality, and elegance of the communiqués. 
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Formalism was an important concern of the 19th century bureaucrat. The form was 
considered as important as its content. A fine document had to be perfectly written and 
correctly constructed in its form. The form itself was important and great care needed to be 
exercised to perfect its formalism. The form was irrelevant to its content, and it was 
equally important for the form to be proper for the future careers of the officials and their 
promotions. The painful process of drafting and then revising the text to perfection through 
several additional drafts was one of the most tiring and crucial preoccupations of Ottoman 
officials in all the governmental offices, including the Foreign Ministry.
884
  
      In short, passion and professionalism are not mutually exclusive. A passionate clerk 
may pen a dispassionate and formal text. This was how he was trained. The Weberian 
bureaucrat is not necessarily the soulless desk worker who detaches himself from his 
passions and identities, but what he tries to imitate is the fictive soulless bureaucrat, the 
imaginary role model of the 19th century bureaucratic. The reason why the Weberian 
ideal-type was taken for granted until being questioned recently is that the written evidence 
and archival documents left to us forces us to assume bureaucratic pretensions as reality. 
Likewise, the alleged contrast between the deeds and deskwork of the 19th century 
Ottoman bureaucrat was not a contradiction, but a matter of different modes of expression.  
       The Ottoman diplomats, who were only a few generations removed from the ―scribes‖, 
were naturally skilled and learned in the aesthetics of handwriting. The Tanzimat was not a 
sharp break in which the old ways of conducting statecraft gave way to a new and modern 
way of conducting statecraft.  On the contrary, it took several decades and a few 
generations for a transition from the traditional scribe to the modern official.
885
 The 
traditional Ottoman a‟dab (refinement) with the genteel culture of the Tanzimat was 
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integrated into the making of the Ottoman diplomats‘ culture of conduct in their work. The 
Tanzimat was not a renunciation of the ancien régime, but a refashioning of it even in its 
maturity, not only in an ideological sense, but also evident in the bureaucrats‘ work and in 
the culture of bureaucracy. 
 
 
5.6. The World of the Ancien régime Aristocracy: A Shared World 
 
       Another point to be underlined in the ambassadorial reports is the depiction of political 
matters at a technical level. The reports did not display the subjectivity, complexity, and 
intricacy of political matters. The reports were penned down as if there was no room 
imagined for the ―political‖. This may be seen as unsurprising for an Ottoman official 
given there was no political space permitted or imagined within the worlds of the Ottoman 
political imagination. Though, lack of political space in the Ottoman Empire did not 
prevent any official from making political assessments. As has been suggested previously, 
this is not simply because no democratic space was permitted by the state. The opponents 
of the regime did not themselves develop a sense of politics for reasons previously 
elaborated. The opponents had a non-political political vision in which the deficiency of 
the Ottoman state derived merely from Hamidian corruption and despotism, and it was 
believed the situation would be ameliorated once an appropriate and learned policy 
program was implemented. Such a background rendered the conceptualization of such 
political notions as ―public opinion‖, ―democratic legitimacy‖, ―pressure groups‖ 
abstractions, instead of vivid realities. As a conclusion, we may suggest that, this deficit 
caused the Ottoman Empire to fail to grasp political situations and therefore hindered the 
development of a realistic and plausible policy in response to the maneuvers of these 
powers. Parliamentary debates made up an important portion of the reports. Although the 
ferocious debates in the Ottoman parliament back in 1876-77 were not to be forgotten
886
, 
the presentation of the parliamentary debates related in the reports seemed like 
technicalities (maybe analogous to the meetings of Şuray-ı Devlet and other administrative 
                                                 
886
 For the first Ottoman parliament convened in 1876, see Devereux, Robert, The First 
Ottoman Constitutional Period, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963. 
313 
 
and legal commissions of the Ottoman Empire), rather than political debates with flesh and 
bone.  
       Another issue which is overlooked in these reports is economics. Nevertheless, this 
does not show any deficiency of the Ottoman diplomatic establishment vis-a-vis the 
European diplomatic services. Indifference to and disregard of economics was a common 
attitude of the pre-WW I diplomatic establishments, contrary to the Marxian argument that 
diplomacy was an instrument of the economic interests.
887
 The diplomats had no 
considerable knowledge of economic matters. However, more importantly, they had no 
comprehension of the role of economics in international politics. The aristocratic 
upbringing of the diplomats infused them with disdain towards ―moneyed interests‖. For 
them, it was not respectable to consider pecuniary matters. This attitude enhanced with the 
rise of the middle-classes to prominence in the political scene in the nineteenth century.  In 
the culture of diplomats, high politics was only a matter of state politics, and economics 
had no place in it. Therefore, they had no interest in commercial matters.
888
 The 
interrelation between politics and economics was yet to be recognized. State affairs and 
economic affairs were (and should be) two different and unrelated realms, and the former 
was deemed respectable whereas the later was regarded as embarrassing. ―Curiously 
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enough, this anti-commercial bias was possibly strongest in Britain.‖889 Even the British 
consuls, who were to protect the British communities overseas and safeguard/promote 
British commerce, were appointed not based on their merits and skills regarding 
commerce, but on patronage and connections. Therefore they failed to provide efficient 
services to the ―moneyed interests‖. For the consuls and their superiors in London, the 
chief tasks of the consuls were administrative and judicial matters.
890
 ―British businessmen 
saw, or thought they saw, a more wholehearted promotion of trading interests by the 
consuls of their foreign rivals, especially the Germans and Americans, and they demanded 
the same treatment from their own. For many years British Government resisted any 
suggestion that its officers should become actively engaged in the promotion of British 
trade.‖891  The consular service in the eyes of a contemporary critic in 1903 was a ―harbour 
of refuge for retired army officers and for failures whose only recommendation is 
aristocratic, official or personal influences, or an easy source of reward for persons to 
whom the Government of the day is in some way indebted.‖892 One exception to the 
contempt of diplomatic establishments towards ―moneyed interests‖ was the Netherlands. 
―(T)he pressure was so strong that between 1825 and 1850 the diplomatic missions were 
downgraded, the consular service augmented and the Ministry staff increased to handle 
commercial rather than political affairs.‖ Though, the Dutch exception had its apparent 
reasons and it was the exception that proves the rule. ―The reduction of the Netherlands 
after 1830 to a third-class power meant a diminished interest in power politics and favored 
a sustained shift of attention to economic and colonial affairs(.)‖893 In other words, the 
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marginalization and exclusion of the Netherlands from the diplomatic scene and European 
politics caused its diplomatic establishment to prioritize economic interests.    
     This state-centric vision of international politics only slightly began to erode in the 
decade preceding the World War I with the reformation and partial democratization of the 
foreign offices.
894
 The financialization of international economics and extra-
Europeanization of international affairs and state interests in the late nineteenth century 
was another factor that rendered economics a matter of concern in the eyes of 
policymakers although staunch resistance to this process never ceased in the foreign 
offices.
895
 Until the ―opening of the state‖ with democratization, the state was claimed only 
by those who perceived themselves as part of the state and perceived the state as theirs; 
namely by the aristocracy which historically and originally meant the entourage of the 
kings and emperors. Industrialists, merchants, and professionals were seen as outside the 
realm of the state. Furthermore, they were seen as within the realm of markets which were 
juxtaposed against the interests of the realm of the state. 
       One scholar of Austro-Hungarian diplomacy observed; ―(w)hat reports often lacked, 
however, was detailed analyses of economic issues. Aside from tariff problems, these 
questions simply did not get much scrutiny. This weakness reflected the general failure 
within the Habsburg leadership to recognize until too late the potential of economic tools 
for political purposes.‖896 The Habsburg Empire lacked the economic means to obtain 
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political gains except through some modest economic initiatives in the Balkans.
897
 
Economic tools were at the disposal of the British, French, and German foreign offices, 
and they employed them to force countries to certain decisions, but the foreign offices were 
aloof to economics and economic diplomacy. As late as the interwar period, the 
deficiencies pointed out above regarding the ambassadorial reporting of the Ottoman and 
Austro-Hungarian diplomatic services were observable. In this period, this deficiency was 
observable in all the diplomatic services. In the United States, ―political reporting, so far as 
it was influenced by old school diplomats, tended to deal with leading figures of 
government rather than deep social and economic forces(.)‖898 
       In this regard, the failure of the Ottoman diplomatic service to regard economics as an 
indispensable component of international politics should not be perceived as a sign of its 
backwardness in statecraft. On the contrary, the Ottoman diplomatic service pursued the 
19th century European pattern in its ideological and cultural make up.       
       In the ambassadorial reports, esteem and reverence for royalty were expressed very 
delicately. Esteem and respect were observed for non-royal offices as well. The prime 
ministers, presidents of states, and military generals were addressed with due respect as the 
Ottoman Empire and its ruling elite were integrated into the established order and the 
family of the national nobilities of Europe. This was not only limited to the honoring of the 
persons in question with proper forms of address. While reporting on political 
developments, an important part of the dispatches was devoted to ceremonies. The 
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―acceptance speeches‖ of the new prime ministers899, the speeches of the prime minister in 
the parliament to honor visiting royal figures, and the inauguration speeches read at the 
beginning of the parliamentary year by the kings were all meticulously reported in 
detail.
900
 These concerns and perceptions are a further indication of the transformation of 
Ottoman political culture (to be destroyed and reversed by the end of the empire and 
replaced by the republic‘s own political culture) and its integration into the ―European 
royal family‖.901 
       Reception of the ambassadors and ―corps consulaire‖ were also regarded as worth 
reporting to Istanbul. From the dispatch of the 27th of February in 1891, we learn that the 
―corps consulaire‖ in Venice had been received by ―son Altesse Royale le Dine de Genes‖, 
the prince. Not unexpectedly, the reception was described in very respectful language. 
Soghadis Bey, the Ottoman consul in Venice, presented his homage to ―L‟Auguste Frére 
de la Reine d‟Italie‖ via the royal palace of Venice. The prince, who recently visited 
Istanbul, drew attention to the increasing commercial relations between Venice and the 
ports of the Ottoman Empire.
902
 Many such reports narrating these ceremonies were to be 
found in the dispatch folders.           
       Naturally, international relations made up an important part of the reports. In these 
reports, the foreign policies of the governments were taken as ―cabinet policies‖. This 
contrasts with the approach of assuming foreign policy orientations to be state policies 
rather than deliberations by the cabinets. The reports were very much cabinet-centered. 
The parliamentary debates also amounted to a significant portion of the reports. The 
permanent governmental institutions did not find much place in the reports. The Ottoman 
embassy reports did not assume the existence of a permanent state interest to take 
precedence over the subjectivity and temporariness of the cabinets and the intentions of the 
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prime ministers and foreign ministers.
903
 The reports did not reflect the state-centric 
assumption that politics was a sham when it comes to the making of foreign policy.
904
 On 
the contrary, the cabinets were treated as having free hands in the making of foreign policy. 
Thus, cabinets comprised of politicians from parties more sympathetic to the Ottoman 
Empire were desired to be established and cabinets perceived as antagonistic to the 
interests of the Ottoman Empire were desired to be dissolved.  
      We may argue that this perception disappeared with the coming to power of the Young 
Turks.
905
 The ultimate western-skeptic and anti-imperialist Young Turks (very much like 
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the distrustful sultan Abdülhamid II) denied any significant role to politics as they were 
sure that the Western powers were inherently Turcophobe and imperialist.
906
 For them, 
political discourses were mere facades to deceive the naive old school diplomats. The 
magical word ―imperialism‖ rendered diplomatic and political maneuvers, dexterities, and 
compromises meaningless as the ultimate end of diplomacy was merely the 
implementation of imperialism. Moreover, politics was also unnecessary as imperialism is 
(a la Lenin) one single program to be activated and no small adjustment, alteration, or 
variation of it possible. Diplomacy was a zero sum game. In the world of imperialism, it 
meant zero for the underdog and one for the imperialist. It is also a fact that as World War 
I approached, the compression of the international situation and tightening of the alliances 
left no free space for political and diplomatic flexibility and maneuver. The complexities of 
the age of imperialism also made the makers of foreign policy incapable of deciding the 
track of foreign policy independently.
907
 Moreover, the ―political‖ lost its centrality in a 
time when economic and financial interests begin to play a significant role in interstate 
relations. By then, the magnificent days of the masters of diplomacy such as Canning and 
Castlereagh were long gone, especially after the deposition of Bismarck. The Hamidian 
Ottoman diplomatic service was cognizant of this transformation of the style and conduct 
of foreign policy albeit with some delay and ambivalence.  
      Writing in 1910, Hayreddin Nedim‘s acclaim of the art of diplomacy reflects the 
education of a diplomat having the 19th century upbringing with his favorite, inspiring 
themes such as the genius of Bismarck.
908
 Writing in a new age in which the delicacies of 
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diplomacy were abandoned, Hayreddin Nedim praises Âli Pasha, Fuad Pasha, but above all 
the legendary Mustafa Reşid Pasha for their genius in diplomacy.909 He exemplifies a salon 
gentleman of yesterday with his accumulation of knowledge and his mental framework, all 
imported from the 19th century diplomatic/aristocratic culturalization and intellectual 
formation and the arsenal of knowledge it nurtured.  It would not be wrong to argue that 
the Hamidian diplomatic service observed and exercised the novelties and alterations of the 
political world after some delay.  
     To conclude, the ambassadorial reports which reflected less the personal opinions of the 
ambassadors and the ambassadorial scribes than the reiteration of the official discourse 
present us some vistas of a vision of a particular socialization and cultural formation. The 
dispassionate reports were produced not in Weberian bureaucratic offices, but in a 
personalized habitus. The content and priorities of the reports also manifested a worldview 
subsuming and amalgamating political and personal concerns. This cultural formation was 
constituted within an intimate relation established with a state that was in retreat and that 
had to be saved in order to maintain the moral universe the authors of the reports 
subscribed to. This world was a bygone age by 1908 in some regards but was also 
constitutive of its after life in other aspects. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
THE MENTALITIES AND DISPOSITIONS OF THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE: 
THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 
 
       An appraisal of the nineteenth century Ottoman ―bureaucratic mind‖ has been 
presented in the previous chapters. The mind of the nineteenth century diplomatic service 
was the epitome of the Ottoman bureaucratic mind. Moreover, it constituted one of the 
pillars of the Ottoman bureaucratic establishment and therefore bears the constitutive 
characteristics of the 19th century Ottoman bureaucratic mind at its best. The Ottoman 
bureaucratic mind of the nineteenth century may be divided into four variants developed 
and based on the preoccupations and tasks assigned. The military, the civil administration, 
the diplomatic service and the technical offices, such as the agricultural, forestry, and 
public construction offices, reflect varieties of the 19th century Ottoman bureaucratic 
mind. Modernization, security, and incorporation into the ―civilized world‖ were the 
coexisting preoccupations and concerns of the 19th century Ottoman bureaucratic mind. 
All these bureaucratic offices prioritized some of these coexisting preoccupations and 
concerns due to their areas of responsibility and their daily encounters.  Nonetheless, 
disregarding their immediate tasks, in their intellectual formations and socializations they 
shared the same ethos and same worldview with nuances and variations developed due to 
their professional encounters and obligations. Nonetheless, as a whole, these variations of 
the 19th century Ottoman bureaucratic mind complement each other and constitute a 
meaningful overarching structure of mentality. Thus we have to perceive the 
ideological/intellectual/cultural formations of the Ottoman diplomatic establishment as a 
particular manifestation of the ideological/intellectual/cultural formation of the 19th 
century Ottoman bureaucratic establishment. 
       Apparently, the structures of mentalities do not come out of a vacuum. They 
developed within a certain international political context. As has been stated, the zenith of 
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the power and influence of the Ottoman diplomatic service was the early Tanzimat era. In 
these particular decades, an optimism regarding the future of the Ottoman realm led the 
Ottoman state to prioritize diplomacy as the crucial and decisive pursuit of the state. The 
Ottoman reforms were undertaken with the support and assurance of Britain although the 
British interference hindered it as much as encouraged it.
910
 International diplomacy, 
reformism, reorganization of the administration, and the suppression of local militarized 
powerhouses were four complementary preoccupations which cannot be separated from 
each other.
911
 The Tanzimat reformism was derived and encouraged by prospects 
envisaged by the Ottoman leadership in the international scene.
912
 Thus, the alliance during 
the Crimean War generated further optimism. However, after the disastrous 1877-78 
Russian War, it became clear to Abdülhamid II and many Ottoman statesmen that it was 
seemingly impossible to keep the empire intact by only peaceful means and reformism. 
Though Abdülhamid II was mastering the complex webs of diplomacy, a fatal threat 
loomed, and diplomacy was no more a guarantee for the survival and integrity of the 
Empire. Moreover, the early optimism regarding the administrative reforms conducted by 
the local and province-level offices failed. On the contrary, these efforts produced 
unexpected and detrimental outcomes. The Ottoman state could not accommodate the 
rising non-Muslim unrests and nationalisms that were prompted by the Tanzimat 
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reformism.
913
 The limits of the Tanzimat reformism convinced the non-Muslims to rebuff 
the Ottoman alternative and seek the promotion of their national/communal interests. In the 
eyes of the larger segments of non-Muslim communities, the Ottoman Empire promised no 
future (if it ever did in the eyes of these communities).  
      Due to the changing realities within the Ottoman territories and the international scene, 
new reflexes developed to encounter the changing (gloomy) conditions. Although 
diplomacy was at the very center of the Hamidian polity, diplomacy was relegated to a 
technical business. It ceased to be perceived as redemptive. In the reign of Abdülhamid II, 
diplomatic service was no more on the forefront of Ottoman statecraft. Abdülhamid 
personally took over the ―diplomatic front‖. During the reign of Abdülhamid II, the sultan 
did not elevate men of diplomatic origins to loftier political posts. The statesmen he 
supported and preferred in his appointments were predominantly from non-diplomatic 
offices such as governors, officers, and fiscal administrators. Men from his personal 
retinue, such as Said Pasha and Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha, also rose to prominence in the 
Hamidian era. Abdülhamid‘s neglect of the diplomatic service was so great that he 
appointed military men to most of the ambassadorial posts in the 1890s. His long-time 
ambassadors in Berlin (Tevfik Pasha), in St. Petersburg (Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha), in 
Stockholm (Şerif Pasha), in Belgrade (İbrahim Fethi Pasha), in Cetinje (Ahmed Fevzi 
Pasha), and in Madrid (İzzet Pasha) were of military origin.914 Although the appointment 
of military officers to posts at Cetinje, Belgrade, and St. Petersburg are partially 
understandable, appointments of officers to posts in Stockholm and Madrid are hardly 
understandable. Appointment of an officer to Berlin leads us to assume that Abdülhamid‘s 
assessment of his cooperation with Germany was predominantly a military one. 
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Furthermore, appointing people with a deep knowledge of military matters, rather than 
diplomacy, reveals what kind of skills and expertise Abdülhamid expected from the men 
whom he selected as his main providers of information. In short, Abdülhamid‘s preference 
for military officers displayed his prioritization of military over diplomatic affairs and the 
creeping militarization of diplomacy. Although classical diplomacy was pursued, 
Abdülhamid was aware that diplomacy not supported by a substantial military power with 
assets to be employed and manipulated in diplomatic bargaining was ineffective and 
futile.
915
 Thus, Abdülhamid switched to a Realpolitik diplomacy from a post-Metternich-
Castlereagh diplomacy in the age of Bismarck. More evidence that Abdülhamid did not 
respect the professional diplomatic service is that from the 1890s until his overthrow in 
1908, he retained the ambassadors giving them tenures of fifteen years. Most of the 
ambassadors he appointed in the 1890s kept their posts until the Revolution of 1908. 
Mehmed Rifat Bey in Athens served from 1897 to 1908. Ibrahim Fethi Pasha served as 
ambassador to Belgrade from 1897 to 1908. The list of the other long-serving Hamidian 
ambassadors with their years of service is as follows: Ahmed Tevik Pasha in Berlin, from 
1897 to 1908; Hüseyin Kazım Bey in Bucharest from 1896 to 1908, Ahmed Fevzi Pasha in 
Cetinje from 1891 to 1908, Salih Münir Pasha in Paris from 1896 to 1908; Mustafa Reşid 
Pasha in Rome from 1896 to 1908, Şerif Pasha in Stockholm from 1898 to 1908; Mahmud 
Nedim Pasha in Vienna from 1896 to 1908.
916
 It is highly unreasonable to assume that 
Abdülhamid‘s confidence in them was based on merit. Seemingly, he appointed them 
because of their loyalty to him, and he did not risk appointing new representatives who 
might have been less loyal. He personalized his relations with the ambassadors. Long 
tenures might also have helped the development of a mutual confidence between the 
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appointee and the appointer. At least, this was what Abdülhamid might have calculated. In 
short, we may argue that he sacrificed competent and dynamic diplomacy in favor of 
stability and confidence in his bureaucrats. In his personalized diplomacy, ambassadors 
began to write directly to the palace instead of addressing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
The sultan gathered all the necessary information both from the embassies abroad and from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then he formulated and implemented his complex 
foreign policies and maneuvers. From the flow of information coming from embassies and 
ministry, as observed previously, it seems that domestic concerns were very significant in 
the making of foreign policy.
917
 The threat of domestic instability and separatist agitation 
was a matter of primary concern. However, it has to be noted that Abdülhamid‘s 
militarized diplomacy was less his personal preference than his reluctance to adapt to 
changing circumstances and respond to them. 
      The diplomatic service was no longer at the forefront of Ottoman reformism and 
modernization, either. By the Hamidian era, the early efforts to establish the modern 
governmental infrastructure had developed considerably. Modern forms of administration 
to regulate forests, agriculture, and metallurgy were all in the process of reaching 
maturity.
918
 All the relevant offices were able to improve themselves in communication 
with the West without needing any external assistance. It was the military ventures and 
military efforts to modernize the army that had engendered, forced, and prompted Ottoman 
modernity, technology transfer, and importation of modern knowledge.
919
 The dramatic 
development of military technology and the new horizons in military organization in 
Europe after the 1870s were to be imported by the Ottoman Empire
920
. It was no 
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coincidence that the Young Turks, who made progress in the Hamidian era captured the 
―mission civilisatrice‖ of the Ottoman Empire after 1908. The ―military modern‖ of the 
late 19th century was to replace the ―19th century modern‖. 
       However, this does not mean that the military had grabbed the role of pioneer of 
modernization and transformed it. On the contrary, it was the changing and evolving 
perception of modernity that engaged the military. It was not the takeover of the Ottoman 
military that had modified the track of Ottoman modernization, but it was the modification 
of the Ottoman modernizing mind that had put the military in the driver‘s seat as far as 
statecraft was concerned. Partially, it was a response to the international alignments and the 
rise of military superpowers, such as Germany and Russia (and Japan in the East). It was 
Abdülhamid who had endeavored and spent enormously to strengthen the Ottoman military 
and ironically as a reward for his efforts, he was toppled by the military he had built up.
921
 
The military did not seize control as much as have it bestowed upon them. It was a change 
in the times that had enforced a transforming ―modernizing ideal‖ which was not simply an 
Ottoman phenomenon, but a continent-wide phenomenon.
922
 Thus, a shift in the minds of 
the diplomats was observed as well. As we will observe below, the Ottoman diplomatic 
service also lost its confidence in the 19th century ―concert of Europe‖ of Metternich, 
Castlereagh, and ―reformism‖.  
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6.1. “Official Mind” ? 
     
      Although embassy reports and dispatches were very bureaucratic and impersonal, still 
they may tell us something about the ―official mind‖ of the ministry and Ottoman statecraft 
in general. The dullness and colorlessness of the reports lead us to think that the dispatches 
tried their best to reproduce the ―official mind‖ and never failed to accommodate the 
official mind. They were skillfully penned down not to divert from or contradict the 
―official mind‖. Doing what was to be expected and not doing what was not to be expected 
would be the most appropriate act of an official in order not to be discarded, but instead 
promoted and considered for higher office. Here, we do not mean that there existed an 
―official mind‖ decided somewhere or that this ―official mind‖ was an impersonal entity. 
On the contrary, what I mean by ―official mind‖ is its commonsense nature. It was 
produced not by a limited number of high-ranking officials, but by the entire Ottoman 
bureaucratic cadre anonymously. It was impersonal in the sense that it was produced by the 
Ottoman bureaucracy as a whole. But the ―bureaucracy as a whole‖ is not a supra-personal 
category. It is constituted by individuals. Furthermore, it was not a static entity. The 
official mind was reproduced and reconstituted every time a new dispatch was penned 
down. The reiteration of it was not a mere procedure. Every time it was enhanced and 
when it was not reiterated consistently, it lost its lucidity, pervasiveness, and 
persuasiveness. It may be also dubbed as ―state wisdom‖. The ―Ottoman‖ official mind 
involved caution, risk-aversion, reluctance to take action, and extreme reluctance to take 
instant action. It consisted of profound admiration, contempt, and an enmity towards the 
European powers. The ambivalent attitudes taken vis-a-vis the European powers were 
crafted within this prism. 
      The diplomatic reports were how they were supposed to be. However, the authors of 
the reports were not mere passive duplicators. We may argue that, they each contributed to 
the making of this anonymous ―official mind‖, and therefore they were manufacturers of 
the official mind while they were replicating the schemes to which they were supposed to 
adhere. They were simultaneously captives and masters of the ―official mind‖. The reports 
provide us the opportunity to survey and scrutinize the official view of the Ottoman 
polity‘s approach to liberals, anarchists, parliamentary elections, Britain, budget deficits, et 
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cetera. These reports were also transformative of the Ottoman official mind because they 
contained new knowledge of different sorts. The reports were also transmitting knowledge 
without being aware of the repercussions of these transmitting activities. The gathered 
knowledge was significant in the making and remaking of the modern Ottoman mind. In 
this regard, we can suggest that, the making of the Ottoman mental set is constituted as a 
response to the intense reception of a novel, alarming, and disturbing accumulation of 
knowledge. 
     A similar observation regarding this institutional thinking is made by Jill Pellew, a 
scholar studying the British Home Office. Pellew writes; ―The interesting thing to the 
historian of an institution is that the institution itself is an entity –almost a persona- over 
and above those individuals who constitute its personnel at any given moment. Its ethos is 
derived from its designated functions, its historical development, its effectiveness and the 
extent of its influence, to which the accumulated actions and interactions of those who 
have worked in it have contributed. While, to a greater or lesser degree this ethos may be 
given a shift in direction by one generation of individuals passing through it, they in their 
turn are to some extent influenced by the institution itself.‖923 Regarding the Ottoman 
diplomatic establishment, here it is argued that the institution was an ―idea‖ as much as it 
was ―substance‖. Therefore, its imposing power on the individual serving within the 
institution was less in comparison to its Western counterparts. That is to say, the Ottoman 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not a dispassionate machine limited to the undertaking of 
its assigned tasks. It was not merely a supra-individual bureaucratic organization. It was 
created in the image of the Ottoman bureaucratic elite in an age of turbulence. The 
individuals and the institution are mutually reconstituting each other. It was the 
institutionalization of a certain mode of thinking transformed into the ―official mind‖. Via 
this process, we observed the impressiveness and capabilities of the Ottoman official mind 
in surviving and prospering against all odds. 
     Reports of the Ottoman embassy to Teheran may illustrate some tiny bits and aspects of 
the Ottoman ―official mind‖. The political environment and realities of late 19th century 
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Persia were quiet similar to the Ottoman Empire regarding her relations with the Western 
powers. Persia in the 19th century was a clear example of the struggle of competing 
imperialisms over a nominally independent but economically dependent state.
924
 
Particularly, the military aggressiveness of the Russians was creating increasing concern in 
Persia. Russophobia was prevalent both among the public and the ruling elite. It would be 
interesting to observe the correspondence of the Ottoman diplomatic representations 
dispatched from a Muslim country sharing similar concerns with the Ottomans although in 
incomparably more severe conditions.
925
  
     Not very unexpectedly, the amount of the deskwork dedicated to conducting relations 
with Persia was very limited. Much of the deskwork of the embassy was devoted to 
scrutinizing and accommodating the activities of Great Britain in Persia. For instance, the 
navigation rights on Shatt-al Arab comprised a significant portion of the deskwork of the 
embassy. The embassy tried to avoid the emergence of a possible disagreement and a crisis 
with Great Britain. The pursuit of Russian involvement in Persia was another major 
concern of the embassy. Although coordination with Russia was a rather insignificant 
agenda item for the embassy, communication with Russia was maintained to accommodate 
the interests of the Ottoman Empire to the Russian interests and to avoid any severe crisis 
with Russia. 
     Correspondence on relations with Persia was limited to technical matters. One 
exception to these technicalities was a report concerning the local Kurdish disturbances 
near the Ottoman-Persian border, the movement of Kurdish bands across the border, and 
disagreements over the border drawn in 1847. In short, the correspondence from the 
embassy to Teheran reveals to us the world of competing imperialism in which Ottomans 
were spectators anxious not to be entangled within the webs of this struggle. They were not 
trying to benefit from the Western powers economic and military drives, but were only 
concerned about avoiding any loss or retreat. The typically cautious and low-profile 
diplomacy and statecraft of the Ottomans were also visible in the Persian context. They 
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were pragmatists. They knew the world in which they were trying to maneuver and played 
the game following the rules of the game.  
     This world came to an end in 1906 in Persia. Expectedly, the Persian Revolution in 
1906 drastically changed the picture we have drawn above. The contents and concerns of 
the reports changed dramatically after the Revolution.  As the political situation became 
more complex and multifaceted, the reports began to reflect these novel realities. The 
reports after 1906 were more political and interpretive in contrast to the technical dullness 
of the earlier reports. We observe the ―emergence of politics‖ in these reports. For the first 
time, the Persian government emerged as a serious counterpart of the embassy.
926
 Persia 
was now perceived as an actor herself although to a very limited extent. Russia‘s hostile 
attitude to the Revolution and the growing resentment of Russia among the governing 
circles, parliament, and the people in general became a concern. With 1906, the reports 
began to become less technical and more political in the age of imperialism, the clash of 
imperialisms, and rising reactions to imperialism. This was the time when the Ottoman 
Empire evolved into an imperialist power as well. In Selim Deringil‘s ―borrowed 
terminology‖, this was ―borrowed imperialism‖.927 This was ―enforced imperialism‖, as 
well. In the Persian context, remembering how the Unionist governments practiced 
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imperialist politics and visions over Persia, it is interesting to observe how the cautious 
Ottomans became active aggressors, and subsequently became entangled in the Persian 
web. Nevertheless, Ottoman firmness did not wait for the Young Turks to come to power. 
―Under the pretext of policing the border, Turkish forces in autumn 1905 occupied a strip 
of land from ten to fifty kilometer wide between the frontier line and Lake Urmiye(.)‖928 
The Turkish occupation lasted until the evacuation in 1912 followed by another invasion 
during World War I.  
     Another random sample to be taken is the embassy to Athens. The embassy to Athens 
may exemplify the ministry‘s attitude towards a small neighboring country. Feridun Bey, 
the ambassador to Athens, is regarded as a fairly hard-working bureaucrat. His regular 
reports were meticulous and informative. His reports were heavily concentrated on the 
parliamentary affairs and informed Istanbul on the parliamentary debates, where fervent 
discussions regarding the Ottoman Empire and the relations of Greece with the Ottoman 
Empire were held. For example, in one of his reports summarizing parliamentary debates, 
he recounted the accusation by the parliament that the cabinet was Turcophile.
929
 
Nevertheless, in his ―rapports particulair‖, he informed the ministry on subjects like the 
―medical society of Athens930‖, the University of Athens931, and railway construction in 
Greece
932
. It is probable that such information on the technical and institutional 
development of Greece was demanded (or expected) from Feridun Bey. In one sense, they 
resemble the seferatnames of the early 19th century.
933
 However, the purpose here is 
probably not learning from Greece but tracking the level of development and the 
advancement of one of the Ottoman Empire‘s immediate enemies. Not surprisingly, the 
diplomatic moves and relations of Greece with greater powers and small regional powers 
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were followed and reported. One report investigated the anti-governmental speech of 
Papamikhalopoulo, which was full of allusions to the glorious history of Greece and 
inspired the ―grande ideé Hellenique‖. Papamikhalopoulo noted that the issue of Greeks in 
Eastern Roumelia was emerging as an issue after the takeover of Eastern Roumelia by the 
Kingdom (sic) of Bulgaria. The Greek government, given its limited financial sources, 
looked for individuals to support the Greeks of Eastern Roumelia, who had to be protected 
against the Bulgarian administration.
934
 After Feridun Bey and following the acting 
ambassadorship of Mehmed Şemseddin (in 1887), Rıza Bey (in 1988) was appointed to the 
post of ambassador to Athens. Mehmed Şemseddin left us only a tiny number of 
documents during his tenure. It has to be said that Rıza Bey‘s reports lacked the quality of 
the reports of Feridun Bey. They were shorter, less legible, and much less meticulous. His 
dispatches were event-oriented rather than providing comprehensive and informative 
documentation. Rıza Bey‘s appointment also coincided with the escalation of Greek 
domestic politics and the rise of Greek expansionist passion and irredentism. The changing 
circumstances of Greece might have played a role in the replacement of Feridun Bey with 
Rıza Bey.  
     The dispatches from the embassy to Belgrade were extremely disappointing in 
comparison to the dispatches from Athens. Moreover, the dispatches were limited only to 
overt political moves by the Serbians, and they especially concentrated on Serbia‘s special 
relation with Russia and its diplomatic relations with Bulgaria. We may say that the post in 
Serbia was much less important in the eyes of Istanbul. In 1890, Feridun Bey whom we 
already met at his post in Athens, was appointed to the embassy to Belgrade. We observe 
an improvement in the style and quality of the reports with the coming of Feridun Bey. The 
reports also expanded in size and in the information they contained. Furthermore, Feridun 
Bey‘s reports were written in a more legible handwriting. As an observation, it has to be 
said that Feridun Bey‘s dispatches were much better in quality although still incomparably 
weak vis-a-vis his previous reports and the dispatches he sent from Athens. Furthermore, 
he limited himself to political affairs. This was obviously due to the fact that Serbia played 
a much less significant role in the eyes of Istanbul, and the extra-political developments of 
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Serbia were of no interest.
935
 The reports were written only to relay concrete matters of 
concern, and we do not see many reports sent in the absence of such a necessity.  
     To conclude, these dispatches are far from exposing a certain and consistent 
ideological/intellectual/cultural formation. However, this does not mean that they are 
unworthy. On the contrary, they display the basic premises of an ―official mind‖. They are 
not mere facades. They establish their own reality. Nonetheless, other sources tell us more 
about the formations of the members of the diplomatic service. In this regard, a very 
valuable source we may turn to is Galip Kemali‘s (Söylemezoğlu) immense account. 
 
 
6.2. Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu: A Liminal Diplomat 
 
      Galip Kemali was a complex figure embodying all the ambivalences and contradictions 
(from our point of view with a century of hindsight) of his time. He was a liminal character 
reflecting the interconnectedness of nationalism, modernism, elitism, and Ottoman 
imperialism. In his mental framework, all these dispositions overlapped and coexisted. His 
memoirs are arguably one of the best primary sources reflecting the structures of 
mentalities of his time. This is not only in terms of the memoirs‘ massiveness, but also in 
terms of their quality, profoundness, and multilayered nature.  
     Galip Kemali came from a local notable family, whose forefathers had moved to 
Istanbul after serving in the provincial administration in Trabzon as the protégés of Halil 
Rifat Pasha when he was the governor of Trabzon. Galip Kemali was born in 1873 and 
joined the diplomatic service in 1892 after his graduation from the Mekteb-i Sultani. His 
father, Ali Kemali Pasha, served as the governor of Konya and can therefore be regarded as 
a high-ranking bureaucrat. Arguably, Ali Kemali Pasha‘s career path resembled the pre-
Tanzimat pattern of career advancement before the formalization and regularization of the 
bureaucracy which ceased to exist with the generation of Galip Kemali after the 
development and consolidation of training and merit-based recruitment and promotion. His 
uncle, İbrahim Edhem Pertev Pasha, served in various high positions, including Assistant 
Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whose career in various postings in 
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different governmental offices was also resembling the premodern and pre-Tanzimat 
pattern of career.
936
  
     Having grown up in an atmosphere of parvenu aristocracy (local notables slightly in 
process of integrating into the imperial Tanzimat aristocracy), it seems that Galip Kemali 
endorsed the aristocratic culture he encountered in Istanbul emphatically. Although he 
belonged to the first generation of the family in terms of having a sound, formal education 
unlike his autodidact father and uncle, he was a staunch defender of aristocratic 
exclusivism throughout his career and was uncompromising in his criticism of the failure 
to follow the aristocratic code of conduct in diplomacy. Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu kept 
reminding his readers that diplomacy was not simply a matter of settling disputes and 
implementing policies, but is also a style and art. Therefore, only those who possessed 
special qualities could be genuine diplomats. He was also very strict regarding upholding 
the standards of professionalism. For example, he was very disturbed by the dilettantism, 
impatience, and crude patriotism of the Unionists. Conceding that they were sincere 
patriots, Galip Kemali argued that they destroyed the Empire with their empty rhetoric.
937
 
He was particularly disappointed with the obstruction of the Turco-Greek alliance he 
attempted to launch while he was ambassador to Athens to counter the Slavic threat from 
the North by the Unionists because of their obsession over Crete and their empty 
nationalist fervor. After the negotiations between Greece and the Ottomans collapsed, 
Greece aligned with the Balkan states, and apparently this alliance cost the Ottomans 
severely in the Balkan Wars. For Galip Kemali, the Young Turks and their lack of insight 
into diplomacy were the chief culprits in this fiasco. Very critical of the nationalist 
arrogance of the Unionists and their obstruction of diplomatic pragmatism, he himself was 
not less nationalist or Turkist than the Unionists as will be shown in the coming few pages.   
      He was no less critical of the Republican establishment. Writing his memoirs in the 
1940s, Galip Kemali criticized the Kemalist Republic explicitly but ―politely‖. One of his 
criticisms was with regard to the Republic‘s abandonment of official uniforms. Pointing 
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out that even Bolshevik Russia reestablished official uniforms, particularly for the 
diplomatic service; it was not only necessary but an imperative for Turkey to reestablish 
official uniforms for the diplomatic service.
938
 He suggested that ―even the most 
democratic‖ countries were following the rituals of official clothing and bestowing and 
accepting badges. Apparently, what democratic meant for Galip Kemali was 
Republicanism and the prevalence of the culture of egalitarianism over aristocratic 
exclusivism. For Galip Kemali, aristocratic formalities and codes of conduct were the very 
basis of diplomacy, and it was untenable to conduct diplomacy in their absence.
939
  
      Though he was a staunch advocate of the 19th century European code of conduct, his 
Islamic upbringing and socialization also showed itself at some moments. One remarkable 
episode worth mentioning is the transformation of Galip Kemali‘s approaches to ―fez‖ and 
―hat‖ as depicted in his memoirs. Before his first appointment abroad as secretary in the 
embassy to Bucharest, he was nervous. He wrote; ―Until that time, I was instinctually 
disgusted with the hat. Like any other Turkish and Muslim child, my ears were ringing 
with the rhymes of ‗whoever wears a hat, God forbid, becomes an infidel‘ ‖. Fortunately, 
before his departure to Bucharest, his pious father advised him that ―if you wear hat out of 
necessity, it is permissible. It is impermissible only if you wear a hat as an imitation of the 
Westerners.‖ Although convinced by the argument of his father, on the first day he wore a 
hat while presenting himself to the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the 
Romanian diplomatic establishment, and he was very much embarrassed and distressed.
940
 
But over time, he began to feel more comfortable without a fez on his head. He notes that 
before 1908, the fez was an indispensable part of the Ottoman official uniforms, but after 
1908, he preferred not to don a fez and left his head uncovered while he was in official 
garb. Moreover, while ambassador to Athens, he encouraged and convinced a colleague of 
his to take his fez off and wear a hat while socializing in Athens, assuring him that it is no 
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sin to wear a hat. Söylemezoğlu advised him that, ―one has to follow the culture of 
foreigners when he is in their environment.‖941 We observe the transformation of Galip 
Kemali into a proud defender of the hat during his tenure in the diplomatic service. He 
began to attribute to the hat a symbolic (and positive) meaning in reaction to resilient 
antagonism towards the hat which Galip Kemali perceives as baseless superstition.
942
  
     Apparently, the fez was a sensitive issue. It symbolized the very mark of the Muslim 
identity while wearing Western suit. It is the threshold of Muslimness. The astonishing 
resilience in defense of the fez and dislike towards the hat displays the seeming 
contradictions and ambiguities which are consistent and totally explicable for their 
protagonists. The fez and hat duality conveys the liminality of the group we are 
investigating. The fez is a sign of authenticity within a full-fledged Westernization. It is 
also associated with notions like honor and decency. The fez acquires an intense and 
resolute meaning irrelevant to its own reality and in wearing it, a value system which is felt 
to be lost, is regained.   
     According to Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and Ziya Gökalp, ―public consciousness‖ 
guarantees that no one can dare to wear a hat in public.
943
 Living in European countries, 
the diplomats faced the challenge of the ―hat‖, and they ended up wearing hats and 
normalizing what had previously appeared to be taboo (and subsequently turning into open 
or shy defenders of the hat and again finding in it an intense symbolism unassociated with 
the realities of the fez and hat).
944
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    Apparently as a general observation, Islam turned out to be a private matter in the minds 
and perceptions of the diplomats and other bureaucrats by the end of the Empire. İbrahim 
Hakkı Pasha perfectly illustrated this privatized and individualized understanding of Islam 
and faith. For İbrahim Hakkı; “Beş vakt de nemaz kılamıyorum…Kimsenin hakkını gasb 
etmiyorum.Üstümde kul hakkı yokdur. Allah, kendi hakkını afv buyurur emma kulun 
hakkını afv etmez…İman kalbdedir. Müslümanlık kelime-i şehadetten ibarettir…Esas 
budur, ibadat ve taat bunun füru‟udır.”945 (I don‘t pray five times (per day)…I do not 
infringe anybody else‘s right. God forgives those committed against himself but does not 
forgive infringements of the rights of his subjects. Faith is in the heart. Islam is a matter of 
believing in the Almighty. This is its essence; rituals and obedience (to God) are means to 
that.)The members of the Hamidian diplomatic service were the first generation who 
retained and upheld their Islamic heritage but adjusted and rationalized it.
946
 As will be 
shown in the coming pages, the next generation was indifferent to religion, preferred to 
disregard it, and did not take it as a reference system. 
      Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu‘s proposals to reform and restructure the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and diplomacy are also worth mentioning. Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu 
suggested recruiting diplomats from the privileged families as it was done in Europe. In his 
memorandum on the ―Reform of Diplomatic Service‖ in 1909, he noted that ―like the other 
countries, the diplomats who will be appointed to the embassies have to be from 
prosperous families.‖ He recommended that, those graduates of Mülkiye who want to serve 
in the Ministry should be employed as Ottoman representatives abroad without being paid 
any salary or allowance for one year. After completing one year in the embassies without 
any salary, they should be entitled to be third secretaries. However, for one year they were 
to be paid only salary, but not an allowance.
947
 Apparently, this policy prevalent in 
European diplomatic services was a mechanism to eliminate those who could not support 
themselves and privilege those with financial means.  
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     For Galip Kemali, diplomats have to be familiar with the European social codes (adab-ı 
muaşaret) and with the codes of conduct of the European higher classes with whom they 
will be in contact throughout their diplomatic careers. For Galip Kemali, this was another 
reason why the diplomats had to come from families of respectability. Only people from 
reputable families can easily socialize with the European refined classes. Abdülhak Hamid 
was in concurrence with Galip Kemali on this point. He wrote ―an ambassador has to be 
from the high classes of the society which he is supposed to represent and has to be a 
career diplomat. If an ambassador lacks these qualities, there would be a loss of 
prestige….There had been several cases in which ambassadors of secondary ranks were 
more respected and taken into consideration by the aristocracies, rulers, and governments  
to which they were appointed
948.‖  For Abdülhak Hamid, ―those ambassadors who lack 
social prestige are doomed to be failures. An ambassador has to be respected not only by 
the governments, but also by the social circles in which he is socializing. Otherwise, he 
will be unsuccessful (as a diplomat).‖949 Thus, ―an official in an embasy either should 
come from aristocratic background or should maintain aristocratic attitudes and 
outlook.‖950 
     Refinement and sociability were the unwritten requirements of diplomacy. The 
otherwise disappointing and unimpressive memoirs of Esad Cemal Paker seem to be 
written for the purpose of convincing the reader that he lived the life of a bon vivant and 
that he drank best wines.
951
 Apparently, the diplomatic establishment was associated with a 
―Westernized‖ life style. This established prejudice had both positive and negative 
connotations. The diplomats were particularly targeted by the Islamists. Derviş Vahdeti in 
his journal Volkan targeted diplomats exemplifying the prevalent perceptions within the 
Islamic and Islamist milieus regarding the diplomats. For him; ―(a)mbassadors had taken 
Christians wives, had many children, and educated them in the mother‘s western European 
way. They learned European languages and were educated in Islamic beliefs and morals 
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only by governesses and teachers of other religions.‖952 They were preys for the populist 
discourses, as well. Fazıl Arif Bey, a parliamentarian representing Amasya in the 
parliament of 1908, was outraged with the diplomats whom he regarded as those ―who are 
bringing governesses and courtesans from Europe‖ and living in luxury while the Ottoman 
populace was in poverty.
953
  While this imagery was to be abused in the hands of populists, 
it made the diplomats objects of emulation for others. Feridun Cemal Erkin, one of the 
doyens of the Republican diplomatic service, is illustrative.  His childhood memories 
vividly display the image of the ―superwesternized‖ Ottoman diplomat. In his memoirs, 
Erkin writes that when he was a kid, his father, who was a civil servant of prominence, was 
visited by two men. One of them was sporting a goatee and a white moustache, the other 
wearing a glass monocle. Impressed by their elegance and courtliness, Feridun asked who 
these visitors were. When his father responded that they were ―sefir-i kebirs‖, the 
impressed young Feridun, as he recalls after more than half a century, decided to be a sefir-
i kebir like them.
954
 At least this is how Feridun Cemal Erkin explains why he wanted to be 
a diplomat. Abdülhak Hamid argued that the ambassadorial officials and military attachés 
not only have to be presentable, but should also be ―good-looking‖. ―Even a rich diplomat 
should not be poor in his physical appearance.‖955 He recalled ―that once an Ottoman 
foreign minister refrained from sending a son of a Pasha as an ambassador because of the 
son‘s poor appearance.‖956 For Abdülhak Hamid, ―especially the members of the demi-
monde are superficial (so that they pay attention to physical appearance very much)‖957, 
and they had to be impressed accordingly. In short, these accounts should be a disclaimer 
to Marcel Proust who in his ―In Search of Lost Time‖ portrayed the Turkish ambassador 
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and his wife as superfluous Orientals alien to the refinement and elegance of the 
aristocratic European culture and the diplomatic establishment.   
    Apparently, for Galip Kemali (and Abdülhak Hamid), the training of diplomats was also 
a major consideration. He resented the unsatisfactory level of training of the diplomats. 
After noting that the principal source of recruits for the diplomatic service was Mekteb-i 
Sultani, Galip Kemali argued that a higher college was necessary for the graduates of 
Mekteb-i Sultani for further study to be eligible to be recruited into the diplomatic service. 
What was in the mind of Galip Kemali was a part-time college of political science (ulum-ı 
siyasi). In the plan suggested by Galip Kemali, these youths were to begin to work in the 
ministry while attending the college until noon. They also had to be taught English or 
German as their second foreign language in their advanced studies. Galip Kemali did not 
ignore the practicalities either. These youths also had to be introduced to the European 
diplomats in Istanbul, so that they would not feel ignorant of the European code of 
conduct. 
     In short, Galip Kemali emphasized ―refinement‖ and ―civility‖. However, he was also 
very strict regarding the necessity of fostering the erudition of the diplomatic service. 
Apparently, he was disappointed with the miserable level of the erudition of the Ottoman 
diplomatic service. Nevertheless, concluding his memorandum, Galip Kemali was 
optimistic. He believed that by training prospective diplomats in a distinguished college 
with an intense curriculum, teaching them the basics of politics, and integrating them into 
the European world of culture and more, their skills and erudition would be enhanced. 
Thus, the quality of the performance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be satisfactory. 
     Galip Kemali‘s memorandum was consistent with the self-portrait he drew in his 
memoirs. He depicted himself throughout his tomes as a professional-aristocrat. That is to 
say, in his self-representation, he was simultaneously very sensitive on the refined and 
socially exclusivist nature of the craft of diplomacy and on the intellectually demanding 
aspect of the profession. He was a professional in the sense that for him one needed to be 
hard-working, working diligently days and nights when necessary.  
      Interestingly, his memorandum resembles the reform of the British and French Foreign 
Offices undertaken in the first decade of the twentieth century in some ways and 
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contradicts them in other ways.
958
 The similar themes were maximizing bureaucratic 
rationality and efficiency. Nevertheless, Galip Kemali also suggests retaining a culture of 
elitism and social exclusion, which the European reformist programs sought to diminish or 
eliminate. Galip Kemali, on the contrary, wanted to formalize what was de facto practiced 
and maintained and avoid ―democratic currents‖. What has been revealed here so far 
regarding Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu is a portrait of an aristocratic diplomat decorated 
with codes of courtliness. Yet, Galip Kemali is a staunch Turkish nationalist on the fringes 
of xenophobia. 
     Galip Kemali‘s propaganda publication in French, ―L‟Assasinat d‟un Peuple‖959, 
written for the purpose of defending the rights of Turkey under occupation, displays an 
amalgamation of different discourses: anti-imperialism, civilizationism, and Turkism. The 
pamphlet addresses  Westerners and was written to unmask the hypocrisy of the West. He 
criticized the West for glorifying civilization and styling itself as the very embodiment of 
civilization, but ignoring the requirements of civilization when it comes to actual policy 
decisions. Galip Kemali criticizes the prevailing view of Turks in the West as barbarians 
and argues that the reality is just the opposite. He reminds the Western reader of the 
murdered, mutilated, and expelled Muslim civilian populace of Thrace and the atrocities 
committed by Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgarians. Galip Kemali develops the idea that 
European powers have a particular problem with Turkey. The Europeans‘ unjustified 
actions and attitudes towards Turkey were distinctive and could not be explained by the 
imperatives of Realpolitik alone. However, Galip Kemali refrains from revealing the 
motivations of Europeans in their mean attitude towards Turkey. He refrains from 
presenting the European great powers‘ aggression as a crusade against the banner of Islam 
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like many others although he seems to perceive this aggression as a crusade.
960
 He also 
refrains from presenting the case against the ―Turks‖. He appeals to the conscience of the 
European audience and evokes the notion of Western civilization to convince his European 
audience. Nevertheless, it is not very hard to detect his ―unspoken assumptions‖. 
Apparently, underneath the text we observe that he shared the ―commonsense perception‖ 
and hearsay knowledge that for ―certain reasons‖, Europeans cultivated an 
uncompromising enmity towards Turks. This enmity did not originate from Realpolitik 
reasons. It derived from historical animosities and was therefore a timeless and an 
eternalized antagonism that was not expected to be easily resolved. 
      He is more explicit in his memoirs given that here he addresses a Turkish audience 
rather than the conscience of the Westerners. In his memoirs and correspondence after the 
publication of his propaganda pamphlet, he revealed that his disgust and abhorrence of the 
Western powers was immense. He writes in a style influenced heavily by the Unionist 
rhetoric.
961
 In these texts, Galip Kemali, the elegant aristocratic and imperial patriot, 
apparently surrendered to a vulgar nationalist rhetoric (with sycophantic praise of Mustafa 
Kemal). For example, he wrote; “Mondros mütarekesinin devamı müddetince hak namına 
kılıçlarını çektiklerini senelerden beri bütün aleme haykırmış olan muzaffer devletler 
tarafından en mukaddes haklarımız kahpece ayaklar altına alındı…Yedi yüz senelik koca 
bir devletin, ezeldenberi hür yaşamış, asırlarca dünyaya meydan okumuş yüce Türk 
milletinin yalnız istiklali değil mevcudiyeti bile sarsıldı. Kendine yakışan bir coşkunluk ile, 
koca Türk, kalbindeki milli imanı, ruhundaki irsi celadeti göstermemiş, onun nelere kadir 
olduğunu keşfederek tam vaktinde başına geçecek bir Dahi çıkmamış ve nihayet 
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memleketin en temiz evlatları, bir nur gibi gökten inen, bu ümit şiraresi etrafında büyük bir 
feragati nefis ile toplanmamış olsaydı, maazallah !”962  
     Yet, the making of a crude nationalist out of Galip Kemali was neither exceptional nor 
idiosyncratic. The recurring military and political defeats created a fear that fomented a 
blatant and unapologetic nationalism. The change of the political elite also forced the old 
timers to accommodate themselves. For example, Sami Paşazade Sezai, who had served in 
the ministry since 1885, had been a staunch defender and promoter of the ―West‖ and 
―Western values‖, and had supported the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the 
―Concert of Europe‖ (which he called a ―Peaceful Conquest‖ -feth-i sulhperveri-)963 also 
lost his enthusiasm for ―Western civilization‖ during his ambassadorship in Madrid 
between 1914 and 1921 and after observing the occupation of Turkey in 1918.
964
 For him, 
after observing the policies of Britain in the World War I, the ―West‖ began to be 
associated with hypocrisy and  imperialist Britain was the embodiment of this hypocritical 
West.
965
 Although he was also critical of the Christian prejudice and double standards of 
the West previously, for him these were side issues not eclipsing the superiority of Western 
values and political culture. Abdülhak Hamid, the elegant aristocrat of the 19th century 
Ottoman world, wrote in a strong anti-imperialist and anti-Christian jargon in 1924. ―The 
ones who share most responsibility (for the decline of humanity and civility) are those who 
acquired most territories in the Great War. Yes, those plunderers and pirates….. This 
cannibalistic personality wants to swim in the blood of Muslims. He enjoys eating Muslim 
flesh and even Muslim carcasses. In his eyes, no nation can have its own state and patrie 
except himself. Whenever he sees independence, freedom, and survival, he thinks of 
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annihilating it and plundering it, destroying whatever the nation has.‖966 In his anti-
Western and anti-Christian tirade quoted above, he went as far as calling the personalized 
European imperialism as ―dünyadaki vatanların en kahbe haini‖ (the most whorish traitor 
of the fatherlands of the world). The Christian West as the eternal foe of the Muslim Turk 
emerged as an invented image prevalent not only in the Young Turk generation, but also in 
the elder generation. Nonetheless, this imagery was much more profound in the next 
generation of the diplomatic service. The next generation of the Ottoman diplomatic 
service introduced young nationalist poets and men of letters. Müftüoğlu Ahmet Hikmet 
and Enis Behiç (Koryürek) were two gifts of the diplomatic service to the nationalist 
literature.  
 
 
6.3. The New Generation and Cumulative Radicalization 
 
      Ahmet Hikmet was born in 1870 with a background typical of the bulk of the diplomat 
service (a middle-level bureaucrat father serving in the provincial administration, a 
respectable genealogy going back to the Peloponnesus, and himself born in Istanbul) and 
was a graduate of Mekteb-i Sultani, like most of his colleagues. He got his first 
appointments to Marseilles, Piraeus, and Poti in the Hamidian era. In his later career, he 
was appointed ambassador to Budapest in 1916, apparently to fulfill his Turkist and 
Turanist ambitions. He was active in Turkist activities in his tenure in Budapest, 
participating in the Hungarian Turanian circles and academic clubs enthusiastically. He 
died while serving as the ministerial undersecretary in 1926. Like Abdülhak Hamid, today, 
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he is not known and remembered for his remarkable diplomatic career but for his literary 
output and his contribution to the nationalist literature.
967
 
      Enis Behiç belonged to a later generation.968 Born in 1892, like Ahmet Hikmet, he 
possessed the attributes of the social and cultural background of a ―typical‖ diplomat. He 
has the three attributes of the average diplomat. He was fathered by a military doctor (a 
civil servant), was born in Istanbul, and was a graduate of Mülkiye. He entered the 
diplomatic service in 1913. Serving in mediocre posts abroad and in Istanbul, he is 
remembered better for his extremely nationalist poems. His poem ―Kırmızı Şezlong‖ (Red 
Chair) was an outrageous anti-Semitic poem recounting the lives of a greedy Jewish 
speculator, Mişon, and his lustful wife, Rebeka, who was deceiving her husband, and is a 
masterpiece of anti-Semitism, portraying the Jewish characters as nasty, corrupt, and 
disgusting rascals.  The motives for writing such a poem remain conspicuous given that no 
full-fledged anti-Semitism developed in the Ottoman Empire and that such enmities were 
reserved for Christian groups within the Ottoman Empire. The anti-Semitism in this poem 
is a perfect illustration of the anti-Semitic themes prevalent in Germany and France at the 
time. Probably, Enis Behiç was influenced by European/French anti-Semite discourses of 
the time. Enis Behiç‘s poems are sharply divided into two: very individualistic poems 
reflecting the loneliness, failed aspirations, and melancholy of the modern individual and 
extremely nationalist poems depicting war scenes in which victorious Turkish soldiers are 
seeking Turan or are about to reconquer the lost Roumelia up to Budapest. Enis Behiç was 
definitely a ―salon Turanist‖. By this time, in the third generation of the Tanzimat, we meet 
a ―modern‖ individual in the personality of Enis Behiç, with whom we share the same 
sensibilities and for whom we feel empathy. He was at the same time a Turkish nationalist 
as a product of his own times.
969
 His nationalism is explicitly and blatantly secular. There 
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is no aspect of religion in his poems whether they are nationalist or individualist. His 
poems display how, in three generations, religion had gradually retreated and then 
vanished from the worldview of the cosmology of the Ottoman bureaucrats. As suggested 
previously, secularization as relativization and decline of the individual faith does not 
soften or terminate the anti-Western rhetoric. On the contrary, like many other modernists 
nationalists of their time, famous names like Ömer Seyfeddin and diplomats like Enis 
Behiç and ambassador Galip Kemali were increasingly becoming anti-Westernist and 
xenophobic. In fact, in Galip Kemali‘s case (as with any other member of his generation), 
such xenophobia was enhanced by secularization. As monotheist universalism and morality 
had disappeared or been marginalized into the private realm; the nation and national 
ethics/morality emerged as the only reference points. The extreme nationalism of two close 
friends of Halid Ziya
970, Reşid Safvet and Safveti Ziya, should also be mentioned as two 
other exempla of the third generation of Tanzimat and the third generation of Tanzimat 
diplomats. 
       Reşid Safvet did not get impressive promotions. His highest positions were first 
secretariat in the embassies of Bucharest, Washington, Madrid, and Teheran. He 
participated in the Lausanne Conference as the general secretary of the Turkish delegation. 
He became a member of parliament in 1927, serving for two terms. However, his major 
achievement was arguably his foundation of TURING (Touring Club Turc) in 1923. Reşid 
Safvet was an impressive personality with various interests and talents. Halid Ziya 
remembers him as a young man, a minor official in the Regie, who was about to join the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and whose sole interest was reading books. Halid Ziya tells us 
that Reşid Safvet lived in an apartment in Akaretler, which was so full of books and his 
many notebooks that there was only enough empty space for his writing desk. According to 
                                                                                                                                                             
collected in Haristan.    Nevertheless, some of his stories collected in Haristan and 
published after 1908 contain themes such as West versus East with their mutually 
exclusive attributes and the equating of Westernized cosmopolitism with decadence and 
corruption emerges.   
970
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Halid Ziya, he read whatever he found on history, sociology, philosophy, politics, and 
religion (but never literature). He never went out, slept little, and showed up in the office 
exhausted but ahead of his colleagues.
971
 In short, Reşid Safvet was a man of his times, 
driven to learn and discover the whole new world in front of him. He displays the new 
intellectual of the third generation of Tanzimat who established for himself a completely 
new world and severed himself from the past explicitly, a move that is striking taken in this 
generation. He was a third generation Tanzimat figure like many others, fascinated with the 
enormity of Western knowledge and science. The encyclopedic curiosity of this new 
generation is embodied in the person of Reşid Safvet as well.   
       Reşid Safvet produced numerous books in French in later life, defending Turkey and 
Turks before the international public in such works as ―Turcs et Arménians Devant 
l‟histoire: Nouveaux Témoignages Russes et Turcs sur les Atrocitiés”.972 These 
publications demonstrated the outstanding contributions of Turks to world civilization
973
 
and defended the Turkish Historical Thesis adamantly in the heyday of the Kemalist 
regime. Reşid Safvet displays the contrast between the conspicuous Westernism in his life 
style and hatred towards the West. Reşid Safvet adopted a fervent nationalist outlook, not 
unlike that of his colleagues Ahmet Hikmet and Enis Behiç. Yet, Reşid Safvet was also a 
bon vivant and loved the good life. Coming from a rich family and married to the 
granddaughter of Rıza Pasha, Abdülhamid‘s chief of staff, he provided the demimonde in 
the marginalized and déclassé Istanbul of the Republic with various entertainments 
mimicking the grandeur of the Istanbul of yesteryear during the Empire 
974
. Yet, his 
hedonism did not hinder or soften his rhetoric of extreme and obsessive Turkism. He also 
volunteered to be an apparatchik of the Republican regime in Ankara. Nevertheless, the 
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idiosyncratic playboy of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs seemed to have his 
counterparts in other European diplomatic services. For Vladimir Lamsdorff, a diplomat 
serving the Russian Foreign Ministry, ―the court had ‗the character of a café‘, the Yacht 
Club was a ‗temple of idleness‘ and much of the aristocracy was ‗…a clique of which the 
court and the circle of profligates and idlers called ‗society‘…the Foreign Ministry was 
indeed not only the focus of Lambsdorff‘s professional skills and energies but also his 
home and his ‗fatherland‘, whence he drew most of his personal friendships…‖975 
       Safveti Ziya was one of the major figures of the Edebiyat-ı Cedide (New Literature) 
influenced from French poetry and literature of the late 19
th
 century. A man of exquisite 
manners and elegance, Halid Ziya describes his artistic and bohemian worlds and circles. 
Coming from a respectable Istanbul family which sent many of his members to the 
privileged offices in the government, for Safveti Ziya, life meant good food, good clothing, 
spending money, and all kinds of luxury. In the account of Halid Ziya, he was well-known 
for frequenting the most trendy venues in Pera in order to be close to beautiful women. He 
danced the best, spoke the most fluent French and English, and was the most handsome. In 
short, for Halid Ziya, Safveti Ziya was a prototypical dandy. Nevertheless, his eccentric 
life style did not obstruct his successful career. At his sudden death (aged 54 in 1929), he 
had just been appointed as ambassador to Czechoslovakia after serving as the director of 
protocol of the ministry. He died during a party at the Yacht Club in Principio. Safveti Ziya 
lived well, dined well, and died well. Apparently, he belonged not to the Tanzimat 
generation, but to a new generation with different socialization and mores. 
      He was, like his other colleagues, a passionate Turkist and Westernist. His novel 
―Salon Köşelerinde‖ was a novel originally ―published in…Servet-i Fünun, told the story 
of a ‗Europeanized‘ Ottoman man who socialized in the foreign quarters of Istanbul and 
tried to prove by waltzing like a European that he was ‗civilized‘ to an English girl with 
whom he had fallen in love. The protagonist of the novel writes that, ‗….I changed my 
plan of action, thinking that it would be necessary to prove to an English girl and an 
English family that Turkishness within a society is not an example of barbarity, but an 
adornment, and that the Turks too are a civilized nation.‘ Even in this non-political, 
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romantic novel, the Europeanized character, who was ready to accommodate to European 
culture, exhibited a reactionary attitude to the European perception of the Turk and fought 
against this ‗misperception‘ by dancing(.)‖976 In the beginning of the novel, the author 
voices his regrets at Turks‘ failure to dance elegantly and hopes that one day Turks will 
master European dances.
977
  Safveti Ziya was encouraged to write such a book by Ahmet 
Hikmet, who opined,  ―how great it would be if you account for your experiences in the 
salons and high society with regard to our nationality. No such work has been yet 
written.‖978 Apparently, both Safveti Ziya and Ahmet Hikmet perceived personal 
encounters with Westerners within a political prism. The politicization of every sphere of 
private life was an aspect of the third generation of Tanzimat.
979
 Whereas politics, 
Westernization, and the expression of Westernization were limited to public display and 
the political sphere while preserving the distinctly traditional lifestyles in the private 
sphere
980
 in the first and second generations of the Tanzimat, with the third generation of 
Tanzimat, there was a Westernization of every sphere of life, and every sphere became a 
contested zone of nationalism in which national displays and national enmities became 
prevalent.
981
 Safveti Ziya, like many of his generation, defined Turkishness with reference 
to their individual attributes and developed a Turkish nationalism to challenge and outdo 
the Europeans. Safveti Ziya‘s book ―Adab-ı Muaşeret Hasbihalleri‖ (Conversations on 
                                                 
976
 Boyar, Ebru, Ottomans, Turks and the Balkans, London: Tauris, 2007, pp. 87-88. 
977
 Safveti Ziya, Salon Köşelerinde, İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 1998, p. 14. 
978
 Safveti Ziya, Salon Köşelerinde, p. 11. (in his preface to the novel) 
979
 Ömer Seyfeddin‘s short stories were also a good demonstration of ―the politicization of 
the personal‖ and ―the politicization of every sphere of life‖. For example, see his Fon 
Sadriştayn‘ın Karısı, (Bütün Eserler, İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1999, V.  II, pp. 191-
202), Nakarat (V.  III, pp. 17-34),  Bir Çocuk Aleko (V. IV, pp. 310-327). 
980
 The outward Westernization was not accompanied by the Westernization of the private 
lives of the Ottoman upper classes. For a vivid portrayal of the intimate lives and family 
relations of Ottoman dignitaries, see Melek Hanım, Haremden Mahrem Anılar, İstanbul: 
Oğlak Yayıncılık, 1996. 
981
 For the politicization and nationalization of consumer culture and personal realms in the 
late Hamidian era, see Frierson, Elizabeth, ―Cheap and Easy: The Creation of Consumer 
Culture in the Later Ottoman Empire‖, in Consumption Studies and the History of the 
Ottoman Empire, 1550-1922, Donald Qutaert (ed.), New York: State University of New 
York Press, 2000, pp. 201-243. 
350 
 
Good Manners) published in 1927 was another exposure of the prioritization of the 
national identity over daily social interactions. Safveti Ziya encouraged Turkish youth to 
participate in the rebirth of the Turkish nation by adopting the code of conduct of civilized 
societies and nations.
982
 In his ―guide book‖, Safveti Ziya particularly gives importance to 
the role of women within polite society. For him, respect towards women was an important 
sign of the degree of the civilized nature of a nation. For him, the code of good conduct 
and politeness was first and foremost a matter of national dignity. The subsuming of the 
personal manners and codes of conduct of the individuals was an extreme example of the 
politicization and nationalization of individual lives.  
     Definitely, these men had different mores and a different reference system than their 
predecessors. We observe the emergence and development of a new intellectual/cultural 
formation subsuming a particular national imaginary, a secularized worldview, and a 
militarized political imagination.  
 
 
6.4. Accommodating the New Times  
 
      Galip Kemali‘s aforementioned pamphlet in defense of the nation under attack was not 
unique. Two years earlier, Alfred Rüstem Bey, another senior Ottoman diplomat, published 
a tract in Bern in French to counter the Armenian allegations and address Western public 
opinion regarding the Armenian massacres.
983
 The text was conspicuous in the sense that 
its author, although a Turkish diplomat born in Turkey, was of Polish origins whose father 
was also a diplomat who converted to Islam after emigrating to the Ottoman Empire from 
Poland in Russian occupation. Ahmed (Alfred) Rüstem Bey was acquainted with Western 
knowledge and Western intellectual erudition thanks to his Polish origins. After denying 
the accusations regarding the Armenians, Ahmed Rüstem pointed to the hypocrisy of the 
West. He especially recounted the atrocities Britain perpetrated in her colonies. Not 
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restricting himself to conventional anti-imperialist rhetoric, he also exposed the British 
brutality in Ireland and condemned the British policies in Ireland. Not unexpectedly, he did 
not fail to mention the brutality of imperial Russia in Poland. Questioning the credibility of 
those who were themselves perpetrators of unspeakable crimes, he related the allegations 
regarding Armenians to the perpetual hatred of the Turks. Regarding the Armenian events, 
Ahmed Rüstem acknowledges the tragedy Armenians had suffered during World War I, 
but he subsequently pleaded with Europeans to acknowledge the great suffering Turks had 
experienced during World War I as well. Moreover, the cause of this tragedy was the 
militant activity of Armenian revolutionary committees, who tried to mobilize the innocent 
Armenian masses against Turkish rule.  
      Ahmed Rüstem represents a complex but characteristic exemplar of post-Unionist 
Turkish nationalism. The text was in some ways very emblematic of the Turkish 
nationalism of his time. On the other hand, some aspects were idiosyncratic and reflected 
his European origins. But it is striking to observe how his Polish Russophobia had easily 
rendered him a sincere Turkish nationalist resenting the hypocrisy of Europeans and 
European liberalism. He arrived at an anti-imperialist position more sophisticated than the 
average Unionist anti-imperialist or even Galip Kemali‘s anti-imperialism. His anti-
imperialism was compatible with the European political language and vocabulary. Unlike 
many Unionist or quasi-Unionist texts and pamphlets, Ahmed Rüstem never abandoned the 
rhetoric of rights and liberties. On the contrary, he repeatedly reiterated his allegiance to 
humanitarian values. He claimed that his criticism was directed to those who were 
hypocritical and insincere in defending rights and liberties and did not abandon 19
th
 
century liberalism. Nevertheless, one can easily observe that his disillusionment with the 
West caused an alteration in his belief in rights and liberties as well. The development of 
his anti-imperialistic views was arguably very much prompted by the Russian 
expansionism towards Poland, the support the British gave to the Russians in the war, and 
the atrocities Russian committed against Polish civilians during World War I; this 
background enabled him to endorse and internalize the Turkist and Islamic anti-
imperialism of the Unionists. The Polish aristocrat was forced to speak the language of a 
Roumelian upstart. 
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     As suggested above, the years Galip Kemali and Ahmed Rüstem composed their French 
propaganda texts were traumatic. It was the time when the last bastion of Turkishness was 
occupied and humiliated. A similar propaganda text was composed by Ahmed Rıza, a 
figure who distanced himself from the Unionists after 1908 and displayed the same traits. 
Ahmed Rıza, the arch-secularist depicted the current situation as a part of the eternal 
struggle between Islam (and Turks as the banner of Islam) and the treacherous, barbaric 
West.
984
  
     The deterioration of the once-gentlemanly Ottoman civil officialdom, which was a 
product and unique composite of the Westernization and the classical Ottoman efendi 
tradition, was dramatic. Nevertheless, names who became prominent political figures after 
1908 and before the Young Turks assumed direct control of cabinets, such as Ahmed 
Tevfik Pasha, and İbrahim Hakkı Pasha kept their distance from the new radicals of the 
time. They were the last ones to defend and uphold the Bab-ı Ali tradition. Lütfi Simavi‘s 
memoirs, which we will scrutinize in the coming pages, also reflect such a contemptuous 
attitude towards the Young Turks.
985
 
  
 
6.5. Voices From the Tomb? 
 
      Hayreddin Nedim Bey‘s book on diplomacy published in 1910 reflected the 19th 
century diplomatic socialization and its intellectual/mental build up as it coalesced with 
Tanzimat‘s official discourse at its best. Hayreddin Nedim‘s account of the 19th century 
Tanzimat diplomacy was laudatory. His praise of Tanzimat was not limited to its 
achievements in diplomacy. For Hayreddin Nedim, Mustafa Reşid Pasha was a man of 
extraordinary gifts and any Ottoman should be grateful to him.
986
 This was especially so 
because he managed to introduce the Ottomans into the concert of Europe as a reputable 
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member of the club
987
 Reviewing the close relations the Tanzimat statesmen developed 
with France and Britain to balance against the Russian danger, he noted that diplomacy and 
the diplomatic skills of the statesmen were crucial in the making of international politics 
and that the Tanzimat statesmen and diplomacy did an excellent job in upholding the 
Ottoman Empire via diplomacy. He emphasized that the conduct of diplomacy was settled 
predominantly by personal skills and qualities.
988
 Thus, Hayreddin Nedim regretted that the 
Ottoman diplomats and statesmen did not write their memoirs like the European diplomats 
and statesmen. He was impressed with the careers and accomplishments of prominent 
European diplomats who mastered their craft and inspired diplomats such as himself, who 
had studied them by reading their memoirs or the memoirs of their colleagues. Apparently, 
Hayreddin Nedim saw himself and his fellow Ottoman diplomats and statesmen as a part 
of the post-Vienna Congress European diplomatic family. In short, the intellectual cosmos 
of Hayreddin Nedim illustrates the emblematical Tanzimat diplomat loyal to the premises 
and principles of the Tanzimat and trying to invigorate the Ottoman Empire within the 
concert of Europe of the 19th century Europe. That is, in Hayreddin Nedim, the Congress 
of Vienna went hand in hand with the Tanzimat as if they complement each other. He was 
a believer in the ideal of a peaceful Europe in which an enlightened Ottoman Empire 
participated as an equal member. His ideal coincided with the ideals of the British, French, 
and Austrian diplomatic establishments as well. In fact, as already indicated, his (and the 
Tanzimat ideals in general) were partially taken from the 19th century European order and 
ancién regime ideals.  
    In another book of his on the Crimean War which he published in the same year, he 
regretted the collapse of the British/French alliance with the Ottomans, which was forged 
during the Crimean War and sealed in the Paris Treaty. Surprisingly, Hayreddin Nedim put 
the blame on both sides instead of indicting Britain unilaterally as his Ottoman 
contemporaries did. He criticized the Ottoman party for not fulfilling the commitments and 
reforms it had promised and criticized the British/French for their indifference and 
negligence towards the injustices the Ottomans and the Muslim population had suffered 
since then. Another surprising commentary developed by Hayreddin Nedim was with 
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regard to Ottoman-Russian relations. Observing the Russian aggression towards the 
Ottomans, he claimed that the best interests of these two ―great nations‖ were an alliance 
and peace.
989
  
      Salih Münir Pasha, one of the most reputable (or notorious in the eyes of the Young 
Turks) diplomats of the Hamidian ancien régime, in his book on Russian foreign policy 
published in Lausanne in 1918
990
 while he was in exile, reconstructs the course of the 
history of Tanzimat as the lethal struggle between hostile and expansionist Russia and the 
defending Ottomans. Whereas all the internal disorders of the Ottoman Empire perpetrated 
by Christian groups were either instigated or manipulated by the Russians, all the Tanzimat 
polices whether they may be international diplomacy, administrative reform or military 
action were undertaken to encounter this many-headed threat. In Salih Münir Pasha‘s 
account, Britain and France appear as bystanders in the Russian aggression. Although they 
also advance their interests in the Ottoman Empire and espouse the causes of the 
―oppressed Christians991‖ of the Ottoman Empire (mainly because of the pressure of public 
opinion and Christian prejudice), their role remains secondary in contrast to the Russian 
menace. Salih Münir‘s approach to international relations is within the framework of 
international diplomacy and within the world of the post-Bismarckian European order. He 
perceives the Russian policy of the ―Eastern Question‖ as ―expansion‖ (rather than 
imperialism) and sees the ―Eastern Question‖ primarily as a diplomatic phenomenon.     
     Lütfi Simavi, a diplomat who served in various posts as the Ottoman consul and in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Istanbul before his appointment as the Lord High 
Chamberlain of Mehmed Reşad (and was appointed as the undersecretary of the embassy 
to St. Petersburg and before his appointment as the Lord High Chamberlain
992
) was another 
voice from the tomb. Appointed to the palace chamberlainship, he was distressed to move 
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from Europe to an archaic court and palace.
993
 In fact, what was expected from his was to 
modernize the imperial rituals and adapt them to European court ceremonial.
994
 What Lütfi 
Simavi did, according to his memoirs and his account, was to blend the traditional Ottoman 
rituals and the modern European court ceremonial and invent an Ottoman imperial 
pageantry.
995
 He administered Mehmed Reşad‘s public and ceremonial appearances. For 
this task, he benefited from his immense knowledge of European imperial and official 
ceremonies and the code of conduct, knowledge of which he was extremely proud. In 
Mehmed Reşad, Lütfi Simavi attempted to invent an Ottoman imperial pomp and 
pageantry in line with and in competition with the European imperial pomp and rituals. 
The low profile character and modesty of Mehmed Reşad was suitable for this newly 
defined and appropriated role.  
    Although in Lütfi Simavi, Ottomanism encompassed the non-Muslims996, the Muslim 
and Turkish character of Ottoman imperialism was not to be marginalized, sidelined, or 
obscured. On the contrary, its Muslim/Turkish character was blatantly expressed within the 
refashioned imperial ritualism. The new manifestation of the Ottoman imperium was to 
include non-Muslims, but not to renounce its Islamic heritage completely, and it was to 
render the overt Muslim/Turkish character not disturbing and threatening in the eyes of 
non-Muslim Ottomans. For Lütfi Simavi, the new imperial display should proudly reflect 
the heritage and magnificence of the classical age of the Ottoman Empire.
997
 In short, Lütfi 
Simavi tried to invent the Ottoman imperium as the very symbol and embodiment of an 
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Ottoman patriotism, to be endorsed by non-Muslims and to be esteemed and glorified by 
the Muslims/Turks.
998
   
      Lütfi Simavi was critical to the developments that commenced with 1908. He was not 
only distanced from the vigilance and nationalism of the Unionists, whose socializations 
and culturalizations were alien to him. He had legal reservations about the post-1908 
politics as well. He was critical of the appointment of members of parliament to 
ministries.
999
 He pointed out the technical problems thus created. He argued that the 
Ottoman Empire moved from absolute monarchy to absolute parliamentarianism, which 
rendered parliament omnipotent. This was due to the habit of imitating the French. He 
notes that absolute parliamentarianism was the French practice. Lütfi Simavi argues that 
the French model was one of various alternatives and certainly not a suitable one in the 
Ottoman context. In this system, the ministers and prime ministers were to be elected from 
the parliament. The principal problem with the appointment of members of parliament to 
ministries and the prime ministry was mainly that most members of parliament did not 
possess any prominent official titles. However, in the Ottoman tradition and political 
culture, the Ottoman ministers and prime ministers had to possess titles and had to come 
from a socially privileged background. They were to be addressed with deference and held 
in high esteem. If they were to be given a title because of the importance of the prime 
ministry, then still it would not be appropriate because the title would have to be revoked 
after the holder no longer held office. It would be inappropriate for an ex-prime minister 
not to carry a lofty title, and, moreover, it would be embarrassing for an ex-prime minister 
to have to work to make his living, e.g., to work as a lawyer and live as a humble man. He 
wrote that in France neither the presidents of the state nor the prime ministers were 
bestowed with any titles. Presidents of the state were not even officially entitled 
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―Excellency‖ although he was addressed as ―Excellency‖ out of respect. If prime ministers 
were to be elected from among members of parliament, this would create a problem of 
authority and respect. In short, for Lütfi Simavi the Republicanism of the French political 
system was not to be replicated in a political organization completely alien to it. 
Apparently, the concerns and priorities of Lütfi Simavi were alien to the Young Turks, 
who had much different concerns and priorities. Thus, Lütfi Simavi, who came from a 
reputable family
1000
, is an example of a loyalist and liberal/conservative imperial aristocrat 
whose loyalty was not to the monarchy per se, but to the idea the monarchy represents or 
should represent in a constitutional monarchy. He also entertained a strong civilizationist 
discourse.
1001
 He was distant from the Unionists, but not entirely opposed to them. In this 
regard, he was highly representative of a certain social cluster.    
      Nevertheless, the traditional nature and characteristics of the diplomatic service as a 
―voice from the tomb‖, the survival of the 19th century European gentlemanly statesman 
ideal lived on in the names of Ahmet Tevfik Pasha and Mehmet Rifat Pasha, the 
ambassadors to London and Paris in the Unionist government. The appointment of 
Mehmed Rifat Pasha as the minister of foreign affairs after serving one year as the 
ambassador to London was welcomed by the British as ―the only safeguard for the dubious 
British orientation of the new Cabinet.‖ But it was noted by Lowther that, ―his capacity to 
cope with the CUP was also in doubt.‖ In his reply, Hardinge concurred. The new regime 
was ―gradually tending to a military despotism of a nationalist and chauvinistic 
character.‖1002 Mehmed Rifat served for two years as the minister of foreign affairs without 
much say in foreign policy decisions. After his appointment as ambassador to Paris in 
1911, he continued to be neglected by the Unionist leadership like Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, 
the ambassador to London. Mallett, the British ambassador, just after the beginning of 
World War I related that, ― ‗(i)f Tewfik had had control of Turkish policy, there would be 
no war with Turkey now(.)‘ But Tewfik was poorly regarded by the Young Turks, as was 
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Rifat in Paris, and during most of October he obtained no replies to the numerous letters in 
which he had urged the Porte to abandon its policy, which as he had told Nicolson ―must 
inevitably end in disaster for the country.‖1003  
    Ahmed Reşid (Rey) also agreed with the observation made by the British embassy. In 
the homage he wrote after the death of Rıfat Pasha in Servet-i Fünun in 1925, he pointed 
out the resentment of Rıfat Paşa towards Enver and his cronies.1004 Apparently, it was no 
coincidence that the Unionists preferred to appoint aged, pro-Entente (Anglophile and 
Francophile), and very experienced diplomats to these capitals. While the Young Turk 
leadership pursued its own agenda in sympathy with revisionist and adventurist Germany, 
these ambassadors tried to co-opt and conciliate the traditional powerhouses of Europe.
1005
 
However, by 1914 their efforts turned out to be futile and irrelevant as the pro-German 
orientation of the Young Turks progressed.  
 
 
6.6. The Unionist Generation 
 
        It is legitimate to question if these idiosyncratic personalities were representative of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a whole. Some anecdotal evidence may also be gathered 
from otherwise unknown officials of the lower ranks, such as the comment of Mehmed Ali 
Bey, the secretary of the Bern embassy in 1917, who made a racist remark regarding the 
Armenians to his German counterpart.
1006
 A cumulative radicalization was not limited to 
the diplomatic service, but was observable in the other Ottoman government offices as 
well.
1007
 In short, we may observe that there was an apparent radicalization of diplomats 
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with the coming of the third generation of Tanzimat in line with the pattern observable for 
the Ottoman political, intellectual, and bureaucratic elite in general. These third generation 
diplomats did not share much with their elder colleagues. The radicalization had three 
manifestations: nationalism, secularism, and modernism. These three traits of 
radicalization complemented and consolidated each other. Nevertheless, a resistance to the 
radicalization within the ministry was observable. The ministry, like its counterparts in 
Europe, was one of the most conservative and elitist offices within the Ottoman 
bureaucracy. Of course, they were not in a position to influence the decision-making 
process, except by providing the flow of information from European capitals and providing 
legal and technical support. The old guard diplomats were contemptuous of the 
amateurishness and crudeness of the Young Turks.
1008
 Moreover as an institutional instinct, 
the ministry had to be cautious and avoid any tensions. However, it must be said that the 
resistance was limited to the shifting mentalities and orientation of foreign policy. 
Disillusionment with long-trusted Britain was a significant factor in this process.
1009
 This 
was also due to the fact that the radicalization derived not from particularistic 
developments within the Ottoman Muslim elite, but derived from a radicalization of the 
state of mind in Europe. It was a generational phenomenon as well. The younger diplomats 
socialized in a milieu which forced them to maintain radical political stances. Thus, instead 
of speaking of a Unionist political leadership or ideological disposition, we may speak of a 
quasi-Unionist generation capturing the minds and souls of a particular generation.
1010
 This 
                                                                                                                                                             
March to World War I, London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. For the intellectual trajectory and 
evolution of Ebubekir Hazım. See Tepeyran, Ebubekir Hazım, Zalimane Bir İdam Hükmü, 
İstanbul: Pera, 1997. Compare and contrast this account with his account depicting his 
experiences in the Hamidian era. Tepeyran, Ebubekir Hazım, Hatıralar, İstanbul: Pera, 
1998. A similar observation can be made with regard to Ahmed Ihsan, the owner and 
publisher of Servet-i Fünun. His memoirs display an ideological and intellectual evolution 
before events crystallized in 1908. For his nationalist rhetoric, Tokgöz, Ahmed İhsan, 
Matbuat Hatıralarım, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993, p. 205. 
1008
 Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, Atina Sefareti, pp. 82-83;Lütfi Simavi… p. 159; 
Abdülhak Hamid… p. 352. 
1009
 Ahmad, Feroz, ―Great Britain‘s Relations with the Young Turks 1908-1914‖, Middle 
Eastern Studies, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Jul., 1966), pp. 302-329. 
1010
 For the aggressive nationalist literature prevalent after the Balkan Wars, some written 
by authors with clear Unionist sympathies but others written by authors aloof from the 
360 
 
process was not a distinctly Ottoman evolution but a manifestation of the global forces 
enhancing the radicalization of minds and ideologies.
1011
  
      Recently, conventional assumptions of the discipline of international relations have 
been criticized.
1012
 International relations‘ isolation from the other disciplines of social 
science came to an end, and it was integrated into the larger framework of social sciences. 
Critical of the conventional paradigms of international relations and rejecting approaching 
states as ―black boxes‖, constructivists in international relations argued ―(1) that the 
structures of human association are determined by shared ideas rather than material forces, 
and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared 
ideas rather than given by nature.‖1013 Therefore, within the constructivist paradigm, 
foreign policy orientations and international alignment preferences are determined not 
merely by Realpolitik and the ―supreme interests of the nation‖ but by ideologies and 
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perceptions determined by social, cultural, and other factors.
1014
 Foreign policy 
considerations are (to a certain extent) reflections of struggles within elites and between 
different social amalgamations.  
       In the case of the pre-World War I Ottoman priorities, we clearly observe that the 
difference regarding the foreign policy orientations derived from diverging class origins 
and mentality structures. The upstart and radical revolutionary Young Turks detested the 
status quo, and they found an alignment with the revisionist Germany, relating their efforts 
to crash the Ottoman establishment‘s status quo with Germany‘s drive to demolish the 
European conservative status quo designed by Britain and France. Needless to say, Young 
Turk ideological dispositions (and those of the Young Turk generation as a whole) were 
compatible with the German radical/militarized modernist vision (especially prevalent in 
the German general chiefs of staff) which was on the eve of World War I in the process of 
escalation.
1015
 In contrast, the Hamidian old guard, having faith in the 19th century 
conservative optimism in order and progress, remained aloof from Germany‘s revisionism 
and felt close to the conservative international order of Britain. They also kept their faith in 
resolving of matters with diplomacy, a view not only not shared but detested by the Young 
Turks. The Hamidian establishment was defensive within the changing circumstances, 
resisting the rising new generation with its different agenda and social background. It was 
in their interests to stick to an order in which they could safeguard themselves. The old 
world was a world they knew and a world in which they felt secure and content.  
     Apparently, in terms of domestic politics, Germany embodied the conservative order as 
portrayed by Wehler, Mommsen, and many others. However with regard to international 
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politics, German militarism was the revolutionary/revisionist dynamic threatening the 
conservative order and the status quo. It was Great Britain that was desperate to defend the 
international order and resist change. That is to say, the political regime of Germany was 
contradicted by its international aspirations. Nevertheless, this does not mean that political 
stances and international visions contradict each other ideologically. On the contrary, they 
manifest an affinity. The expansionism of the conservative Germany had led the political 
regime to transform itself to a radical and revolutionary position in two decades. This is not 
to say that this transformation was inherent in the Prussian order, but it is an example how 
interactions between the level of international politics and domestic politics influence and 
shape each other.
1016
 The revisionist zeal in terms of international politics restructured 
Germany as a militarized autocracy in which the military and the newly rising classes were 
in the ascendancy by 1914.
1017
  
    It is equally true for the Ottomans. The revisionism of the Young Turks on the 
international level led them to endorse a radical and modernist agenda and policy program. 
Such a comprehensive vision was quiet different from the dispositions of those who were 
not pursuing territorial revisionism and who were eager to accommodate the international 
order. Therefore whereas the Young Turks allied with Germany (although this was not the 
original intention), others looked to side with Britain and France even after the break-up 
after World War I in Europe. Apparently, the Young Turks‘ association with Germany was 
not limited to a political alliance. It was the German vision with which they were 
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fascinated.
1018
 The same was equally true for the pro-English and pro-French old guard and 
the opponents of the Unionists (as well as pro-British and pro-French Unionists such as the 
liberal Minister of Finance Cavid Bey), who were pursuing a moderate political stance 
(arguably both for their class interests and due to their political socializations). 
     Although such orientations may derive from formations that developed based on class 
backgrounds, aspirations, and identities, once they are developed, they surpass social 
differences and socializations. The sons of old Istanbuliots and diplomats of the new 
generation who came from socially exclusive backgrounds were also heavily influenced 
and shaped by the new radicalism. As argued in the previous chapters and in this chapter, 
this was a generational phenomenon determined by interacting complex dynamics 
(surpassing class interests). As the new intellectual historians and new cultural historians 
have shown, patterns and structures of mentalities were formed, constructed, and 
developed within certain milieus, and subsequently these structures of mentalities also 
stimulate their surroundings and transform them.
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
THE EUROPEAN PATTERNS AND THE OTTOMAN FOREIGN OFFICE  
 
7.1. The End of the Old Order and the Old Diplomacy 
 
       Regretting the decline of the influence of the Foreign Office over policymaking and 
criticizing the ignorance of the political elite of Britain regarding international affairs, 
Permanent Undersecretary Hardinge wrote to Buchanan, the British ambassador to St. 
Petersburg, in 1917: ―We have two diplomacies-one the Foreign Office and the other 
‗amateur,‘ running side by side.‖1020 Harold Nicolson, one of the foremost historians and 
scholars of diplomacy and himself a prominent diplomat in the service of the Foreign 
Office, narrates several witty anecdotes reflecting the amateurishness of the leaders 
participating in the Paris Peace Conference.  One of them is as follows: ―Addressing the 
House of Commons on April 16, 1919, he (Lloyd George-DG) made the following frank, 
modest, and eminently reasonable statement: ‗How many members have ever heard of 
Teschen? I do not mind saying I had never heard of it.‘ Obviously, no more than seven 
members of the House of Commons could ever have heard of that remote and miserable 
duchy, yet Mr. Lloyd George‘s admission of that fact struck horror into the heart of those 
specialists, such as Mr. Wickham Steed, who had been familiar with the Teschen problem 
for many years.‖ Nicolson was evidently emphasizing the ignorance of Lloyd George but 
nevertheless shared the apprehensions of Wickham Steed, who reacted to the self-exposure 
of Lloyd George‘s ignorance as follows: ―The cry was raised at once. ‗Lloyd George 
knows nothing of the problems which he is attempting to solve. From his own lips, we 
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learn it. The whole British Delegation in Paris, the whole Conference in fact, are ignorant 
and unprepared. Disaster is upon us.‖1021 Ironically, the Cassandran prophecy of Wickham 
Steed
1022
 turned out to be correct. The Paris Peace Conference failed to maintain a peaceful 
Europe. Instead, it sowed the seeds of future conflicts.
1023
 The snobbish amateurishness of 
Lloyd George became even more marked in its mismanagement of Turkish affairs to the 
opposition and resentment of the British Foreign Office, and the Turkish-Greek war ended 
up as a disaster for Britain.
1024
   
       Nicolson, in his book on the Paris Peace Conference, from which the above excerpts 
are taken, makes his points clear. He did not see the political leaders as personally 
responsible for this failure. ―Given the atmosphere of the time, given the passions aroused 
in all democracies by four years of war, it would have been impossible even for supermen 
to devise a peace consisting of moderation and righteousness. The task of the Paris 
negotiators was, however, complicated by special circumstances of confusion. The ideals 
to which they had been pledged by President Wilson were not only impracticable in and of 
themselves but necessitated for their execution the intimate and unceasing collaboration of 
the United States. ...It was thus the endeavor of men like Clemenceau and Lloyd George to 
find a middle way between the desires of their democracies and the more moderate dictates 
of their own experience, as well as a middle way between the theology of President Wilson 
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and the practical needs of a distracted Europe.‖1025 Nicolson situates the shortcomings of 
the Peace Conference within a wider framework. ―I have tried to deal with the transitional 
phase between pre-war and post-war diplomacy and give some picture of the Paris Peace 
Conference.‖1026 For him, the diplomacy of Peace Conference reflected the changing times 
and milieu. For him, in the new world of the post-war, no effective and constructive 
diplomacy could be pursued. He clearly sympathized with the ―old diplomacy,‖ the world 
he had known from his childhood, from his career in the Foreign Office and from his 
father, who was also a prominent diplomat in the Foreign Office and served as the 
undersecretary of the Foreign Office between 1910 and 1916. Nicolson wrote, ―Diplomacy 
essentially is the organized system of negotiation between sovereign states. The most 
important factor in such organization is the element of representation-the essential 
necessity in any negotiator that he should be fully representative of his own sovereign at 
home... in other words, it is the incidence of sovereignty which has gradually shifted and 
not the essential principles by which efficient diplomacy should be conducted.‖1027 In these 
lines, he was clear. Post-war diplomacy represented interests other than those of the 19th 
century diplomatic services.  
       Arno Mayer contrasts the participants of the Paris Peace Conference with the 
participants of the Congress of Vienna a century earlier.
1028
 ―In 1814-15, the peace was 
negotiated ‗in elegant and ceremonious privacy.... (by) a group of Aristocrats life-trained 
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as statesmen or diplomats‘ who considered themselves responsible to crowned sovereigns 
and barely worried about partisan pressures. The situation was not so serene a century later 
when seasoned party politicians of petit-bourgeois background - two professors, a 
journalist, a solicitor- gathered around the conference table. The Big Four were responsible 
to parliaments, and they never seriously considered insulating themselves from the political 
parties, pressure groups, mass media, and mass electorates, which were highly agitated 
over the peace question. To be sure, compared to Metternich, Castlereagh, and Talleyrand, 
the Big Four were ―amateur‖ diplomats.‖1029  
       Arno Mayer developed an impressive interpretation of the logic of the Paris Peace 
Conference. For Arno Mayer, it was the last stand of the ―party of order‖ to reestablish and 
impose the status quo, which had been severely crushed. Mayer notes that, in 1917-18, 
during the heat of war, the ―parties of movement‖ were in a strong position. With the end 
of the war and the treaties concluding war, the ―party of order‖ reclaimed its 
supremacy.
1030
 However, this victory remained only on paper. The good old days of the 
party of order were already gone. For him, the Paris Peace Conference was the last stand of 
the party of order.
1031
 
       The Italian Prime Minister Francesco Nitto wrote in his memoirs, ―Europe was happy 
and prosperous, while now, after the terrible World War, she is threatened with a decline 
and a reversion to brutality, which suggests the fall of the Roman Empire.‖1032 World War 
I was certainly a watershed for the ―old regime‖ and ―ruling elites.‖ There were few 
republics in Europe in 1914.  The end of the war brought the collapse of four monarchies 
and declarations of numerous republics, big and small and continent wide. At the end of 
the war, the first socialist state of the world was calling for a world revolution. Democratic 
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and revolutionary currents were on the rise. The world of 19
th
-century Victorian 
conservative values was gone forever. The red scare of the postwar era was to be 
accompanied by the fascist scare at its zenith in the 1930s. Socialism, fascism, and 
liberalism were all challenging the status quo in their own unique ways.  Although they 
diverged in their political visions, with regard to the threat they exerted on the conservative 
orders and the milieu in which they were fostered, they were different manifestations of the 
same phenomenon. They were all the products of the post-1918 milieu and the 
consequences of the collapse of the old order. 
       In that sense, 1918 was a landmark year. It sealed the end of the Old Regime. Many 
old guards like Harold Nicolson lamented the passing of the good old times in which 
diplomacy was not a quarrel (and not philanthropy in the Wilsonian sense) but a 
gentlemen‘s discussion. The vision of diplomacy and statecraft imagined and presented in 
the earliest scholarly studies on diplomacy perceived the ―art of diplomacy‖ likewise. 
Diplomacy in the 19
th
 century cannot be reduced to the staunch defense of state interests. It 
was also never a matter of principles, beliefs and commitments. It was not Realpolitik 
either. Realpolitik was yet to be invented in its Morgenthauen definition. These premises of 
the ―old diplomacy‖ began to change gradually in the last three decades of the 19th century 
as the alliances system replaced the conventional concert of Europe. The rise of Germany 
triggered the conclusion of bilateral agreements and alliances between the Great Powers.  
      However, others were not enthusiasts of ―old diplomacy.‖ For them, ―old diplomacy‖ 
was the epitome of the decayed aristocratic order.  ―In the immediate aftermath of the 
Great War, impelled by revulsion at the carnage of that conflict, generations of historians 
identified 'old' or 'secret diplomacy' as a major factor leading to war. The pre-1914 Foreign 
Office, in particular, appeared to be the quintessence of 'old diplomacy'.‖1033 Mistrust of 
the Foreign Office and its dealings were already suspect in the eyes of the parliamentary 
―Foreign Affairs Group‖ of the Liberal Party, which consisted of radicals who were 
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heavily critical of the mandarin-like organization of the Foreign Office.
1034
 Another issue 
of the parliamentary group that was critical was the Foreign Office‘s defiance in giving 
information to the parliament on its conduct of foreign affairs.
1035
 In their eyes, ―old 
diplomacy‖ was another name for political conspiring and corruption. Thus, in the age of 
democracy, such an attitude and old diplomacy were relics of the old bigotry and had to be 
eliminated.
1036
        
     Old diplomacy ended with World War I, by which time it had become completely 
discredited. However, it has recently been acknowledged that the transformation from ―old 
diplomacy‖ to ―new diplomacy‖ was a myth exaggerated by the champions of new 
diplomacy, who were trying to legitimize their exercise of diplomacy by discrediting the 
old corrupt style of diplomacy.
1037
 The Bolsheviks‘ revelation of the secret treaties was the 
final blow to the defenders and makers of the old diplomacy. These revelations exposed the 
level of corruption and insincerity of the old diplomacy. The idealists, journalists, and 
radicals were advocating ―new diplomacy,‖ which was supposed to be ―open‖ rather than 
―secret‖ and ―corrupt,‖ ―internationalist‖ rather than ―national,‖ and ―democratic‖ rather 
than ―aristocratic.‖ The League of Nations was an embodiment of this new ideal. In fact, 
the rhetoric of ―new diplomacy‖ was a sign of the changing class character of the makers 
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of foreign policies. Middle class radicals were now replacing aristocrats, both as makers of 
foreign policy and as opinion leaders with regard to foreign policy. The 1920s epitomized 
the development of a new style of diplomacy in Versailles, in Genoa
1038
, and in the routine 
conduct of diplomacy. However, the new style of diplomacy collapsed in the hollow 
decade of the 1930s, when democracies were uncertain as to how to respond to the rise of 
fascist and authoritarian regimes.
1039
 Vansittart, the last ―old diplomat,‖1040 failed in the 
face of the opposition of the political elites to pursue the ―aesthetics‖ of old diplomacy.1041 
Arguably, one of the reasons why Vansittart was one of the British elitists who was most 
alarmed by the ascent of fascism and was concerned with opposing Hitler was his ―old 
diplomat‖ background. Nevertheless, the democratic world of politics and the active 
involvement of party politicians did not allow him to pursue a 19
th 
century diplomatic 
game, which had been more efficient and had a more problem-solving orientation in its 
understanding of conflict resolution. The diplomacy of the post-World War II era, 
dominated by the ruthless realities of the Cold War and the rise of Realpolitik, was a world 
apart from the pre-1914 diplomacy. In short, the 19th century diplomatic world, with its 
class character and social culturalization, was gone and had turned into a curiosity for 
historians to study.       
       We have to situate the Ottoman Foreign Ministry within this framework. The Ottoman 
Foreign Ministry is a world lost to us as well. A similar and simultaneous transformation 
was observable with the coming of the republic. The Ankara government, with the habit 
(out of necessity and concern for the urgency of international bargaining and compromises 
that are not possible within the practice of routine diplomacy) it gained during the War of 
Independence, appointed several non-career diplomats (such as army generals) to 
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important positions. They were trustees and de facto personal representatives of Mustafa 
Kemal. They functioned as persons in the service of Mustafa Kemal and the political 
authority in Ankara rather than as functionaries performing regular and professional 
diplomatic craft. Several of them retained their diplomatic careers after the end of the War 
of Independence War thanks to the prominence they acquired through the partial shift of 
the political and bureaucratic elite. Nevertheless, the displacement in the diplomatic 
establishment was fairly limited, - being limited to some ambassadorial posts
1042
. The rank 
and file of the ministry retained their posts. What changed was the style and aesthetics of 
diplomacy. The diplomacy of a nation-state was apparently different from the diplomacy of 
a retreating empire. The diplomacy of the latter was ―old diplomacy,‖ which had its own 
logic, whereas the diplomacy of the former entailed an interest-maximizing strategy of the 
nation state.  
 
  
7.2. The Aristocratic Worlds of the Hamidian Foreign Ministry 
 
       One of the significant signs of the transformation of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th 
century was its changing perception of the European powers. The European powers came 
to be seen as equals and counterparts rather than as eternal foes of the empire. This was 
more a discursive transformative than a real one given that it was a de facto 
acknowledgement on the part of the Ottoman Empire. The European powers were also 
considered to have legitimate claims to power and authority. Moreover as fellow 
monarchies (or fellow republics as republics also had their legal personalities), they were 
regarded as ―venerable.‖1043 The principle of reciprocity was also established. The 
representatives of the foreign states (ambassadors, consuls, et cetera) were welcomed with 
due respect.  
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     The annals of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reflect this emphasis on respect. In the 
first annal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published in 1885, the chapter ―Düvel-i 
Ecnebiye‖ introduced the emperors, kings, and sultans with the biography of the reigning 
monarchs and names and titles of their honorable wives, sons, and brothers. The only other 
detail provided with regard to these monarchies was the official religion of each 
monarchy.
1044
 Thus, we are provided with ample information on the monarchs of Hawaii, 
Ethiopia, and Wurttemberg. The following chapter was entitled ―Cumhuriyyetle İdare 
Olunan Memalik-i Ecnebiye” (States governed as Republics).1045 It is interesting to 
observe that, at least theoretically, according to this categorization, the republics were not 
recognized as states proper given that whereas monarchies were introduced in the chapter 
“Düvel-i Ecnebiye”, the republics were introduced in a separate chapter titled as ―those 
governed by Republics‖ as if they are states needing an extra adjective (Cumhuriyetle 
İdare Olunan). At the very least, they were not seen as equal to those states which were 
monarchies. In this chapter, only the name of the presidents and the year of their election 
were listed. For example, what we learn about republic of Argentina is that its president 
was General Julio Roca and that he was elected on 12 October 1880. The same limited 
information was provided for republics such as France, the United States, Peru, and Haiti. 
Although considerable space was allocated to monarchies, the information provided for 
republics is conspicuously small. The next chapter listed the prime ministers and certain 
ministers of the states regardless of whether they were monarchies or republics
1046
. 
Therefore, here, an equality of republics and monarchies was acknowledged. Thus, 
although republics and monarchies were deemed as equal in introducing their 
administrative organization, in terms of their legal personality they were not. Nevertheless, 
in the Ottoman diplomatic jargon, while the emperors and kings were majestically 
addressed formally as ―Son Altesse Impériale‖ and ―Son Altesse Royale,‖ the presidents of 
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the republics were merely addressed as ―Notre trés cher ami et allié.‖ The French 
presidents of the republic were specifically addressed as ―Notre Grand et Bon Ami.‖1047 
      The next chapter listed the former representatives of the states in the Ottoman Empire 
as well as the actual personnel of the legations from ambassadors to minor scribes
1048
. In 
short, the annals of the Foreign Ministry were formalistic texts and clear manifestations of 
the Ottoman claim to be a part of the concert of Europe.   
       More significantly, the annals were very meticulous in their observations of ranks and 
formalities of aristocracy – so much so that a page was allocated for the definitions and 
explanations of the European aristocratic titles (―Avrupa‟da asilzadegana mahsus 
unvanlar‖) such as baron, cardinal, and marquis.1049 The decorations of European orders, 
insignia, and merits were also seen as very prestigious and thus worth mentioning. The 
biographies of the high-ranking members of the Ottoman diplomatic service listed the 
merits and orders granted by the European states. The listing of the decorations of 
European titles was also mentioned in the biographies of the prominent Ottoman diplomats 
and statesmen provided in the Foreign Ministry annals. It was also one of the five 
questions asked in the questionnaire of the Ministry kept in the personal files in Sicil-i 
Ahval. In fact, the awarding of decorations was a mechanism employed exhaustively by 
Abdülhamid to maintain the loyalty of his civil servants and to monitor them. This 
strategy, as well as ―inventing a loyalist Hamidian state aristocracy‖ was one of the pillars 
of the Hamidian regime.
1050
 While Esat Cemal Paker mocked the absurdity and 
ridiculousness of the exhaustive decorations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
1051
 for 
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Galip Kemali (Söylemezoğlu) 1052 and Hayreddin Nedim,1053 decorations were a primary 
institution of diplomacy and governance. In his memoirs, Galip Kemali seriously and 
meticulously listed the decorations he was awarded, as well as those given to others. We 
may conclude by arguing that while the Hamidian regime sanctioned and endorsed the 
contemporary European formalities, codes of conduct, and procedures, the sultan made use 
of them to maintain and reestablish a traditional loyalty alongside a new mode of loyalty 
established based on these new codes of conduct. In this regard, the Hamidian imperium 
was arguably an idiosyncratic blend of these two diverse political traditions. This was not 
different from the other 19
th
 century Ottoman institutions that integrated traditions 
imported from Europe and those derived from the pre-modern Ottoman past and 
appropriated for 19
th
 century usage.    
       The annals of the Foreign Ministry allocated numerous pages to the exaltation of the 
glamour of the Ottoman Empire at its zenith and during its post-classical age. The annals 
began with a long tribute to the sultans. The sultans were listed with their illustrious titles 
in due respect, reverence, and exaltation. Obviously, what was implied in these acclaims 
was that the glorious 19
th
 century Ottoman Empire of Tanzimat owed its magnificence to 
the exploits and the splendor of the Ottoman Empire of the previous centuries.
1054
 The next 
entry in the annals provided brief  information regarding the full names and the definitions 
of the prominent Ottoman titles beginning from the highest ranks (rütbe-i vezaret ve 
müşiriyyet) to the lowest titles (hacegan rütbesi-yüzbaşılık rütbesi).1055 The entry ―Rüteb-i 
Resmiyye-i Saltanat-ı Seniyye‟nin Suret ve Keyfiyyet Te‟sissine Da‟ir İzahat-ı Mahsusa‖ 
informs us that the ―modern‖ system of titles and its regulation was introduced in 1836.1056 
The annals also listed how the bearers of certain ranks and titles were formally addressed. 
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It was clear that addressing individuals in a culture of hierarchy and ranks was not a simple 
procedure and was a matter of formality. First and foremost, everybody was to be 
addressed differently according to their own ranks and titles. Forms of address revealed the 
relations between the one who was addressed and the one who was addressing. Therefore, 
the forms of address also changed according to the position of the person doing the 
addressing. Moreover, when a bearer of a certain title was cited, out of respect, his title had 
to be used along with  appropriate phrases. For example, the ulema had to address a former 
prime minister as ―ma‟lum-ı da‟ileridir ki‖ whereas members of the civil service had to 
address a former prime minister ―ma‟ruz-ı çakerleridir ki.‖ When the name of a former 
prime minister was cited in a speech, he had to be addressed ―übbehetlü devletlü ..... Paşa 
hazretleri.”1057 The use of forms of address   in a culture of aristocracy and hierarchy was 
not a technicality. On the contrary, it was one of the founding pillars of the polity. The 
superiority of the superiors was reproduced and reinforced every time they were addressed 
with the respect they were to be afforded. It was one of the constitutive parts of the 
hierarchical political order. In that regard, cultures of aristocracies including the Ottomans 
were no different than the Malaysian cockfights noted by Geertz
1058
 and the theater state of 
Negara.
1059
  
      The next entry in the annals describes the regulations governing the priority of the title-
holders. Here, we learn who precedes whom in a ceremony. The entry continued with the 
listing of names and descriptions of the four decorations of the Ottoman imperium: Nişan-i 
imtiyaz, osmani, mecidi and şefkat. Of course, all these decorations have several degrees 
from first degree to fourth or fifth degree.
1060
 In short, the annals of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs were books of protocol observing the codes of respect between fellow monarchies 
and states and reflected the ―official discourse‖ of the empire.  
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      The appropriate and formal addressing of foreign emperors, presidents of the states, 
and other holders of various prestigious titles was crucial. Hüseyin Agah‘s pamphlet was 
written to instruct the young diplomats in the European protocol and formality of the 
diplomacy. The author was an official employed in the Translation Office of the Foreign 
Ministry. In his tables, he provided the Turkish and French versions of the principal forms 
of address.  For example, he noted that the French ―Son Excellence‖ was the translation of 
the Ottoman title ―devletlu, atufetlu, saadetlu, asaletlu efendim hazretleri..‖ The French 
―Impériale Votre Majesté‖ was the Ottoman ―zat-ı hazreti mülükhaneleri.‖1061 It is 
interesting to observe the assimilation of the classical Ottoman titles and addresses into the 
European titles and addresses. In this adaptation process, the long Ottoman titles and 
addresses were shortened and specified.
1062
 Room for authenticity was also maintained. 
The adjective of ―imperial‖ was Ottomanized and absorbed into the Ottoman political 
culture. While ―zat-ı Şahane‖ was employed for the emperor sultan, the term ―şahane‖ was 
also employed to establish the exaltedness of the imperial institutions such as Mülkiye-i 
Şahane and Tıbbiye-i Şahane. The empire was begun to be called Memalik-i Mahruse-i 
Şahane as an alternative to the conventional ―Devlet-i Aliyye." The word  seniyye‖ was also 
employed as the Ottoman counterpart of imperial as in saltanat-ı seniyye. The Ottoman 
embassies abroad were known as ―sefaret-i seniyye‖s, translated into French in official 
documents as ―Ambassade Imperiale Ottomane.‖ The more traditional imperial titles were 
also retained and used for various and ancient institutions as in Hassa-i Hümayun and 
Mabeyn-i Hümayun-u Hazret-i Mülükane. With localization of the European terminology, 
the empire created an authenticity for itself within its accommodation to the European 
universalism. In this way, the original conventional Ottoman contents and their 
idiosyncratic senses of grandeur remained unchanged. The standardization and 
concretization of the traditional titles and addresses was also part of the process of the 
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adaptation of the Ottoman statecraft to modernity and modern governance.
1063
 However, 
the Ottoman forms of addresses continued to be longer (and loftier) than their European 
counterparts and the Ottoman distinctiveness was articulated in these formulations. Yet, it 
was apparent that there was an attempt at an accommodation of  Ottoman political culture 
to  European political culture. 
       In short, the contents of these annals demonstrate an aspiration on the part of the 
Ottoman polity to be recognized as a part of the Concert of Europe. The Hamidian and 
Tanzimat Ottoman Empire was the continuation of the splendid empire of the Suleiman I 
and Mehmed II. This emphasis continued to be the principal legitimacy for the 
maintenance and advancement of the 19
th 
century Ottoman Empire. Although, the 
Tanzimat was perceived as the birth of a new political entity replacing the obsolete 
structure (an ancien régime) in terms of administration, the magnificence of the previous 
Ottoman centuries was to be hailed.  The regression and degeneration of the Empire two 
centuries before the Tanzimat separated the Tanzimat-state from the glorious era of the 
Empire
1064
. However, the imperium was refashioned not as a military superpower with 
militarist fervor but an empire of cultivation and civility as a part of the empires 
international (as opposed to the republics and republican international).        
     The de facto aristocratic nature of the Ottoman Empire was not new, but its 
formalization and its open recognition, affirmation, and articulation was novel. It is also 
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significant that although republics and presidents of republics had been included in the first 
annals published in 1885, in the second annals, published in 1889, there was no mention of 
them. Instead, the table included the Pope, the king of Saxony, the prince of Monaco, and 
the grand duke of Hesse with an entry in the table showing the dynasties to which these 
monarchs and princes belonged. 
       The second annals published in 1889 allocated a chapter to the decorations granted 
after the publication of the first annals.
1065
 In other words, the list was refreshed. It 
included the names of the diplomats who were decorated and the insignias that had been 
granted. Another list showed the members of the diplomatic service who had been granted 
insignias by other states. For example, we learn that the former Ottoman Minister of 
Foreign Affairs was granted the insignia of the ―Red Eagle‖ from the state of Germany.1066 
As expected, the list begins with the highest-ranking officials who had been honored with 
decorations. They were also given to low-ranking officials such as Galib Beyefendi, an 
assistant in the Office of Ceremonies in the Foreign Ministry who was decorated with a 
second-level Vasa insignia from the state of Sweden.
1067
 States ranging from Montenegro 
to Italy had decorated several Ottoman officials, although the two countries which 
decorated the Ottoman officials the most were Iran and Romania.  
       The symbolism and meaning of the institutionalization of nişans has been analyzed by 
Edhem Eldem. He has demonstrated the gradual transformation of the aesthetics and the 
style of the nişans from the first insignia in 1831 (or 1832) to the end of the empire. 
Although Mustafa Reşid Bey (the future Mustafa Reşid Pasha) suggested that the 
institutionalization of an insignia system would  increase the prestige of the empire, it did 
not happen that way because the Westerners did not feel  honored by the decoration of the 
insignia by the Ottoman Empire. On the contrary, they felt that it was a degradation to be 
granted an insignia by a state of low prestige.
1068
 It was only in the later few decades that 
the Europeans began to be ―honored‖ by being awarded an Ottoman insignia. For Eldem, 
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the crucial decade for the institutionalization of the system was the 1850s. This was due 
especially to the endorsement of a cosmopolitan discourse created by the implications of 
the Crimean War and the coalition with Great Britain and France. Nevertheless, the 
Crimean War only reinforced this process. The modernization of insignias began as early 
as 1852 with the appearance of the Mecidiye insignia in 1852 prior to the Crimean 
coalition. By the 1850s, the more traditional designs and scripts of the insignia alluding to 
the classical age of Ottomans were replaced by more ―modern‖ designs and scripts in terms 
of the messages conveyed.
1069
 While the insignia of the early Tanzimat reflected a blend of 
the traditional discourses of the pre-modern Ottoman Empire and the modern self-images 
of the 19
th
 century, in time this transitional phase was superseded by the complete 
endorsement of 19
th
 century imperial discourses. We may argue that, by the 1850s, the 
Ottoman Empire had managed to enter the family of fellow European monarchies in the 
symbolic realm.  
       A significant part of the operation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was dedicated to 
ceremonies. The ministry was responsible for celebrating and congratulating the ―days‖ of 
the monarchs, which included birthdays, anniversaries of their accessions to the throne, and 
weddings. Of course, national holidays were also commemorated. The greetings of the 
fellow monarchs on the anniversaries of the enthronement of Abdülhamid and the religious 
holidays were received and dispatched to the palace.
1070
 The follow-up and conduct of this 
procedure was one of the tasks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
      In short, Ottoman officialdom endeavored to be incorporated into the European family. 
This was not a matter of symbolism. On the contrary, the empire‘s primary concern in its 
pursuit to be admitted into the European family was to secure its territorial integrity.  
Ottoman officialdom believed that the perpetual threat of partition and annihilation would 
be avoided by inclusion into the European family. Tanzimat statesmen thought that they 
had achieved this in 1856. ―Finally, the Ottomans had succeeded in gaining admission, 
however qualified, to the European club of powers. The Paris Treaty of 1856, which 
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provided an unprecedented guarantee of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman state, made 
the empire, in effect, a member of the European concert. From the Ottoman perspective, 
this was a more important result than the Russian surrender of southern Bessarabia or even 
the neutralization of the Black Sea (.)‖1071 Nevertheless, the hopes and expectations of the 
Ottoman statesmen were not to be realized. Equal terms between the Ottomans and the 
European powers could not be established for apparent reasons. Realpolitik and 
Machtpolitik were better means to secure territorial integrity and Ottoman attempts at 
Europeanization and synchronization of its self-imagination and self-portrayal remained 
futile. 
 
 
7.3. Transitions to the Cultures of Bureaucracy 
 
       A glance at the salaries of the members of the diplomatic service also gives some 
inkling as to the aristocratic and patriarchal nature of the Ottoman culture of 
officialdom.
1072
 The disparity between the highest-paid officials and the lower echelons of 
the bureaucracy is striking. From the annals, we learn that the Foreign Minister was 
(supposed to be) paid 360,000 guruşes per year according to the 1889 yearbook. The 
undersecretary, the highest-paid employee of the ministry, was paid 288,000 guruşes. The 
second highest-paid employees were the ambassadors to London, Berlin, Paris, St. 
Petersburg, and Vienna, who enjoyed an annual income of 246,000 guruşes. They were 
also entitled to stipends of 186,000 guruşes each. Although the Ottoman representatives in 
Rome and Teheran also held the title of ―büyükelçi‖s, they were entitled a more modest 
salary of 120,000 guruşes per year (with a stipend of another 120,000 guruşes), which was 
considerably lower than the salaries paid to the holders of other more prestigious 
ambassadorships. Regarding the staff in the embassies, we observe a dramatic decrease for 
the lower posts including the salaries of the undersecretaries of the embassies. The 
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undersecretary in London was granted only 48,000 guruşes a year. The secretaries of the 
first rank, the second rank, and the third rank were entitled to an average of 20 to 35 
thousand guruşes a year. The translator of the embassy in Teheran, who was not part of the 
regular staff of the diplomatic corps in the embassy, was paid 18,000 guruşes.1073 When it 
came to the porters, the salaries were even less. The porters serving in Istanbul were paid a 
maximum of 350 guruşes and a minimum of 150 guruşes a year.1074 That meant that the 
ministerial undersecretary was paid almost two hundred times more than the lowest paid 
worker, which was a conspicuous and manifest demonstration of the aristocratic/patriarchal 
nature of the Ottoman polity.
1075
 The salary scheme of the Ministry (with regard to 
diplomats) was like a steep pyramid in which the few highest ranking diplomats were paid 
enormously in comparison to the modest income levels of the low-ranking diplomats.  
      On the one hand, the 19
th 
century Ottoman Empire resembled a bureaucratic state in 
which the level of incomes was determined by state fiat. On the other hand, it retained the 
vestiges of the pre-modern mode of wealth distribution in which there was no concern for 
egalitarianism and scales of wealth accumulation were determined by personalized, 
decentralized, arbitrary, and irregular dynamics.
1076
 Moreover, the lack of finances of the 
state meant that modestly paid officials were more likely to have their salaries curbed, 
something that is reminiscent of an inegalitarian mode of wealth distribution based on 
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prestige and power. Furthermore, they were financially more vulnerable in case of non-
payment of salaries. 
       The aristocratic and patriarchal nature of Ottoman officialdom can also be deduced 
from the table of salaries in Findley‘s work on the social history of the Ottoman 
officialdom.
1077
 In Findley‘s scheme, the employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
were divided into three: non-Muslims, ―modernist Muslims‖, and ―traditional Muslims. In 
his table, the ―modernist Muslims‖ were paid the best whereas the non-Muslims came 
second. The ―traditional Muslims‖ were paid very modestly and were predominantly 
employed in low-ranking posts. Considering that in Findley‘s categorization, ―modernist 
Muslims‖ were those who were educated in westernized (and therefore the best) schools, 
they occupied the highest and most prestigious positions for which non-Muslims were 
discriminated against unless their competence was indispensable, like the non-Muslim 
officials in the Office of Legal Counsellorship. This table clearly demonstrates that a good 
education secured considerably higher incomes. It also reflects the discriminatory nature of 
the Ministry in favor of Muslims. Although the non-Muslims on average had better 
education and skills, they were denied equal opportunity of advancement in ranks and 
income.  
      One of the radical moves of the Tanzimat was the inauguration in 1838 of a salary 
system that replaced the old structure in which no distinction between ―public‖ and 
―private‖ had been made.1078 Obviously, the pre-Tanzimat rewarding of the public officials 
privileged the high-ranking officials who had better connections and occupied better 
positions. However, it was ironic that the ―salary system‖ of the Tanzimat ―while (it) 
intended to do the opposite, (it)... heightened officials‘ economic worries.‖1079 due to its 
evasion of arbitrary and irregular sources of extra income. Although, the new 
Weberian/rational system of payment seemed to serve as a relative equalizer between 
officials in public officialdom, ―a vast gap between highest and lowest salaries remained a 
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hallmark of the Ottoman official salary system, even if the gap narrowed with time.‖1080 In 
this regard, the Ottoman understanding of merit was a typical corollary of the aristocratic 
culture, albeit an aristocratic culture in which state was at the center and determined 
aristocratic credentials. The emerging bureaucratic state of the Tanzimat retained several 
features of the pre-modern state, especially in its structures of redistribution of wealth. 
Throughout the Tanzimat, (for Muslims) the state continued to be the foremost provider of 
wealth, which reproduced the principal attributes of a pre-modern polity. Although the 
Tanzimat acquired many features of the modern bureaucratic state and the Hamidian era 
witnessed the enormous growth of a bureaucracy with the number of civil servants 
employed in state service reaching one hundred thousand by 1900,
1081
 the facets of modern 
and pre-modern structures coexisted before most of the pre-modern remnants were 
gradually abandoned (culminating in the Hamidian era and progressing thereafter). The 
substantial steps to standardize and formalize salaries and their regular distribution were 
taken in the early reign of Abdülhamid II. One significant development was the 1881 
Decree on the Promotion and Retirement of Civil Officials (Memurin-i Mülkiye Terakki ve 
Tekaüd Kararnamesi), which was superseded by another decree in 1884.1082 The decree of 
1881 ―was divided into two sections, of which the first dealt summarily with conditions of 
appointment and promotion, while the second dealt with the creation of a modern kind of 
Retirement Fund (Tekaüd Sandığı), to be financed by the deductions from the salaries.‖1083 
The foundation of the Mülkiye was another major step in the recruitment of officials 
endowed with sufficient skills and knowledge regarding administration and (modern 
European) law. The new recruits were provided with much better opportunities, rewards, 
and assurances compared to their older colleagues. The conditions of employment were 
also standardized and regularized. ―To govern the workings of the personnel records 
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system, there were two sets of instructions, the first being issued in 1879, the second in 
1887.‖1084  
      It was the porters and the lower-ranking officials, not members of highest-ranking 
officialdom of the state, that benefited from the newly emerging Weberian regulation of 
public officials in which the disparity between the salaries of the higher and lower echelons 
of the bureaucracy gradually narrowed. Although the Hamidian bureaucratic reforms 
established a predominantly bureaucratic state, the higher echelons remained privileged 
and remained intact, insulated from bureaucratic modernization and development of a 
culture of (Weberian) bureaucracy.
1085
 This duality lessened with the 1908 and subsequent 
purges (tensikat). The ―tensikat‖ of 1909 severely reduced the salaries and benefits of high-
ranking bureaucrats. Against the motions of the parliament, the ministers had to defend the 
reasonableness of the level of salaries of the high-ranking bureaucrats, including those in 
the diplomatic service, suggesting that with the salaries proposed by the parliament, no one 
would want to work in the Foreign Ministry.
1086
 The motion prepared by the committee of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was rejected by the parliament, so the committee had to 
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prepare a second motion regarding the salaries and reorganization of the ministry to satisfy 
the concerns of the critical parliamentarians
1087
. The scale of disparities of incomes and the 
gradual narrowing of these discrepancies in the Ottoman Foreign Ministry was an 
indication of the development and evolution of the modern bureaucracy and state. As 
observed, this was not a linear and smooth process in which the former was repudiated and 
the new was endorsed but rather an evolution in which distinctions were retained and 
reproduced.  
     The rationalization and professionalization of the diplomatic service, as well as other 
governmental offices, progressed without a definite deadline. Nevertheless, 1908, and 
arguably to a lesser extent 1923, were two key turning points in this inevitable process. The 
move of the capital from Istanbul to Ankara protected Mustafa Kemal from the predatory 
elite of the Old Order. Therefore, instead of surrendering to them, he could demolish all the 
established strongholds of the aristocratic and imperial order. What the relatively 
rationalized and impersonalized bureaucracy replaced was not a pre-modern and 
unprofessional bureaucracy, but an institutional culture of its own which had retained its 
own intimate and personalized socialization. An institutional culture replaced another 
although the culture of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry was retained to a considerably extent 
in the republican Foreign Office in Sıhhıye. 
     There were apparent continuities in the transition from the Empire to the Republic. 
Nonetheless, the foundation of a republic also meant dramatic changes in various areas.  
The relations established between the state and its privileged servants were one of the 
distinctions between a Republic and an Empire. Klinghardt, writing in 1924, just one year 
after the proclamation of the republic, puts the main difference between the old times and 
new times as the austerity and plainness of the style and aesthetics of the new regime 
compared to the ostentation of the old regime. He contrasts these two ―spirits‖ not with 
regard to architecture and ideology but predominantly with regard to the aesthetics of 
governmental offices and office habits.
1088
 For Klinghardt, the new state in Ankara 
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managed to halt the flamboyance and impudence of the imperial civil servants and imposed 
the authority of a modern and effective state. Klinghardt contrasts the toughness of the 
―new men‖ with the elegance and effeminate-like courtliness and empty pageantry of the 
imperial establishment. Klinghardt was mesmerized with the end of the cosmopolitan 
world in Istanbul smashed by the Prussian and egalitarian Ankara representing genuine 
Anatolian Turkishness. For him, Ankara symbolized a new style of aesthetics not a world 
apart from the communist aesthetics of the Bolsheviks and the European fascist aesthetics 
of later years. One thing was for sure: The Ottoman pageantry, its distinct culture, and the 
ethos imbued in the imperium had vanished for good or bad. 
    
 
7.4. The Aristocratic Worlds of European Diplomatic Services  
 
       The pre-1914 diplomatic service was the most aristocratic of all the civil services 
throughout Europe. ―The atmosphere within the Habsburg foreign service was distinctly 
international and aristocratic. Only 3 percent of the seventy-two senior diplomats posted 
outside Austria-Hungary had no noble title. At the Balhausplatz, a prince, ten counts, 
twenty-four barons, and thirty-two with simple noble predicates controlled the bulk of the 
senior positions. Aristocrats, whether Austrian or Hungarian, held the top diplomatic posts 
abroad and usually represented decades of familial service to the Habsburg dynasty.‖1089 
Russian diplomats ―in line with general European practice, were from much grander social 
backgrounds than any of the domestic civil servants.‖1090 ―Members of the Swedish foreign 
service were consequently recruited almost exclusively from the high nobility of the 
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country.‖1091 ―In Belgium, ‗(o)f the 169 diplomats that can be accounted for in the period 
between 1830 and 1850, 120 were noblemen.‘"1092 The dominance of aristocracy in the 
diplomatic service prevailed throughout Europe until 1914 with the relative exception of 
France, where diplomatic service was bourgeoisified to a certain extent throughout the 
Third Republic, thanks to the conscious policies of Third Republican politicians.
1093
 The 
pre-World War I years were the years of talk of ―reform‖ to reorganize and ―modernize‖ 
the foreign offices and end the aristocratic institutional culture since aristocratic cultures of 
diplomatic services were not suitable for the complexities of the international politics of 
the age. Although ―talk of reform‖ was in the air, the implementation of reforms remained 
fairly limited
1094
 and foreign offices successfully resisted the efforts of the political elites to 
reform the foreign offices
1095
. Nevertheless, after World War I, diplomacy lost its blatantly 
aristocratic character in all Europe to the lament of aristocrat diplomats, including a sad 
Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu writing in 1940s.1096   
       The typical 19
th
 century diplomat did not perceive his occupation as a profession but 
rather as an aristocratic pastime activity. The workload was far from being heavy and 
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―there was time for friends and visitors.‖1097 In other words, diplomacy was a part of the 
aristocratic way of life. It was not seen as a profession practiced for income and material 
reward but as an activity performed for prestige, glamour, and family reputation. Naturally, 
given that such an understanding of diplomacy prevailed in the foreign ministries, the 
organizations of foreign ministries remained backward in the nineteenth century in terms 
of their professionalism, organizational structures, and bureaucratic efficiencies in 
comparison to the other ―reforming‖ governmental offices. In the heyday of the Concert of 
Europe, diplomacy was seen as a culture of aristocratic socialization.
1098
 As the Concert of 
Europe unraveled and the complexities of international affairs became more sophisticated, 
an attempt at professionalization and ―disciplining‖ of the foreign offices was 
undertaken.
1099
 However, by the outbreak of World War I, as suggested above, the reforms 
had been only partially successful. 
       In the British Foreign Office, diplomats and Foreign Office officials were strictly 
separated. ―Diplomacy was recognized as elitist service... By 1914, career diplomatists 
numbered 150, forming a closed, gilded circle, staffed in the main by the sons of peers, 
landowners, and aspiring gentry, and drawn primarily from the prestige public schools and 
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Oxbridge colleges.‖1100 In contrast, Foreign Office officials were less aristocratic than the 
diplomats. The reasons were obvious. The expenses abroad were difficult to afford, 
especially bearing in mind that their salaries were comparably modest and they were paid 
no salary in the first two years of their service.
1101
 Apparently, such a material difficulty for 
the recruits was established to discourage those who lacked means of self-financing and 
favored those who were financially privileged. There was a sharp criticism leveled against 
this discriminatory practice. Both services cultivated prejudices against each other. ―The 
Foreign Office... tended to regard diplomatists as dilettantes and social butterflies. Quite 
naturally, a degree of competition, if not latent hostility, developed between the two 
services... continued until 1919 when formal amalgamation took place.‖1102 A transition 
between these two services was an exception, and such a move was not seen as laudable 
nor was it encouraged. For a Foreign Office official, a transfer to a diplomatic post meant 
degradation. For a diplomat, a post in the Foreign Office meant deterioration in social 
standing.    
       The idea that diplomacy is not a source of income was well established in the French 
and German Foreign Offices as well. ―No requirement was so carefully observed, as the 
rule formally in effect until 1908, that candidates had to have independent incomes…The 
Wilhelmstrasse had first insisted in the 1880s that candidates give evidence of private 
wealth, with the annual figure set at 6,000 marks.‖1103 In Austria, ―admission to the foreign 
office was not in the first place decided by the obligatory diplomatic examination but by 
social status; for a leading position in the Foreign Service, proof of a fixed income, which 
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made it possible to fulfill the duties of representation, was also required.‖1104 ‖This was a 
common practice, enforced also in …Russia and Italy as well.‖1105 In Italy, ―the candidate 
had to be ‗possessed of sufficient financial means to maintain the volunteer in the Italian 
consulates abroad and, for a diplomatic career, a compulsory income of 6,000 lire‘; this last 
figure was fairly high so as to ensure that the number of candidates was limited.‖1106 In the 
Quai d‘Orsay, ―(u)ntil 1894 candidates (applying for the Foreign Office) had to have a 
private income of 6, 000 francs.‖1107The French Foreign Office was an island of aristocracy 
in the sea of republicanism. ―French governments (of the Third Republic) were prone to 
send aristocrats of great standing to important posts. Moreover, even if a Republican 
represented the French government, he usually made a clear distinction between internal 
and international politics…(R)epublicanism was simply not an export commodity. Like his 
aristocratic counterpart, the new Republican diplomat also found parliamentary politics 
thoroughly repugnant (.)‖1108 In an effort to make the Quai d‘Orsay more bourgeois, ―the 
Republic had attempted to upgrade salaries in the hope of attracting permanent officials of 
bourgeois Republican persuasion.‖1109 This policy did not work out primarily because the 
social costs of expenses of diplomatic corps were not affordable for a state official 
dependent on a salary. Although in the Ottoman Empire there was no strict separation of 
diplomatic posts and Foreign Office posts and diplomats were assigned to both tracks, 
these two tracks had their autonomies. The diplomatic posts were filled by men of 
comparably higher social origins and respectability.
1110
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       In reaction to the rising popularity of social and economical history and the thesis of 
―Der Primat der Innenpolitik,‖ Zara Steiner argued that the making of the British foreign 
policy and the road to World War I was decided primarily by the independent exploits of 
the Foreign Ministry. For Steiner, although several concerns might play a role in the 
making and implementation of foreign policy, the determining force was the closed world 
of diplomacy.
1111
 ―They operated in a closed circuit and tended mainly to hear each other‘s 
voices.‖1112 Denying a prominent role to social and economic forces in determining foreign 
policy orientations, Steiner maintains that states and ―official minds‖ had an immense 
power to shape foreign policy orientations. Moreover, the world of diplomacy was a 
socially exclusive world closed to the worlds and minds of the non-official elites (such as 
industrialists)
1113
 and, therefore, the secluded ―diplomatic mind‖ strictly hindered other 
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alternative visions and perspectives from contributing to the molding of foreign policy, 
avoiding any external influence of any sort. 
       Apparently, the diplomats shared a common educational background besides a 
common social background. A comparison between education systems and universities of 
various countries is illuminating.
1114
 Britain was the country where institutions of 
education were most strictly exclusive to non-aristocracy. In fact, Oxbridge functioned to 
sustain the social, political, and cultural superiority of the aristocracy. The Oxbridge and 
public schools were strictly nonegalitarian, class conscious, and class-based.
1115
 The 
Prussian gymnasiums were state institutions launched to recruit and educate future 
knowledgeable bureaucrats trained in a Humboldtian neo-humanist culture and imbue them 
with Bildung,
1116
 In gymnasiums, nobles and non-nobles were trained together without 
discrimination, especially in the late 19th  century. In Russia, in contrast, education was 
overtly non-aristocratic. It was the sons of the poor, the lower middle classes, and the non-
privileged who crowded the best universities in St. Petersburg and Moscow and cultivated 
contempt and hatred against the philistine, indolent, and unproductive aristocracy during 
their education. Lieven notes that in the Russian universities (and in the Moscow 
University in particular), it was the scions of aristocracy who were discriminated 
against.
1117
 In contrast to the Prussian case, the Russian state failed to absorb and 
assimilate the university students. As a result, a grave and insurmountable social 
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contradiction emerged between the aristocracy and the new class of razhnochintsy.
1118
 The 
Hamidian graduates of the Ottoman Empire demonstrated a similar pattern in which the 
state‘s establishment of a modern and fine education system created an undesired outcome. 
As the education system paved the way to a communist takeover in Russia with the 
alienation of the university graduate intellectuals, the egalitarian and relatively non-class 
conscious Ottoman education system facilitated a Young Turk takeover against which the 
Hamidian establishment and aristocracy remained helpless. The constructions of the 
education systems were significant factors in determining the evolution of national paths. 
In the Ottoman and Russian cases, they became dysfunctional and worked against the 
establishment.
1119
 The Hamidian graduates of imperial colleges became adversaries of the 
system (although unlike their Russian peers, they were employed within the state 
administration and thus perceived their prospects in the state). Most of the upstarts 
cultivated resentment towards the beneficiaries of the ―unproductive‖ establishment and 
were in favor of a more efficient, productive, and meritocratic one.  
      Evidently, the diplomats in all the Great Powers of Europe were graduated from 
privileged and secluded schools of aristocracy and officialdom. The typical educational 
background of a British diplomat was schooling in Eton and university training in Oxford. 
A few graduates of Cambridge at the university level and graduates of other prestigious 
aristocratic public schools besides Eton such as Harrow, Rugby, and Wellington at the high 
school level were also observable. Career in diplomacy was certainly closed to any 
outsider.
1120
 In France, recruitment favored elite schools.
1121
 Austro-Hungarian diplomats 
were predominantly graduates of Theresianum, the school founded by Maria Theresa as a 
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center of patriotic imperial officialdom.
1122
 In a republic with strong anti-aristocratic 
prejudices, over 60 percent of the diplomats of the United States in the late 19th century 
were graduates of Harvard, Yale, or Princeton.
1123
 
     In the Ottoman Empire, given that there were only a few university level institutions, 
apparently the diplomats came predominantly from Mülkiye and Mekteb-i Sultani. We 
observe that the graduates of Mülkiye and Mekteb-i Sultani who opted for the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs came from relatively conformist backgrounds in comparison with those 
graduates who opted for other governmental offices. According to the list prepared by Ali 
Çankaya, 8 percent (124 men) of the graduates of the Mülkiye joined Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.
1124
 This minority was comprised of the privileged graduates of Mülkiye. As 
pointed out previously, this was seemingly due to the costliness of the life of a 
diplomat.
1125
    
 
 
7.5. The End of the World of Aristocracy and Gentlemanly Diplomacy 
 
       The aristocratic culture of public administration enabled the 19
th
  century configuration 
of the foreign offices to prevail, creating very limited friction until World War I. In France, 
prior to World War I, new recruits who were dubbed ―Young Turks‖ reacted to the 
conservative style of conduct of diplomacy. The French Young Turks were nationalists and 
Germanophobes.
1126
 Whereas the ambassadorial elite, comprised of men of aristocratic 
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background, held on to the alliances system to maintain peace, the Young Turks advocated 
an aggressive policy toward Germany and were willing to risk a war if necessary. The 
disagreements between the ambassadorial elite consisted of the ambassadors appointed to 
St. Petersburg, London, Berlin, and other old guards who advocated pursuing delicate 
diplomatic negotiations and Young Turks in the Centrale, who advocated a tougher and 
uncompromising stance and created mischief in the Moroccan Crisis in 1909. The crisis 
was finally resolved with a Franco-German agreement thanks to the workings of the old 
guard.
1127
 The Austrian historian Fritz Fellner argued that ―the unleashing of the war 
(World War I-DG) could be attributed in no small part to the activities of younger 
diplomats in the Viennese foreign office.‖1128 The ―old diplomacy,‖ which not only 
referred to the method and conduct of the craft of diplomacy, but also to the aristocratic 
culture, paved the way to a new culture of diplomacy determined by competing 
nationalisms and unilateralist postures in contrast to the premises of the old diplomacy. 
The old diplomacy was based on a mutual understanding of the shared interests of the 
aristocratic ruling classes.
1129
  
 
―However self-enclosed or socially exclusive, this was a professional elite whose 
interests went beyond national borders. Because, with few exceptions, the same kind 
of men staffed the departments of all the states, they understood each other, they 
spoke the same language, read the same books. Members of the diplomatic 
establishment were the multinationals of their time. William Tyrell, Sir Edward 
Grey‘s pre-war private secretary spent his vacations from 1900 to 1910 at the home of 
Prince Hugo von Radolin, the German ambassador in Paris, whose mother-in-law was 
in turn a Talleyrand. Members of the profession, despite the occasional chauvinist, 
thought of themselves as members of a cosmopolitan, culturally homogenous, 
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European family…They were the defenders of the same institutions, national and 
international. They were conscious of the common lines that kept the peace between 
them and had a vested interest in their preservation. There were unspoken assumptions 
about the way diplomacy should be conducted that influenced behavior at home and 
abroad.‖1130  
 
In old diplomacy, the diplomats met not to maximize their own party‘s interest to the 
disfavor of the other party, but to reach a compromise on common ground to protect and 
advance their shared class-based interests. ―Europe‘s elite was more closely tied by culture 
and concrete interests to an international class than to the classes below them.‖1131 It was 
so much so that the Danish foreign minister Christian Bernstorff, who was an ethnic 
German like most of the Danish diplomats
1132
 and whose father was a Danish foreign 
minister as well, was transferred to Prussia as the new Prussian foreign minister to serve 
from 1818 to 1832
1133
. This class-based multilateralism under the tutorship of Great Britain 
became unfeasible after the rise of Germany and emergence of rival alliances and camps in 
the last decades of the 19
th
 century.  
       The responsibility for World War I is a matter of controversy, both as a political issue 
and as an academic debate. Fischer, in the 1960s, argued that Germany bore the sole 
responsibility for World War I.
1134
 Moreover, for Fisher it was not the German Foreign 
Office but the Chiefs of Staff that intentionally opted for a war. According to Fisher, it was 
the deliberate calculation of the militarist elite that had instigated the Armageddon.
1135
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However, others questioned the argument for the sole responsibility of Germany and 
suggested that the escalation of tensions, the irreconcilable nature of the Great Power 
aggressions and many other structural factors rendered a great war possible if not 
inevitable. Examining the change of attitudes, perceptions and the ideologies within the 
foreign offices of Britain and France as well as Germany supports such a claim.
1136
 The 
new cadres of diplomats were more nationalistic (even chauvinistic), and they were eager 
to demolish the international gentlemanly diplomacy.
1137
 Realpolitik and national interest 
became the catchwords of the new generation of the diplomatic service. These catchwords 
replaced the hegemonic discourses of ―balance of powers‖ and reciprocity.1138 
Furthermore, every single incident and clash of interests began to be taken as ends in 
themselves instead of being seen as parts of a whole. Therefore, trying to maximize 
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national interest on every occasion naturally triggered the escalation of tensions and the 
irreconcilability of interests. 
       It was also the beginning of the 20th century when ideology and politics made their 
way into the Foreign Offices. Ideological and political preferences and inclinations began 
to influence and shape the advising and implementation of the foreign policy there. At this 
particular time, national and ideological orientations became decisive in the making of 
foreign policy as the old cosmopolitan and aristocratic cultures of the foreign offices were 
collapsing. The rising antipathy towards Germany in the British Foreign Office, which was 
a manifestation of these nationalistic and conservative inclinations, was a remarkable 
factor in the making of the anti-German alliances with France and Russia, which prepared 
the ground for World War I. Although the issue of responsibility for the outbreak of the 
war has been a controversy since 1914 and the culpability of Germany has been maintained 
by many scholars.  This group of scholars includes not only Fritz Fisher and his followers 
(Imanuel Geiss, Berghahn), but also other respected scholars, such as Albertini in 1940s, 
and Taylor, Steiner, and Lieven since then. However, it seems more accurate to argue for 
common guilt with different levels of culpability. In an era of ideological escalation, the 
outbreak of World War I cannot be regarded as an accident or a consequence of the 
overreaching of one of the parties.    
 
 
7.6. Institutionalization, Modernization and Bureaucratization of Foreign Offices 
 
       The British Foreign Office evolved from being a small bureau predominantly 
preoccupied with the deskwork of diplomacy to a sophisticated office responsible not only 
for the coordination and conduct but also the making of foreign policy throughout the 
second half of the 19th  century, albeit  very gradually. It was only on the eve of World 
War I that the  Foreign Office was acknowledged as the primary office responsible for  
foreign policy. In the 19th  century, foreign policy was mainly the domain of the foreign 
minister. ―Castlereagh completely ignored his staff, Canning did all his own drafting... 
Palmerston wrote all important dispatches himself and left only minor administrative 
details to his clerks. He wanted abstracts made, dispatches copied, queries answered and 
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papers properly circulated, but he did not wish for or seek advice.‖1139 The Foreign Office 
grew in size and in its tasks throughout the second half of the century. The number of 
dispatches handled by the Foreign Office increased steadily (6,000 in 1829; 30,000 in 
1849, 111,000 in 1905), but on the eve of  World War I, the staff of the Foreign Office 
numbered only 176, including doorkeepers and cleaners.
1140
 
       In this era, a crucial development was the rise of the permanent under-secretary. The 
traditional duties and responsibilities of the permanent undersecretary (writing first drafts, 
preparing abstracts of incoming dispatches, and even copying and ciphering) were replaced 
by the advising and active coordination of the implementation and conduct of foreign 
policy.
1141
 By the turn of 20th century, the permanent undersecretary was perceived and 
regarded as the primary expert regarding international politics and the most prominent 
counselor in the conduct of foreign policy. Nevertheless, this transformation was not a 
linear and smooth process. On the contrary, many Foreign Office staff, including 
permanent under-secretaries, resisted the imperatives of the modernization of the Foreign 
Office. The conventional perception of the task of the Foreign Office was sustained in the 
minds of the officials. Many permanent undersecretaries avoided assuming political 
powers.
1142
 In short, the Foreign Office lagged behind the other governmental offices in 
assuming the responsibilities of a modern bureaucratic state, predominantly due to its 
aristocratic character. 
       The reforms of 1905 determined the character of the modern Foreign Office and 
signaled the end of the old order.
1143
 While many continued to question as late as the Cold 
War if the British Foreign Office had ever been reformed to adapt to the needs of 20th 
century, it became a nostalgic icon for those who remembered it at a later time within a 
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much more professionalized profession of diplomacy.
1144
 The 1907 reforms in Quai 
d‘Orsay were less drastic and radical given that its aristocratic character had already been 
considerably effaced
1145
. However, the most radical reform, which was in fact no less than 
a revolution, was undertaken by Schüler just after World War I in Weimar Germany. The 
German foreign office was also Weimarized/republicanized by the eradication of its 
aristocratic heritage and its commercialization and bourgeoisification under the supervision 
of Schüler.1146 These reforms, which were undertaken in all major European countries, 
significantly curtailed the cultural characteristics and distinctions of foreign offices. 
Although all the foreign offices continued to retain their own cultures and 
characteristics,
1147
 they began to look alike more than ever and transformed (at least) into 
semi-Weberian bureaucracies. It was the strange death of the Old Order. 
      It is also striking to observe that such a small number of people played such a 
fundamental and determinative role in the making of world politics, especially regarding 
the advent of World War I. ―Ministries remained tight organizations right until the First 
World War. Russia was the outstanding exception (.) Elsewhere, few foreign offices, even 
among the great powers, employed more than 50 officials at mid-century, or between 100 
and 150 men on the eve of the Great War. The French, for instance, increased the number 
of their officials from 80 in 1870 to 170 (excluding doorkeepers, typists, etc.) in 1914. The 
Danish Foreign Ministry increased from nine officials in 1848 to 21 in 1914, the Dutch 
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from 23 in 1849 to 45 in 1914.‖1148 It is also striking to observe how limited the level of 
professionalism was in offices which had immensely influenced, shaped, and designed the 
modern world. The secluded worlds of Foreign Offices led the course of history. Given the 
smallness of these offices, the role these individuals and small groups of men played in the 
shaping of the modern world order is striking.    
 
 
7.7. The Bismarckian and Wilhelmine German Foreign Office 
 
       Among the Foreign offices throughout Europe, the German Foreign Office was 
arguably the one that resembled the Hamidian Foreign Office most in terms of its 
incorporation of loyalty, subservience to the throne, and high level of professionalism. The 
German foreign office was the foreign office with the least institutional autonomy vis-à-vis 
its political superiors, compared to its British and French counterparts. During the 
chancellorship of Bismarck, the foreign office was completely subservient to him. 
Bismarck controlled the ministry via his son, whom he appointed as the foreign minister. 
The subservience of the foreign office prevailed after the downfall of Bismarck. In spite of 
his disregard of the diplomatic service, Bismarck was held in esteem by the diplomatic 
service, whose exceptional level of knowledge of international affairs, skill in conducting 
foreign relations, and political genius were acknowledged and revered. ―Under Bismarck, 
if diplomats were allowed only a limited initiative, they could at last be confident that they 
were serving Europe‘s preeminent statesman and the policies they would be expected to 
implement would be reasoned and coherent.‖1149 In contrast, Wilhelm II was seen as a 
reckless and unreliable amateur, if not a charlatan. However, although the destructive 
intrusions of the Kaiser were resented by the diplomats and his damage to the 
professionalism of the diplomatic service infuriated them, from 1890 to 1914, there was 
not a single resignation from the service in reaction to these arbitrary and coarse 
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intrusions.
1150
 Apparently, in the clash between professionalism and aristocratic loyalties, 
the aristocratic loyalties determined the deeds of the officials. In fact, these two attributes 
do not necessarily contradict. They may coexist. Nonetheless, what we observe is that 
aristocratic ethics came first since professionalism was an aptitude to be acquired and 
practiced whereas the culture of aristocracy was a habitus, a code of conduct, and a merit. 
       The only exception to the total subservience of the foreign office was the immense 
control Holstein exerted over the ministry during his tenure as the senior counselor of the 
Political Division.
1151
 Holstein was a figure that Bismarck had to take into consideration 
during his chancellorship; but Holstein‘s power reached its zenith during the ministry of 
Caprivi, who was inexperienced in foreign affairs and, therefore, in this period, Holstein 
reigned over the ministry de facto. With the exception of Holstein, the highest-ranking 
positions lacked prominence and never played major roles in policy making. ―The under- 
secretary was completely subservient to the state secretary, and it was, therefore, a post to 
be avoided‖1152 for the German diplomats.  
       The German diplomatic service was one of the clearest examples of the European-
wide practice of diplomacy as a game involving gentlemen. It was strictly elitist. The 
German diplomatic service was predominantly Protestant. Only a few Jews ever served in 
the office.
1153
 Sixty-nine percent of the Foreign Ministry officers bore titles of nobility.
1154
 
Moreover, most of these officials came from certain families which were closely related 
and affiliated with others operating within a closed circle.
1155
 It is not surprising that for 
Bismarck what a diplomat should know and do best was socialize in aristocratic salons and 
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display the best manners.
1156
  
      Nevertheless, the aristocratic nature of German diplomacy went hand-in-hand with an 
aggressive and fervent foreign policy conducted both by Bismarck and Wilhelm II. 
German diplomatic aristocratic culture did not hinder the uncompromising tone of German 
foreign policy which, in the end, destroyed ―Old Europe‖ and its political order. On the 
contrary, it perceived aggression as a manifestation of the ethos of the aristocratic culture 
and upbringing of its members. Apparently, aristocratic distinctions in the original 
medieval era were distinguished by military vigilance and maintained with military honor. 
What the Wilhelmine German aristocratic culture did was uphold this militarized ethos and 
exercise it within modern militarist politics and culture.
1157
 Together with the fact that 
Germany was seeking a place under the sun, German aristocratic culture did not become a 
bastion of order and status quo in the international arena but an anti-status quo force that 
was forced in the end to bow to the non-aristocratic radicals. This is not surprising given 
the fact that the German old regime had developed its own ―peculiarities‖ and had not 
followed the path of the liberal/conservative credo of the British old regime. No two old 
regimes resemble each other. In that regard, the Ottoman Hamidian Foreign Ministry 
oscillated between subterranean radicalism and anti-status quo intentions, and pro-status 
quo conservatism. In time, it gravitated from the latter to the former as the ―ancien régime‖ 
generation passed away and international developments increasingly obliged it to change. 
 
 
7.8. The Hamidian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Comparative Perspective 
 
      The political division of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs was formed after the 
Revolution of 1908. The institution of the political division was a sign of the relative 
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―autonomization‖ and institutionalization of the ministry after the Hamidian yoke had been 
lifted and a further step toward professionalization, distancing itself from its aristocratic 
culture. Nevertheless, the workings of the ―political divisions‖ in Britain and Germany 
show that the political divisions work not within a Weberian bureaucratic ethos but within 
an aristocratic ethos and worldview. The ―myth of professionalism‖ does not apply to these 
bureaus. The bureaus based on geographical specialization were formed only after the 
proclamation of the republic. This was one more step toward professionalization, 
institutionalization, and bureaucratization in the Weberian sense. Interestingly, 
geographical bureaus based on geographical specialization were formed in the Western 
foreign offices after World War I at the same time as their Turkish counterpart as one of 
the reforms undertaken to professionalize these offices.
1158
   
      To recap, as a continent-wide trend, foreign offices reached the zenith of their 
institutional power on the eve of World War I. This period was characterized by the 
meteoric expansion of bureaucracy and the development of bureaucratic professionalism. It 
was followed by the advent of the democratization of politics and governments following 
the devastating world war. The democratization and the middle-class takeover of the 
governments and administrations would bring about the imposition of political 
infringement on the bureaucracy.
1159
 The bureaucracy and the political elites no longer 
came from the same cultural and social class. The change of the class character of the 
political elites destroyed the coherence of the bureaucracy and political decision-makers in 
favor of the new political elites. The antipathy and distrust of Lloyd George towards the 
diplomatic service is well known. The liberal Lloyd George, who liked to expose his lower 
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class origins on various occasions, disdained the snobbery of the diplomatic service and 
made foreign policy decisions with minimal coordination with the Foreign Office.
1160
 
While he ignored the Foreign Office, he made his decisions in consultation with his 
informal ―garden cabinet.‖ From the prime ministry of Lloyd George onwards, the British 
Foreign Office was sidelined and lost its centrality in the decision-making process.
1161
 Its 
monopoly in shaping foreign policy was taken away, and some of the components of the 
foreign policy-making process were distributed to various governmental offices. This 
process destroyed the self-perception of the exceptionalism that the privileged foreign 
policy establishment enjoyed and the idea that foreign policy had to be conducted and 
implemented behind closed doors by knowledgeable experts, thus rendering the political 
elites‘ position stronger vis-à-vis the bureaucratic establishment. 
       The reign of Vansittart in the British Foreign Office (and his failure to lead  foreign 
policy due to the opposition of the political elite) was  the last case of the éminence grises 
and a swan‘s song, thus bringing to a close  the generation of the great diplomats that had 
begun in early 20th century. The ―golden age of the diplomats‖ contained such impressive 
names as Holstein and Schüler in Germany, and Hardinge, Eyre, and Crowe in Britain. 
These ―grey eminences,‖ who exerted immense power and controlled the implementation 
and making of foreign policy from the back of desks owing to their professionalism, 
erudition and respectability, were the product of a particular and idiosyncratic era. With the 
end of the ―old order‖ in diplomacy, enigmatic and thundering grey eminences disappeared 
and gave the floor to the dreary Weberian desk worker bureaucrats. The ―old diplomacy‖ 
in which personal skills and interpersonal relations were decisive and which was part of the 
conduct of business gave way to a depersonalized diplomacy in which personalities 
mattered less. The new mode of diplomacy hindered and limited the role of individuals in 
favor of the preponderance of the structural and political dynamics. Regarding the 
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Ottoman/Turkish case, a similar pattern is observable with one difference. The zenith of 
the institutional power of the ministry, not in terms of exerting influence on the making of 
foreign policy but in terms of developing an institutionalized role in the conduct of 
coordination of foreign policy and establishing its institutional autonomy, was reached 
(after the collapse of ―old diplomacy‖ and in the age of Weberian bureaucratization) by the 
1950s just after the end of the single party rule
1162
. However, this institutional power was a 
legacy of a process of decades. One figure that may be seen as the master architect of the 
institutional power of the ministry during the single party regime was Numan 
Menemencioğlu, the general secretary of the Ministry between 1933 and 1942 and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1942 and 1944, a figure who is comparable to the grey 
eminences of the pre-World War I of European diplomacies and embodying the 
institutional power of the ministry in his persona. Apparently, this process was related with 
the development of the institutionalization of bureaucracy in general. In Turkey, the 
democratization of the political scene (not only in terms of the emergence of an electoral 
democracy but also) in terms of the background of the politicians was observed in 1950s 
which brought an end to the parliaments and cabinets composed of ex-bureaucrats and 
weakened the institutional powers of the bureaucratic offices.
1163
 Although, in Turkey, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs retained its institutional culture, privilege and relative 
autonomy due to the peculiarities of Turkey, the post-1950 was a new era for the Turkish 
diplomatic service as well
1164
.   
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      There is no evidence that the structuring of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
consciously modeled on any European example. ―There is no documentary evidence that 
the officials of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry made any close study of the organization of 
the corresponding agencies of European governments before 1908.‖1165 Yet, to conclude, 
we observe a similar/parallel pattern and trajectory regarding the evolutions and 
transformations of the Ottoman/Turkish Foreign Office and its Western counterparts. This 
is not due to emulation but due to the fact that Ottoman 19
th
 century bureaucratic culture 
demonstrated a similar path of evolution and transformation sharing the same premises and 
externalities. One major difference is the time lag within which change occurred in the 
Turkish Foreign Office. The institutional zenith of bureaucracy in Turkey was reached with 
the Kemalist regime, building upon the institutional reforms already undertaken during the 
Hamidian and post-Hamidian eras and the premises taken from the Hamidian 
establishment.  
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POSTSCRIPT: PASSAGES OF THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE FROM THE 
EMPIRE TO THE REPUBLIC  
 
       From 1908 onwards, the pace of change accelerated. The ―new men‖ came to power 
with an entirely new political agenda, vision of politics, and social order. This 
transformation was not unique to the Ottoman framework. A similar transition and 
transformation was visible in the European scene as Europe approached World War I. The 
European mental structures were evolving in a direction in which ideologies such as 
fascism, communism, and Republicanism would later be able to flourish. This was not the 
world of Metternich, Castlereagh, or Bismarck anymore. This was not the world of Âli 
Pasha, Fuad Pasha, or Abdülhamid II either. The Ottoman Foreign Ministry which 
mastered the ―balance of power politics‖ became out of fashion in the new world of 
Machtpolitik. The Ministry was less at home and therefore less influential in the 
coordination of policymaking in the post-1908 world of Machtpolitik.  The aging diplomats 
belonging to the age of Metternich-Castlereagh in Europe, who had faith in the traditional 
order and inclined towards France and Britain (i.e., Europe), were alienated and 
marginalized although they were also partially capable of adapting to the new cultural and 
intellectual milieu and radicalizing in pursuit of the ―spirit of the times‖.1166   
      Given that Ministry of Foreign Affairs was part of the Tanzimat/Hamidian bureaucracy 
and its informal culture, it cannot be separated and isolated from the attitudes and culture 
of the Tanzimat bureaucracy in general. This elite encountered an unprecedented crisis 
with the 1908 Revolution. The Kamil Pasha government which assumed office after the 
Revolution due to the lack of experience of the Young Turks may be regarded as the ―last 
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stand of the old/established Tanzimat bureaucracy. The Kamil Pasha Cabinet was ousted 
from office by the Unionist parliament after a tense period during which parliament, seeing 
itself as the representative of ―new forces‖ against the ancien régime (devr-i sabık), 
clashed on various occasions severely with the Kamil Pasha cabinet. Kamil Pasha‘s cabinet 
was ousted by the parliament with a vote of no confidence
1167
, the first in the Ottoman 
constitutional period.  
     The expectation of the Tanzimat bureaucracy in the first years of the Second 
Constitutional Period was that it would regain the position it had largely lost during the 
Hamidian era. This expectation did not materialize. On the contrary, with 1908 it lost its 
power and influence forever. This was true for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well. The 
ministerial staff was scrutinized harshly by a skeptical parliament. The salaries of its 
personnel were curtailed.
1168
 Many were dismissed from office in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs after the conclusion of tensikat (purge). Many parliamentarians expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the diplomats and questioned their skills. The parliament was 
apparently distrustful of the Ministry, seeing it as a hub of ancien régime corruption and 
decadence.
1169
  
       If the conventional assumption that the Ottoman 19th century was characterized by the 
rule of the state is true, then the Foreign Ministry like all the other imperial offices should 
had been satisfied with the conduct of state affairs. The idea that raison d‘état was the 
decisive motivation for Ottoman statecraft is simplistic and conceals the complex dynamics 
and particular interests that pushed the 19th century transformation. Governance, 
underneath its claims to objectivity and dispassionate appraisal, is never free of 
ideological/political dimensions. There is inevitably always room for ideological 
preferences. The conducting of state affairs was never a technocratic and professional 
business even in non-representative authoritarian regimes. There was certainly room for 
ideology at the high tides of both the Tanzimat and the Hamidian eras. Nevertheless, their 
                                                 
1167
 Tural, Erkan, Son Dönem Osmanlı Bürokrasisi: II Meşrutiyet Dönemi‟nde Bürokratlar, 
İttihatçılar ve Parlamenterler, İstanbul: Türkiye ve Orta Doğu Amme İdaresi Enstitüsü, 
2009, p. 34, pp. 130-147. 
1168
 Tural, Erkan, ibid, p. 58,68. 
1169
 MMZC, 1909, v. III, pp. 47-50.  
410 
 
ideological disposition was state-centered and unless it was adamantly opposed, there was 
no self-recognition of its ideological nature. Its ideological attributes became manifest only 
when it was attacked by the Unionists at a time when Unionist ideology was powerful 
enough to take control of the state and cleanse the imperial offices from the traditional 
imperial powerhouses.  
       The post-1908 era was the transitional period from an imperial language to a 
―national‖ one although this transition was not a linear and inevitable path with the 
discourse of the nation replacing the failed discourse of Empire. It may be formulated that, 
in many aspects ―the Empire was already national and the Nation still imperial.‖1170 The 
Young Turks, although they were ardent Turkish nationalists, did not denounce the Empire 
and the imperial idea. On the contrary, they aimed to build their nationalist project on the 
top of the imperial grandeur. Rather than abandoning Ottomanism, they Turkified 
Ottomanism. They tried to retain and even strengthen the imperial idea while trying to 
enact their national(ist) project. They had to reconstitute the Empire along with their 
worldview and render the imperial and national discourses compatible.  
       However, it has to be said that there was no one identifiable and concrete Young Turk 
worldview.
1171
 It is even hard to argue that any individual ―Young Turk‖ had a consciously 
developed, proper, consistent, and comprehensive worldview. The era can be characterized 
by a huge cloud of ambivalence. The acts and moves of the Young Turks developed 
spontaneously. It is clear that the Young Turk era and its disruption set the ground for the 
Kemalists to take over. The Kemalists managed to assume the control of the state thanks to 
the Young Turks‘ purge of the Tanzimat bureaucracy (or rical-i Tanzimat). The continuity 
was an ideological one as well. We can establish a link from the Young Turks to the 
Kemalists, especially in terms of constructing a nationhood. But there were very strong 
discontinuities between the two as well. In a sense, Kemalism was closer to the Hamidian 
view in its glorification and sacralization of the state than the Young Turks‘ attempt to 
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ideologize the state. Kemalism reestablished the ―primacy of the state‖ which had been 
destroyed by the Young Turk zealots.    
       As the Ottoman government in Istanbul was abolished by the leadership of the War of 
Independence on 1 November 1922, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry was also abolished. 
With that decision, hundreds of officials serving in the Ministry became unemployed. In 
two weeks time, all the foreign representations of the Ottoman Empire were assigned to 
Ahmed Ferid (Tek), the Paris representative of the Ankara government. Ahmed Ferid sent 
circulars to the undersecretaries or other assigned officials to take over the administration 
of the relevant embassies and representations.
1172
 For example, the man in charge in the 
London embassy was no longer Mustafa Reşid Paşa, but Şefik Bey. In Stockholm, the head 
of the representation became Esad Bey replacing the ambassador Galip Kemali 
(Söylemezoğlu). However, decisions with regard to other heads of representations were not 
unambiguous. Although Ahmed Ferid Bey assigned the second secretary, Numan Rifat 
Bey (Menemencioğlu), in place of the head official, Reşat Nuri Bey, he informed Reşat 
Nuri Bey that this decision was temporary and that he should stay in Berne and take a rest 
while waiting for the final decision. It seems that some prominent diplomats with 
connections and affiliations with the ancien régime were eliminated and others who were 
not associated with the ancien régime were retained.1173  
    Before the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, like all other Ministries, the Foreign 
Ministry in Ankara took over the responsibilities of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry although 
a representation in Istanbul continued to function until 1927. The transfer of the Ministry to 
Ankara was completed by 1928 with the opening of the new building of the Foreign 
Ministry at Sıhhiye.1174 We do not observe a Republican policy of purging the cadres. The 
ones who were eager to move to Ankara from their comfortable houses and mansions in 
Istanbul were all welcome to continue their careers with the exception of the ones who 
were thought to have been disloyal to the National Struggle during the War of 
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Independence.
1175
 That was not an ideological purge, but a retribution for misdeeds. It is 
true that the Republic recruited many of its ambassadors from the Kemalist loyalists who 
had committed themselves to the Kemalist cause during the War of Independence.
1176
 
Many military officers turned into career diplomats. Although some of the military officers 
terminated their diplomatic careers after one posting, others became professional diplomats 
serving the Republic for some two decades like Ahmed Ferid (Tek) and Hüsrev Gerede 
(who was ironically the son-in-law of Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu, whose career was 
terminated by the Republic due to his service to the Istanbul government during the War of 
Independence) or more than one decade like Kemalettin Sami Paşa. However, the 
transplantation of the loyalists into the diplomatic service occurred only at the 
ambassadorial level. The cadres below the ambassadorial posts continued to serve as 
Republican loyalists who were promoted to more prominent posts in time. Although in the 
first ten years of the Republic, the Republican Ministry of Foreign Ministry, reluctant to 
fill the diplomatic posts with the sympathizers of Britain, France, and imperial loyalists 
found difficulty in recruiting qualified younger people due to the unattractiveness of 
Ankara and the limited prospects such a career promised, the Foreign Ministry reacquired 
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its earlier prestige and became a niche of prestige and high esteem, attracting the 
descendants of the aristocratic/imperial families of Istanbul and the sons of high-ranking 
bureaucrats and the new political elite in Ankara.
1177
 With the appointment of  Numan 
Menemencioğlu as the general secretary of the Ministry, the Ministry became 
professionalized and ―admission to the Ministry was now conditional on the candidate 
passing an entrance examination.‖1178 The internationalization of politics, the escalation of 
tensions in Europe, and diplomacy‘s increase in importance from the early 1930s onwards 
should have played a role in the professionalization of the Ministry. In short, the Republic 
took over the imperial cadres and the Ministry became one of the most prestigious offices 
of the Republic following ten years of negligence.   
       However, this does not mean that the Republic continued with conventional policies. 
On the contrary, the Republican leadership was at a distance with the traditional Ottoman 
diplomacy. The Republic had a clear change of policy in foreign relations. It rejected the 
old style of ―balance of power1179‖ politics and turned to isolationism.1180 The Republic 
and the republican historiography demonized the Tanzimat declaring it a sellout of the 
Empire. It was also highly critical of the Tanzimat diplomacy. The Tanzimat was 
associated with capitulation and submission to the Western powers. It was perceived as 
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effeminate and naïve in contrast to the vigilance and Spartan nature of the Republic.1181 
The Republic took Turkey away from the predatory webs of European diplomacy. The 
Republic consciously disowned Tanzimat diplomacy. The resistance and delay by foreign 
diplomatic legations in Istanbul in moving to Ankara was symbolic in the sense that they 
symbolically resisted the change of the Turkish government‘s new diplomatic course and 
abandonment of the Ottoman ―old diplomacy‖. The Republican Foreign Ministry declined 
any request by an ambassador to meet with the foreign minister because such moves were 
reminiscent of the Tanzimat diplomacy in which the ambassadors were acting like semi-
colonial governors.
1182
  
     The good news was that the Republic did not have a heavy workload (before the 1930s). 
The European powers were not interested in Turkey and the ―Eastern Question‖ anymore. 
The ―Eastern Question‖ had expired with the post-1918 settlement in the Middle East and 
Anatolia in which every party was forced to accept its share. Every country had its own 
problems at home to which they all had to turn. From being the hub of international 
diplomacy and the venue of military espionage and battles for world domination before 
World War I, the strategic assets of Turkey deteriorated, and Turkey became a remote land 
on the margins of world diplomacy after 1923 (to the satisfaction of the Republican elite). 
The British representatives‘ spare correspondence and remaining classified files 
(predominantly limited to technical and commercial matters rather than political concerns) 
sent from Turkey in the second half of the 1920s and the early 1930s in contrast to the 
heavy files containing extensive correspondence and reports before 1914 illustrates a 
drastic contraction in the diplomatic involvement and a distinct lack of interest.
1183
 The 
number of Turkish representatives abroad and foreign representations in Turkey shrank 
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drastically disregarding the new representations opened in the post-1918 new independent 
states
1184
. This was the end of the age of diplomacy (and age of imperialism) in which the 
Ottoman Empire was a grand chessboard for the diplomats and on which the Ottoman 
Empire was always in a defense position. Instead of being entangled and trapped in the 
niceties of international diplomacy and forced to make new ―concessions‖ every time, the 
Republic, in the aftermath of the collapse of the old ―European order,‖ could manage to 
break with the past and Europe.
1185
 Hence, the Treaty of Lausanne was rendered mythical, 
the very symbol of being freed from former bonds and the founding moment of the 
revival/resurgence emerging from a disgraceful legacy.  
     In fact, in spite of the republican claim to disown the diplomacy of the ancien régime, 
continuity was also visible with regard to the conduct of foreign policy. The Republican 
stubbornness of the Republican/Kemalist foreign policy establishment observable during 
the negotiations in Lausanne, in the conduct of foreign policy throughout the 1920s and 
1930s, and in the resilient neutrality of Turkey in World War II
1186
 was inherited from the 
Tanzimat and Hamidian way of conducting foreign policy. The Republican foreign 
policy‘s pragmatism, conservative attitudes with regard to the protection of status quo, and 
low profile diplomacy were also retained from the Tanzimat and Hamidian conduct of 
foreign policy.
1187
 
       The Republic willingly renounced any claim to grandeur. Instead, the Republic 
happily espoused the role of being a small nation-state, not interested in what was 
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happening beyond its borders.
1188
 Lost territories were gone. It was not the time to weep 
for what had been lost. Macedonian melodies and the memories of lost Macedonia 
saddened Republican cadres, but they never dreamed of regaining what had been lost, even 
though it had been the homeland of many. They educated themselves to come to terms 
with this loss forever. They endorsed non-revisionism in international politics. Anatolia 
was the new Macedonia, the new El Dorado.  It was the site where the Republic aimed to 
build its utopia. ―Peace at home, peace in the world‖ was the motto of the new 
understanding of international politics. Turkey did not interfere with  foreign developments 
and expected the same attitude from the other countries regarding its ―resolution‖ of 
domestic problems. Suppressing the Kurdish insurgency from the 1920s to 1938 was an 
easy job because, especially after the settlement of the Mosoul problem, no one in Europe 
was interested in these policing maneuvers, unlike the ―Armenian problem‖ of the 1890s. 
Apparently, no one cared as well.  
       The Republic consciously denied imperialism whether in the Islamist or Turkist form. 
Many of the formal symbols of legitimacy of the Empire were abandoned.
1189
 The new 
discourse of legitimacy was constructed through a very different language. Turkishness 
became the only source of legitimacy.
1190
 This perception was in many ways a complete 
reversal of the Ottoman self-representation. However, all these were one side of the coin. 
The Republic retained and reformulated many practices and mental structures of the 
Empire. Arguably, the new Empire was in Ankara, and Turkishness was the new source of 
legitimacy functionalized to establish the imperial tradition in Republican/national garb. 
Many features and peculiarities of the Empire were retained in the Republic. Its political 
cosmology and its vision of social order were taken over from the imperial legacy. Its 
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imagination of the ―people‖ was arguably more imperial rather than nationalist in many 
aspects. The relation it established with its citizens also retained the Ottoman pattern. The 
state retained its mythical and supra-social attributes. It continued to be elitist. Its 
assimilative nationalism was also partially inherited from the Empire and Ottomanism.
1191
 
As shown by recent studies, it was assimilationist and inclusive as long as its premises 
were endorsed and internalized.
1192
 It was exclusivist otherwise.
 
 
       A valid question to be posed is with regard to the level of the endorsement of the new 
Republican line by the imperial diplomats. In the absence of archival sources, we cannot 
make any conclusive observation. However, it is safe to observe that many Ottoman 
intellectuals and diplomats became sycophants of the Kemalist regime throughout the 
1920s in the absence of any alternative political center. We do not observe any significant 
ideological opposition or criticism leveled against the regime leveled by the imperial and 
bureaucratic elites. On the contrary, many turned into Kemalist Republicans overnight. 
Some preferred to stay silent in their later life in Istanbul, but almost none of them leveled 
an ideological assault on the Republic even after 1950. Their criticisms remained mild, and 
they were respectful of the ―achievements‖ of the Republic.  
     What is interesting is that the Republic developed its isolationist ―new course‖ with the 
―old cadres‖. The experiences, frustrations, and disillusionments of the imperial diplomats 
may have reoriented their political and ideological outlooks. The pupils of the Republic, 
who studied in the Republican Mülkiye (in İstanbul and later in Ankara) instead of the 
imperial Mülkiye in İstanbul1193, started to take office in the Foreign Ministry by the 1930s. 
Interestingly, the generation trained by the Republic began to take high office by the late 
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1940s as the Republican isolationist policy gave way to a new internationalism within the 
alignments of the Cold War. Ironically, the first generation of Republican-trained cadres 
had, from the late 1940s onwards, established and directed the pro-Western policy, which 
was a divergence from the isolationist Republican foreign policy.   
       Taking over the imperial legacy, the Republic tried to establish its distinct and not-so-
distinct ideology. It adopted various tenets of the imperial ideology and modified some 
others. In many ways, the Empire had already established a ―nation-state ideology‖ 
through a process that began in the early 19th century and escalated in the Unionist 
imperialism.  As argued above, Ottomanism in its various practices and manifestations 
resembled the prospective Kemalist nationalism of the Republic. In that regard, staying 
away from romanticizing Empires (as opposed to the cruelties of the 20th century nation-
states), we may argue that the Ottoman Empire may not be seen as an Empire in the 
universal sense if any of the other Empires (British, Habsburg, Russian) may be seen as 
such
1194
although it also has to be said that the Ottoman Empire took its Ottomanism and its 
claim to universalism seriously. The course of the late Ottoman Empire can be seen as the 
process of gradual transformation into a nation-state in the form of an Empire.
1195
 On the 
other hand, the Republic took over and retained many facets of the imperial ideology.
1196
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The Republic tried to establish the primacy of the state and raison d‘état against the 
primacy of ―politics‖ and ―ideology‖ which brought about the destruction of the Empire at 
the hands of the Unionists. In this regard, Kemalist nationalism differed from Unionist 
nationalism. Kemalism was the domination of raison d‘état and suppression of the 
―political‖ in the aftermath of 1908 and its costly consequences. The Republic tried to 
create loyalty to the state by consecrating the state as the embodiment of the nation and 
rendering the nation subservient to the state. The ―Republic‖ repressed the non-official 
alternative interpretations of the ―nation‖. It rendered ―nation‖ subordinate to the state and 
defined it only in its submissive relation to the state. This perception was also a derivative 
of the imperial ideology.
1197
 
       The working assumption here is that Kemalism can be interpreted as statism (or 
nation-statism) rather than ―nationalism proper‖. This derived from the heritage it had 
received from the culture of Empire. In other words, as has been demonstrated in many 
other studies, there was a visible continuity from the Empire to the Republic. The transition 
was rather a step function. The considerably smooth adaptation and transition of political, 
intellectual, cultural, and bureaucratic elites to the new environment, and their impressive 
capacity and eagerness to adapt to the new ideological formations and the new ideological 
milieu is illustrative. The Republican bureaucracy which was crucial in the establishment, 
institutionalization, and consolidation of the Republic was taken over from the Empire. 
Even prominent men of the late Ottoman Empire who were sidelined and lost their 
positions in the Republic never leveled ideological criticism. They acquiesced in their 
retirement days in their mansions in Istanbul. This was partially due to the surveillance of 
                                                                                                                                                             
the 19th century. Instead, nationalism is an amalgam of different dynamics developing 
from early modernity onwards.  
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the Republican authorities. However, it may be argued that it was more due to the culture 
of loyalty and the (emotional) relations they had established with the intimitized state. 
Therefore, it was easier for the old cadres to switch their loyalties without contradicting 
themselves. It was the state upon which they bestowed their allegiance, regardless of the 
specific ideological dispositions of the state to which they adhere. Thus, the Republican 
transition may be dubbed as a quiet revolution in which the old culture and habitus was 
retained and rehabilitated.   
       The Turkish Foreign Ministry with its radical Westernism and nationalism was an 
ideal place where we can observe this cooptation. Here it can be argued that the Turkish 
Foreign Ministry as an institution exemplifies the Kemalist vision at its best. Moreover, it 
may be argued that Turkish Foreign Ministry is the quintessential prototype of 
institutionalized Kemalism.  Kemalism was not nationalism in its conventional sense 
(nationalism with a reference to ethnicity) but was a discourse of elitism that utilized the 
nationalist rhetoric to serve other ends. The nation was defined in the image of the habitus 
and culture of the elite. The national attributes and qualities were imagined and defined in 
line with the culture and socialization of this class. The nation was supposed to be secular, 
modern, and pure as a replica and extension of the ―cultural intimacy‖ of the late Ottoman 
and Republican bureaucratic elite which was constituted based on the absorption of a 
shared ethos and cultural intimacy. 
      A very prominent and universally accepted axiom of the Turkish diplomatic 
establishment is that foreign policy is a supra-political issue not to be interfered with by 
amateurish and irresponsible politicians.
1198
  This was also a dictum arguably retained from 
the Ottoman pre-political world in which the state was the chief object of allegiance and 
politics was not seen as legitimate, but viewed as corrupting (fitna). Thus, the Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs‘ elitism and its culture of detachment from the outside world 
were also arguably derivations/remnants of the imperial heritage it holds onto. 
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       The social portrait and characteristics of the Republican diplomatic service are also 
worth an assessment. With its élitist background, it continued to constitute a Bourdieuian 
state nobility.
1199
 We may argue that, it retained the old Ottoman premise of the complete 
separation of the masses from the ruling class (askeri versus reaya) and developed its own 
askeri class (based on assimilation into its value system as well as genealogical continuity) 
with distinct qualities. The Tanzimat‘s new bureaucratic class‘s peculiarities rendered this 
separation even more tenable. Coming from distinctive and privileged backgrounds 
(education in Mekteb-i Sultani and the imperial high schools), experiencing their political 
and cultural socializations in their habitus, and cultivated as a la franga, they developed an 
exclusivist perception of the people. This elite also reserved the state their privilege and 
continued to intimitize it. In other words, they owned it rather than vice versa.  
      The persistence of the diplomatic establishment and its elitist characteristics can also be 
observed examining the biographical data of the diplomatic service as of 1967. By 1967, 
Istanbul continued to be the main source for recruiting diplomats. Of the 474 career 
diplomats serving as of 1967
1200
, 191 were born in Istanbul
1201
. 52 diplomats were born in 
Ankara, 19 were born in Izmir, and 24 were born in foreign countries, including the lost 
territories of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, 265 of the 474 career diplomats graduated 
from high schools in Istanbul. Given that 47 of the career diplomats graduated from high 
schools abroad and 94 of the career diplomats graduated from high schools in Ankara (84) 
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or Izmir (10), only 56 of the career diplomats graduated from provincial high schools
1202
. 
Not surprisingly, forty percent of the diplomats graduated from a French-language school 
such as Galatasaray (the Ottoman Mekteb-i Sultani), Saint-Benoit, and Saint Joseph. 
Around fifteen percent of the diplomats were graduates of both Galatasaray and 
Mülkiye.1203 These statistics display the portrait of a ―typical‖ Turkish diplomat. It also has 
to be remembered that Mülkiye moved to Ankara only in 1937, and before the Republican 
purge of the faculty of the University of Istanbul in 1933, literally the Ottoman Mülkiye 
continued to provide diplomats to the Republic. 
      In this study, the Foreign Ministry was not only taken as a governmental body, but also 
as a manifestation of the making of the modern Turkish state elite. Given that the Ministry 
assumed an unprecedented, prominent role in the turbulent (and long) Ottoman 19
th
 
century, it is hoped that this study of the Ministry reveals that in the development of the 
discourse of modern Turkishness, modernity and nationalism were intertwined and 
inseparable from each other. The case of the Ottoman/Turkish Foreign Ministry provides 
us some insights concerning how Turkish Euroskeptic nationalism was an inherent part of 
the Turkish modernization project itself and how Turkish modernization, contrary to the 
established Kemalist and pseudo-Kemalist discourse, was not an attempt to renounce the 
―old‖, but instead was an endeavor to revive and restore it in a brave new world. The study 
has tried to highlight that the very discourse from Mahmud II onwards had a lasting impact 
on the 20
th
 century official/private Turkish discourse.  
      In his book, Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu evaluates Turkish foreign policy from a constructivist 
perspective and argues that Turkish foreign policy is a function of the identity and identity 
politics of the Kemalist elite.
1204
 Taking Kemalism as ―Westernism‖ and the ideology of 
Westernization, he argues that Turkish foreign policy priorities are determined by Turkey‘s 
effort to be involved within ―Western civilization‖. He takes Turkey‘s Cold War 
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1203
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College, could dare to take the entrance examination of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.‖ 
Dikerdem, Mahmut, Hariciye Çarkı, İstanbul: Cem Yayınları, 1989, p. 74. 
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York: Routledge, 2003. 
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diplomacy and alignments as Kemalist foreign policy orientation per se.  However, I would 
argue that Kemalism is something very different from Westernism. Though Westernism is 
an indispensable and pivotal component of it, Kemalism is a much more complex 
amalgam. Contrary to Bozdağlıoğlu‘s assumption, here Kemalism‘s basic premise is taken 
as nation-statism, which is understood as isolationism and a rejection of any Western 
(international) interference along with an intense distrust of the ―West‖. Here, it is argued 
that, Bozdağlıoğlu fails to take Kemalism in its complexity and in its ambivalence. 
Furthermore, he overlooks the complex build up of Kemalism and merges the Kemalism of 
the single-party period and the Kemalism that had been reformulated, softened, and 
rendered compatible with democracy and the Cold War environment (and therefore 
reinvented) with the collapse of the single-party regime. In fact, Kemalism was reinvented 
with the collapse of the single-party regime.
1205
 Taking Kemalism as an evolution of the 
late Ottoman souveranisme, this study has tried to establish that Kemalism fits into the 
mindset of the late Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and the Ottoman bureaucracy as a 
whole). This also explains the conservatism of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its 
perception of the dynamics of globalization and the process of accession to the European 
Union (especially before the Summit of Copenhagen in 2002) in the post-Cold War world 
and its becoming trapped in the arguably insoluble issues of Cyprus
1206
 and coming to 
terms with the Armenian massacres in 1915.
1207
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 Koçak, Cemil, Belgelerle İktidar ve Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, İstanbul: İletişim 
Yayınları, 2006, pp. 633-692. 
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 Another book on Turkish foreign policy written by one of the eminent scholars of the 
foreign policy of contemporary Turkey that may be considered as ―constructivist‖ and 
suffers from the same bias is William Hale‘s study on the Ottoman/Turkish foreign policy 
from the late 18th century onwards. One of the principal premises of this book with regard 
to Kemalism underestimates the very complexities of the nature of the Ottoman/Turkish 
modernity and the Republican ideology. William Hale argues that ―in foreign policy, their 
(Republican elite –DG) primary aim was to see their country recognized as a respected 
European power‖ and  ―to raise Turkey to the ‗level of contemporary civilisation‘ ― besides 
―safeguard the hard-won security which they had achieved in 1923‖.  Hale, William, 
Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, London; Portland: Frank Cass, 2000, p. 57. However, 
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       That is, observing the continuity of a certain discourse espoused by the Ministry not 
only from the Empire to the Republic, but also from the early 19
th
 century to the 21
st
 
century, may open vistas in reinterpreting the ideological and mental structures of 
contemporary Turkey, and the crises faced by Turkey as manifested in its perceptions of  
the EU, Cyprus, the United States, and global liberalism. It is crucial to observe how this 
perpetual discourse of souverainisme was created at a time of imperial retreat and 
dissolution and was perpetuated and transmitted to the Turkish nation-state which 
continued to live with Sevrophobia as if time was frozen at a particular moment of the 
course of history.   
      We also should bear in mind that Sevrophobia does not simply refer to the Treaty of 
Sevrés signed in 1920 which rendered Turkey a small state confined to the interior of 
Anatolia and which delivered vast territories with Turkish populations to Armenians and 
Greeks. Sevrophobia goes back in time before the Republic and before the Sevrés Treaty. 
It is as much about St. Stephanos, the Balkan War treaties, and the other humiliating 
treaties the Ottomans had to sign as it is about Sevrés. Nevertheless, it may be argued that 
Sevrésphobia or the Sevrés syndrome, a concept introduced by liberal political 
scientists
1208
 to define a certain attitude, perception, and reflex is an apt label given that the 
Republic also strove to obliterate the pre-Republican traumas, subsumed the previous 
disillusionments under the bogeyman of Sevrés (republicanization of the traumas), and 
established a dichotomy between Lausanne and Sevrés. Nevertheless, it is important to 
reiterate that the trauma of Sevrés was not generated by Sevrés. On the contrary, the 
traumatic perception towards Sevrés was constructed upon the previous memories and 
experiences such as the loss of Crete, the unkept promises of the Western powers after the 
Balkan Wars, et cetera. What Sevrés did was to eternalize and transcendentalize the 
                                                                                                                                                             
here it has been argued that this was the Cold-War reinterpretation of Kemalism, 
concealing many other aspects of ―original Kemalism‖ which became more visible after 
the end of the Cold War. For a more subtle constructivist interpretation of Turkish foreign 
policy, see Robbins, Philip, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold 
War, London: Hurst & Company, 2003. 
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193; Robins, Philip, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War, 
London: Hurst & Company, 2003, pp. 102-104. 
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mundane and Realpolitik, transmit them to the realm of universals, and amalgamate several 
traumatic experiences into one single overarching and encompassing traumatic experience 
which subsumed and reinforced all the others. With such disillusionment, it was the 
transcendentalized imagery of the state which the elite always turned to and espoused.
1209
 
The transcendental state was not only a haven against external attacks, but also a shelter 
from the ignorant masses that had to be reeducated, civilized, and incorporated into the 
habitus and cultural intimacy of the state elite.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
    This study investigates the cultural, intellectual, and ideological formations of the 
Ottoman diplomatic service in the late Ottoman Empire with an emphasis on the Hamidian 
era. The study attempts to describe the basic contours and premises of the culture of the 
late Ottoman bureaucratic culture (culture in its ―thick description‖) as well as the social 
origins of the late Ottoman state elite by examining the diplomatic service as a microcosm 
of the late Ottoman bureaucratic elite. The study also aims to highlight the prominent role 
the late Ottoman bureaucratic establishment played in the development of the modern 
Turkish national identity and Turkish nationalism as well as the ideological premises of the 
republic.     
    The Ottoman diplomatic service was the most elitist governmental office of the late 
Ottoman Empire. This elitism becomes even more apparent in the social backgrounds of 
the ambassadors. The elitist nature of the diplomatic service was not peculiar to the 
Ottoman Empire. On the contrary, this was a European continent-wide pattern. It has been 
argued that the Tanzimat was an era of the consolidation of a state elite or nobility. In 
contrast to the European nobilities, the late Ottoman nobility was constructed on its 
relation to the state and based on serving in the state bureaucracy (which had some 
resemblance to the Russian nobility which was based on both blood lines and service to the 
state). The Ottoman state elite was welded around the state and developed a loyalty to the 
state which also served the self-interest of this class cluster. The Tanzimat elite was an 
amalgamation of different elites. It was consolidated by the marriage of the aristocracies of 
the center and the elite resident in Istanbul. It has been argued that the late Ottoman 
diplomatic service is a good place to observe the recruitment patterns, structures of loyalty, 
and other prominent characteristics and peculiarities of the ancien régime of the late 
Ottoman Empire because it is where we can observe the sons of grand viziers, ulema, and 
lower-ranking officials working alongside the sons of Kurdish mirs, Turcoman tribal 
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chieftains, and Turkish, Caucasian, Albanian, and Arab provincial dignitaries as well as the 
sons of the elites within the non-Muslim communities.  The Ottoman diplomatic service 
was an amalgamation of modern, meritocratic professionalism with the traditional 
aristocratic service. This world of the Ottoman ancien régime came to an end with the 
Revolution of 1908. As education became a prominent factor in advancement in career and 
the accumulation of material and social capital, a new political and bureaucratic elite 
emerged. The new Unionist generation, predominantly coming from lower middle-class 
backgrounds and the families of lower-ranking civil servants, curtailed the privileged 
world of the Ottoman ancien régime.  The mental and ideological structures of the ancien 
régime were abandoned in favor of a new radical stance. This was not only the end of the 
Ottoman ancien régime and the emergence of the Turkish nouvelle regime, but also the end 
of the Metternichean-Castlereaghian Concert of Europe and Bismarckian diplomacy and 
therefore the end of the late Ottoman diplomats and their diplomatic culture. Nevertheless, 
the Ottoman ancien régime, its culture, and its ideological underpinnings were constitutive 
in the Young Turk and Republican nouvelle regimes in terms of their cultural and 
ideological structures as well as their elite recruitment. 
     The continuities (as well as modifications and changes) from the Empire to the 
Republic are also emphasized. It has been argued that the notion of ―Nation‖ in the 
Republic was very much influenced by the image of ―Nation‖ created and developed by 
the Ottoman imperial center, which imagined ―Nation‖ in a subservient relation to itself. 
Although it is a very complicated process, studying the dispatches sent from the Ottoman 
embassies and legations to European and Balkan capitals, it had been suggested that the 
self-identity of the Ottoman imperial elite was constituted in the process of encountering 
(and opposing) perceived threats. These threats, unlike the perceived threats of earlier 
centuries, were diffuse and abstract, which rendered them not only less predictable but also 
more threatening. They were not clearly identifiable; thus, they were not only more 
dangerous, but also more treacherous. These enemies, as observed in the correspondence 
from European and Balkan capitals, included seditious non-Muslims, the expansionist and 
imperial aims of the Great Powers, ambitious, small Balkan powers, and other unreliable 
elements and ideas. Furthermore, these threats were envisaged as potentially acting in 
concert and coordination with each other. These perceived constant threats and dangers 
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ensued the emergence of a defensive and reactive statism. Within this environment, it has 
been argued that an intimate relation with the state was forged. It was the state and the 
imagery of the state that was aggressively protected, and simultaneously it was this state 
where these people could take refuge in the midst of constant danger.  
      It has been proposed that over time non-Muslim communities and eventually even 
Muslim ethnic groups (such as Albanians, Arabs) would come to be seen as unreliable and 
disloyal to the imagery of the imperial center, leaving only those of Turkish ethnicity as a 
reliable force.  Thus, although an interest in Turkish ethnicity emerged, this derived less 
from ethnic awareness and more from the concerns of the state and the imperial center. As 
pointed out above, this nation was defined with regard to the (subservient) relation it 
established with the state. Nevertheless, what was radical and novel in the nouvelle regime 
was the renunciation of the multiple objects of loyalty in the Empire and the 
monopolization of one single object of loyalty, the Nation.  
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